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ÔTwo men went up to pray; and one gave thanks, 
Not with himselfÑaloud, 
With proclamation, calling on the ranks 
Of an attentive crowd 
Thank God, I clap not my own humble breast, 
But other ruffiansÕ backs, 
Imputing crimeÑsuch is my tolerant hasteÑ 
To any man that lacks 
For I am tolerant, generous, keep no rules, 
And the age honours me. 
Thank God, I am not as these rigid fools, 
Even as this PhariseeÕ 
Alice Meynell, ÔThe Newer VaingloryÕ 
ÔA gross error it is to think that regal power ought to serve for the good of the 
body and not of the soul, for menÕs temporal peace and not their eternal 
safety; as if God had ordained Kings for no other purpose than to fat up 
menÕs souls like hogs and to see that they have their mash?Õ 
Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity 
ÔI cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised, unbreathed, that 
never sallies out and sees her adversary, but slinks out of the race where that 
immortal garland is to be run for, not without dust and heatÕ. 
John Milton, Areopagitica 
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Introduction 
From the Ethics to the Politics of Virtue 
THE ARGUMENT 
At the end of the twentieth century, the triumph of capitalism and democracy 
seemed so complete that it raised once more HegelÕs spectre of the Ôend of 
historyÕ Ð the convergence towards a final form of human government that 
embodies the supposed universality of liberalism. But then the twenty-first 
century quickly revealed a recommencement of history that called into 
question both the complacency and the character of the West. First came the 
extra-civilisational challenge of Islamism after 2001, and then came intra-
civilisational financial and civil breakdown after 2008. Both challenges 
exposed the limitations of the two liberalisms that have dominated Western 
politics for the last half-century: the social-cultural liberalism of the left since 
the 1960s and the economic-political liberalism of the right since the 1980s. 
These liberalisms have provided greater personal freedoms and individual 
opportunities for some, but can now also be seen as atomising and authoritar-
ian. For together they have served the purposes of the central state and the 
globalised market, which have collusively brought about an unprecedented 
augmentation of power and concentration of wealth in the hands of a few.1 In 
consequence, a new, rootless oligarchy now practises a manipulative populism 
while holding in contempt the genuine priorities of most people.2 
The two liberalisms were always in tacit, secret alliance. They have now 
more explicitly fused to proffer a creed shared by the left that has embraced 
economic liberalism together with an impersonal statism, and by the right 
that has openly espoused cultural liberalism in scorn of its own natural con-
stituency. This book will suggest that, instead, politics now needs a novel and 
paradoxical blend of two older and nobler traditions: a combination of 
honourable, virtuous elites with greater popular participation; a greater 
1 
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sense of cultural duty and hierarchy of value and honour, alongside much 
more real equality and genuine creative freedom in the economic and politi-
cal realms. This would be enabled by a newly mutualist approach to both 
domestic and foreign affairs that substitutes for the dominance of market, 
state and technocracy the primacy of society, culture and interpersonal 
relationships. 
To understand more deeply what this new approach involves, it is necessary 
to attend closely to the intended sense of the notion Ôpost-liberalismÕ. ÔPost-Õ 
is different from Ôpre-Õ and implies not that liberalism is all bad, but that it has 
inherent problems and deficiencies. Long centuries and recent decades of 
liberalisation have afforded some protection against the worst transgressions 
upon the liberty of some by the liberty of others. But evermore individual 
rights and untrammelled economic contract alone cannot provide security, 
prosperity and human flourishing for the many. Appeals to emancipation and 
social justice ignore the relationships that can provide substance to such 
abstract norms. That is why there is a need to invent or discover new, more 
participatory modes of self-restraint and responsibility, of economic justice 
and shared well-being. 
The Metacrisis of Liberalism 
It is not merely the twin liberal revolution that is now in question. Instead, 
the whole liberal tradition faces a new kind of crisis because liberalism as a 
philosophy and an ideology turns out to be contradictory, self-defeating and 
parasitic on the legacy of Greco-Roman civilisation and the Judeo-Christian 
tradition, which it distorts and hollows out. The triumph of liberalism today 
more and more brings about the Ôwar of all against allÕ (Hobbes) and the idea 
of man as self-owning animal (Locke) that were its presuppositions. But this 
does not thereby prove those presuppositions, because it is only liberalism 
that has produced in practice the circumstances that it originally assumed in 
theory.3 In this manner, liberalism marks the unnecessary victory of vice over 
virtue Ð of selfishness, greed, suspicion and coercion over common benefit, 
generosity, a measure of trust and persuasive power. Just as liberal thought 
has redefined human nature as fundamentally individual existence abstracted 
from social embeddedness, so too liberal practice has replaced the quest for 
reciprocal recognition and mutual flourishing with the pursuit of wealth, 
power and pleasure Ð leading to economic instability, social disorder and 
ecological devastation. 
The alternative to this anthropology is, first, the antique notion of human-
ity as Ôa political animalÕ, expanded by Thomas Aquinas to Ôsocial animalÕ. 
This means that, paradoxically, by nature we are also the artificial shapers 
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of a polity, and live our specifically human animal lives only through the 
contrivance of social and legal convention based on the artifices of tool and 
sign.4 Second, it is the specifically Christian idea of the uniqueness and uni-
versal value of the person (not an individual, atomic example of a general 
norm) inherently realised through constitutive relations to other persons and 
to things through a dynamic, essence-exceeding participation in an infinite, 
ordered and transcendent Logos.5 
So in theory and practice, liberalism goes against the grain of humanity and 
the universe we inhabit, as captured by such older traditions. Therefore, the 
current crisis is neither merely a temporary or cyclical nor necessarily a final 
crisis, but rather a ÔmetacrisisÕ, since now, at last, this perversion is starting to 
be revealed in its full nihilistic scope. The metacrisis of liberalism consists 
more specifically in its evermore exposed tendency at once to abstract from 
reality and yet to reduce everything to its bare materiality. This twin tendency 
leaves an irreducible aporia between human will and artifice on the one hand, 
and imagined laws of nature and history on the other Ð the violent Ôstate of 
natureÕ (as for Hobbes) or conflict-ridden human association (as for Rousseau) 
that requires the remedies of coercive state control and market competition. In 
this way, liberal ideas and institutions rest on a violent ontology and a pes-
simistic anthropology that incentivise and reward bad behaviour. Eventually, 
as we see today, the fantasised state of nature returns, but now in reality to 
expose the limits of the solutions of social contract or impersonal, supposedly 
automatic coordination, and to give the lie to their purported capacity as 
artificial devices to naturally restrain nature in its fantasised human raw. In 
such a fashion, liberalism not only undermines its claim to offer the salve to 
the reality of human vice. It also undoes itself and erodes the polity it claims 
to save from rival ideologies. 
The only genuine alternative is a post-liberal politics of virtue that seeks to 
fuse greater economic justice with social reciprocity. It rejects the double lib-
eral impersonalism of commercial contract between strangers and individual 
entitlement in relation to the bureaucratic machine. Instead of the mixture of 
contract without gift, plus the unilateral and poisoned gift from nowhere that is 
state provision at its worst, it proposes gift-exchange or social reciprocity as the 
ultimate principle to govern both the economic and the political realms. 
So faced with the double failure of the post-war Ôembedded liberalÕ model 
that nationalised the economy and the neo-liberal model that privatised the 
state, we argue for a new settlement that is centred on association and 
mutualisation. We propose a reciprocalist model of sharing risk, 
responsibilities and resources wherein reward is reconnected to personal 
requirements both for varied self-fulfilment and for rendering a social 
contribution. 
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Defining Virtue Ethics 
In our usage, ÔvirtueÕ is not an empty, moralistic word. Instead, it indicates an 
ethical and political approach that calls into question basic liberal and secular 
habits of mind that have become so ingrained that we scarcely notice them.6 
These habits assume, above all, that most of reality has nothing to do with 
either good or evil, that it is just ÔthereÕ in its underived givenness. This 
applies first and foremost to the surrounding physical environment in which 
we are located and included. But in the second place, this inclusion is taken 
to mean that most of human reality also Ð our consumption, production, 
exchange and linguistic expression Ð shares in the same natural neutrality. In 
consequence, all normal human activity and political or socio-economic 
processes are regarded as being, at best, amoral, if not often also inevitably 
flouting of any perceived moral imperatives. The ethical is not seen, as it was 
for previous Western traditions, as self-grounded in the reality of the good, 
regarded as the real factual and valuative object of human pursuit. 
Entirely otherwise, virtue ethics runs with our spontaneous inclination to 
see goodness in nature, in the mode of the flourishing of all things insofar as 
they fulfil their given character and realise their innate ends to circulate, grow 
and propagate. It follows that for this alternative and traditional outlook, the 
primary dimension of the ethical is continuous. A moral stance does not ask, 
first of all, what I should do faced with such and such a predicament, but 
rather what I should consistently be doing at all. What sort of shape might my 
entire life appropriately take? What sort of character do I want to be and how 
should I order this desire in an acceptable way to my relationships to others? 
And those questions, even though they are unavoidable, especially at the key 
transition points of life, can only be answered if we also ask what sort of 
society all of us want. What aims should it pursue and then what individual 
tasks might be set by this society? How can individual aspiration fall together 
with a collectively shared one? For naturally no one ever really projects for 
herself a role ex nihilo Ð we all of us pursue, in however rebellious a form, 
initial social promptings. 
From this point we can realise, against any form of ethical Ôsituation-ismÕ,7 
that relatively abiding virtuous character is just as much assumed and acquired 
from the social exterior as is any momentary response to contingent 
circumstance.8 It is untrue that consistent virtue is an illusion, which some 
form of behaviourism exposes, because both publically prescribed roles and 
the inward life of the person exhibit patterns of consistency that are always 
linked, the one with the other. Without this there could be no possibility of 
lived or described narrative Ð neither as history, nor as autobiography, the two 
being always complexly entangled and reciprocally presupposing. Certainly 
historical situations and events can shock us with a life-changing 
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trauma, or bend our existing habits in new directions. But events themselves 
always exemplify non-identically the repetitions of habit, in however novel a 
form, as much as they jolt them into new deviation. Thus a pure Ôsituation-
ismÕ is merely in league with the doomed but dangerous attempt of contem-
porary liberalism to render us all spiritless and passive subjects of spectacular 
shock and accumulators of transient sensation. The attempt to do so is a cru-
cial aspect of liberal metacrisis Ð its reductio ad absurdum, which calls the 
very coherence of its principles into question. 
It will then be apparent that virtue ethics is less moralistic than either liberal 
consequentialism (the imperative of happiness) or liberal deontology (the 
imperative of duty to preserve freedom). For it assumes that the ethical is a 
normal and essential ingredient of human action. Most good human actions are 
performed unconsciously and with nothing like a ÔsaintlyÕ attitude, if to be 
saintly means to be exceptional. The most fundamental human goodness is an 
everyday matter of performing your job well, being a good lover, spouse, 
parent, friend, colleague and citizen, or even enjoying a game or a trip. For if 
goodness is given in nature and not something we contrive with difficulty from 
time to time, then simple gratitude is a crucial aspect of virtue. 
Defining a Politics of Virtue 
This alternative but more traditional approach to ethics is also less moralistic 
insofar as it is immediately and even primarily political. Inverting the import 
of the genitive, the politics of virtue is also the politics of virtue. This equally 
intended inversion indicates that by a Ôpolitics of virtueÕ we do not mean a 
pious new demand for more morality in public life, as if the ethical were 
something alien to the political in the first place, and in tension with its more 
pragmatic and realistic exigencies. Instead, the point crucial to virtue ethics is 
that there can be no human practice, which is always collective, unless we are 
aiming for the good in some sense, and have some idea how to recognise and 
successfully pursue it. Thus for virtue ethics, morality is not a kind of 
optional extra for either the historical or the political process. History cannot 
be cynically related as a story of mere necessities and expediencies without a 
measure of inaccuracy. For it is also and inevitably Ð on account of the very 
nature of the specifically human, historical event as such Ð a story of human 
courage, imagination and creative effort to achieve honourable ends. Were it 
not so, then it could not also be the tale of both intermittent and continuous 
catastrophe Ð of lamentable failure to project sufficiently good aims, failure 
to achieve them and a tendency also to distort them for lazy, greedy or 
sadistic purposes. 
One might negatively ask here whether this is not a kind of seemingly 
Victorian outlook that has rightly not survived the horrors of the preceding 
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century, and the continuing horrors of the present one. However, the counter-
question to that now typical stance would be this: supposing the horrors are 
in some measure a self-fulfilling prophecy, supposing the gradual Western 
slide into theoretical nihilism and cultural despair were in part responsible for 
a political disintegration of goodness in practice? 
However that may be, if all human historical action is ethical just because it 
is human action, then the immoral is also a failure of action as such, a failure of 
the practical really to be so. Therefore immoral action is of its very nature 
unrealistic, because the immoral by definition means a mistaking of true 
fulfilment and a deficient or incompatible way of pursuing it. To put it in the 
simplest possible way: to do something wrong is also to do something badly, to 
botch things up in a way that is bound sooner or later (even if decades or 
centuries later) to fail, because vices are hard to sustain and ultimately self-
defeating. Lies get found out, lack of trust leaves people alone, poor work-
manship damages even our material well-being, and unreliable products tend 
eventually not to sell well or do not sell at all Ð even though this usual circum-
stance is today massively distorted by the blandishments of brands. But even 
there, the unhealthy or ugly can be but artificially kept alive and may always 
suddenly fail, like the crudest forms of fast-food or post-war architecture. 
So part of the claim of this book, which we hope to make good in detail, is 
that contemporary politics is failing because it mistakes the very nature of the 
realistic Ð this being finally coincident with the ethical. According to the 
eighteenth-century Neapolitan Ôcivil economistÕ Antonio Genovesi, ÔVirtue is 
not Ôan invention of philosophers ... [but instead] a consequence of the nature 
of the worldÕ.9 By contrast, ever since the dawn of early modernity, liberalism 
has privileged vice by pursuing a kind of simulacrum of real association, 
which consists in the ÔautomaticÕ balancing of fear with fear, egoism with 
egoism and selfishness with selfishness. This, indeed, seems to work, yet it 
also engenders an ever-faster spiralling social and ecological crisis. 
An ethics of virtue therefore counter-diagnoses merely cynical verdicts as 
themselves always insufficiently realist. It is certainly true that in history 
virtuous endeavours habitually fail Ð from the decline of craft skills to the 
corruption of ruling echelons. Yet this does not alter the fact that they are the 
only possible endeavours, and that the challenge is not to balance ethical con-
siderations with pragmatic ones, but to try to act more humanly. This means 
with more skill, more art, more tact, more forceful subtlety Ð and with more 
vision, given that an unrealistic vision is not a vision at all, but an illusion. 
And if we act in this way, then we also act with more receptive gratitude, 
more communicated generosity, and in such a way that in turn opens up the 
possibility of trust and further self-giving on the part of others. For virtue and 
gift are inseparable: virtue, as we have seen, begins in grateful wonder and is 
sustained only through an honourable Ôseeming to be virtuousÕ as well as 
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having the inwardly right intention. Deeds must be publicly enacted and so 
offered, and the highest outcome of virtuous practice is the reciprocal giving 
that is friendship, upon which Ð as for the older Western tradition, but not for 
liberalism Ð the human city is founded. In this way inner virtue is inseparable 
from external, manifest honour. Like justice, it must be seen to be performed 
if it is really to abide. 
Therefore to act with honourable generosity is not at all to qualify politics 
adjectivally as ÔvirtuousÕ. Our title is really an unavoidable misnomer. It is, 
instead, to act in more political terms as such. It is to resume politics as a neces-
sary and properly shared teleological purposiveness, and as an attempted archi-
tectonic justice Ð or a distribution of roles and resources according to capacity 
and calling. Thus politics is a shared demand for a manifest mutual recognition 
and regard, since justice and friendship are co-original and inseparable. 
Virtue so construed also breaks with the usual contrasts of people versus 
elite. For in the first place, virtue is democratic because its practice is open to 
all, especially the supreme virtues of love, trust, hope, mercy, kindness, 
forgiveness and reconciliation, which we have all in the West, whether 
avowedly Christians or not, inherited from the teachings of the Bible. But 
second, it is also benignly non-democratic because the practice of virtue 
requires guidance through time by the already virtuous, skilled, generous and 
wise at every level of society from the plumber to the wing-commander. 
Faced with largely self-serving elites that are corrupt and nihilistic, society 
today desperately needs honourable and much more widely distributed lead-
ers who can lead by example in all walks of life. For without good examples, 
there can be no guidance as to initiation into good practice. 
Beyond Communitarianism 
A post-liberal politics of virtue is not simply a rehash of communitarian 
thinking. We do build on the communitarian critique of liberalism, but our 
account accentuates the role of free and newly shaped associations beyond 
merely ÔgivenÕ ethical and cultural solidarities. We also seek to link the 
admittedly ÔineffableÕ and indefinable nature of given community in place and 
time with a more purposive and culturally pluralist shaping of association 
around shared aspiration and ideal purpose, which seeks to integrate different 
human roles and traditions.10 
Moreover, we try to develop a post-liberal Ôcivil economyÕ where com-
munitarian thinking is either silent on matters of economic organisation or 
else views the market as more or less inevitably devoid of virtue and thus 
appeals almost exclusively to the state in order to limit the damages of com-
mercial exchange.11 The reason for this is that it wrongly sees community as 
either an undisturbed preceding ground for embedding the market, or else 
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as a compensatory tempering of its ravages.12 This flies in the face of all the 
evidence of the power of hyper-capitalism both to disembed the economy 
from society and to invade the familial, social and cultural sphere, as Karl 
Polanyi argued. Hence, unless one can achieve a genuine Ôsocial marketÕ, 
society itself will be ever-further eroded. Communitarian thinking does not 
take seriously enough the possibility that market activity can have a proper 
telos and that virtuous behaviour is compatible with both just returns to the 
individual and with social benefit.13 
Equally, communitarianism tends to lack a real political dimension, con-
fining itself to a nostalgic one-sided appeal to group rights, autonomy and 
plurality, however important this emphasis must be. Our book tempers this 
approach, which can expand into nationalism and atavistic ethnocentrism. It 
also qualifies the usual demand by the mainstream left and right for simply 
more freedom, equality and democratic choice, which history has shown 
often to produce evermore terrible and arbitrary tyrannies. That is why we 
match our programme for a civil economy with a political one that renews a 
Classical and Christian centrality of the mixed constitution, the priority of 
education as paideia for domestic affairs, and the primacy of cultural 
association and shared sovereignties for external ones. 
Structure of the Book 
The book applies this conception of a politics of virtue to the economy, 
politics, culture and international relations. Throughout it involves a blend of 
political and social theory with consideration of our current human predica-
ment. Each of the five parts combines a critique of liberalism with post-liberal 
alternatives. The first part provides a novel account of the limits of liberal 
political thought and the shape of post-liberalism, while the second part turns 
to the metacrisis of capitalism and the civil economy alternative. In the third 
part, the shortcomings of liberal democracy are detailed and the mixed con-
stitution alternative is proffered. The fourth part focuses on the metacrisis of 
liberal culture and ways in which we can renew a true culture of formation. In 
the final part, we analyse the unravelling of the liberal international order and 
set out a post-liberal vision of international relations with a specific emphasis 
on culture, covenant and commonwealth. 
Our entire argument will suggest that in the long run, nobility is more 
realistic than mere realism. That is because nobility is about the sustaining of a 
high quality of action and an honourable social ethos that generously recog-
nises and advances every essay of the good, however fragile. Without these 
characteristics, no specific mark of our humanity can remain. For this reason 
the return to the common good is the least implausible of all the admittedly 
implausible positive alternatives to the contemporary metacrisis of liberalism. 
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Chapter 1 
The Metacrisis of Liberalism 
1. THE RISE AND CRISIS OF ULTRA-LIBERALISM 
The last century in Western politics can be read in terms of the ever-
increasing triumph of liberalism. After the First World War, the 1920s 
inaugurated the elite influence of an avant-garde that for both good and ill 
eventually spread its libertarian revolt to mass culture, thereby often debasing 
its bohemian critical edge during the 1950s to 1960s. Amid economic 
stagnation and a post-colonial hangover, the Ôembedded liberalismÕ of the 
post-war trentes glorieuses gave way to the ultra-liberalism of Margaret 
Thatcher and Ronald Reagan that has defined politics and the economy since 
the 1980s. Over the last fifty years, the left has advanced a social-cultural 
liberalism that promotes individual rights and equality of opportunity for self-
expression, while the right has advocated an economic-political liberalism that 
champions the free market liberated from the constricting shackles of the 
bureaucratic state. For some time now, we have had a Ôliberal rightÕ 
celebrating economic and political negative liberty, and a Ôliberal leftÕ 
celebrating cultural and sexual negative liberty. 
In reality, of course, the two liberalisms have triumphed both at once and 
in secretly collusive harmony, despite their twin and symmetrical residues of 
shame about a consistent espousal of either full economic or full personal 
ruthlessness. And starting with Bill ClintonÕs politics of the Ônew centerÕ, 
both liberalisms shamelessly converged Ð and with them the mainstream left 
and right. The result was a new, scarcely questionable consensus masquer-
ading as a pragmatic centrism that concealed its ideological commitment to 
limitless liberalisation and mindless modernisation. The notion of emanci-
pation has thereby become debased to mean liberation not simply from the 
prejudiced social exclusion of certain groups and from arbitrary inequalities, 
1 3  
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but also from almost all and every restriction on individual choice. As the 
unleashing of choice always involves new restrictions of the choices of some 
by the choices of others, it quickly and contradictorily leads to new and 
draconian restrictions on citizensÕ freedoms. Since rival rights and freedoms 
collide, power decides, such that ultra-liberalism results in a hysterical oscil-
lation between release and control. For merely negative liberty lacks positive 
criteria for discriminating between what should be allowed and encouraged 
and what should not. 
Both the liberal right and the liberal left have also privileged blind progress 
(understood as growth in technology, wealth and private autonomy) over 
tradition and a sense of mutual obligation. The twin triumph of the two 
liberalisms has thereby reinforced the continual convergence of the strong state 
and the free market. By celebrating individual choice and dismissing 
reciprocal responsibility, the liberal Ômarket-stateÕ disembeds the economy 
from society and at the same time re-embeds social relations in a transactional, 
economistic and utilitarian culture that only state-power can coordinate.1 From 
this perspective, the post-war and the 1980s settlements represent two sides of 
the same coin. Each has favoured processes of uniform, legally guaranteed 
transaction over interpersonal relationship. By venerating an increasingly 
positivistic, amoral and supposedly neutral law, liberalism has reduced politics 
to little more than managerial and technocratic bureaucracy Ð a neo-liberal 
variant of the Communist nightmare that sought to replace Ôthe government of 
peopleÕ with Ôthe administration of thingsÕ. 
Both settlements have, accordingly, combined to fuse the visible hand of 
the state with the invisible hand of the market at the expense of intermediary 
institutions and popular participation. To this end, liberalism has undermined 
the civic bonds upon which a vibrant democracy and a productive market 
economy depend. It has further fragmented mutual organisation and under-
mined the pursuit of reciprocal benefit based on contribution and appropriate 
reward. 
But the joint failure of the post-war and 1980s settlements is now becom-
ing evermore apparent: neither remote bureaucratic control nor commercial 
competition has worked for the mutual benefit of all, while when conjoined 
they have led to a new oligarchy. Nor is there any pragmatic justification for 
this. On the contrary, it has presided in many countries over economic break-
down that was later thinly disguised by a financial surge, which has often 
blinded elites to the need to regenerate a beneficial agriculture, 
manufacturing and industry, and to better deploy human inventiveness. 
Before returning to the crisis of liberalism, we will first of all, in the 
following sections, (a) further define liberalism as individualism, negative 
liberty, pessimism and apparent optimism; (b) deal with objections to this 
characterisation; (c) discuss objections to our thesis that liberalism is the 
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ideology of modern times; and (d) review the objection that our tracing of 
ÔliberalismÕ to early modernity is anachronistic. Then we will show (e) how 
pessimistic political liberalism is also, and ineluctably, capitalism; and (f) 
how apparently optimistic liberalism automatically involves state techno-
cratic control. In conclusion we will explain how all these features finally 
engender a metacrisis. 
2. THE TYRANNY OF NEGATIVE LIBERTY 
Historically, each face of liberalism seems to be the opposite of the other: the 
liberal left appeals to the state to protect the people from the forces of market 
fundamentalism that the liberal right champions, while the liberal right 
defends conservative values of family and the nation against the 
multiculturalism and emancipation that the liberal left celebrates. But far 
from representing genuine alternatives to one another, the two liberalisms 
are mutually reinforcing in the way we have just described. Thus we have 
entered a new era in which the seamless fusion of both reveals liberalismÕs 
hidden nature: the primacy of politics and the economy over society, which 
brings about a centralisation of power, a concentration of wealth and a com-
modification of life. 
Nor is this fusion limited to party politics. In business and the Ôculture 
industryÕ, figures like Richard Branson, Bono, Bob Geldof or Bill Gates, 
who simultaneously pose as free-market champions and liberal humanitar-
ians, embody a post-hippy, beach-combing Ôcapitalist philanthropyÕ. The 
merging of social with economic liberalisation has produced a new form of 
liberal imperialism that extends state and market power to conflict-zones by 
commodifying access to suffering populations Ð a multi-billion business that 
benefits not just predatory belligerents and for-profit military/security 
companies, but also donor countries that pursue their geo-political self-
interest and NGOs that promote their liberal ideology.2 
In broader conceptual terms, the two liberal revolutions are one because both 
champion Ônegative libertyÕ, that is to say, unfettered personal choice and 
freedom from constraint except the law and private conscience.3 This is to be 
contrasted with the promotion of Ôpositive libertyÕ, or the self-release of people 
from debilitating passions and degrading choices, in favour of the more 
strenuous pursuit of human flourishing. To believe in the primacy of positive 
liberty is to take the view natural to every parent that what is most freely 
chosen is genuinely attractive in its own right and most satisfying and 
releasing of creative individuality in the long run. By comparison, the appar-
ently free choice of false goods always involves a succumbing to false blan-
dishments that conceal a hidden and, thereby, all the more insidious coercion. 
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Just as children deserve nurture and so our protection from disguised 
violence and subtle domination, so also all citizens have the genuine right to 
expect that their leaders will encourage their true creative development and 
(often surprising) fulfilment, rather than their covert frustration. 
And here it should be noted that, to the instance of the thwarting of 
peopleÕs nobler natures and aspirations, can be added a much more recog-
nised and conscious frustration at the inevitable inability of liberal society to 
offer anything like the same degree of the release of negative liberty for all. 
Liberalism legitimates the limitless expansion of the power of the more 
skilled, opportunistic and ruthless, so long as this proceeds in accordance 
with contractual agreement and the supposedly neutral expansion of oneÕs 
ÔownÕ domain. And yet the expansion of private resources of all kinds in 
reality affects through influence of usage the environment and scope for free 
action of others. 
In this way, the produced inequity of liberalism gives rise to endless dis-
contents, which today, once more, are spilling over into atavistic assertions 
of absolute identities Ð of race, nation, religion, gender, sexuality, disability, 
etc. Such identities are often in hybrid association with liberal goals of 
egotistic increase, which are, after all, but half-spurned.4 In direct contrast, 
an initial admission of the inequality, though equal importance of the many 
different and necessary social roles Ð which form an organic unity and which 
all bear different inherent inflections of the goals of positive freedom Ð is far 
more likely to engender relative social contentment. This is particularly true 
if people are encouraged to seek fulfilment more through excellence in their 
specific vocations rather than in unending material competition. And where 
liberalism yields ever-greater actual inequality in the name of formal 
equality, a politics of virtue can exhibit just the reverse tendency. Respect for 
the necessity of every role, however humble, is more likely to encourage a 
relative parity of material rewards, where the ÔprofessionalÕ architectonic 
functions are pursued more for their own sake and accorded a high degree of 
social honouring. 
Beyond the vocational dimension of our lives, the pursuit of positive liberty 
also encourages the living of rounded lives with time and space for the leisure 
pursuit of other creative talents and of religious or cosmic contemplation 
tending to genuine (as the reverse of complacent) tranquillity and contentment. 
At this most crucial level of all, the politics of virtue pursues a more substantive 
equality. It follows that the espousal of egalitarianism and democracy by 
liberalism is a deception. By contrast, the support of these things by a politics of 
virtue is more modest and cautious, since it will not surrender the priority of 
excellence to a formalist obliteration of real differences in capacity. Yet, just on 
account of this more balanced and realist axiology, it has a greater tendency to 
foment greater equity and inclusion in practice. 
Milbank and Pabst_9781783486489.indb 17 5/31/2016 3:20:23 PM 
The Metacrisis of Liberalism 17 
For this reason, politics should revert to its ancient character as a Ôpolitics 
of the soulÕ, concerned above all to nurture virtuous citizens, just as parents 
are concerned above all with the character of their children, precisely 
because they are also primarily concerned with their happiness. 
Of course, the liberal riposte to this deliberate and unavoidable post-liberal 
provocation is that it is wholly unacceptable to treat citizens as children and for 
government to assume any kind of parental cast. Yet this trite liberal truism 
about government for and by autonomous adults is also the ultimate liberal 
delusion, and on two counts. First, liberal government is inevitably involved in 
just the most patronising mode of parenting, since the alternative to treating 
citizens as souls is to treat them as mere bodies to be endlessly and externally 
managed and manipulated. This is done through the bypassing of all 
dialectical, Socratic persuasion and with a requirement from their minds only 
of assent to prevailing mass opinion, propaganda and fashion. For that is all 
that the shadow of the publicly psychic can consist in, if it is thought that there 
are no souls and no objective truths to be discerned by them.5 
Secondly, and most crucially, adulthood is never achieved all at once, is 
never fully achieved at all and yet is already partially entered into in the 
course of childhood itself. Over the span of ÔadultÕ life, it is forever being 
further entered into, including by leaders and educators of all kinds 
themselves Ð the very precondition for whose leadership should be their 
(always relative) maturity. Where this reality is half-suppressed, as by 
liberalism, and it is officially supposed that adulthood is a matter of absolute 
metaphysical status and not of degree, then, ironically, all citizens are trapped 
within the worst sort of perpetual, self-congratulatory infancy. They live in 
denial of their need to grow in their most essential humanity, which is not 
already given as a matter of both inalienable fact and right. No doubt this is 
why, today, a vast number of adults seem to spend much of their time off 
work out shopping in chil-drenÕs shorts, trainers and slogan-covered tee-
shirts, the speaking garments of the inarticulate. Only the multiple tattoos, in 
mockery of ÔbarbarianÕ symbolic dignity, proclaim that they have undergone 
an initiation to distinguish them, by a skin-stamped particular expressive 
variant of universal fashion, from their equally half-clad offspring.6 
Where all free choices are validated in the name of negative liberty, then 
infantile options go unrebuked, just to the degree that these adults are in 
reality the victims of coercive and abusive economic and political processes. 
These processes subvert their humanity by appealing to their lower and 
distorted instincts, including, now, a blatant advertisement of contempt for 
aesthetic standards in the name of comfort and grotesque singularity. Bound 
by concealed chains, such citizens become less and less capable of creative 
autonomy and active participation, though they may in extremis fall prey to 
nihilistic and atavistic cults of ressentiment. 
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In this way, the characteristic liberal ignoring of the primacy of time, 
tradition, habit and formation, together with the gradualness and unfinished 
character of human growth, ensures that its formal claim to treat all equally 
as autonomous adults, bearers of natural rights, reverts inevitably to a real 
infantilisation of most. Increasingly, we are subjected to a rationalising, 
utilitarian calculus, which barely conceals the usage of people for mass ends 
as a substitute for a care and cure of their souls. By contrast, the apparently 
unacceptable ÔparentalismÕ of the politics of virtue in reality nurtures both 
freedom and independence, since it is only the truth that can possibly set us 
free. If there is no truth, then the realm of the spirit must also be an illusion, 
a mere phantom of material processes to which governments should more 
honestly attend. And if no spirit, then no freedom, only the unblocking of the 
path of atoms for a more coordinated articulation (after Hobbes) and the 
smoother securing of social permissions via better educative manipulation 
(after Locke). 
All this is not to say that a priority of positive freedom leaves no place for 
negative liberty whatsoever. On the contrary, to begin with, in the history of 
modern times, the release of individual negative freedom removed many forms 
of oppression and allowed for new manifestations of political liberty and 
creative talent. But in the long run, by virtue of that excess which attends any 
partial good, it too much stifles the exercise of trust that is crucial to all human 
association. It also erodes the belief in the objective values that liberty and 
creativity might seek ceaselessly to discern and instantiate. A lack of trust and 
belief in objective truth and goodness (however hard to fully disclose Ð it is the 
work of centuries) then favours the growth of high-level criminality. For a 
legality founded in egotism is scarcely morally distinguishable for the 
individual from evasion of the law when she can get away with it. This but 
reinforces inequality and fear-driven rivalry. 
Such an atmosphere actually starts to inhibit peopleÕs inventiveness and, 
therefore, their capacity for freedom Ð even for freedom of choice.7 The 
liberal defence of exclusively negative liberty therefore ends up undermining 
all modes of freedom, because it produces the very effects that liberalism 
wrongly associates with positive liberty Ð ideological supremacy, the closing 
down of debate about substantive ends and the hollowing out of plurality. 
Thus liberal politics brings about exactly the kind of intolerant illiberalism 
that it ascribes to all non-liberal positions. 
LiberalismÕs conception of negative liberty rests on two pillars: a proce-
dural, formalistic conception of justice and an instrumental notion of reason. 
The former articulates in practice the classical liberal argument that any 
notion of substantive, objective truth engenders a Ôtyranny of the GoodÕ and 
that justice is best seen as a form of procedural fairness (on a Rawl-sian 
model). The latter Ð instrumental reason Ð reflects the liberal tendency 
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to replace social solidarity that seeks mutual benefit with a calculative 
rationality that maximises enlightened self-interest (on a Weberian model). 
In this manner, individuals are proclaimed ÔautonomousÕ when all the while 
they are subjected to the instrumental logic of bureaucratic control and com-
mercial exchange. The more they are deemed negatively ÔfreeÕ, the more 
their freedom can only be cashed out in a public, measurable currency of 
degrees of force and lack of self-constraint. Thus the scale of self-worth that 
the individual is encouraged to adopt is the very same scale by which she is 
subjected to mass manipulation. Furthermore, it is only this manipulation Ð 
through the continuous removal of traditional barriers and the proffering of 
opportunities for endless consumer and investment growth Ð that offers the 
individual the possibility of liberal ÔautonomyÕ at all. Such a logic locks 
human beings into a vicious circle of ever-greater voluntary servitude and 
obsequiousness. 
Taken together, procedural justice and instrumental reason can only enter-
tain freedom as negative refusal, arbitrary spontaneity or affirmation of its 
own emptiness. Positive freedom is, by contrast, the liberty to search for 
objective truth and the substantive good, which offer themselves without con-
straint or coercion to our wills just because they attract only through their 
own inherent rightness. They draw our desire but do not force it. In this 
manner, they can sustain a more generous tolerance of individual and group 
practices that are similarly aimed at truth or goodness than can a formalism of 
reason. For such formalism must ceaselessly and even terroristically seek to 
banish any hint of persuasion to the substantive and extra-rational (ÔrationalÕ 
in the narrow sense of logically watertight and fully demonstrable). Of 
course, persuasion will always, in time, tend to be commingled with subtle 
ideological coercion that must, indeed, be endlessly sifted out. But by 
bracketing truth and goodness out of the picture, liberalism does not so much 
liberate society from the Ôtyranny of the GoodÕ as impose a new tyranny of 
freedom from any sense of mutual obligation, which paradoxically enslaves 
the supposedly emancipated subject. 
For it soon turns out, as already intimated, that most exercises of negative 
freedom interfere with the liberties of others through the arbitrary use of 
economic power. Also the imperative to continuously expand the sphere of 
ÔemancipatedÕ negative liberty collides with the equal exigency to call it in 
check through new legislation and evermore intensive policing and surveil-
lance, as the last thirty years have so dramatically witnessed. Here we face a 
double paradox at the heart of liberalism: the relentless privatisation of the 
public sphere and yet the ever-greater invasion of the private sphere, coupled 
with an oppressive moralism masquerading as liberal impartiality and pro-
cedural fairness. As Slavoj Žižek has remarked, the liberal obsession with 
negative liberty has led to 
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an explosion of legal and moral rules, an endless process of legalization and 
moralization, presented as Ôthe fight against all forms of discriminationÕ. If there 
are no shared mores in place to influence the law, just the bare fact of subjects 
ÔharassingÕ other subjects, then who Ð in the absence of such mores Ð will decide 
what counts as ÔharassmentÕ?8 
He cites a number of revealing examples, such as associations of obese 
people demanding an end to all public campaigns against obesity and for 
healthy food because they violate the sense of self-worth of obese people. 
Other examples include Ôthose fighting for the right to incest-marriage, con-
sensual murder, cannibalism, and so onÕ.9 
Thus keeping exact pace with the extension of formal rules, we have an 
equal extension of practices based upon the mutual consent of autonomous 
adults to anything and everything, regardless of a consequent debasement of 
character that cannot be without a contaminatory social effect. For we 
increasingly do not know what should be allowed and what should not, and 
inevitably permissions given to some will be experienced as peremptory bar-
riers by others. This liberal logic of exponentially expanding legalism and 
moralism is not limited to minority rights claims, but extends to majorities 
and the whole governance of the common public realm that is drained of any 
shared ethical moorings. Like most other Western societies, Britain makes 
entirely arbitrary decisions about what is permitted and what is banned. 
Most, but not all, soft drugs are prohibited. Smoking is now outlawed in 
cars, but not in closed rooms at home. 
Beyond this arbitrariness, liberalism has a clear tendency to impose at once 
a libertarian ethic and an oppressive moralism often linked to a fetishisa-tion 
of perfect health (ironically alongside a total neglect of real preventive 
medicine and regulation of the food supply). Soon we will suppose that right 
and wrong can be precisely defined and that all that is wrong must be legally 
outlawed, while all that is not outlawed must be not only permissible but also 
objectively desirable. Soon after that we will imagine that we should only be 
allowed to do that for which we have a legal licence and that allowance 
implies imperative encouragement. 
A society devoid of any shared moral horizon would, as Jean-Claude 
Micha writes, Ôby this token be condemned to see crimes everywhereÕ.10 
These drifts can be readily seen to be at work in the recent debates over same-
sex adoption (closing down the Catholic agencies that asked to be exempt in 
the name of freedom of conscience) and same-sex marriage (threatening to 
take to courts those institutions that refuse to comply with the assumed impli-
cations of the new law) and also in those over surveillance, whistle-blowing 
and the indictment of military decisions before courts of human rights. All of 
this witnesses to the bankruptcy of the liberal rights perspective and the lack of 
attention to non-formalisable, non-legal judgement. 
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In short, we have today a sterile oscillation between a ruling liberal ruth-
lessness on the one hand, and an impotent and unrealistic liberal moralism 
on the other. The ruthlessness is the result of the ever-greater submission of 
more and more spheres of human life to the instrumentalist logic of capital-
ism, which is increasingly driven by a revived social Darwinism. In the face 
of this ruthlessness, moral reserve retreats into the private domain and takes 
the form of a stuttering series of complaints that all too often are merely 
about the supposed restriction of certain individuals and groups from full 
participation in the mass instrumentalising process. 
3. LIBERALISM AS PESSIMISM 
Despite the failures of contemporary liberalism, ÔliberalÕ may, nonetheless, 
suggest to many an easy-going and optimistic outlook that celebrates universal 
freedom, equality and happiness. Liberalism is also synonymous with the 
inalienable rights of the individual and the fundamental liberties supposedly 
upheld by a state whose sovereignty derives from the people and whose pow-
ers are split between the three branches of government. Yet, to the contrary, at 
the core of a searching critique of liberalism lies the argument that it is a far 
too gloomy political philosophy. For liberalism assumes that we are basically 
self-interested, fearful, greedy and egotistic creatures, unable to see beyond 
our own selfish needs and, therefore, prone to violent conflict. 
Virtue Dismissed 
This assumption ultimately arose from a tension within late medieval and early 
modern Christianity between virtue as human achievement and virtue as divine 
grace.11 Traditionally, grace had been thought synergically to ÔdeifyÕ and 
complete human life and action, and such an outlook was subtly reworked by 
the Jesuit theologians and playwrights in terms of a human theatrical Ôputting 
onÕ of virtue, such that cultural artifice here provides the mediating link 
between oneÕs given nature and a new infused gift from above.12 But now, in 
both Protestant and some Catholic thought, a cruder metaphysics often placed 
divine and human activity in false competition, and as a result any human 
contribution to merit was regarded with increasing suspicion, while the only 
true merit was thought of as arriving from a divine exterior. This shift had a 
double consequence: either, theologically, the human self-management of the 
exclusively human realm was thought of in purely amoral terms. Or, in total or 
partial rejection of Christianity, the pagan virtues independent of grace Ð 
AugustineÕs Ôglittering vicesÕ Ð were revived, though often in a manner newly 
ignoring any divinity whatsoever.13 The first option can be described as 
Ômodern pessimismÕ, the second as Ômodern apparent optimismÕ. The 
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first gloomily assumes that we are naturally selfish and violent. The second 
tends to celebrate pride and self-assertion, yet in a manner that often equally 
assumes the agonistic as ontologically fundamental Ð the difference being 
that agon is here celebrated in a post-Christian and quasi-Homeric fashion. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the main founding assumption of the individualistic 
liberal creed as to virtue is not the second, secular, humanist and apparently 
optimistic one. Rather, it is the first, debasedly theological and pessimistic one, 
whereby human virtue is not redefined, but rather dismissed. It is just this 
view, in its Protestant recension, that ultimately informs the three primary 
founding fathers of liberalism in the seventeenth century: Hugo Grotius, 
Thomas Hobbes and John Locke.14 Instead of inherent virtue, one has here the 
notion of originally Ôself-possessedÕ individuals mutually contracting to ward 
off the threat of the other and thereby to conserve and even promote by 
artificial means their supposedly natural self-possession. 
Robert Brenner has linked the growth of this ideology to agrarian surplus 
extraction arising uniquely in England from the abolition of the peasantry in 
favour of rural wage labour, and the pursuit of initially piratical forms of 
overseas trade by a newly mercantile gentry.15 The exponential growth in 
surplus caused a switch from the primacy of subsistence production and 
localised exchange towards a generalised and eventually international 
agricultural commerce. It was later supported by the creation of the Bank of 
England, whose unique functions simultaneously permitted the growth of the 
national debt, upon which landowners, in turn, speculated. 
Such speculation was able, also for the first time in history, to fund a 
government run by professional politicians, ruling through patronage and 
influence and the manipulation of a parliament whose genuine power was 
highly constrained. In this way the aristocracy and gentry became character-
ised, in practice, less by their local political and juridical functions and more 
by their purely commercial ones. The entirely contingent and by no means 
fated growth of capitalism was in this way linked to and predicated upon an 
undoing of ancient corporate order, or the separation of the political from the 
economic role. ÔLiberalismÕ as a theory and as a political practice based upon 
the primacy of the individual cannot be separated in its origins from the whig 
settlement combining the alienation of agricultural labour, an economic 
primacy of financial speculation, the commercialisation of landed power and 
the professionalisation of politics.16 
This outlook sounds, as it effectively and eventually became, secular and 
materialistic and was from the outset enthusiastically embraced by many lib-
ertine spirits whose religious beliefs had thinned to deism or become almost 
non-existent. And, indeed, one cannot divorce the dominant whig ideology 
from its modification of the sacral basis of the early modern English state, and 
its concomitant dislike of corporatist order, which was inseparable from 
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the sense of the Kingdom as a sacral body, incorporating a Ôcommunity of 
communitiesÕ.17 To deny the primacy of kingship as the source of constitu-
tional privileges (the older tory view) in favour of their theorised contractual 
origin was also to deny the personal and in a sense private character of 
supreme power. Traditionally, it had been limited (and remained so limited, 
even in the case of French ÔabsolutismÕ)18 by this privacy, which demanded 
that it be exercised in confederal association with other lesser ÔprivateÕ indi-
viduals and bodies, whose very ÔpersonalityÕ was, nonetheless, linked to the 
expected virtuous performance of public duties. By contrast, an altogether 
de-privatised central sovereignty, however far that might seem to us now 
desirable, proved in effect much more absolute and imparticipable, becom-
ing eventually the authority of a ÔstateÕ whose scope was unbounded just by 
virtue of its abstraction. 
To abandon corporate aristocratic and gentry participation in the royal 
power, whose divine right was now qualified by original contract, was also to 
secularise the noble and gentlemanly role. One effect of this was to restrict it 
to the regular observance of economic contract and to a ÔmannerlyÕ, polite 
conduct regarded as a style of behaviour that ÔinterestedlyÕ modified oneÕs 
passions in the face of the desires of others. The now discarded alternative 
was to ÔhonourablyÕ assert oneÕs virtue in a way that expected public recogni-
tion on account of substantively shared, positive standards.19 
However, the rise of agricultural capitalism, the commercialisation of the 
upper classes and the new speculative basis of political power cannot after 
all be regarded as simply secular manifestations, attributable to ahistorically 
constant secular causes. They are, rather, themselves manifestations of the 
construction of the secular, attributable to a modification of religious legiti-
mations of political and social authority, which theologically displaced the 
primacy of virtue and honour in favour of the normativity of more 
impersonal and ultimately utilitarian procedures. 
Calvinism and Jansenism 
Such modification, which is historically a crucial part of the makeup of lib-
eralism, derives especially from Calvinist and Jansenist theologies. The latter 
rejected all taint of Jesuit ÔtheatricalÕ mediation of human nature with the 
sacred (rendering RacineÕs ÔAugustinianÕ anti-baroque dreams also a kind of 
Ôanti-theatreÕ)20, just as the former came to oppose the theatre in England.21 
For these theological outlooks, original sin was envisaged as so extreme that 
human beings must be considered to be Ôtotally depravedÕ or (for Jansenism) 
almost so, and incapable by nature of acting out of generous instincts to pro-
duce any Ôexemplary dramaÕ of economic, social or political order. Instead, in 
a kind of proxy operation, divine providence, on a stage deprived of all 
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actors save a deus ex machina, must manipulate our egotistic wills and even 
our vices behind our backs. This occurs in such a way as to make will balance 
will and vice balance vice in order to produce a simulation of economic and 
political harmony Ð as in the exiled Huguenot Bernard MandevilleÕs dictum 
Ôprivate vice, public benefitsÕ.22 Here lies the ideological root of Adam 
SmithÕs Ôhidden handÕ. 
Historians have now shown that this ultimately descends from the French 
Jansenism of Pierre Nicole and, later, Pierre le Pesant de Boisguilbert.23 Here 
one must note a seemingly complicating factor in the genesis of liberalism. 
The main traditions of political economy specifically refused, in an apparently 
more humanist manner, the Hobbes-Locke fantasy of originally isolated 
human beings entering into mutually limiting contracts for self-interested 
reasons. Instead, they envisaged a more plausible, historical and continuous 
process whereby selfish passion was constantly negotiated by a micro-
calculation of interest ensuring an economic machine that converts sinful 
chaos into order, itself embedded in a wider context of social ÔsympathyÕ Ð 
whether conceived as a projected egotism, or a spontaneous animal instinct.24 
However, Nicole, nevertheless, drew on Hobbes in support of his economic 
vision of the interested qualification of passion by passion and it was this 
vision that tended to prevail in the specifically economic aspects of the later 
social thinking of Hume and Smith.25 This serves to indicate how the more 
tacit contract conceived by political economy is by no means the substantive, 
shared traditional horizon later envisaged by Burke. Rather, it is a slower, 
more incremental, dispersed and diversified version of the conveniently 
coinciding egoisms of the social contract model. Thus Hume and Smith do not 
allow sympathetic concerns as drivers of specifically market processes as 
opposed to wider civil concerns.26 
Therefore, the pessimism of Hobbes was not abandoned, but, rather, differ-
ently inflected by the Jansenists and, later, the political economists. Moreover, 
it did not apply only in the economic, but also in the cultural sphere. Nicole 
treats interpersonal relations in exactly the same, theologically depressed 
idiom. Just as the market produces a simulacrum of reciprocal charity, so also 
does our amour propre in all human interactions. Since the realisation of self-
interest depends greatly upon success and the opinion of others, we naturally 
tend to placate them, flatter them or please them positively in pursuit of our 
own covert ends.27 
The Market in Manners 
In describing what he calls the first rise of ÔliberalismÕ, Jean Rohou has related 
how, in the course of the seventeenth century, an inherited ethic of honour and 
generosity was, in accord with this model, displaced by a half-cynical, or 
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even avowedly Machiavellian, code of politesse, courtoisie and coqueterie.28 
Traditionally, noble behaviour at every social level was perceived as pursuing 
not self-interest, but, rather, social recognition for the manifestation of a given 
or achieved social status with its concomitant duties. But now there was a shift 
in the aristocratic redefining of its prestige away from the honour of the 
noblesse dÕpe towards the performance of the administrative functions of the 
noblesse de robe. Besides commercial success and successful speculation (also 
present in France, though far more dominant in England),29 this led to a 
situation where all social ÔpositionÕ itself began to become more speculatively 
insecure. That was especially the case because (contrary to the Marxist nar-
rative of a primary Ôclass struggleÕ)30 the big change in early modernity was 
the pacification, juridification and commercialisation of the upper classes and 
not the Ôrise of the gentryÕ or of the Ômiddle classesÕ. Nevertheless, it had also 
perforce to involve the enhancement of the role of lesser middlemen and to 
create a greater fluidity between aristocracy and owners of ÔrealÕ landed 
property on the one hand and the speculative traders and owners of ÔmobileÕ 
property on the other.31 In consequence of this Ôdebasement of officeÕ, every 
social interaction started to become one of a dynamic negotiation of separate 
advantages, rather than one of reciprocal and honourable meeting and melding 
of priorly understood responsibilities. 
Thereby, from the outset a ÔfreeÕ economic market was matched by a more 
fluid cultural market, just as the ÔreleaseÕ of individual autonomy in every 
sense could not be separated from the capitalist project. Not just since 
yesterday have economic and cultural liberalism been inseparably linked, 
even though it is but recently that a far more hegemonic and unchallenged 
liberalism has been unleashed within both spheres. 
Given RohouÕs genealogy, we can see how liberalism has been doubly pro-
moted from the outset by both secularising hedonists and Christian puritans Ð 
both those unashamed of egoism as the basis of economic order and those who 
think the latter is a providential diversion and tempering of our shameful 
nature. Today BritainÕs Conservative Party, which has long since abandoned 
toryism for liberalism, remains something of an uneasy alliance between these 
two different character traits, even if the puritans are fast losing ground. 
This is a very significant development if, as just suggested, the thesis of a 
normative materialist selfishness first of all achieved legitimacy in the 
seventeenth century only because it was underwritten by perverse and dis-
torted developments of the Christian Augustinian legacy. For it then becomes 
hard to envisage the precise eventual consequences of the final abandonment 
of this carapace, which remained paramount, for example, in the case of 
Margaret Thatcher. But one must assume that, without the lingering belief in 
the providential purpose of obeying the rules, even if for selfish reasons, it will 
become evermore likely that both elites and many others will calculate 
Milbank and Pabst_9781783486489.indb 26 5/31/2016 3:20:23 PM 
26 Chapter 1 
that they should exacerbate their vices for the sake of their own short-term 
gain. They will do so in the belief that they may be able to get away with 
viciousness and even illegality for a sufficiently long term to satisfy them-
selves, and with indifference to a widening gap between their own short-term 
success and any possible Mandevillian long-term public benefit. 
4. LIBERALISM AS APPARENT OPTIMISM 
However, neither the hedonist nor the puritan label would seem to apply to 
the Guardian/New York Times-reading, granola-eating left liberal, whom we 
more usually take today to define liberalism as such. Why does the fit appear 
so poor? The answer is that there is another, ÔromanticÕ variant of liberalism 
that was invented in the late eighteenth century by Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
and which resumed, in a new guise, the humanist and apparently optimistic 
secular response to the decadently Christian suspicion of all natural virtue. 
Rousseau inverted Hobbes by arguing that the isolated, natural individual 
is ÔgoodÕ, lost in contemplative delight at the world around him, satisfied with 
simple pleasures and provisions. He is not yet egotistic, because that vice 
arises from rivalry and comparison. However, Rousseau took the latter to be 
endemic once the individual is placed in a social context. Accordingly, his 
optimism about innocent isolation is trumped by a pessimism about human 
association. This encouraged scepticism about the role of corporate bodies 
beneath the level of the state: for it is only the state that can lead us to 
sacrifice all our petty rivalries for the sake of the Ôgeneral willÕ Ð each and 
every negative freedom and all negative freedoms compounded in their 
degree of shared compatibility Ð which will return to us, at a higher level, our 
natural isolated innocence.32 
The problem with this vision is that the state will not really stand above 
the interests of faction and sectional intrigue. And meanwhile the 
concentration of all power in the centre will just as effectively undermine the 
immediate bonds of trust between people as does the operation of impersonal 
market forces. Recent Western governments have apparently exulted in this 
erosion of trust because it tends to increase their power to control individuals 
both directly and en masse. Accordingly, they have decreased the power of 
local government and voluntary associations, and permitted immigration 
without integration in such a way that tends to make the inhabitants of 
countries more and more strangers to each other. 
The invocation of Rousseau allows us more easily to locate the left liberal. 
While the Ôright-wingÕ FT/Wall Street Journal liberal takes a basically 
gloomy view of the individual, the Guardian/New York Times reader takes a 
basically gloomy view of society. This verdict, nonetheless, seems to have 
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things back to front. Is not the political right suspicious of anything public 
and the political left unwilling to trust individual liberty very far? But at the 
deepest level, the contrast is the other way round: right-wing liberalism is so 
cynical about individual motivation that it entrusts social order to the public 
mechanism of legally enforceable contract and to an inflexible protection of 
absolute and invariable property rights by the state. This occurs in the Nicole-
like belief that the market will deliver a providential or natural simulacrum of 
the effect of real interpersonal charity and real distributive justice, in defiance 
of all the evidence that the simulation eventually delivers a degenerative 
distancing from ethical goals. The liberal left, on the other hand, so distrusts 
shared tradition and consensus that it endlessly seeks to release, by the agency 
of state power, chaotically various individual desires from any sort of gener-
ally shared requirements, which it always tends to view as arbitrary. Hence 
the convergence of the two liberalisms is reflected in the more apparent than 
real oscillation between the liberal right as the party of greed and the liberal 
left as the party of lust. 
This is most of all shown by the ÔNew LeftÕ, which ever since the 1960s has 
rarely pursued a politics of solidarity but, rather, predominantly one of 
ÔemancipationÕ. As Marx pointed out, that means always at base the freeing of 
the economic from political control and responsibility, and therefore a new 
mode of enslavement of people by economic avarice, however culturally 
disguised.33 Such a politics endlessly seeks to show that an overlooked 
ÔexceptionÕ Ð of gender, sexuality, race, disability, religion or culture or incli-
nation Ð does not and cannot conform to a shared norm or pre-given social 
role. Therefore, the specificity of exceptions must be released into NicoleÕs 
cultural market of more or less politely mediated self-assertions, even though 
each such specificity is regarded at once, incoherently and undecidably, as 
arising from both given nature and pure elective preference. 
Equally, this politics misreads the necessity of hierarchically organised care 
that is intrinsic to our need for education through time, and variability of talent 
and formation, as unacceptable patriarchal domination.34 But by doing so it 
cannot promote an extreme libertarianism (crossed with and confused by 
multiculturalism) without at the same time reinforcing and assisting the cause 
of right-wing liberalism, which it claims to oppose, since the anarchy of 
legitimation by choice alone can only be mediated by market forces. 
The most defining product of the New Left was the student revolution of the 
1960s. It represented the ultimate Rousseauian gesture that rejected even the 
necessity of a temporal hierarchy of education between teacher and pupil Ð a 
hierarchy that is, of course, likely to be reversed in time, as the initially 
ignorant themselves gradually become the wise. Since this inequity of relative 
maturity and learning is unavoidable, all that its impossible refusal has led to 
in the long run is students being treated as consumers. Their exaggerated 
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rights to elect, assess and complain conceals from them the reduction of their 
education to a standardised and quantifiable process, which supposedly guar-
antees their fitness to enter the labour market.35 
In this instance, as in many others, all that survives of a left libertarian 
legacy accrues mostly to the advantage of the liberal right. For the new left, 
what is basically celebrated is random individual desire. By implication, 
human association or relationship is distrusted, since it is held that it is bound 
to be perversely motivated in terms of a will to power over others. The politi-
cal right Ð symbolised by a generation of drug-using financial speculators Ð 
has now fully appropriated both this emancipatory goal and mistrust of trust 
itself. It holds that the remedy for inevitably warped interpersonal relation-
ships is the Ôhidden handÕ of the marketplace. In riposte, Clintonite Demo-
crats in the United States and New Labour in the United Kingdom insisted 
that part of the remedy remained the manifest hand of the state, now less in 
the economic than in the cultural and social spheres where it enthusiastically 
renewed the task of social engineering. 
This settlement represents a new and insidious form of corporate control 
working in the interests of an unprecedentedly unleashed and unrestricted 
new elite of Ôultra-whigsÕ, augmenting beyond precedent Ôold corruptionÕ, 
who trade in power and cash for purely personal advancement. 
5. WHAT LIBERALISM? WHOSE LIBERALITY? 
At this point in the chapter, however, we must pause. So far we have tried to 
claim, with both philosophical and historical support, that liberalism is the 
prime ideology of modern times and that, despite tensions, its economic, 
political and cultural manifestations are in ontological terms seamlessly one. 
This unity, we have implied, is given by an assumption of the primacy, both 
real and axiological, of the isolated individual and his untrammelled will. 
However, many will object that ÔliberalismÕ denotes no such unified creed 
and that it cannot be taken as the sole dominant bearer of modernity. 
In this section we will deal with the first objection. The sheer diversity of 
liberal thought and thinkers appears to support the claim that there is neither a 
single history of liberalism nor a unitary core of liberal theory. Accordingly, 
the liberal tradition has been distinguished in binary terms: either ÔclassicalÕ vs. 
ÔnewÕ liberalism, contrasting a serious concern for the nobility of freedom with 
the triviality of a celebration of consumer choice;36 or the English penchant for 
atomistic empiricism and utilitarianism vs. French egalitarian social 
philosophy;37 or else again in terms of relative universalism vs. relative 
pluralism.38 Based on the latter characterisation, John Gray argues that 
liberalism has two ÔfacesÕ and is caught between two incompatible 
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philosophies: either a universal regime that provides the maximum possible 
progress for each and every one by enabling the pursuit of a single good life, 
which is best for all humankind based on a rational consensus that must inevi-
tably be defined in utilitarian terms. Or else a plural modus vivendi that pro-
motes peaceful coexistence between incommensurable substantial values and 
ways of life Ð founded upon the recognition that pluralism and the diversity of 
difference are both metaphysically and culturally true.39 For Gray, only the 
latter can secure liberalismÕs claim to the universal authority of liberal values 
such as toleration and the advancement afforded by (an updated account of) 
universal human rights. 
Given these claimed contrasts, there has been a recent tendency to eschew 
the language of ÔessenceÕ or ÔcoreÕ in favour of Ludwig WittgensteinÕs notion 
of Ôfamily resemblancesÕ. Gray mentions liberal universalism, individualism, 
egalitarianism and meliorism, while in a recent book, Edmund Fawcett sees 
liberal thinkers as coalescing around four closely connected ideas: inescap-
able conflict of interests and beliefs; resistance to implacable human power; 
the promise of progress; and equal respect for all.40 
But what is immediately striking here is that, with the exception of the 
primacy of the supposedly ÔnaturalÕ individual (not even listed by Fawcett), 
none of these values would appear to be unique to liberalism, even if liberal-
ism inflects them in certain decisive ways. For example, many creeds would 
espouse an equality of persons, but only liberalism accords people equal 
Ônatural rightsÕ in formal terms that prescind from any given social arrange-
ment, while at the same time withdrawing a natural law endorsement of any 
normative set of culturally specific rights or distribution of roles. Accord-
ingly, this dubious latitude of definition beyond individualism tends falsely to 
insinuate that we owe certain inherited Western values to liberalism alone. 
But in reality, liberals cannot pretend to have invented values such as free-
dom, equality, toleration (well known to the late antique period, for example), 
individual rights, constitutionalism, mixed and balanced government, the rule 
of law, limits on both state and market power or even the principles of gener-
ous and, so, justly cautious justice: fair detention, fair trial, right to defence, 
habeas corpus, good treatment of the convicted, trial by peers, need (in some 
mode) of proof for guilt and requirements of restitution, reparation and reha-
bilitation of offenders. 
Liberality before Liberalism 
All such values, however greatly they have mutated with time, have been 
handed down from Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the Renaissance Ð notably 
from Greco-Roman philosophy and law as well as their fusion with both 
Germanic law and Christian notions of charity informing Church canonical 
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formulation and practice.41 In certain dimensions, the latter demanded a 
generous giving of the benefit of the doubt, as well as succour, even to the 
accused, and was thereby the eventual source of the assumption of innocence 
in modern times. By contrast, in all earlier ages, the actionable was thought of 
more in terms of interpersonal civil disturbance than of criminality, and 
credence was readily given to communal suspicion of a seemingly disruptive 
individual. A presumption of guilt was much more the norm within all 
historic legal codes. So in the case of the presumption of innocence, we have 
a case where liberalism has validly extended the protection of the individual 
and yet has surely not invented the sense of the absolute worth and non-dis-
pensability of each and every person. Nor has it invented the sense of absolute 
(originally divine) justice as transcending even the most valid community 
concern, which ultimately undergirds this principle. 
Thus legal historians have recognised that the first universal polity know-
ing no bounds and truly based upon the rule of law (thereby combining both 
universality and right in the sense of objective ius) was none other than the 
Latin Catholic Church. After the Gregorian reforms of the eleventh century, 
the ecclesia was reconceived in terms of the sway of Canon law, rooted in 
the charitable precepts of the gospel and the theology of the creeds and 
Church Fathers.42 
A politics of virtue as necessarily a politics of the soul tends to be assured 
by the existence within a polity of such a ÔtranspoliticalÕ community orien-
tated beyond time to eternity and devoted to more rigorous ideals than the 
community at large, which nevertheless serves to guide it.43 In antique times, 
even though the most crucial religion was strictly civil, this function was sup-
plied by communities of mystical initiates and philosophers, whose desiredly 
pivotal role is theorised in PlatoÕs Republic. Certain parallels exist in ancient 
China, and the elevation of the guru beyond kingship in India, but still more 
with the Buddhist Sangha. In the case of Christianity and Islam, the Ôinner 
and higherÕ community is democratised and made coextensive with the politi-
cal community itself (as Ecclesia and Ummah), while being somewhat distin-
guished from it Ð in the case of Christianity, far more acutely so. The political 
community is regarded as finally answerable to the spiritual, whose higher 
standard is much reinforced by the presence of spiritual virtuosi and ascetic 
sub-corporations. In this way the universal ideal is rendered concrete and not 
merely abstract through exemplification, while Ð beyond pagan norms Ð this 
concretion is seen as transcending the state and, in the case of Christianity, 
the secular legal domain. 
Without this inner polity, it is arguable that liberalism represents not so 
much a ÔprogressiveÕ advance as a lapse towards paganism and a mythical 
civic politics Ð an aperu that looks especially plausible in a world religious 
context in which other religions and other Christian formations have not so 
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clearly been overtaken by the Enlightenment: for how can liberalism refer 
beyond the realms of prevailing power towards the transcendent norms, 
which it still claims to instil? Arguably, its post-ecclesial conceptual space 
faces an aporia: either universal law floats free of any concrete communal 
instantiation and so tends to be without effect, such as claims to human 
rights against regimes that, by their own definition, will never enforce them, 
or else it claims to coincide with the rule of a political ÔstateÕ, thereby 
running the risk that rights are subordinate to the interests of the state and 
may always be suspended in its every emergency. 
The first instance is true, by and large, of modern, post-Catholic Anglo-
Saxon law, which celebrates the Ôrule of lawÕ that is, in principle, like Roman 
and Canon law, not state-bound. In consequence, this legacy eventually 
bifurcated between two strands: first, the English insistence on an absolute 
sovereignty resultant upon an Erastian interpretation of Church establishment 
(whereby the King and parliament are absolute because the state is now the 
church); second, an American primacy for natural law, interpreted increas-
ingly as absolute formal rights Ð potentially applying across national bound-
aries, but in practice still requiring state enforcement. The latter is mainly true 
of continental and French revolutionary Staatsrecht, for which the liberty of 
each as the liberty of all cannot be divorced from the Republican liberty and 
monopolised legitimacy of the state itself. In this way, liberalism, as in origin 
primarily a refusal of ecclesial power (see further below), is aporetically 
caught between absolute exaltation of the individual and absolute exaltation 
of the state, even though in the end one tends to imply the other. Neither 
individual presumption nor state overweening can now be so effectively 
chastened as by the constraining and normative presence of an inner psychic 
community. 
It is for this reason that liberalism does not necessarily entail an accompa-
nying democracy. Its very protection of individual liberty and social equality 
can readily morph into their subordination to collective power and commercial 
exchange, since these, in lieu of the role of a guiding psychic community and 
the carapace it offers to smaller intermediate corporate bodies, are now the 
very conditions for the possibility of such protection. Government will then 
tend to become entirely a policing and military function, as we begin to see in 
contemporary China, most of all, but also elsewhere. For the decay of all tacit 
constraints embedded in family, locality and mediating institutions has illiberal 
consequences in every sense, as Tocqueville warned. Even though liberalism 
promotes the idea that a family, a region, a craft tradition, etc. are crucial 
elements within a polity, it undermines the role of an overarching psychic 
community that sustains their transcending of the political, leaving the isolated 
individual at the behest of an anonymous collectivity. Increasingly, the 
operation of economic and civil rules, which no individual 
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has any longer any intrinsic interest as an isolated ego in enforcing, will be 
extrinsically and evermore exhaustively imposed by a state become totalitar  
ian in a new mode.  
 
The French Liberal Difference?  
 
To mention Tocqueville is to allow that some liberals have recognised that 
check. liberalism itself can threaten freedom and have therefore realised the 
need for lower corporate bodies to act as a check on state power. As Larry 
Siedentop has stressed, nineteenth-century French liberalism, in particular, 
tended to qualify the atomism and exclusively formal representation promoted 
by English liberal philosophy, on account of its empiricist and utilitarian 
assumptions.44 By contrast with Locke and J.S. Mill, French liberal thinkers 
accentuated the social nature of man, the centrality of civil society and the 
role of political participation in fostering human fulfilment through the prac-
tice of civic duty. 
Crucially, for Siedentop, French liberalism maintains a clear distinction 
between mores and laws (les mÏurs et les lois), and it links individual intentions 
and motives to social action beyond self-interest. In turn, this somewhat shifts 
the emphasis away from the dialectical relationship between subjective rights 
and collective power towards notions of free mÏurs Ð the habit of self-
government and voluntary association that defines intermediate institutions as 
opposed to the central administrative state and the free market. Dislodging 
individuals from the fixed social positions of the ancien rgime provided 
greater individual freedom and opportunity, but growing equality also entailed 
atomisation that paved the way for the centralisation of power and wealth, with 
a resulting diminution of the scope for the common exercise of genuine liberty. 
In the face of this, the French liberals argued that diverse participation was 
necessary even for the realisation of negative freedom. Following Benjamin 
Constant, they, indeed, upheld Ôthe liberty of the modernsÕ, which is negative, 
against the Ôliberty of the ancientsÕ, which was a positive liberty of the soul and 
of the shared pursuit of commonly accepted goals. Yet, by way of modification 
of this preference, they emphasised the crucial role of variegated social rules in 
the realm of mÏurs. Politics is now viewed as providing guarantees for rights 
that imply accompanying obligations, which operate to uphold the negative 
liberty of the other and which may take varying substantive forms in different 
historical and cultural circumstances. 
However, SiedentopÕs defence of French liberal thinking against the 
empiricist and utilitarian tradition of English liberalism fails to question two 
fundamental premises: first, in accordance with ÔmodernÕ liberty, rights still 
ground obligations, rather than duties begetting rights; second, the individual 
is more primary than human association, even if the practice of the latter at 
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every level is crucial to defend individual freedom. Both presuppositions 
have their ultimate roots in late medieval univocity (the denial of inherently 
different qualitative degrees within being), nominalism (the denial of the 
reality of universal modes of existence) and voluntarism (the insistence that 
divine and then created will is the primary determinant of reality), which 
shape much of modern political thought all the way to Rawls.45 
The Unity of Liberalism, After All 
Thus SiedentopÕs typology of two distinctly different traditions underplays 
the unity of liberal thinking. This unity pivots about the primacy of the indi-
vidual. Always allied to this primacy is the replacing of notions of substan-
tive goodness or truth with the ultimacy of subjective rights, subjectively and 
voluntaristically grounded; the substitution of formal social contract for 
prescribed, substantial unity and the privileging of progress (towards negative 
liberty) and Ôlaws of historyÕ (entailing the necessary ÔrationalityÕ and, 
therefore, logical necessity of this progress) over tradition and contingency. 
It is because of the collusion in liberalism between the subjective and the 
objective that GrayÕs dual categorisation also collapses. For the more that 
pluralism involves the coexistence of incommensurable values, then the more 
also a purely rational and utilitarian process must govern the unavoidable 
public coordination of an otherwise anarchic diversity. The application of 
formal rules cannot achieve this, since the avoidance of overlap between 
incommensurable principles and attitudes in the sphere of their various opera-
tions is clearly an illusion. 
Liberalism is, therefore, incorrigibly atomistic and oscillates between the 
isolated subjective individual and collective unity either objectively com-
pounded or artificially supposed Ð ÔLeviathanÕ was both. Otherwise, it fails any 
definition or consistency as a recognisable modern and secular phenomenon. 
Liberal recognition of association and group identity must, in consequence, 
always logically give way before the recognition of individual rights that are 
ultimately upheld by the state.46 So in terms of a genuinely liberal logic, 
democratic, corporatist or republican qualifications of this tension can never be 
stable, and are always threatened with corrosion in the name of a further 
unleashing of individual potency. Though one may, indeed, try to argue that the 
substantive scope of freedom is diminishing and becoming trivialised into 
consumerism, such protests are in vain, though admirable, unless one questions 
liberal first premises. For these, by virtue of their agnosticism concerning 
substantive ends and the means to achieve true freedom (by disciplining of 
psychic passions towards the true and the good), are committed at base to a 
formal and not substantive definition of freedom. The understanding of 
modern, negative liberty as the removal of barriers, legally guaranteed, means 
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that wherever these formal conditions prevail, there genuine freedom must be 
presumed to be present. Thus a more chastened liberalism is impotent in the 
face of Hobbesian arguments to the effect that the formal liberty of the indi-
vidual is better guaranteed by an absolutely unvarying and uniform system of 
market and state regularity. For it no longer places any democratic barriers on 
mass will or corporate barriers of special group privilege between the person 
and her self-chosen destiny. The will merely to will naturally evolves into the 
will merely to shop. 
Those nineteenth-century liberals in France (Constant, Tocqueville, 
Guizot) and in Britain (W.H. Gladstone, T.H. Green and L.T. Hobhouse) 
who tried bravely to channel liberalism in a more organicist direction, were, 
therefore, either proffering incoherence, or else producing a hybrid theory, 
which was no longer exclusively or even predominantly liberal, since they 
sought in effect to blend formal with substantive freedom. Even if the latter 
be conceived as negative exercise of autonomy, it is impossible for a theory 
grounded on a formal definition to defend any exception to the formal exten-
sion of liberty, or any special pleading on behalf of customary mores as 
opposed to the indifferent operation of law. For this can always be deplored 
by the consistent liberal as improper delimitation of choice, contract and 
commercial flow. Thus liberalism, as with J.S. Mill, is ineluctably drawn 
towards positivism.47 
In retrospect, the problem with all this qualified liberalism was that it tried 
to make arbitrary ÔtraditionÕ do the work of a previous, traditionally mediated 
metaphysic. The latter was always in some way religious and involved an 
appeal to ancient, positive liberty.48 By forgetting, or vainly seeking to 
secularise, its religious roots, liberalism cuts itself off from the tradition of 
Western theology and legality, which had first proffered a thicker and more 
coherent version of those values Ð liberty, equality, constitutional representa-
tion, etc. Ð that liberalism still tries to sustain. For freedom rests on the belief 
in the existence of a genuinely free will under rational guidance of a psychic 
essence, and equality is linked to the idea of a personal Creator God in whose 
image and likeness all men and women are made. They are considered equal 
in terms of their unique spiritual personhoods, which are believed to have 
impermeable value only because of their participatory reflection of an eternal 
personal principle, which is therefore the ultimate truth. St PaulÕs teaching on 
the equality of souls in the eyes of God accordingly laid the foundations for a 
universal order beyond particular legal or cultural normativity.49 It was the 
Christian fusion of ancient with biblical virtues and of the principle of free 
association in Germanic law with the Latin sense of equity and participation 
in the shared civitas that created the conditions for an ethics and politics of 
the common good. 
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Equally, Christological and sacramental notions of ÔrepresentationÕ of a 
whole by a part, sign or person first encouraged Ð through canonical, monastic 
and mendicant influence Ð the growth of constitutional government in the 
West, initially within the Church and later within the secular order.50 But this 
older and initial sense of representation was not seen as a mere mirroring of, 
or alternatively substitution for, a group will, in the absence of a given, shared 
horizon of agreement.51 Rather, within a substantive horizon of shared mÏurs 
and attitudes, the representative could authentically, yet freely, interpret the 
will of those whom he represented. His role is at once to listen and to follow, 
and yet, also to lead educatively, and, in either case, both for clarification and 
for guidance. The role of the representative is indispensable and required for 
the democratic aspect of any polity (which the Middle Ages usually affirmed 
and practised).52 
Without such a horizon, it is unclear for liberalism as to whether consti-
tutional representation is required at all, and if it is seen as requisite, its role 
becomes aporetically indeterminable. Thus, for the Hobbesian approach of 
what one might term Ôundemocratic authoritarian anarchismÕ, there is no 
representation, but only an assumption that the state as a whole constitutes a 
fictional, artificial body, which is ÔLeviathanÕ. It is quite deliberately con-
ceived by Hobbes as a kind of blasphemous substitution for the community as 
the body of Christ Ð a body requiring a representative head and, in turn, many 
plural representatives and mediations of this headship. The fiction is 
necessarily of an absolute sovereign totality, if it is to be able to secure and 
guarantee the irrefrangibility of all individual negative freedoms and pri-
vately agreed contracts. 
Equally, though with a different twist, for Rousseau the general will of the 
state is the unalienated, and so, unrepresented unity of the entire people, in a 
fashion that can come to support a more statist and bureaucratic (rather than 
market-mediated) mode of tyrannical power. On the other hand, if 
representation is embraced, as for more constitutional liberals like Locke or 
modern republicans (like James Harrington), then a debate must ensue as to 
whether the representative is simply a mandated delegate or else is permitted 
to exercise her free judgement. This tends to bring an assessment of her 
character back into the equation in a way that is problematic for a purely 
liberal outlook. In strict liberal terms, where this permission is granted, the 
representative must tend to become a substitute Ð substituting her lone will 
for a coagulated will of the people Ð in a manner that tends to the oligarchic. 
Representation accordingly lapses, or else is deconstructible, into either 
mandation or substitution, once uprooted from its earlier, Christian metaphys-
ical background. As Burke realised, in order to operate at all it requires an 
unwritten, unformalised sense of customary ÔprejudiceÕ and acceptance of the 
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traditionally ÔprescribedÕ (as mediating in culturally specific ways the natural 
law) to be tacitly shared between the represented and the representing.53 
6. LIBERALISM, REPUBLICANISM AND MODERNITY 
A second objection to our treatment of liberalism might be that liberalism is 
not, after all, the only, or even the central, ideology of modernity. This is a 
particularly important issue, because the key counter-claim here would be that 
there is a distinctly modern and secular mode of the Ôpolitics of virtueÕ that has 
been promoted by the tradition of civic republicanism since Machiavelli. We 
will now show just how this counter-claim is open to question. 
Liberty in Machiavelli and Harrington 
Amongst the advocates and historians of republicanism itself, there has been 
much recent debate as to whether it is allied to positive or to negative 
liberty.54 This is crucial, because in the first case, it would proffer a genuine 
politics of the soul and of virtue, whereas in the second, it could be regarded 
as a variant of liberalism. Specifically, this would be a variant that insists, 
contrary to Hobbes, that the protection of individual freedom requires a par-
ticipatory and democratic theory of government to the extent that (as for the 
French revolutionary ÔDeclaration of the Rights of ManÕ)55 the natural rights 
to life and property must be supplemented by a natural right of specific for-
mal assent to sovereign rule. Otherwise, it is contended, one has the right to 
freely dispose of oneÕs own life and property only at the discretion of another 
person or power. This is seen as a condition of slavery and not citizenship Ð 
in advertence to the basic classical typology of human actors. The status of 
citizenship also requires as a primary, not secondary, aspect of individual 
liberty the collective participation of free individuals in the business of what 
is ultimately self-government. 
For modern republicans, the landed class of gentlemen proprietors consti-
tuted the prime band of such political actors, who aimed to keep taxes low, 
and sustained a potentially fighting militia. Thereby, they espoused a Ôcoun-
tryÕ ideology that contrasted with the ÔcourtÕ promotion of a professional 
political class together with a standing professional army, both sustained by 
relatively high taxation and a national debt on which a more commercially 
conceived landed class constantly speculated. The court ideology aligned 
more naturally with theories of original political contract and natural rights, 
though it was primarily linked with the continuous economic contracts of 
political economy, and sometimes included a republican account of the divi-
sion of powers at the centre, derived from James Harrington. 
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In general, the second view, which regards modern republicanism as a 
variant of liberalism, turns out to be correct Ð although the issues and 
examples are highly complex, largely owing to the often hybrid and scarcely 
consistent character of modern republican thinkers. 
For J.G.A Pocock, the Renaissance republican tradition, which he situates in 
a largely Machiavellian trajectory, upholds positive liberty and active virtue. 
That is because it insists, after a Roman model,56 that to be free is to participate, 
on the basis of secure property ownership and a degree of military 
independence, in the running of a polity, which is itself freely bounded against 
all external imperial control.57 However, Pocock defines republican virtue as 
essentially the sustaining of a prideful Ôself-governmentÕ, in a way that would 
not qualify as full positive freedom in the Platonic and Aristotelian sense of 
Ôself-realisationÕ. The latter is the attaining of a true telos of self or civic rule in 
terms of the securing of distributive justice, true friendship sustained by a 
shared and interactive love of the truth and the encouragement of a 
contemplation of the cosmos or of the divine.58 And Machiavelli does not 
advert to the governance of the soul. His virt is the military and political 
excellence required to sustain collective independence, and can notably be 
fostered by a certain controlled sustaining of factional struggle within the city, 
which serves as a training ground for the combative spirit. 
Thus Machiavelli shares with Hobbes the ÔliberalÕ assumption of a given, 
ontological agon, which is to be manipulated but not potentially overcome in 
the name of a more primary and peaceful ontological harmony (as for 
Augustine and Aquinas still more than for Aristotle or Plato).59 This agon is 
seemingly given a little more instrumental play by the Florentine than by the 
sage of Malmesbury. But just this dimension is an aspect of the later much-
debated Ôpolitically economicÕ question of the relation between military virtue 
on the one hand, and more muted commercial rivalry on the other. It follows 
that the price of the modern secularisation of virtue in Machiavelli is also its 
re-primitivisation and re-paganisation, which returns virtue understood as virt 
to its etymological root of male aggressive prowess. This renders modern 
virtue actually proximate to liberal norms, whose formal negativity is 
predicated on the latent violence of an assumed initial lack of consensus. Such 
a view brackets out of political relevance the cultural ÔprejudgementsÕ later 
seen as essential by Burke. 
English and Scottish Republicanism 
When one turns from Machiavelli to the post-restoration English and later 
Scottish republican theorists, one is faced with a tangle of complexities. 
Harrington does, indeed, refer to the soul and he, Shaftesbury and Algernon 
Sidney tend to blend elements of Machiavellian virt with notions of Platonic, 
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Aristotelian and Biblical virtue.60 To the extent that they do so, they advert 
more to a transcendent horizon and obeisance to divine government, however 
deistically construed. And other Renaissance traditions of civic republican-
ism, especially the Venetian, remained much more Catholic in character, as 
with the approach of the ecumenically humanist Gasparo Contarini, by whom 
these British thinkers were also influenced.61 
At the same time, and somewhat confusingly, the purity of even a 
Machiavellian understanding of virt and freedom is qualified in the case of 
these thinkers, in ways that show, after all, some proximity to and influence 
of ÔliberalÕ natural rights thinkers, like Hobbes and Locke.62 Indeed, their 
very insistence against Hobbes on the need for constitutional guarantees of 
representation and mixed government in order to sustain negative liberty, 
nevertheless, exhibits a certain parallel shift from the primacy of individual 
ÔcharacterÕ as ensuring freedom to the primacy of structural arrangements. 
One can try to grasp the nub of this confusion at the point where James 
Harrington defends against HobbesÕs Ôthe rule of lawÕ as opposed to Ôthe rule 
of menÕ.63 In one sense, this is indeed an appeal to ancient virtue, to Aristotle 
(who is cited here) and to Plato. Therefore, in contrast to anything in 
Machiavelli, Harrington elsewhere endorses PlatoÕs rational rule of legal 
patterns reflecting the eternal forms, as opposed to a mere sophistic economy 
of the passions.64 Yet in another sense he is saying that Hobbes offers only an 
economy of power Ð the rule of a fictional, compounded atom, really embod-
ied in the force of a single monarch and her counsel. By contrast, the rule of 
law does not rely, for the securing of freedom, on the ingenious self-limiting 
by contract and monopolised violence of the powers and passions of men. 
Rather, it entrusts this to more impersonal and inherently rational patterns and 
structures. 
For Harrington, the primacy of even Machiavellian virt is ultimately 
subordinate to the best securing of negative individual liberty of choice and 
security of possession. Thus he argues that even if Hobbes is right and we are 
generally ruled by our passions and selfish interests, then the ÔrepublicanÕ bal-
ancing of forces will still serve infallibly to secure a free people in a free state. 
This balancing is itself conceived according to a scenario that is but a variant 
on the notion of an original contract, involving the famous example of the two 
girls sharing a cake. Where Hobbes and Locke would require that they need to 
draw up an agreed contract to be enforced by their parent, Harrington suggests, 
instead, that one girl will divide the cake, but the other will get to have first 
choice of which piece to take, with the implication that the foreknowledge of 
the first girl will constrain her to a just slicing.65 In political terms, this becomes 
the crucial division between the judicial, senatorial function of one chamber 
(advising on how the cake is to be cut) and the sovereign decisions of the more 
popular chamber (authorising which pieces are to be taken and 
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by whom). The executive carrying out of this advice and these legal decisions 
is somewhat dispersed (in great contrast to Hobbes) amongst the justices of 
the peace and the like. In this way, the primacy of political virtue is severely 
undermined by Harrington, in favour of the primacy of political structures 
guaranteeing a balance of forces Ð even if there remains, ambivalently, some 
suggestion that these structural arrangements will encourage a more substan-
tive cultivation of virtue and of positive freedom. 
In the wake of Harrington, and his successors Algernon Sidney and Henry 
Neville,66 historians no longer think that there was in eighteenth-century 
England a clearly distinct ÔcommonwealthÕ or ÔrepublicanÕ faction.67 Instead, 
many thinkers (beginning with Sidney himself) blended natural rights ideas 
with an insistence upon the importance of the direct ÔvirtuousÕ political 
participation of landed proprietors. The latter requirement did, indeed, clash 
with the oligarchy of the ÔnewÕ or ÔcourtÕ whigs, who had, as we have already 
mentioned, professionalised the political together with the military function 
and concomitantly commercialised the role of landed proprietors, through the 
mechanism of the national debt. All these things were often denounced both 
by ÔoldÕ whigs and by some (but by no means all) tories. 
However, the unease about the substitution of commerce for agriculture 
and warfare, and the consequent effect on virile mores, was registered by 
almost everyone in various degrees. For example, David Hume, while 
broadly accepting commercialisation, also worried about the loss of the 
personal representative role and the implications of an ever-mounting debt.68 
Equally, almost everyone was influenced by a specifically modern substitu-
tion, since Montaigne and others, of the ÔgentleÕ virtues of pity and sympathy 
for the harsh and ascetic virtues both of the antique hero and of the Christian 
ascetic or saint.69 
What is more, insofar as commerce is seen as an acceptable substitute for 
warfare and the accompanying ÔmannersÕ as a substitute for virtue, there is 
also a subtle continuity with Machiavelli. That is because the competitive 
rigours (qualifying the docility) of commerce are regarded as an acceptable 
substitute for the fearful training ground of the Italian city-state in factional, 
familial and class rivalry.70 And at the defining limit of national pride, 
freedom and survival, commerce can be once more converted into military 
currency and the mask of manners slips to reveal the real continued face of 
passion now, in extreme, threatened circumstances no longer able to be tem-
pered by a measured ÔinterestÕ. 
Whigs and Tories 
Finally, the crucial lines of political division appear to have run, after all, not 
between court and country, but between whigs and tories who were divided 
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over the questions of the legitimacy of the Hanoverian line and the primacy and 
independence of the Church in the constitution.71 Just this latter stress rendered 
the tory version of ÔcommonwealthÕ constitutional politics (remarkably 
instigated in part by none other than Charles I)72 more genuinely hospitable 
towards diverse corporate privileges and to the cultivation of genuinely virtu-
ous roles Ð architectonically guided by ÔgentlemenÕ Ð within communities of 
purpose, positively pursuing a collectively shared end of national and human 
excellence.73 By contrast, the whigs tended to override all inherited rights in the 
interests of property Ð demolishing and removing villages, executing youthful 
deer-stealers and legitimising the ownership even of people.74 And far from 
being necessarily in favour of a republican option, or its commercial 
simulation, they could at times, as in the case of Josiah Tucker, the Dean of 
Gloucester, be dismissive of Locke and natural right just because it appeared 
too much to echo the Harringtonian insistence on the primacy of property as 
allowing a Roman independence and primacy of self-subsistent produc-tion.75 
So here ÔliberalismÕ and republicanism are, in effect, equated, and yet TuckerÕs 
own advocacy of what he saw as a natural law primacy for exchange and 
continuous, always already initiated, rather than original contract, must itself be 
seen as a variant of the liberal creed. 
In the end, those substituting the state and civil religion for the Church 
(Harrington as much as Hobbes) were at one in promoting a primarily nega-
tive liberty, whether as natural right, political economy or the quasi-virtue of 
the modern Commonwealth. It is for this reason that one must argue against 
PocockÕs view that both right and left nineteenth-century romantic critics of 
liberalism in the name of organic virtue had overlooked the modern idiom of 
republican virtue or commercial quasi-virtue as a feasible synthesis of the 
modern with the ancient. Quite clearly, it was an unstable, or else false, 
synthesis, failing essentially to qualify a liberal ideological hegemony. The 
Ôcommonwealth whigÕ version of history is simply a mild mutation of the 
whig version of history after all, as J.C.D. Clark contends. 
This is not to say that the tory faction was authentically uncontaminated by 
modern idioms. To the contrary, at times it might favour the disdaining of all 
custom in favour of absolute, centralised, voluntary control.76 And as Clark 
emphasises, English divine right doctrine (whether in its tory-Stuart or 
modified whig-Hanoverian version) was not authentically medieval and 
constitutional. Rather, it followed from the Reformation merging of Church 
with State and placing of the monarch as the ChurchÕs head. This resulted in an 
extreme doctrine of the absolute sovereignty of king in parliament that rendered 
the thought of a federal sharing of sovereignty much more difficult than it was 
under the norms of Roman law and eventually served to make the problem of 
the Thirteen Colonies (how can they have self-rule without separation?) wholly 
intractable.77 Equally, the English Reformation tended to 
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encourage the idea of common law as being (like the literal and sole rule of 
the Bible) wholly based upon positive precedent. Only under the influence of 
Richard Hooker amongst others, encouraging a recovery of canon and so 
Roman law influences, was ÔprescriptionÕ once more fused with interpretative 
equity Ð as it later is, supremely, by Burke.78 
At times, toryism could follow both Reformation bents and regard the 
power of the king and the force of law in the secular realm as bounded only by 
will and the positive series of legal judgements, in total disregard of Ôthe 
ancient constitutionÕ. On the other hand, the Ôneo-HarringtonianÕ and Ôgothic 
WhigÕ adulation of the latter as an equivalent of ancient republicanism tended 
to reduce both to a contractual balancing of monarchic and aristocratic forces. 
Only in the case of the later Burke does one see a certain blending of whig 
constitutionalism, tory prescription and tory sense of the protective authority 
of kings in a way that recovers something of a genuinely Catholic Christian 
approach.79 The mixed constitution is seen now as a more organic unity with 
each governing aspect and equivalent estate paying a vitally necessary, rather 
than mutually limiting, role to combine unified monarchic governance with 
the wise advice of the few and the represented or tacit assent of the many. 
Equally, the realm is once more seen as a community of communities: 
With us, the representative [the house of commons] separated from the other 
parts, can have no action and no existence. The government is the point of 
reference of the several members and districts of our representation. This is the 
center of our unity. This government of reference is a trustee for the whole, and 
not for the parts. So is the other branch of our public council, I mean the house 
of lords. With us the king and lords are several and joint securities for the 
equality of each district, each province, each city.80 
These were not reactionary insights on BurkeÕs part, but, essentially, a 
belated realisation, in the face of the French Revolution, that liberalism could 
eventually use the unleashed power of money and the national debt to over-
turn all sacral authority above the level of the state and all lesser authorities 
beneath it. This tends to legitimate the terroristic and nationally unbounded 
activities of any arbitrary group claiming to act ÔrepresentativelyÕ in the name 
of the people.81 
US and French Republicanism 
In the case of the founding of the United States, a republican element was also 
much fused with a natural rights theory that had become increasingly detached 
from common law.82 Already, Montesquieu had misread the British 
constitution in terms that accentuated the Harringtonian emphasis on a 
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Ôbalance of powersÕ, and the American recension further detached this from 
any real sense of organically cooperating social orders.83 In consequence, the 
balance at the centre only confirmed the power of the centre at the expense of 
a federal subsidiarity (as favoured by the more truly republican Jefferson). Yet 
the failure to envisage a shared, if balanced, sovereignty distributed amongst 
the three powers ensured and ensures to this day an ironic contestation 
between them over sovereign government and an ironic accentuation of the 
English eighteenth-century whig oligarchic rule through patronage and 
influence, always hovering on corruption. Equally, the liberal republican 
insistence upon a strict division of powers clashes with the theoretical invest-
ment of sovereignty now, no longer in the Crown and its sharing of rule (as for 
a Ôtory constitutionalismÕ), but in an abstract ÔpeopleÕ. In consequence, the 
United States has been caught from the outset between oligarchic stasis and 
corruption on the one hand, and the claims of a majoritarian tyranny, 
manipulable by the propaganda of opinion, on the other.84 
By contrast, the British constitution would seem to allow at once clean 
decision making and yet some sort of genuinely independent advisory roles 
(of the Crown, the Lords, the independent civil service). But, of course, the 
advantages never lie altogether with one system. Thus many more federal 
dispersive elements remain in the United States, which has to this degree 
succeeded in a ÔcountryÕ qualification of absolute common law ÔcourtÕ sover-
eignty that still eludes the United Kingdom Ð now to its double dire peril in 
terms of its relations to both Europe and its own Celtic constituents. Equally, 
the republican sense that freedom requires an active, educated and even virtu-
ous participation is surely far more alive in the United States. What is more, 
for all the Unitarian, Masonic and old dissenting character of the founding 
fathers,85 this sense has since then been much buttressed by new dissenting, 
(Methodist and evangelical) besides Irish and other Catholic, contributions Ð 
not neglecting the Anglican ex-loyalist presence in New York State, nor the 
strong Scottish Jacobite and Irish Catholic presence in the original thirteen 
colonies from the outset. 
In the case of France, we have already reason to suppose that the republi-
canism of both Montesquieu and Rousseau is at bottom liberal. Indeed, it is 
gathered round the protection of private person, property, central state power 
and debt-funded commerce Ð to which the power, property and charitable 
endowments of the Church were all sacrificed in the Revolution to provide the 
stable guarantee for a new flood of paper money. This, of course, formed the 
centrepiece of BurkeÕs critique, alongside his new realisation that the avatars of 
Ônatural rightsÕ were mainly concerned to abolish all traditional corporate and 
often socially beneficial privileges that the Church had sheltered.86 To begin 
with, in the Middle Ages, as Franois Guizot noted, French monarchic power 
had been weak and English monarchic power strong.87 Accordingly, 
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the English aristocracy in alliance with the commons and under the aegis of 
Canon law, secured constitutional rights against the crown. In France, by con-
trast, the monarchy started to erect against landed power its own somewhat 
arbitrary legal and policing structures Ð as criticised by Sir John Fortescue in 
the late Middle Ages.88 
But in the long run, the rival cousins separated by the channel have con-
verged, with the Reformation and its Jansenist and deistic aftermath proving 
the great solvent. In England, the aristocracy and gentry came, after all, to 
ally themselves with undiluted central sovereignty (thereby betraying the 
Catholic spirit of Magna Carta, clean contrary to Ôold hatÕ Protestant-Whig 
mythology).89 In France, the burghers and functionaries, together with some 
aristocrats and clergy, usurped and perpetuated the aspirations of the crown.90 
In so doing, they removed to a large degree the power of the corporations and 
guilds. It was not the beginning of modernity as such, but, rather, of that 
modernity which is but the final triumph of the intendants and the gloomy 
Jansenists, besides being the final, hypertrophic and unwanted revenge of the 
Huguenots. 
The Liberal Attack on the Ecclesial Polity 
In the face of this, liberal, modernity, Burke suggested that it was not that 
commerce gave rise to civilised manners, but, rather, that the tempering spirit 
of mediaeval chivalry had first permitted sufficient peace for the development 
of markets and trade.91 Without the continued work of this spirit, an incre-
mental rights-based anarchy and a terroristic insistence on an ever-further 
removal of extra-rational barriers to negative liberty was bound to ensue. 
Religious and gentlemanly virtues were therefore not dispensable for any 
civilisation, ancient or modern, and cannot be substituted by any ersatz man-
nered ÔcivilityÕ whose mask over a new barbarity will always slip in time. 
Therefore, Burke reasserted the independence and normative priority of the 
Church patrimony as the shelter for various corporate liberties and honour-
able practices.92 
In his wake, Samuel Taylor Coleridge suggested (in a manner partly 
anticipated by Hume) that the Clergy supplemented by a cultural ÔclerisyÕ are 
required to mediate between the stable landed and the ÔmobileÕ commercial 
interest.93 For the truncated republicanism of the whig outlook, it had proved 
impossible to resolve an aporetic oscillation between the notion that virtue as 
autonomy could only be upheld by landed archaism and the acclaimed dynamism 
of modern, commercial society. But it is precisely ColeridgeÕs Christian 
romanticism that is able to overcome this oscillation between a truly reactionary 
Roman and pagan option on the one hand, and a dangerously anarchic progres-
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upon property and independent military prowess. Rather, it should depend more 
primarily upon lands and resources (for example, and partly under an ultimately 
Coleridgean influence, modern universities, the BBC and the National Trust)94 
set aside to offer at once a real possibility for, and materially sacramental 
mediation of, divine contemplation and the priority of charitable practice. 
This extended ecclesial space Ð allowing also for sacramental mediation by 
nature, by the arts and by learning Ð is neither exclusively on the side of the 
rural, bounded and productive, nor on the side of the urban, mercantile and 
accumulative. Its transcendence can accommodate both and resist equally the 
older (exaggeratedly Roman) negative liberty of stable possession and the 
newer negative liberty of increasingly abstract speculation. And its 
sacramentality requires at once a certain substantive stability and also a 
certain dynamic, such that the modern progressive factor is paradoxically 
what guarantees an ancient and spiritual apophatic reserve. In this way, the 
ÔaristocraticÕ element is Platonised and naturalised (as partly anticipated by 
the arriviste Burke) in terms of the crucial guiding role of talent and 
excellence for any sound polity. At the same time, it serves to shelter non-
formalised, unarticulated and ÔobscureÕ interests against the notion common 
to both pure democracy and pure absolute monarchy that representation 
involves total alienation, giving the dangerous and illusory presumption that 
Ôthe whole will of the body politic is in act at every momentÕ.95 Such a vision 
is truly once more the republicanism of Plato, Aristotle, the Bible and Cicero, 
gothicised and Christianised, and by that token also modernised in a more 
stable fashion. Both in Britain and on the Continent the nineteenth century 
often bravely sought to realise this through endeavours that persisted in the 
twentieth century at least up till 1945.96 
Moreover, socialism and certain other post-romantic radicalisms are not, 
after all, the offspring of liberalism and iconoclastic revolution, but, rather, 
themselves began as a kind of romantic left-Burkean critique of the French 
revolutionary legacy. Even Thomas Paine criticised the power of paper 
money and the national debt as the most fundamental driver of capitalism.97 
Such a left-Burkean perspective by no means (any more than did Burke 
himself) wished to restore an ancien rgime or the tory ideology.98 Beyond 
secular republicanism and often with various explicit religious avowals 
(however heterodox), they revived the ancient and Catholic projects of the 
pursuit of substantive, shared ends of flourishing through mutual cooperation 
and reciprocal exchange. In these respects, they often popularised certain 
older approaches of the Jesuits, the Jacobites, the Pietists and the tories. This 
can be tracked, especially in the development of Methodism from the High 
Church tory legacy of John Wesley. 
But if, for example, William Cobbett agreed with Edmund Burke that for a 
republican, non-corrupt involvement in politics, one required a propertied 
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independence as the foundation for the development of free virtue, then he 
did not, in the end, see this as a barrier to the extension of the franchise.99 
Instead, he saw it as an argument for the undoing of the effects of abolishing 
the peasantry, enclosure and expropriation of rural resources, which was the 
precondition for the take-off of capitalism as such. A wider distribution of 
assets and resources in this way adds genuine independence to cooperation as 
the true basis of political virtue, and thereby should avoid any slippage into 
the radicalism of mere collectivity whose only justification is likely to be 
utilitarian.100 
The latter Benthamite option has always been, since the late eighteenth 
century, the serious alternative to Burke, once the anarchic heart of liberalism 
had been exposed by the revolutionary turmoil. As we saw in the criticism of 
John Gray, the limitation of the anarchic discord opened by rights is here 
filled by the supposedly transparent objectivity of material well-being. The 
pursuit of such well-being can only add a bodily confirmation to the 
untrammelled liberal sway of individual will and passion on the one hand, 
and the necessary subordination of this to central ÔscientificÕ organisation on 
the other. 
7. THE DEFINITION OF LIBERALISM 
Liberalism therefore exhibits in all its variants an individualist consistency 
and is truly defining of the most influential, specifically modern, political 
outlook. Insofar as this has been constantly qualified, it has not been funda-
mentally challenged by Ôalternative secular modernismsÕ, supremely repub-
licanism, whose unproblematic difference from liberalism tends to evaporate 
upon inspection. Rather, it has been mainly qualified by religious perpetua-
tions of older outlooks whose creative mutations (as in the case of evangeli-
calism or Catholic personalism) can be seen to be just as contemporary as the 
dominant ÔmodernÕ norms of liberalism and secularity. 
ÔLiberalismÕ, however, was not used as a term until the early nineteenth 
century: first, in a political context in Spain to denote the followers of the 
French revolutionary principles; second, in a theologico-political context in 
England (as by J.H. Newman) to denote a position (religious or otherwise) 
that refuses to accept anything not rationally proven or demonstrable and, 
above all, disallows any public influence for the non-proven Ð the emotively 
or faithfully affirmed.101 However, this late specific usage would not seem to 
disqualify, but, rather, to confirm the usage of ÔliberalÕ as a term of art to 
capture something that has much earlier and distinct origins. The revolution-
ary ideology was clearly a development of the post-Hobbesian substitution of 
subjective individual ÔrightÕ for objective, distributive and relational natural 
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law. Equally, the outlawing of the extra-rational as cognitively or publicly 
acceptable is rooted in the refusal by Hobbes, Spinoza, Harrington and Locke 
of any public power to psychic communities or to traditions of interpretation 
(of scripture and other authoritative, including legal, texts) that cannot be fully 
rationalised, but must perforce rely on ÔprejudiceÕ or prejudgement.102 A 
reigning individualism is inseparable from this rationalism and from opposi-
tion to any Catholic conception of the role of the Church. 
Here the advocacy of toleration by Locke and others was in reality an 
advocacy of civic indifference, and his exclusion of Catholics from toleration 
was not an ÔexceptionÕ to his theory, but, rather, its whole basis, since for 
Catholic doctrine, such indifference is unacceptable.103 For this reason, the 
nature of eventual Catholic emancipation is a highly debatable event and the 
debate is clearly not yet over. Arguably, it was understood by some, in an 
English romantic tradition (after Burke, Coleridge and Carlyle), as an 
admission that the notion of a collective neutrality as to some sort of fun-
damental existential choice is as much a myth as it would be in the case of an 
individual. For in either case, not to choose is, after all, to choose only 
arbitrary choosing, supplemented by a qualifying, yet confirming, utilitarian 
notion of the objective and effective as the only thing that can ever be chosen 
in all its modes. Thus the effectiveness of choosing and operating becomes 
the only shared public measure and value. 
The actuality of liberalism therefore preceded its verbal identification and 
always involved a tight combination of individualism, latitude as to substan-
tive opinion and advocacy of a strong state to support and yet protect from 
anarchy both these aspects Ð the one political and the other cultural. But, in 
addition, the mediation of sovereign strength and cultural latitude was pro-
vided by the theory of government as stronger when apparently lighter and 
less overbearing, as we shall now see. 
8. LIBERAL PESSIMISM AS CAPITALISM 
The unity and modern primacy of liberalism also allows us to see the integral 
link between liberalism and capitalism. Not only must the latter be regarded as a 
liberal upshot (as will be argued in this section), but one must also counter 
arguments to the effect that there can be non-capitalist liberalisms, or liberal 
regimes severely qualifying of capitalist hegemony (see the following section). 
We have already seen how liberalism involves a combination of the cen-
tralised ÔabsoluteÕ state with the dispersed ÔfreeÕ market. In fact, liberalism 
comes more fully into being in the eighteenth century when, to the existing 
seventeenth-century theory of the primacy of the individual, was added the 
idea of deceptively ÔminimalÕ but strong government. 
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This was linked to the science of political economy, which proposed the 
novel idea that governments can rule more by ruling less.104 Instead of trying 
to ÔpoliceÕ every aspect of their subjectsÕ lives, they can leave much to the 
operation of the market whose workings are seen as ÔnaturallyÕ mediating 
between originally isolated choices, sympathies and predilections. In this 
way, through the supposedly mechanical balancing of supply and demand, 
wealth and population are more increased, while peace and order are spon-
taneously maintained. The stateÕs interest is in a controlled and strong 
population, energetically ready to fight wars, yet pacifically compliant in the 
everyday, prepared to renounce traditional prerogatives of honour and 
eccentric local privilege. It is for this reason that Michel Foucault argued that 
we must understand liberalism to involve the Ôbio-politicalÕ. This heuristic 
concept allows us to see how a claim to rule less over the subject qua subject 
and qua possessor of an immortal soul is in reality an unprecedented claim to 
extend sovereign lordship over human, nature as such, besides man as homo 
politicus. 
Apparently, and by its own lights, the state now releases the economic and 
social spheres to be pre-politically themselves as natural, meaning true to 
human biological needs and inclinations. In truth, however, it politically 
produces this sphere of man as most basically pursuant of amour propre and 
ÔtruckingÕ advantage, and tries through the educative and cultural processes of 
Ôcivil societyÕ (in a new and specific sense) to create subjects who are 
negatively choosing and self-governing, relatively disembedded from family, 
locality, tradition and artisanal formation (and so from civil society as we 
would now more widely understand it, in an older, more generic sense). 
In reality, such subjects could well be seen as less ÔnaturalÕ, but this is 
disguised from view by Adam SmithÕs redefinition of humanity as homo 
economicus, characterised by Ôthe propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one 
thing for anotherÕ.105 As Polanyi argued, when the economic sphere is seques-
trated by this naturalising sleight of hand, it is bound to become fundamental, 
because it concerns our most vital human needs and functions. Just because these 
material needs are basic does not, however, mean that they are determinative in 
the last instance, in either a Marxist or a Hobbesian liberal sense. To the contrary, 
specifically human existence is perhaps definable by an Ôoriginal detourÕ, which 
determines even animal functions through cultural ones, and even the utile 
through the gratuitous.106 However, once the managing of our material needs for 
production and exchange is sequestered from other aspects of social life Ð the 
symbolic, the ritual, the ethical and the political Ð then the unavoidability of 
material needs, including our mutual material reliance, tends to ensure that what 
is naturally basic now, indeed, becomes culturally fundamental. Yet only by 
cultural illusion do we imagine that this primacy of the spuriously ÔnaturalÕ 
belongs naturally to, specifically, human nature. 
Milbank and Pabst_9781783486489.indb 48 5/31/2016 3:20:24 PM 
48 Chapter 1 
Only modern economics treats the biological as foundational for human 
cultural existence. And this was greatly accentuated in the nineteenth century 
through the Malthusian view that one requires the threat of poverty and the 
spur of hunger in order to force people to work in a world of lazy sinfulness 
and constitutive material scarcity. Yet, in point of fact, just as the idea of the 
supposedly Ôfree marketÕ is politically produced, so, also scarcity is nearly 
always something artificially engineered by monopolisation or global trade in 
order to increase returns on capital. Nature is naturally abundant and inex-
haustible, if treated with ecological care. But ecological abuse is not merely 
an accidental spin-off from supposedly ÔrationalisedÕ economic practice. It is 
actually constitutive of that practice insofar as both a social reality and psy-
chological fantasy of ÔscarcityÕ must be instilled by capitalism if competition 
is to be seen as a basic necessity, rather than being rightly regarded, in more 
tempered fashion, as often a stimulus to greater excellence, with ensuing 
social benefit. In this way, the destruction of a natural, if measured, superflu-
ity is driven not only by greed but, ironically, also by a fantasised fear of an 
ultimate natural paucity. 
The psychological fantasy of scarcity (as with marginalism in the later 
nineteenth century) supposes a sheerly natural contagion of mimetic desiring, 
in denial of any hierarchy of values or any sense that the most valuable 
things Ð such as sunshine and friendship Ð are not in short supply.107 The 
produced social reality of scarcity in the Malthusian tradition requires an 
artificial blocking of natureÕs plenitude by monopoly control and short-term 
exploitation of given resources, in self-fulfilment of the otherwise erroneous 
prophecy of endless diminishment of a supposedly finite supply. Through the 
false supposition of a given scarcity that, in fact, we alone create, liberalism 
here again promotes its own projection as something ÔnaturalÕ. The narcis-
sistic greed of the lone trucking animal is now compounded by a fantasised 
fate of a given constraint to struggle with its fellow creatures over limited 
means and ends. Added to ontological violence and natural egoism, this 
thesis of unavoidable scarcity engenders a triple anthropological pessimism 
at the heart of the liberal tradition that renders it, in MichaÕs phrase, the 
realm of lesser evil Ð the best of all possible realities in a world of necessary 
perversion. 
9. APPARENT LIBERAL OPTIMISM AS  
TECHNOCRATIC CONTROL 
Many on the contemporary left will claim that if liberal rights began as the 
defence of property and the self-possessed individual, they were later rein-
terpreted, around the French Revolution, as emancipatory rights of liberation 
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from all oppressive personal and property-based constraints. Yet the revolu-
tionary account of rights, whether after the 1790s or the 1970s, is not a simple 
subversion of the property-based account of right.108 Rather, it is the case that 
property and revolution are twins. Just because the new prime duty of the state 
is to protect life and property, Hobbes (never mind Locke) claimed that the 
legitimacy of government lapses if it fails to do so.109 This implies a new 
individual or mass right to rebellion that is quite different from traditional 
medieval Ôrights to resistÕ that empowered lesser constitutional bodies to 
overturn higher ones if they had grossly lapsed in their exercise of responsi-
bility. Indeed, many still interpreted the legitimacy of the rebel causes in both 
the English civil war and the Glorious Revolution in these ÔancientÕ terms.110 
What one can anachronistically but validly describe as the ÔliberalismÕ of 
Hobbes and Locke was concerned primarily with the freedom of inequitable 
property ownership as secured by the state with a monopoly on violence. Thus 
political liberalism initially had a bent to the authoritarian and not the 
democratic. But once such a state has started to remove the various particular 
liberties and customary privileges that had existed at a lower level, then inevi-
tably Ôcounter-rightsÕ start to be asserted against the original rights Ð rights to 
extend the franchise in order that the state be not merely on the side of big 
property, rights to equality of entry into social and economic competition. 
In consequence, the revolutionary traditions have continued to be fixated on 
ownership, while demanding a more egalitarian access to it. Although the non-
statist traditions of socialism refused the language of rights in the name of 
distributive justice and social reciprocity,111 welfarist social democracy has 
been largely concerned with rights as entitlements. Even Marxism remains 
focused on the rightsÐpropertyÐrevolution triangle insofar as it thinks of a 
general will as controlling collective property and suggests that equity means 
the ÔrightÕ of the individual to receive all she needs. This is matched with the 
equal collective right of the general will to demand from each such individual 
the full measure of her means. 
Marx recognised the liberal revolutionary suppression of the social, and 
realised that social contract implies a channelling through state power, and not 
complete suppression, of an originally supposed anarchic, natural violence, 
precisely in order to tame it. Thus the stateÕs claim to act as guardian of 
absolute rights also depends, with the same paradox, upon a continuous 
infringement of this absoluteness. This occurs in terms of its constant 
decisions as to what are effectively ÔexceptionsÕ to the regular but impossible 
equal exercise of contractual balance between isolated absolute wills, in which 
its establishment of its own sovereignty must always finally consist: ÔThe 
limits within which each individual can move without harming others are 
determined by law, just as the boundary between two fields is determined by a 
stakeÕ. Arbitrariness alone can mediate between freedoms by arbitrarily 
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limiting them because Ô[t]he liberty we are dealing with here is that of man as an 
isolated monad who is withdrawn into himselfÕ,112 and who therefore must Ôsee 
in others not the realisation but the limitation of his own freedomÕ.113 
However, Marx finally reduced the social to an ÔimmediateÕ Leibnizian 
coincidence of the individual with the species, downplaying the primacy of 
reciprocal bonds of agreement as to social value.114 For him, the content of 
rights must be technologically determined according to supposedly objective 
criteria, and the operator of an ensuing social machine must initially be an 
evermore bureaucratic government. Thus, if the nineteenth century in its 
liberal aspect came to exacerbate, as with Malthus and Ricardo, the suppos-
edly ÔnaturalÕ character of the economy, it also exacerbated the supposedly 
ÔartificialÕ and ÔscientificÕ character of the political.115 The ÔpoliceÕ aspect of 
the pre-politico-economic mercantilist state, which still sought to increase 
national wealth in a more ÔdirectÕ fashion, did not, after all, go away, even if it 
was now exercised with more subtlety. From the Scots philosopher Adam 
Ferguson onwards, liberal political economy concluded that the state must 
continue to create an environment within which the market can flourish by 
attention to education, the arts, sanitation, crime, poverty and demography.116 
If the market was concerned with a supposed release of free choice (under-
girded by individual property rights), then the political aspect of civil society 
had to do with material interests at the point where this is also an inescapable 
aspect of the economic sphere. 
In this way, from early on, the rise of the Ôfree marketÕ and of Ôpolite societyÕ 
and an accompanying political ÔindirectionÕ, which regarded the market and 
cultural spheres as freely non-political, nonetheless involved also an 
unprecedented growth in the power of the central sovereign state.117 The 
economy and the political order were radically sundered, just because they 
were secretly so united. The liberal minimalism of government conceals from 
view a new maximisation of the same that is more sinister than the old archi-
tectonic role of the state, being less mediated by decentred foci of sovereign 
power and more amorally self-directed. On the one hand, this maximisation is 
exercised indirectly, as we have seen, through persuading people into a fantasy 
of nature whereby they can now only receive social recognition and quasi-
honour through adopting the new role of sheerly ÔeconomicÕ and ÔcivilÕ 
individual actors. On the other hand, the new political-economic state inter-
venes directly with a more technocratic (rather than architectonic) artifice. It 
does so not to shape peopleÕs ethical habits educationally, but, rather, to 
determine their material conditions, strength and contentment in a scarcely 
disguised contempt for higher human possibilities that is at once Protestant, 
Jansenist and utilitarian. The implicit contract here involves a trade-off 
between the security of the individual, as increasingly guaranteed by the state, 
and his political indifference and lassitude Ð together with the compounded 
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military and economic strength of a nation-state made up of increasingly 
healthy, happy and passive human persons.118 
Thus this ÔdirectÕ power concerns an increase in political artifice as outright 
amoral techne, in contrast to the supposedly ÔnaturalÕ operation of self-
interest in the economic and of ÔsympathyÕ in the social sphere. But in 
reality, such a novel governmental art operates, as Foucault argued, to control 
and manipulate human ÔanimalÕ life as the context within which economic 
processes can nestle119 Ð hence an entirely new and mostly unprecedented 
governmental attention to health, demography, sanitation, technical education 
and public entertainment. Previously, medicine, education and artistic-craft 
activity had been more diffused through ÔsocialÕ management, predominantly 
by the Church, city-state or borough, and these activities participated in polit-
ical rule to the degree that they shared in the governmental aim to promote 
human flourishing and virtue.120 Now a more centralised politics intervenes 
more immediately in peopleÕs lives, but less holistically, since it is only to 
the degree that these are mere lives Ð examples of a proper human bios that 
can be subjected to outright political manipulation in order to produce a new 
sort of humanÐanimal hybrid. This is quite other to the integrally rational, 
social, cultural and religious animal envisaged by Plato, Aristotle, Augustine 
and Aquinas. 
For the new human construct is by contrast schizophrenic Ð a hybrid of the 
purely animal and the purely and arbitrarily artificial, as if reason, sociality, 
creativity and the political architectonic of virtue were in no way our natural 
destiny. But this model does not work, as we now know, even for beavers.121 
We see only the germ of this bio-political combination of ÔnaturalÕ market and 
ÔartificialÕ sovereign state in the later eighteenth century. In the course of the 
next two centuries and beyond, its scope has been vastly intensified and 
extended, so rapidly that today even the pre-1970s politico-social landscape 
looks somewhat ÔAristotelianÕ compared with what we now experience. 
If, on the politically economic model, the state political aspect is relatively 
artificial but in reality works upon the infrastructure of economic and civil 
nature, then we can see the same liberal inversion at work in the case of the 
individual. Like the collective state actor, she is deemed to be at base amorally 
free, not naturally constrained to any ethical goal. This means that many of 
her economic and social choices are regarded as trivial: a matter of lifestyle or 
preference in a sphere that must be indulged for the sake of contentment. 
Likewise, state technical artifice must be matched by state sponsorship of the 
arts, now regarded as a libidinously free realm of leisure-time indulgence or 
else as a quasi-religious refuge from the objective realm for the isolated 
subject. 
However, her objectively crucial choices concern those to which she is 
formally bound by contract. Economic choices are of this kind, and they are 
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artificial both to the degree that they reflect personal whim and insofar as 
they are yet secured as permanent through the shackles of a legal fiction that 
is ÔbindingÕ. Nonetheless, it is assumed that people enter into the pretence of 
this bond in order to secure their very real material interests or welfare, 
besides their ultimately corporeal desires. The freedom of the Ôpolitically 
economicÕ and Ôcivilly politeÕ subject is, indeed, a freedom rooted in rights, 
which presuppose a ÔspiritualÕ notion of free will. But this is paradigmatically 
linked to the self-government of mere animal nature, which takes into 
account only utility and an animal or egoistic sympathy for the material 
needs of others. When the French revolutionaries spoke of social hierarchy as 
only justified in the interests of Ôpublic utilityÕ, they by no means had a 
reduced Benthamite notion of the useful in mind. Yet the voluntarist 
emptiness of the notion of foundational rights that they espoused invites this 
investment in a measurable, merely hedonistic utility Ð in parallel to the way 
ultra-capitalist abstraction must ultimately be coordinated with starkly 
reduced material need. 
Hence, as Foucault puts it, material ÔinterestÕ in the liberal model always 
overflows rights.122 Accordingly, the notion of the cultivation of civility 
degenerated (most of all in Britain, yet also elsewhere) into a government-
sponsored but socially diffuse promotion of the Ôgreatest happiness of the 
greatest numbersÕ (Bentham) by educative and disciplinary programmes 
more designed to induce a regularity of behaviour than to induce any dis-
cernment of personal talents or vocation.123 So where it might appear that 
liberalism is primarily about personal freedom, on account of its bio-
political character it turns out in the long run that it is more fundamentally to 
do with material interest or with (individual and collective) ÔwelfareÕ. 
Statism Trumps Individualism 
Here one can go further. The duality between the political and the biological 
means that, in the end, it is the freedom of the state and not the freedom of 
the individual that is primary for liberalism, once it has been deconstructed: 
for the liberty of the subject is only in historical reality allowed as an indirect 
device of ÔgovernmentalityÕ in order to increase the power of governance. 
And in this sense, the mercantilist model was never really abandoned, only 
surreptitiously refined. The market promotes, first of all, the welfare of the 
individual, but the state promotes the market, providing a legal contractual 
framework as its condition of possibility. Its aim in doing so is mainly to 
promote the welfare of the entire political body, wherein the formal interests 
of each and every one are taken, ever since Hobbes, to coincide, but are 
inevitably also over-determined, and perhaps primarily determined, by the 
interests of a governing class. 
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This can be evidenced by the way in which modern state tax-and-spend 
does not so much serve the purpose of rooting out poverty or inequality as 
seizing control of civil society and ensuring that it operates in the Ferguso-
nian sense of support for a strong economy, state security and military 
power. Indeed, compared with the impact of the exigencies of mass warfare, 
such measures alone have done very little to diminish inequality, even 
though they have improved base levels of health and security, if not of 
literacy and numeracy. Thus the welfare states variously in place since 1945 
have ultimately proved unable to prevent the rise in power once more of 
inherited and earned wealth.124 
Meanwhile, apparent direct attacks by governments on capital accumulation 
have fared no better. For example, the legal abolition of primogeniture and 
entail under the Napoleonic code did not prevent the return of economic 
disparities to levels as high or higher in France than in the United Kingdom by 
the end of the nineteenth century. As in the case of later social expenditure, 
these measures may have weakened the socio-political role of patrimonial 
power, but not the economic power of patrimony, which is now rendered all 
the more irresponsibly private, and yet more recruitable to the service of a 
centralised political oligarchy linked to a supposed Ôorder of meritÕ. One can 
suspect that this effect was the prime objective intention of such measures all 
along: for, as Burke noted, the French Revolution attacked absolutely every-
thing except the national debt, which had to a large degree occasioned it, but 
which it proceeded to deploy as an excuse speculatively to plunder existing 
ecclesial and social patrimonies.125 
The executive usurpation of the common sovereign will by the governing 
class becomes almost inevitable under liberal assumptions, where no tacit 
bond of a mutually acknowledged common good any longer places rulers and 
ruled within a shared horizon. But in the case of either the presumptively 
shared or covertly ruling interests of a new utilitarian elite, an increase in 
supposedly natural power or collective material strength will be the first 
prerogative. And so it is logical that later, with the advent of the economic 
doctrine of marginalism, the always latent assumption of political economy 
that the economic operator is a utilitarian calculator is explicitly recognised, 
beyond even BenthamÕs perception. Later still, with the neo-classical ideas of 
Kenneth Arrow and then the Chicago school in the twentieth century, this 
calculation is extended to the working of bureaucracies and finally even to 
things such as education, sex and procreation Ð thereby economising the 
entire social field.126 
At this point, the overturning of all inherited human wisdom is complete. 
No longer is the economy embedded in society regarded as reciprocal 
exchange. Instead, all of human life is supposedly economic and so capable 
of being ÔnaturalisedÕ, if one strips away the many veneers of custom in 
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the name of liberal reform. In consequence, the artificial directness of state 
bureaucracy and re-crafting of civil society starts increasingly to merge with 
the ÔnaturalisingÕ indirectness of rule through the marketplace. 
So, for example, today in the United Kingdom, central government 
intervention by regulation and diktat in the operation of the non-monetary 
public professions of education, medicine, law, policing and emergency aid 
has reached unprecedented heights. But the aim of this intervention is often 
newly to enforce an internal market that displaces self-control through 
adherence to standards of professional honour, with an internal market that 
negatively motivates by pitting individuals in accentuated competition with 
their peers and is happy, for example, to put public policing and prison 
management out to tender to private security forces. Here indirection comes 
entirely to coincide with direction, the invisible with the visible hand: for a 
supposedly natural competitiveness can only be released through the all too 
artificial imposition of targets, checks, quantification of achievement and 
accountability (that shiftily liberal word. 
But the economic, as we have seen, like the liberal sovereign state, finally 
concerns entirely material interest or ÔwelfareÕ. It is this primacy of welfare 
that allows us better to understand and deconstruct the duality of state and 
market. In a first historical phase (approximately from the late sixteenth to 
the early eighteenth century), a still mercantilist concern with the welfare of 
the entire body of the nation-state caused the deliberate construction through 
primary accumulation Ð via enclosures, abolition of guilds and privileged 
corporations at home, and colonisation abroad Ð of the sphere of the ÔnaturalÕ 
market governed only by the price mechanism in the balance of supply and 
demand.127 
Then after the interval of classical political economy in the eighteenth 
century (which ostensibly stressed freedom, but, in fact, inserted a more subtle 
rule of indirection), during a third historical phase in the nineteenth century, 
the still-lurking shadow of human psychic and spiritual freedom gives way 
more and more to the socio-Darwinian fantasy of a sheerly animal humanity, 
which a better evolutionary science by no means requires.128 So it is 
ÔeconomismÕ itself (the doctrine of material accumulation as the fundamental 
socio-political reality, rather than the seeking of social recognition) that 
returns us full-circle to the primacy of welfare and so to the primacy of the 
state as the authoriser of a predominantly capitalist market in the first place. 
Crucially, this includes the dependence of the emergence of a professional 
political class upon the creation of a national debt. 
Moreover, if market choice is gradually acknowledged to be a mode of 
indirect and dispersed public utilitarian calculation in the disguise of 
apparently foundational respect for individual rights, it remains the case that 
the market cannot fulfil the whole of utility or of welfare even from 
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a dogmatically liberal point of view. As Polanyi noted, the arrival of an 
unlimited market in labour, land and money in Britain in the 1830s coincided 
with an unprecedented extension of state power in terms of the collecting of 
statistics, of policing and of promotion of scientific education, civic sanita-
tion and national transportation. So from its inception, the free market was 
always linked to the authoritarian state Ð a model that Mrs Thatcher would 
later revive and extend.129 
And as Polanyi also pointed out, the subsequent emergence of state 
welfare structures in the second half of the nineteenth century was not 
primarily a reaction against laissez-faire, but, rather, a problematic extension 
of its tendential logic. 
We have seen how the liberal invention of capitalism rests on the fusion of 
the free market with the centralised state in the following terms: first, the bio-
political assumption of human division between a nature without value or 
meaning and an artifice that is either objectively technological or else 
culturally arbitrary; second, a legal framework for the undermining of older 
corporate and guild privilege, together with the institution of untrammelled 
formal contract that in general absolves impersonal transaction from personal 
involvement and commitment; third, insurances against the capitalist deficit 
in terms of both oligarchic corporatism and welfare provision that more fun-
damentally allow the Ôfree marketÕ economy to evade for a further time its 
own shortcomings. 
10. LIBERALISM SWALLOWS ITSELF 
Why should liberalism produce this illiberal upshot? And has it really done 
so? Is our diagnosis correct and is liberalism itself to blame for the manifest 
triple erosion of democracy, liberty and economic justice? For surely the 
liberal legacy has further released individual freedom and our respect for the 
individual human being? Surely it has increased true community in the form 
of a spirit of diversity, whereby we are less likely to confuse our own particu-
lar preferences with universal norms? 
Because post-liberalism is not simply anti-liberalism, it candidly agrees that 
those things have proved true up to a point. At first, as we have already noted, 
the exaltation of negative freedom of choice swept away many rigid 
restrictions and autocracies that have eventually seemed without justification 
even for their (often religious) instigators. However, in the long run, liberal-
ism seems to undo itself and to reveal that, as a mode of sophistry, it erodes 
the very political field that it claims to save. This self-undoing turns out to 
mean that eventually liberalism is exposed as a tautology and as only applying 
to abstract individuals and the monolithic collectivity, thereby revealing 
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nothing of the deeper truths about human association. Going backwards from 
post-modern liberalism through modernist liberalism to original, early mod-
ern liberalism, we will briefly highlight in three Ôsnap-shotsÕ ways in which 
the working through of the logic of liberal thought ends up by drastically 
mutating or threatening to abolish liberalism itself. 
The Scepticism of Post-Modern Liberals 
Post-modern liberalism advocated deconstruction, whereby one reveals the 
arbitrariness of any construct and the way that ÔhigherÕ values are only 
revealed by their complicity with contrasting ÔlowerÕ ones. This very simple 
exercise, of course, proved for a time eminently marketable and made many 
an academic career. However, its validity depends wholly on the assumption 
that every artificial construct is merely arbitrary and that the co-dependence 
of higher and lower somehow disproves the inherently hierarchical nature of 
their relation. 
But, of course, only liberalism itself makes this assumption about human 
constructs: they are seen as the result of naked force or else as covert 
imposition disguised as contractual agreement, since there can be no valid 
consensus about objective values for either the community or the individual. 
Claims to valuation are assumed to be rival and even incommensurable, as 
already for late modern liberal thinkers in the Anglo-Saxon tradition like 
Isaiah Berlin and Joseph Raz, who contrast the liberal value-pluralism they 
defend with the authoritarian universalism of other liberals and conservatives 
or Marxists. 
Thus liberalism imagines it can deconstruct the non-liberal Ð the traditional, 
the deferential, the customary, the religious Ð but, in reality, all that liberalism 
can deconstruct are the works of liberalism itself. For example, the atomising 
effect of both social and economic liberalism undermines the very social 
contract that liberalism promoted. And this tends to deconstruct liberalism 
tout court as being always the operator of the deconstructible. Of course, the 
post-modernists knew this Ð but even when exposing the inconsistencies of 
liberalism, they could not exit from the liberal logic upon which even that 
exercise of scepticism depended. 
The Diminishing Returns of Neo-Classical Liberalism 
The second older and modernist self-abolition of liberalism concerns the law 
of diminishing returns on marginal utilities as expounded by neo-classical 
economics from the late nineteenth century onwards. The problem is that, as 
with deconstruction, this law only applies tautologously to the products of 
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liberal choice. Trivial material goods or things that are merely the election 
of my passing fancy (which is all that liberalism and neo-classical econom-
ics can recognise in terms of valid desire) are subject to the reverse lure of 
boredom and lose their significance and so economic value over time. But 
that is not true of symbolically valuable objects, like your grandmotherÕs 
ring, or of relational goods whether enjoyed along with other people or 
other natural realities. I can constantly find more and more to treasure in a 
person or a beloved landscape. And a non-liberal economy could realisti-
cally express, even through the various modes of exchange, our often 
mutual appreciation of such things, since human disagreement about the 
common good or individual goods is simply not as absolute as metropolitan 
liberals like to fantasize. 
However, if liberalism encourages an economy based on our boredom with 
shallow things, inciting us always to want more, as our passions are beguiled 
through their subtle persuasions, then liberalism itself is of diminishing utility. 
At first it unleashed a thousand blossoms of creativity, but in the long term, it 
undermines creative impulses to produce the genuinely valuable and it equally 
undermines the confidence upon which all economic interventions and 
exchanges ultimately depend. 
Primordial Violence in Early Modern Liberalism 
In the third place, reaching still further back in time, liberalism has now 
abolished, precisely by trying radically to renew, its own early modern ori-
gins.130 The abandoning of the politics of the soul had begun well back into 
the Middle Ages but was certainly consummated in the seventeenth century, 
as we have already suggested. It arose to a large degree because agreement 
concerning the transcendent good started to be associated with conflict and 
warfare. Yet, in the face of an increasing exigency for peace at any price, 
Hobbes and others oddly assumed a hyperbolic violence, a war of all against 
all as the natural human condition. 
But this exposes to view a remarkable chiasmus. While both the Greco-
Roman philosophy of Plato, Aristotle or Cicero and Christian thought believed 
that reality was originally and at heart peaceful, and only violent because of the 
irruption of fate or sin, but in practice such thought had sometimes encouraged 
warfare in the name of this original harmony, liberalism exactly reverses this. 
In the name of reducing conflict, it, nonetheless, thought that reality was 
inherently agonistic and humans naturally egotistic and indelibly prone to the 
sway of eros.131 In the long run, just and limited warfare, as espoused by the 
older outlook in the name of original and eschatological peace partially 
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run, a liberal quasi-peace Ð designed to restrain a ÔgnosticallyÕ perverse reality 
Ð has served only to increasingly engender it in finite time, through the 
unleashing in practice and prospect of evermore unlimited and total war. 
11. LIBERALISM IN METACRISIS 
In this way, as already contended, liberalism more and more produces the war 
of all against all that was its own mistaken presupposition. This developed 
illusory proof in the shape of practical violence of its negative assumptions 
also undermines its claims to offer the salve to this reality. Thereby, its self-
swallowing is no partial crisis, susceptible to a new adjustment, but is rather a 
metacrisis, which cannot be transcended, whether for good or ill, in a purely 
liberal way. 
This holds true despite the many historical wars over truth as to claims to 
territory or creed: for were they not more noble than liberal wars over money, 
and less terrible than the wars that have been instigated by nihilists who have 
taken the liberal logic to its limits? At least, the past wars over jurisdiction and 
belief assumed a reachable horizon of consensus in eternally guaranteed moral 
reality: the pax romana or the pax christiana. But it is this horizon that 
liberalism no longer envisages. Initially it wagers that a more modest, horizon-
less cynicism will produce a more stable political pacification. But in the long 
run, this very cynicism has proved to be naive delusion: a horizon, after all, of 
assumed ontological violence that eventually proves a terrible prophecy of the 
nihilist consequences of such an assumption, without by one jot confirming it. 
At the heart of liberal self-undoing lies the primacy of the economic and the 
political over the social and thus the subordination of both social bonds and 
civic ties to the abstract standards of law and contract. So under the aegis of 
liberalism, the realm of society is corroded from two opposite directions. On 
the one hand, everything human is declared only natural Ð we are a bunch of 
greedy apes with bigger brains. On the other hand, everything human is 
declared entirely artificial, just stuff that we have made up such as the social 
contract, which reflects nothing other than the arbitrary whims of human 
volition and can be simply undone by other acts of will. In this way, liberalism 
tends to make the human vanish in two directions: first, archaically in the face 
of the tide of pre-human nature by appealing to the lowest instincts such as 
greed, fearfulness and enmity; second, futuristically, in favour of a Ôpost-
humanÕ project that can hopefully subordinate human egotism and the 
unpredictabilities of desire to a cybernetic future that will augment the liberal 
Ôpeace of a sortÕ into an absolute bio-politics. In this way, the consummation 
of liberalismÕs inevitable utilitarian inversion ushers in a phase of history that 
is both post-democratic and post-humanist.132 
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Chapter 2 
The Post-liberal Alternative 
1. POST-LIBERALISM AND THE COMMON GOOD 
The sway of both social and economic liberalism is today being qualified by 
the intrusion of political polarities that do not readily fit into a leftÐright 
spectrum.1 These new polarities concern variously the populist versus the 
technocratic, the bio-conservationist versus the trans-human, rootedness 
versus mobility, the interpersonal versus the anonymous, the virtuous versus 
the amoral, the local versus the uniformly global and, above all, the primacy 
of society versus the primacy of the economy and the polity. 
The neglect of the social is the neglect of the substantive. People may be 
free and equal in theory and even before the law, but in practice, the grossest 
inequities and inhibitions of the freedoms of the many pertain. During the 
period of neo-liberal hegemony, the gap between the wealth of the super-rich 
and the often falling incomes (in real terms) of the majority has widened, 
while rights to free time, work breaks and worker organisation have nar-
rowed. In a more concealed way, the pressures of frenetic work have left 
most of us too tired to explore real exercises of freedom in creativity and 
adventure. Yet it is increasingly apparent that liberty and equity cannot be 
rendered fully substantive by a programme of liberal statist equalisation that 
has always proved to engender a new tyranny exercised by an elite of state 
functionaries and party cadres. 
Instead, post-liberalism suggests that a more universal flourishing for all 
can be obtained when we continuously seek to define the goals of human 
society as a whole and then to discern the variously different and in them-
selves worthwhile roles that are required for the mutual achievement of these 
shared aims. The respective freedoms of these roles and their rewards will be 
variegated: not literally equal in terms of wealth, power or command and yet 
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equitable and so capable of sincere general acceptability. It can even be the case 
within such a post-liberal approach to justice that Ð as Aristotle suggested Ð 
rewards of honour and prestige for some may be balanced by unexpectedly high 
material rewards for relatively humble but crucial contributions.2 
Yet contemporary liberalism argues that appeals to goodness ignore the 
diversity of incompatible and incommensurable values in the complex societ-
ies of our late modern age. This means that we can only agree to disagree and 
put in place some ground rules of fairness, for anything else would violate the 
sacrosanct principle of negative liberty. But, if anything, the reverse is true. It 
is precisely negatively open and indeterminate freedom, the Ôgeneral willÕ and 
utility maximisation that are the enemies of pluralism and tolerance, because 
they impose a single, homogeneous and uniform set of standards on 
everybody: mutually self-interested contract instead of real mutual agreement; 
an often assumed collective volition to the detriment of free association and 
aggregate utility instead of the diverse but coordinated flourishing of both 
persons and groups. 
By contrast, faith in the common good promotes the plural search for shared 
ends. For the common good is not the total mathematically measurable good, an 
aggregate of privately owned items, but is, rather, concerned with the truest 
goods that we share together, such as intimacy, trust and beauty, whether 
momentarily with strangers or continuously with friends.3 But a sense of the 
common good shared by an entire culture is embedded in practices of honour 
and reciprocity. Such an ethos can only develop over time, through the habitual 
formation of tradition, the educative exercise of wise leadership and the 
prudential adaptation in practice by all of previous example. 
Indissolubly linked to the vertical need for virtuous leadership is the other 
aspect of a general Ômoral economyÕ of the entire social order, which is hori-
zontal mutual obligation or the principle of solidarity. European socialism was 
first grounded in the notion of solidarity among labour and it regarded all 
human beings as workers in one crucial aspect of their humanity, which is the 
capacity for artifice and free creativity. As Maurice Glasman has said, in line 
with Catholic Social Thought, ÔIt is with respect to work that we see the 
personal origin of all of human society and culture, the manifestation of indi-
vidual and unique character.Õ4 Yet work as the free expression of personhood 
requires learning from the past and induction into inherited lineages of good 
craft, as well as an initial submitting to guidance if one is eventually to guide 
in oneÕs turn (the self-cancelling aspect of verticality). It requires equally 
patient relating and sympathetic cooperation with fellow workers and clients 
(along the horizontal plane). A traditionally socialist affirmation of solidarity 
and mutuality therefore requires a linkage with certain Burkean thematics if it 
is not simply to fade back into the current hegemony of liberal notions of 
isolated freedom of choice. 
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The same consideration applies to notions of equality. How can we decide 
to own some things in common and to divide up other goods equitably if we 
do not know what constitutes a good and what broad ends of flourishing 
human beings should agree to pursue? Of course, we have no fixed or final 
knowledge of such things. But it is precisely the inherited wisdom of 
tradition that gives us some intimation of their nature, something to begin to 
debate about. And it is education that allows us critically to refine and debate 
this intimation. Without a concern for formation and virtue, which is not in 
itself democratic Ð because the genuine good remains the good even if all 
voted against it Ð we lack the precondition of well-informed discussion. Only 
such a discussion enables a true ÔrepublicanÕ, participatory democracy, which 
will not degenerate into mass manipulation through propaganda wielded by 
the powerful and amoral. The paradox here is that democracy depends 
vertically and temporally on a hierarchy of virtue. Yet at the same time, 
virtue is also spatially horizontal and of itself democratic in the sense that 
virtuous practices are open to all, and universal education provides one form 
of such access. 
This is especially the case in the Christian era, which has seen the most 
crucial virtues stemming from agape as exercisable by all Ð in contrast to the 
most admired virtues of classical antiquity, which involved a usually male 
exercise of stored wealth, knowledge and power for the exercise of generos-
ity. Here the crucial vertical dimension of social giving was grasped, but not 
so completely the horizontal dimension of the reciprocal exchange of gifts of 
all kinds as the most fundamental basis of social order.5 Such mutuality 
reflects the fact that we are rarely either purely interested or purely disinter-
ested. Society is a spiral paradox of Ônon-compulsory compulsionÕ, in which 
the giving of gifts (and every act and speech-act is a gift) half-expects but 
cannot compel a return gift. This is the very fabric of all human society. It is 
at once a political and an economic fabric, so that when we try to base our 
economy on de-sacralisation and individualism, society is gradually abol-
ished and humanity starts to contradict itself.6 
Post-liberalism, accordingly, concerns the continued link of loving inten-
tion to ancient virtue as skill, whose key mark is Aristotelian phronesis: a 
kind of moral art or tact. Without such links, we will remove social judge-
ment from the hands of humans as workers or craftsmen and assume that 
everything public must be precisely legislated and oligarchically controlled, 
with love confined to the private sphere. Similarly, this notion of ethical art 
allows us to steer between the illusion of absolutely inviolable (and so non-
relational) human rights on the one hand, and equally absolute rights of the 
sovereign power to override private freedoms in the name of collective 
security and strength, on the other. One can illustrate this by saying that 
governments have no unexceptioned right to know everything, but neither 
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are rights of privacy unexceptioned in relation to the public good. Therefore 
(to avert to some contemporary contestations), soldiers who reveal flagrant 
injustices performed in the course of battle should not be treated as mere 
breakers of a contract, since they are appealing to a wider, and sometimes 
implicit, social compact. But neither can army commanders treat protection 
of their troopsÕ lives as an absolute, given that a soldier, by definition, has 
signed up to possible sacrificial death, in the face of other considerations, 
such as not alienating a civilian population. 
Having initially defined post-liberalism as the primacy of common good, 
we must now further spell out the nature of the common good in terms of 
what we will argue are its crucial general components: (a) a culture of 
honour, (b) community as the combination of virtue with gift; (c) true 
socialism; (d) political pluralism; and (e) genuine corporatism. 
2. HONOUR AND ETHOS 
In a sense, what is most of all opposed by post-liberals is the increased 
criminalisation of political and economic power, which both lies behind, and 
is reinforced by, their newly reinforced collaboration. Inner-city riots across 
the West, from New York to Paris, London and Malmo, can plausibly be 
seen here as a strangely political manifestation of petty criminality. In effect, 
the rioters indicate their scepticism about the moral superiority of the current 
legislators and law enforcers.7 If they implicitly suppose that there is no 
moral, as opposed to pragmatic, reason for keeping the law, then this is 
surely a conclusion that they share with many wealthy financiers, journalists, 
senior policemen and holders of government office. 
Thus the criminalisation of the young rioters ensues necessarily upon the 
debased materialism of modern liberal assumptions, which demand no exer-
cise of ÔhonourÕ from leaders, but only an acting in their own self-interest 
within legal bounds and a representation of the massed selfishness of others. 
An understandable cynicism about the exercise of honour in the past causes us 
to overlook the fact that yet more dire consequences follow when honour is 
not even paid any normative lip service. For it is no longer so clear that self-
interest and legality will sustain each other in a beneficial circle, as the liberal 
capitalist model requires. According to this outlook, a more measured and 
pragmatic self-interest will prevent any habitual or contagious breaking of 
legal bounds. But today, the loosening of regulations on finance and business, 
together with the legal weakening of trade unionsÕ right to resist, means that 
the border between the permissible and the impermissible has become fatally 
blurred. In consequence, the realm of Ôwhat one can get away withÕ has been 
greatly extended. And since the requirement for order permits no 
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real vacuum, the formal bounds of trust in contract Ð upon which capitalism 
is supposed to rely Ð get gradually displaced by mafia-like power structures 
of interpersonal corporate bullying, blackmail, deceit and protectionist 
racketeering (of however polite a kind). 
The antidote to this cannot only be a restoration of proper regulation of 
monetary practice. For if the single constraint upon individuals and corporate 
bodies is fear of reprisal, then such a purely liberal economic order is inher-
ently unstable. That is because the Hobbesian logic of sheer self-interest 
undergirding contract always ensures that the former will strive to break the 
bounds of the latter. Thus the inherent dynamic of capitalism threatens its 
own formal, anarchy-assuming order in the direction of a more substantive 
and enacted anarchy. So it is not just a matter of Ôthe wrong politicsÕ having 
allowed moneyed men to more and more evade norms in a manner that is 
readily reversible, should more popular voices prevail. For it is the inner 
thrust of capitalism that has recently broken through the forlorn attempts of 
social democracy to hold back its tide, while not seeking to alter this funda-
mentally prevailing current. Thus the seawalls of state protection against the 
worst excesses were eventually and not accidentally breached. 
But this breaching by the force of capitalism is also over-reaching, as we 
have seen. It tends to convert capitalism into a mode of criminal economic 
oligarchy, often half in league with political oligarchies of the state. By 
refusing all self-restraint of honour and all direction towards truly substan-
tive goals, market operators are ironically doomed to evolve towards a mafia-
like parody of an honour-economy. In such a perverse economy, the 
neglected interpersonal dimension reasserts its unavoidable human sway in a 
brutal idiom, however paradoxically enabled by evermore obscurely abstract 
refinements. 
It follows that only a business ethos that eschews financial gain as the sole 
motivation can possibly ensure a stable economic process that does not 
degenerate into inequitable practice, malpractice and outright criminality. 
More substantive teleological regulation based on mutually recognised self-
interest and allowance of organised labourÕs right to resist are necessary 
ingredients in such stability. But even they are not sufficient in themselves, 
because they also will be breached if their tenor is at variance with the 
groundswell of a continued self-interest alone on the part of entrepreneurs 
and also of workers themselves. 
Therefore, a new internal ethos is required, in order to ensure stability and 
sustainability in the economic domain. One can never abolish, nor should one 
seek to abolish, the motivation of proper pride. But this lies deeper in human 
psychology than our mere pursuit of power, material wealth or a shallow 
amour propre. It is an inherently social motivation because it is linked to 
recognition by others for honourable performance of a mutually recognised 
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and beneficial role. And here lies the core of an honour culture. An 
alternative business ethos, which would be a new version of many economic 
environments in the past, would seek to instil the pursuit of self-worth as a 
seeking for collegial and public recognition. In turn, this would encourage 
the virtuous provision of social benefit, and genuine distributed wealth of all 
kinds Ð besides the successful production of worthwhile things and the 
attainment of reasonable profit enabling a future expansion of objectively 
desirable as well as successful economic production. 
In this way, one can see how a renewed sense of Ômy station and its dutiesÕ 
(in the Victorian Idealist philosopher F.H. BradleyÕs phrase) is the basis for 
any possibility of equitable sharing. Otherwise, we will have no basis upon 
which to agree what resources and rewards might properly belong to any 
given civic role. And in the case of every metier, this inevitably includes a 
legitimate place for hierarchy in terms of educative guidance, gradual initia-
tion and the conveying of tradition and ecological balance (both natural and 
cultural) into the future. Where this necessity is insincerely denied, there the 
unavoidable hierarchical function does not just vanish, but, rather, assumes 
more and more the modes of abstract wealth, empty celebrity and naked force, 
shorn of the tempering gloss of the honourable. Thus the pursuit of pure 
equality is a self-defeating myth, whereas, paradoxically, the attempt to 
realise a valid hierarchy and a true deference is the only possible means to 
realise a more equal society in practice. 
Likewise, honour and good ethos can only be renewed by reconnecting in 
novel ways both material wealth and political power to symbolic signifi-
cance. Here the work of Karl Polanyi is decisive. In effect, Polanyi devised a 
history and typology of the economics of honour, or of the relationship of 
wealth to power and symbol. He recognised that, in the era of ancient com-
munity, the economy was integrated first through the reciprocal exchange of 
gifts, which was the crucial way of constituting society through ever-
renewed mutual dependency and recognition. Later, with the emergence of 
proto-state formations of one kind or another, it was reintegrated through a 
more deliberated exchange of economic goods mediated by a sovereign tribal 
or political centre. Such a centre distributed and redistributed benefits and 
favours. Of course, this generally involved various forms of oppression and 
inequality,8 despite the common expectation of an honourable magnanimity 
on the part of rulers, which to a degree was supposed to restrain, and 
sometimes even did restrain, these endemic excesses. This is witnessed in 
many ancient Near Eastern texts, including the Hebrew Bible/ Old 
Testament.9 
In modern times, by contrast, integration has been increasingly achieved 
(at least in aspiration Ð in reality, many crucial archaisms oil its wheels) 
through the unplanned and seemingly accidental coordination of isolated 
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individual needs and preferences in the increasingly global marketplace. In 
consequence, all the higher and ideal motivations of human beings in the past, 
which had been perennially proposed as examples for children to imitate, now 
start to be read as mere ideological disguises for the self-seeking of the ÔfewÕ 
rather than the ÔmanyÕ.10 
However, Polanyi did not wallow in mere nostalgia. He recognised per-
fectly well that the spread of commerce had dislodged unjust hierarchies and 
impermeable local tyrannies. Yet at the same time, he correctly considered 
that there was severe loss as well as gain involved here, and that with the 
passage of time, economic disembedding engenders more terrible and locally 
impinging tyrannies than any known to the past Ð the Ôsatanic millsÕ of the 
Industrial Revolution, which Danny BoyleÕs opening ceremony at the 2012 
London Olympics captured so well. 
Therefore, Polanyi hoped that we might yet achieve a balance between 
community and contract through a fluid cognition of the importance of recip-
rocal free association and just political distribution. This could be done in a 
manner that would respect group feeling and the common good, and yet also 
advance the authentic creative reach of individual liberty Ð given that it lacks 
any real scope if pursued in isolation. 
The popular search for such a balance is today witnessed in a growing 
desire on the part of many people to combine the pursuit of material well-
being with honourable social service.11 Perhaps this is because, where a 
certain measure of wealth commonly prevails, one starts to need other 
markers of prestige. The currency of mere currency must eventually become 
debased with over-usage, and people begin to search for other and usually 
more elevated tokens of esteem.12 For one can wager that the logic of mutual 
honour is fundamental to the constitution of human culture itself. 
Once, through this dialectical return to basics, the exchange of honouring 
becomes itself a socio-economic currency, more and more consumers may 
naturally tend to ally themselves through their choices to an honourable style of 
life. The capitalist mutation of the buying of mere commodities into the buying 
of lifestyles enables people to feel that they are joining the ruling spectacle of 
cultural command.13 But this can further and benignly shift into a more 
genuinely participatory involvement in an ethical process. Indeed, such 
participation tends to prevent the creaming off of both the surplus value of the 
commodity and the surplus alienated power of the mass cultural spectacle. 
Examples here include various modes of Fair Trade and fair treatment of 
workers, which tends to go along with the relative reliability of product and fair 
treatment of the consumer herself. In this way, a certain significant contagion of 
good practice is starting to arise: limited and peripheral, yet growing and 
converging evermore upon the core economy, as we see with the growth of 
hybrid profit/not-for-profit enterprises.14 
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3. VIRTUE, GIFT, COMMUNITY 
It is for these reasons to do with honour and good ethos that one should now 
question our over-devotion to the social democratic politics of supposedly 
ÔgivenÕ material interest qualified by governmental tinkering where profits 
will allow. Instead, political movements need to revisit their legacies of 
ethical commitment, which was often linked in the past to strong group 
adherence Ð whether to religious bodies or to secular equivalents. This also 
tended to involve a spirit of genuine festivity, rooted in folk culture (that 
persists, despite everything), as opposed to the craven promotion of mass 
commercial culture by a left liberal metropolitan middle class. 
A post-liberal perspective would thereby combine a working-class search 
for restored community with the new middle-class search for more holistic 
fulfilment in work and the search of both classes for the combining of work 
with the needs of family and community.15 It would also not give priority to 
goals of social mobility and individual rights Ð although these aims have a 
validity and importance within a certain range.16 Rather, post-liberals seek to 
broker cooperation where there are conflicts of interest and to bring people 
together in a nobler and more benign rivalry over honourable achievement 
and excellent performance. 
In this context, they refuse the implicit disdain for those performing 
necessary mundane jobs implied in the reduction of equality to Ôequality of 
opportunityÕ. The same attitude rides roughshod over humble circumstances 
of birth and belonging that are still vital to most individualsÕ sense of identity 
and being cherished. ÔRescuingÕ a talented few from an abject human morass 
is hardly a radical objective, even if lowly born talent should rightly be 
recognised and encouraged to succeed. All the evidence suggests that in any 
case this approach rarely works. Rather, whole families and communities 
need to be nurtured. It has been demonstrated in practice that only a holistic 
tackling of every aspect of a deprived local communityÕs life, including the 
initially gratuitous distribution of owned assets, resources and responsibili-
ties, can make any effective and long-term difference.17 By the same token, 
we need a shift in focus away from a reactive approach that mostly deals 
with the effects of problems (e.g. unemployment and ill-health) and towards 
a proactive stance that tackles the root causes by adopting a strategy of early 
intervention.18 For example, teaching underprivileged parents to read with 
their children has been shown to be decisive.19 
For fundamental humanist reasons, post-liberals place a securing of the 
mutual flourishing and vocational development of all above the goal of social 
mobility. Yet these considerations show that this more associationist and 
outcome-focused approach is also more likely to assist a wider number and 
range of individuals. Equally, the ensuring of more contentment and 
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satisfaction from the bottom up is more likely to instil good working practices 
that complete and round off more overarching architectonics, besides fertilis-
ing a ground soil from which more sturdy and flamboyant shoots may spring. 
If it is true that virtuous ends are internal to activities, then it follows that 
no ethical objective, which is not to some degree intrinsically realisable by 
some known process of activity, is genuinely ÔmoralÕ at all.20 By comparison, 
the public promotion of utility may appear moral, but at bottom it is only 
committed to the pursuit of an amoral and sensualistic private ÔhappinessÕ. 
Equally, the public respect for freedom may appear to be moral, but at root it 
recognises only the infinite vagaries of private desire. For an unadulterated 
liberal understanding, private desire must reduce to the random promptings of 
individual bodily motions or the human will. But against the impersonal-ism 
of liberal institutions and policies, post-liberals shift the emphasis to the 
Ôwhole personÕ Ð the unity of body, mind and soul, embedded in a social order 
that is more basic than either state or market and to which these necessary 
realities must be referred. 
The social is more basic than either the political or the economic because 
human society Ð beyond the natureÐculture divide Ð binds together material 
reality with symbolic significance. Indeed, human culture primordially forms 
around the production and exchange of things that are both goods and symbols. 
If the inaugurating gifts of goods and symbols are received, then they enter 
into circulation, and a community is constituted insofar as it understands itself 
as ÔparticipatingÕ in the Ôideal realityÕ that significant material goods are taken 
to represent. This circulation enjoins on the community cer-tain preferred 
behaviours, as contemporary anthropology has documented.21 
According to ethnographically aware thinkers in the wake of Marcel 
Mauss, the linguistic, the social, the political, the economic and the ethical 
were all originally inseparable. To some degree they remain so, since this is 
the very logic of the human as such, as an irreducibly social animal.22 We are 
only Ôbound togetherÕ through structures of mutual recognition mediated by 
things at once tangible and meaningful. That implies things imbued with a 
ÔsenseÕ that must be in the last analysis ineffable.23 Therefore, to remove all 
ÔlocationÕ from people is to remove the very soil of their humanity, which 
alone fundamentally nurtures cultural growth.24 
Against this abstract universalism of liberal ideology and its preference for 
the global and the virtual, post-liberals argue for the honouring of place.25 At 
the same time, they recognise that communities are never discrete and are 
even internally constituted by micro-meetings with relative strangers who 
constantly arrive through time, from other ÔtribesÕ, from the other gender and 
from elsewhere altogether. The ineffable identity of community is the result 
of a constant binding and re-binding of these micro-disparities. And with the 
advance of history, diverse communities get evermore entangled with each 
Milbank and Pabst_9781783486489.indb 78 5/31/2016 3:20:25 PM 
AQ: Please 
check if the 
sentence that 
begins with 
ÒYet, thisÓ is 
OK in 
meaning. 
78 Chapter 2 
other.26 Yet this circumstance only augments a need to newly construct a 
situated if complex and spatially entangled shared identity, which never alto-
gether loses touch with its originally more discrete bases. For example, the 
inhabitants of Cornwall today are fathomlessly diverse, yet an ancient sense 
of Cornishness still exerts a deeper sway over most of them. 
It follows that the clichd contrast of a cosy community where all are 
friends to an alienating city where all are strangers is false. Community is 
always a Ôbeing withÕ, as etymology would suggest. Therefore it is composed 
of a long string of entangled relationships. All these encounters are with 
others who must remain somewhat unknown, however familiar. Indeed, the 
deeper the encounter with a friend, the more her profound otherness will 
emerge. It is, rather, every urban stranger who is formally the same and 
substitutable. And surely it is in negotiating such mutual strangeness that a 
shared ineffability of local cultural atmosphere arises to engender a shared 
new strangeness and depth. Because community consists of a series of end-
less, if characterised, encounters, it is also, as its etymology further indicates 
(munus is one Latin word for gift), a series of exchanged and binding gifts, 
which originally constitute society prior to any economic or political 
contract. Herein consists the very ÔcommerceÕ of both friendship and 
common life in a shared polity.27 
In this way, the social already includes and yet constrains both the 
economic and the political. As Jacques Godbout puts it, the social as the gift-
exchanging relationship is a Ôstrange loop and a tangled hierarchyÕ.28 It is the 
former because it involves an economy of spiralling linkage through time 
rather than perfect circularity or mutual standoff in space. It is the latter 
because it involves continued guidance and ordering of some by others, but 
often in educative oscillation and in such a way that some may lead for certain 
purposes while others may lead for different ones. From this argument, it can 
be seen how both the economic and the political spring from the humus of the 
social. In the course of time, they have obviously attained a certain autonomy 
that cannot simply be undone. Nonetheless, the post-liberal politics of virtue 
asks how the economy and the polity could today be more referred back to 
their always secretly fundamental social basis, embedded in relationships of 
reciprocal trust and collective endeavour. 
4. SOCIALISM AND COMMON DECENCY 
As we saw in chapter 1, the supreme irony of liberal theory is that the pessi-
mism and cynicism with regard to human nature, which it falsely assumes in 
theory, it truly delivers in practice over time. People tend to live up to what is 
expected of them, and if the prime mode of social recognition is a collective 
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salute to successfully manifested narcissism, then the dominant idioms of 
human behaviour will follow suit. Yet the liberal Ôontology of violenceÕ or of 
Ôthe primacy of evilÕ is not thereby confirmed, only the real effect of perverse 
liberal assumptions.29 
We can contrast this self-fulfilling prophecy of liberal pessimism with 
George OrwellÕs genuinely socialist, but also ÔTory anarchistÕ, trust in Ôcom-
mon decencyÕ.30 People have always lived through practices of reciprocity, 
through giving, gratitude and giving again in turn. By way of this process, 
people achieve, in a simple way, mutual recognition and relationality. Most 
people pursue association and the honour and dignity of being recognised in 
significant ways (however lowly) as their main goals. They are relatively 
unconcerned with becoming much richer than their fellows or achieving great 
power over them. Indeed, most people wisely realise that such things will 
only increase their anxiety and insecurity. Rather, like hobbits they prefer the 
less spectacular but steadily satisfying life of the shire. 
Nevertheless, this is not Rousseauist liberal optimism. The temptation to 
pursue the goals of pride at the expense of danger is there in all of us Ð in 
some, more than in others, and in some, to an overwhelming degree that can 
threaten the social fabric. Deep down, people are ÔdecentÕ and rejoice in rela-
tionality, yet in all of us a destructive imp of the perverse always lurks, and it 
is finally human perversion and passionate submission to their worst 
instincts, and not merely the unavoidable sway of alien structuring forces, 
which are responsible for the ravages of liberalism. The bad structures are, in 
the end, but our bad human habits. 
Orwell suggested that a good society is one that erects safeguards against 
such perversity, and especially against the overweening, reckless individual, 
and he pointed out that most tribal structures are built on just this Ôwarding off 
of dangerÕ.31 Conversely, the positive structures of a social order should seek to 
build upon our natural and given practices of reciprocity Ð not destroying, but 
augmenting, our natural capacity for association. For Orwell this was 
ÔsocialismÕ, and one could cite here the way in which the UK National Health 
Service built upon the pre-existing practices of mutual assistance that had 
begun in the working classes, sometimes with philanthropic help. Of course, 
this very genealogy demands that we remain vigilant as to whether or not the 
politicisation and centralisation of an originally social practice is in danger of 
destroying the local, participative and cooperative dimension. 
But liberalism does just the opposite to what Orwell recommends: it tries to 
remove intermediate social practices of mutual assistance, while augmenting 
our tendencies to pursue wealth and prestige, instead of human and, ultimately, 
divine love. It ignores the fact that human life as such depends upon a bedrock 
of gift-exchange and that it develops in time through the astonishing and 
gratuitous irruption of new gifts of talent.32 In the nineteenth 
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century, working people and some intellectuals started to grasp this. They 
were inspired by a spontaneous sense that something was missing from 
liberal modernity. What was lacking was relationality, creative fulfilment in 
work, festivity and joy. They did not, like some conservatives of Ôthe rightÕ, 
wish to return to the bastard feudalism of the ancien rgime, but they also 
rejected the individualism of the modern liberal ÔleftÕ. 
Now, to pursue relationality above all is to risk being wounded by the 
other: thus the mood is, indeed, often going to be ÔblueÕ.33 The market and 
the state encourage us to think that we can be insulated from such hurt by the 
impersonality of economic and bureaucratic or legal transactions.34 But 
without embracing the likelihood of some or even much sorrow, there can be 
no openness to real joy either. Through a bland buffering, participatory 
power is removed from ordinary people. 
By contrast to such sterile immunity, traditions of courage, commitment, 
loyalty and leadership shaped the workersÕ movement in Britain, France and 
then elsewhere, in resisting the worst excesses of the Industrial Revolution. 
Against the forces of the increasingly free market and the increasingly 
centralised state, British workers set up burial societies to honour their dead, 
and created cooperatives and mutuals to honour their communities and the 
places that they inhabited. They forged ties among Anglicans, Catholics, 
Methodists, other Nonconformists, Evangelicals and Jews that gave rise to an 
almost unique internationalist movement of patriots who honoured their 
country, its constitutional legacy, literary culture and singularly long history 
of political unity and organic development. 
This radical traditionalism transcends reactionary nostalgia whose fatalism 
is just as misguided as the progressive utopianism of both state communism 
and market capitalism. In keeping with the oldest socialist traditions in Britain 
and France, and with an echo of Radical Toryism reaching back to Cobbett, 
Wesley and Dr Johnson, post-liberals reject both these positions in favour of 
the endless creative reshaping of traditional prescriptions and the reforming of 
habits, which can seriously and drastically transform, beyond the illusory 
reach and damaging iconoclasm of revolutions. 
5. POLITICAL PLURALISM AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 
As we saw in chapter 1, liberalism is incorrigibly atomistic. Liberal recognition 
of group identity is always subordinate to the recognition of individual rights. 
As we also saw, those nineteenth-century liberals who tried to transform 
liberalism in a more organicist direction, were, in reality, producing a hybrid 
theory that was no longer pure liberalism.35 Rather, it drew upon some form of 
Ôorganic pluralismÕ on which contemporary post-liberalism builds. 
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Liberalism so inspired, as with aspects of W.E. Gladstone and the more 
theologically orthodox drift of mainline Victorian Protestant dissent (as 
compared with the eighteenth century), denoted not religious or philosophical 
ÔindifferenceÕ, nor the revolutionary Ôrights of manÕ. Rather, it denoted 
charitable humanitarianism, constitutionalism, the rule of equitable law, and 
the deepening and widening of ancient civil liberties (in a manner that could, 
as with Gladstone, sometimes blend variously whig and tory legacies). This 
liberalism, which is still liberal in the root sense of ÔgenerousÕ, post-liberals 
fully endorse and sustain. That which genuinely challenges liberalism is a 
truer ÔliberalityÕ, which supposes that societies are more fundamentally bound 
together by mutual generosity than by contract Ð this being a thesis anciently 
investigated by Seneca in his De Beneficiis, and in modernity again reinstated 
by Marcel Mauss. 
Organic constitutional pluralism supplements the other nineteenth-century 
liberalism of ancient liberality or tolerant generosity in a significant way. As 
already intimated in chapter 1, its defence of the relative independence of 
social groups is part of a fundamentally different conception of sovereignty. It 
rejects the liberal idea of isolated, autonomous individuals whose activities 
can only be coordinated by an absolutely sovereign centre, holding a monop-
oly of violence, power and ultimate decision making. By contrast, political 
pluralists would shift the focus away from modern accounts of sovereignty in 
terms of a single source of absolute sovereign power (monarchic or popular) 
towards the idea of plural sources and graded degrees of sovereign power. 
Key to this is the role of constitutionally protected corporate bodies that 
mediate between the individual and the sovereign centre, for example, 
associations and intermediary institutions such as manufacturing and trading 
guilds, cooperatives, ethical and profit-sharing businesses, trade unions, 
voluntary organisations, universities, village colleges, ecological groups and 
free cities.36 
An ÔorganicÕ pluralism provides a more logical bulwark against atomistic 
liberalism than a mere Ôliberal pluralismÕ (to which many pluralists have 
been prone) that sees the state as secondary to the social, because it proffers 
no postulate of either individuals or groups existing ÔbeforeÕ the political. 
Groups no more ÔprecedeÕ the political whole than do LockeÕs supposedly 
isolated individuals engaged in the ÔoriginalÕ social contract. That is because 
both persons and corporate bodies can only fulfil their functions and turn 
conflict into cooperation within a common polity pursuing shared ends, even 
if this polity consists in a pre-legal tribal ritual bonding. For the architectonic 
function of Ôthe oneÕ, though it need not be monopolising or monolithic, is, 
nonetheless, indispensable and co-original with the social, being part of it Ð 
as Thomas Aquinas (building on Aristotle and the Greek Christian fathers) 
taught. 
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Yet, conversely, pluralism does not posit a political sphere that takes 
precedence over particular societies and society in general, constituting 
them with theoretical and historical priority.37 That is because the polity is 
itself a nested, interlocking union of persons, families and communities 
who are bound to one another by social ties and civic bonds Ð the fabric 
that holds society together. And despite its organicism, which stresses the 
functional interlocking of diverse groups in achievement of a shared 
sociality and the common good, the organic constitutional pluralism that 
we defend does not rule out elements of a more heterogeneous pluralism 
and the toleration of different groups. For political society as a whole need 
not entirely agree with the premises of individual groups or corporate 
bodies to be able, nonetheless, to accept that these groups and bodies are 
performing certain roles that contribute to the cohesion of the entire polity. 
Christians do not have to ascribe to exclusively adult baptism to see that 
Baptist churches rightly value Christian baptism and assist in social 
cohesion. Likewise, we do not have to be pacifists, teetotallers or execra-
tors of all forms of gambling to see that organisations of pacifists, temper-
ance associations and Methodists usefully remind us through their extreme 
rejections that war and addiction to potentially dangerous practices are not 
good things. Therefore at a deeper level, dissenting groups paradoxically 
reinforce a deeper social consensus. 
If this is not the case, then either society is tolerating and often regulating 
a sin that it rightly does not see as a crime (as for example with some modes 
of pornography and, in some countries, recreational drugs), yet still marks its 
disapproval through modes of regulation. Or else society cannot and should 
not tolerate at all dissenting practices that do not exaggerate shared common 
principles so much as reject them altogether. For example, it is fine if shariÕa 
law brokers marriages according to Islamic custom, so long as this does not 
permit polygamy or the coercion of women disallowed by either Roman or 
Common Law as informed by the Christian Canon law tradition. That would 
violate the necessarily organic element in post-liberal pluralism, in the name 
of a diabolical combination of liberal pluralism and barbaric disrespect for 
the female sex and human dignity.38 
Finally, pluralism defends the idea of group personality. That means the 
paradoxical blending of personhood and association. A notion of group per-
sonality requires a teleological ethics: one has to be able to say that a group is 
aiming for a goal, that its collective character fosters desired social ends. And 
to reiterate the point just made: even if there are groups with whose ideals you 
do not fully agree, you can, nevertheless, acknowledge that in one sense they 
are pursuing social goals that are compatible with, and promote a shared sense 
of human dignity and respect for life. The hyperbolic respect of animal rights 
activists for animal life and dignity reminds us of something important, 
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although if they equalise the worth of animal with human life, they must be 
strenuously resisted. 
Linked to this pluralist organicism is the re-invention of Ôconstitutional 
corporatismÕ in a more plural guise against both market individualism and 
state collectivism, in particular the principle of Ômixed governmentÕ and the 
role of corporate bodies in both politics and the economy. Beyond the 
formalist separation of powers that ends in institutional stalemate or the 
primacy of executive power, the principle of mixed constitution can help 
balance the three branches of sovereign, executive and judiciary, while at the 
same time upholding the autonomy of both individuals and corporate bodies 
within a free, shared social space. Such balancing blends, power of the ÔoneÕ 
(nation, parliament, monarchy or president), the ÔfewÕ (regions, localities, 
professions and virtuous elites) and the ÔmanyÕ (the people or the citizenry). 
This approach can re-balance the growing power of the executive and the 
judiciary vis--vis the legislature at the national level and of a financial 
oligarchy at that of the global. 
6. PERSON, CORPORATION, DISTRIBUTION 
In addition to support for the integrity of social groups, post-liberals seek to 
uphold the inalienable dignity of the person in extra-legalistic ways. Persons, 
unlike liberal atomic ÔsubjectsÕ who are supposedly primary and yet in both 
theory and reality interchangeable, are at once ÔmoreÕ and at the same time 
ÔlessÕ than the social whole. Less, because persons only exist in relation and 
only acquire defined personal roles in relation to the totality of these relations, 
which is the social whole. More, because it is the very position of the person in 
a relational series that helps to grant her a unique identity of character. Serial 
positioning is not simply fated, and if personal positions are situated in a chain, 
the chain is equally constituted entirely by its links. A person freely, 
interpretatively and creatively absorbs and responds to all the human relations 
in which she stands and the physical influences to which she is subject. 
Therefore her character springs as much spontaneously from herself as from her 
unique and complex relational situation.39 Both factors combine to ensure an 
irreplaceable ÔpersonalityÕ that is ÔmoreÕ than the whole, since the human whole 
is only composed of the totality of such persons. The Christian West, through 
the outworking of Christological and Trinitarian doctrine, came to accord a 
unique value to the person in this sense.40 By comparison, the liberal valuing of 
the individual and her rights is but a pale parody of this complex and more 
entirely humanist recognition of the basis of all human worth. 
But the Ôdouble excessÕ of society over single person and, yet, person over 
the social whole can only be sustained and mediated by a complex 
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and overlapping series of partial societies or intermediary associations that 
compose Ôcivil societyÕ. We take the latter in a neo-medieval sense that does 
not divide the political from the social, or vice-versa. Thereby, it exceeds the 
eighteenth-century dominant usage of this sphere as an instrument of political 
control by keeping culture within the bounds of politesse or ÔcivilityÕ as 
such.41 Such relatively independent associations at once remind the state of 
the excess of personal freedom over its own totalising thrust, and yet equally 
temper the personal tendency to autonomy with a liveable concrete reminder 
of wider society in an amenable microcosmic guise. 
In this way then, personalism and authentic corporatism (the role of inter-
mediary formations as qualifying absolute state sovereignty) are inseparable. 
And since this true corporatism, in refusal of the whig debt-funding of 
politics as an alien, ÔexpertÕ profession, necessarily involves the non-
separation of the economic from the political, the contemporary Catholic and 
European subsidiarist vision entails a distribution of some political 
responsibilities to economic bodies, in a socially accountable manner that can 
correct the de facto anarchic and criminal distribution of such responsibilities 
that is now in any case to the fore. So, inversely, in ensuring that economic 
decisions acknowledge their political and social consequences, it also ensures 
that personalism must pervade the economic as well as the social and 
political dimensions. From a post-liberal perspective, the alternative to 
atomistic liberalism is something at once social and political, which embeds 
state and market in a social polity (Ôcivil societyÕ) more loosely yet more 
substantively and humanely construed. 
Here it is important to note that not just Catholic (beside much Orthodox, 
Anglican and Protestant) social teaching, but also the non-Fabian currents 
within the early British Labour Party, as with G.D.H. Cole and R.H. Tawney, 
tended to uphold something like this mix of personalism and corporatism, 
combined, as for Catholicism, with notions of subsidiarity and a wider distri-
bution of property and assets, rather than a supposed collective ownership of 
everything.42 So this socialist current in its own way also ascribed to Ôdouble 
excessÕ. Each human person is spontaneously unique, as still, for many of the 
Labour pioneers, seen as created in the image and likeness of God. Yet this 
precious and irreplaceable ÔcharacterÕ of each and every one is also in part 
conveyed by nurture, vocation and friendship. For this reason, it is inseparable 
from its social role. In consequence, one cannot respect a man and at the same 
time despise him as miner, son, father, cricket player or lover. 
It might, nonetheless, still seem to some that stressing the dignity of role 
would run the danger of subordinating the person to her function for the social 
organism. This raises the spectre of an ugly corporatism that dominated much 
of Europe in the first half of the twentieth century Ð whether in the form of 
Fascism, National-Socialism or Communism. But a rigid organicism only 
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follows for a reactionary traditionalism and positivism, not for an Aristotelian 
and, later, Thomistic view that defines the purpose of the social and political 
whole as securing reciprocal justice and the always specific virtuous flourish-
ing of each of its members. 
Indeed, one can turn the tables on liberalism here: if we mainly respect a 
man as a man per se, then this formalism can readily turn out to be compatible 
with all and every exploitation of him qua miner, son, father, fast bowler, etc. 
In consequence, these functions do, indeed, get reduced to merely instru-
mental functions of a machinistic totality. Functions cease to be personally 
infused if, with false idealism and piety, we try to divorce personhood from 
Ôvocational roleÕ. This false idealism informs every liberal constitutionalism 
insofar as it only recognises persons as bearers of abstract individual rights, 
and otherwise regards social and economic life as Ôpolitically indifferentÕ. 
However, if, as for Aristotle, the aim of politics is to produce virtuously flour-
ishing citizens, then, since people only develop characters through social and 
economic relations, the nature of these relations and their aims cannot be so 
treated. Inversely, the aim of social and economic relating will not be mainly 
the satisfaction of private predilections, but relationship as such, reciprocal 
sympathy as such, and the good of the other, besides oneself, in the widest 
possible range. The widest possible immediate constitutional range is the polis 
seen as the Ôbiggest legally-governed societyÕ, and beyond the bounds of the 
state the broadest scope of just reciprocity is the culturally united international 
society of the Philonian megalopolis.43 
In this sense, megalopolis refers to an interlocking, nested union of cities, 
regions, nations and commonwealths. Such a vision differs sharply from a 
Stoic-Kantian unity of cosmopolis (today championed by left liberals like 
Jrgen Habermas) in which both individuals and states are absorbed within a 
global public square that is governed by formalistic, procedural standards that 
are in danger of endorsing an individualism of the nation. 
This national and international rejection of the separation of political from 
socio-economic powers is a necessary conclusion of any authentically post-
liberal political thinking. It is the simple core of non-Statist corporatism, which 
operates a subsidiarist influence of relatively independent economic bodies 
upon the political centre, combined with an inverse tempering of economic 
purpose by political responsibility, rather than a fascistic manipulation of still 
essentially capitalist business and market to racist and nationalist, and then 
nihilistic ends (as denounced in the pre-war era by Catholic thinkers such as 
Jacques Maritain). We have also just seen how such genuine corporatism 
enables the Ôdouble excessÕ of personalism. In order to value each and every 
person, one must accordingly nurture free associations, local government and 
economic vocations. To widen personal political participation or democracy, 
one must ensure that every individual can exercise political influence through 
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the workplace and with those with which she shares a common purpose. In 
this way, the corporatist refusal of any absolute political/economic divide is 
brought right down to the level of the experience of every individual. 
By contrast, merely representative democracy (which, nevertheless, has its 
place) assumes that there is in any case little impact to be made on most of 
human life through the political process. This is one reason why today democ-
racy and the exercise of majority will is inevitably withering in the face of 
sheerly economic choice and judicial determination of private rights. For liber-
alism undemocratically defines legitimate politics as primarily the upholding of 
contractual rights that do not need voting on because they are supposedly 
ÔnaturalÕ. Similarly, liberalism is committed to the securing of social and 
economic Ôfair playÕ irrespective of any substantive and constantly debatable 
notions of the common good or the good life. Democratic decision is in con-
sequence reduced to mass adjudication concerning the endless Ôhard casesÕ to be 
decided within these terms of reference. All merely liberal constitutions (above 
all that of the United States) are devised to prevent any representation of a 
collective will that would reject the ground rules of liberalism itself. 
Understood in these broad but authentic terms, corporatism may have been 
more muted in Catholic social thought and practice since the Second World 
War (in part because of its rejection of corporatist state totalitarianism on 
both right and left), but the tradition of non-state corporatist ideas and 
institutions has never gone away. Under the leadership of Luigi Sturzo and 
Luigi Einaudi, Italy retrieved its more authentic Catholic Christian legacy of 
corporatism, which MussoliniÕs neo-paganism had corrupted.44 And with 
British rather than American encouragement, West Germany adopted power-
fully corporatist elements, purged of most fascist statism, into its post-war 
settlement.45 These elements included the close alliance of local business and 
local government, vocational training, vocational associations, high entry 
qualifications and alliance of traditional craft skills with modern technology. 
What is more, these elements have proved capable of delivering sustainable 
economic success as well as greater personal fulfilment compared with typi-
cal Anglo-Saxon practice. 
Equally, in recent Catholic social teaching, the stress on vocation and 
virtue and their political relevance has been paramount. Nor is it right to say 
that Catholic social thought has abandoned its defence of forms of virtuous 
hierarchy. ÔSubsidiarityÕ is clearly a hierarchical doctrine, since it teaches that 
political, social and economic functions should be fulfilled at the most 
appropriate levels and preferably at the lowest ones (closest to the person, 
the family, the community and associative ties). Such a conception assumes 
that there is a socio-political pyramid with rule at the top only authenticated 
by its guardianship of the common good with popular assent. The key shift in 
Catholic teaching came with the reclaiming of this link of height to 
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responsibility under law, and of rank to achieved virtue. Beginning with Leo 
XIIIÕs social encyclical, this marked a late nineteenth-century rejection of 
certain absolutist ancien rgime notions, which are essentially modern and 
voluntarist, insofar as they reconceived ÔfeudalÕ bonds in terms of property 
ownership instead of personal fealty, and so in a sense were themselves 
ÔliberalÕ.46 It did not mark any supposed twentieth-century rejection of organic 
hierarchy, which remains essential to the notion of subsidiary cooperation. 
By the same token, the doctrine of subsidiarity remains corporatist, since it 
seeks to devolve central sovereign powers to groups that are economically 
vocational and voluntary, as well as to local political formations. They are all 
regarded as interlocking in function and as contributive to the flourishing of 
the political whole, as the work of Paul Hirst on associative democracy 
illustrates.47 Clearly, this mode of more rightly named corporatism has noth-
ing to do with the oligarchic sway over governments of irresponsible cor-
porations in recent times. For such bodies do not accept and are not openly 
granted any political purpose, but, instead, deploy political influence through 
ÔwhiggishÕ lobbying in order to subvert political priorities and subordinate 
them to the economic, itself falsely understood as the mere accumulation of 
abstract wealth by whomsoever. 
Recognition of group rights and the supplementation of representative 
democracy by corporatist governance by no means implies any neglect of 
individual civil rights. But post-liberalism defends individual rights in per-
sonalist terms, which regard the individual not in isolation, but as the most 
basic rung in a subsidiarist vision that is in continuity with older ÔdistributistÕ 
notions. What an individual can do for herself, own for herself, grow for her-
self, make for herself, she should Ð this relative independence being a precon-
dition for genuine social and political participation, in a more democratised 
version of the republican tradition. Inversely, she should be able to appeal 
against an oppressive group, just as a group has the right to appeal against an 
oppressive higher body and, ultimately, the state. 
But the claim to rights of the individual necessarily closes the circle: she 
must appeal back to the state or an international jurisdiction, thereby reveal-
ing a hidden reciprocal aspect to the hierarchy of a subsidiary settlement. The 
latter is not a kind of Ôgroup liberalismÕ that regards the state as a necessary 
evil. Rather, national or international sovereign bodies themselves should 
sometimes reach down to protect the individual person against the group, or 
smaller groups against greater ones, as in the protection of small businesses 
against greater ones and against monopoly. 
This, indeed, was traditionally the populist argument for the need for 
ÔmonarchyÕ as against merely ÔaristocraticÕ power: the One must sometimes 
defend the Many against the virtuous Few turned corruptly oligarchic. And 
this is one of the reasons why we argue for a greater equitable role for the 
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head of state, in a way that is to be distinguished from an executive 
usurpation of representative authority (see chapters 5 and 6). 
In the wake of the manifest failure of the liberal consensus adhered to on all 
sides, it is clear that we should search for an alternative politics and a different 
social ethos. This would be not just about linking rights to responsibilities, but 
also about solidarity and subsidiarity. In these ways, the real alternative to 
liberalism involves both greater economic egalitarianism and an updated social 
conservatism, freed of oppressive and unjustifiable prejudices against women 
and minorities and intolerances of exceptions and complications. At the same 
time, it rejects the new tyranny of exception posing as obligatory universal and 
supportive of loyalty and belonging to the family (traditional or otherwise), 
community and locality. 
The theory and implications of post-liberalism will be more extensively 
elaborated in the remainder of the book. 
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The Metacrisis of Capitalism 
1. CAPITALIST CRISIS 
Clearly, the global economic crisis since 2008 does not foreshadow the end 
of capitalism. However, it both reminds us of something well known and 
reveals something new. It reminds us that capitalism is subject to a peculiar 
sort of periodic downturn: an alternating deficiency of profit or of demand. 
Episodic over-accumulation of capital, achieved in part by the depressing of 
wages, entails lower demand Ð as Adam Smith recognised long before Karl 
Marx.1 Inversely, Keynesian attempts to remedy this crisis by boosting 
demand can eventually eat into profits and returns on capital. 
But the current crisis also reveals that globalisation since the 1970s has so 
expanded and speeded up the processes of capitalist change as to engender 
something qualitatively different: not only the need to balance the growth of 
abstract wealth with demand for concrete commodities, but also a chronic dif-
ficulty in sustaining economic growth as such. This was symptomised already 
in the 1970s by the ÔimpossibleÕ coincidence (in Keynesian terms) of high 
unemployment and, therefore, depressed demand, with rampant inflation, 
which should have been an indicator of intensifying economic activity, but 
clearly was not. Here one had an early sign that the late modern capitalist 
system so much depends on creating abstract wealth that it is increasingly less 
able to generate productive capital and genuine goods serving human needs. 
One indication for this is that global finance uses other peopleÕs money to 
trade almost exclusively with itself: taking deposits and lending to industry 
accounts for only 3 per cent of assets on the balance sheets of UK banks, 
while international foreign exchange trading is nearly 100 times the volume of 
commerce in goods and services.2 
9 3  
Milbank and Pabst_9781783486489.indb 94 5/31/2016 3:20:27 PM 
94 Chapter 3 
The growing frequency of financial crashes and the recessions they induce 
suggests that capitalism, taken to its logical extreme, provides only the kind 
of nominal growth that arises from making money out of money and that is 
compatible with actual material decline. Thus capitalism simultaneously 
abstracts from the real economy of productive activities and reduces every-
thing to its bare, abandoned materiality Ð a double movement that is central 
to the capitalist metacrisis (not to be confused with a Ôfinal crisisÕ), which is 
the focus of this chapter.3 
Meanwhile, globalised movements of international finance now severely 
curtail government freedom of action in a way that places democracy itself in 
danger. The manner in which excess capital can be transferred from one part 
of the world to another and back again in a matter of milliseconds has in large 
part generated the recent economic destabilisation and also expanded the 
opportunities for outright criminal behaviour.4 In response to the collapse of 
the sub-prime mortgage market and the 2008 global Ôcredit crunchÕ, national 
states bailed out transnational banks by taking over their debts in a manner 
that locks politics itself yet more into this financial logic. In consequence, 
government has less and less regard for the specifically political ends of 
human well-being and interpersonal relationships, while the long-term needs 
of the national polity and society are subordinate to the short-term interests of 
quarterly returns.5 
This growing global economic turbulence sheds new light on the nature of 
capitalist crisis as such. The maximisation of profits by defeating workersÕ 
demands in the 1970s and 1980s did not prove effective for very long. Quite 
quickly, a lot of capital had nowhere to go and there was a need to boost 
demand again. The increasing speed of capitalist cycles meant that suppos-
edly opposite crises started to coincide, delivering a double deficiency of 
both return and demand, which manifests as ÔmetacrisisÕ the linear tendency 
of capitalism towards simultaneous abstraction and materialisation. This ulti-
mately generates a problem of correlation between money and the material 
substance of both land and labour-power, as exemplified by the bursting of 
the sub-prime housing bubble in 2008. 
More specifically, such a drastic coincidence has been achieved through 
financialisation, or the complicity between the speculative loans of the 
wealthy minority and the debts of the masses. Financialisation seeks first to 
increase demand through credit, rather than through a more egalitarian 
increase in wages and distributed ownership. It operates this preference in 
part for political, class-based reasons and in part because today a productive 
economy that might supply higher wages and salaries is stagnating. Second, 
financialisation seeks to exit debilitating cycles once and for all by rendering 
demand in the mode of credit in a newly positive relationship to profit 
deriving from speculation. However, it does not thereby resolve the crisis, 
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but further assists that ÔmetacriticalÕ process whereby seemingly opposite 
crises of insufficient extraction of surplus value as profit and insufficient 
purchasing-power of demand now coincide. And yet within this coincidence 
a certain oscillation remains uncured, after all, as we shall see. 
Under financialisation, those in debt are socially disempowered and politi-
cally weakened as they find themselves shut out from the formal banking 
system and driven into the arms of dubious mortgage brokers, payday loan 
companies or loan sharks. The returns that accrue to payday loan companies 
from charging usurious interest rates (in the United Kingdom between 100 
and 4,000 per cent) further anchor wealthy speculation only in order to allow 
it to become increasingly unmoored from labour-power, which is left 
abjectly confined to its own resources. In this manner, the triumph of artifice 
seems to return the mass of people to that Ôstate of pure natureÕ which 
liberalism first fantasised as a false historical origin (as we argued in chapter 
1). Liberal capitalism realises an economic version of the reduction by bio-
politics of people to Ôbare lifeÕ. 
Thus we are facing a metacrisis of capitalism whereby the simultaneous 
process of abstraction and materialisation subjects the real economy of pro-
ductive activities to combined speculation and exacerbated commodification. 
In so doing, it further separates symbolic significance, equated with pure 
exchange value, from material space, which is seen increasingly as just an 
object for arbitrary division, consumption and destruction. Thereby, it renders 
social destruction and ecological damage constitutive of our fundamental 
economic processes. However, financialisation is not Ôthe end of historyÕ. 
Debts cannot be endlessly offloaded onto more and more fictional vehicles, 
and so the doubled resort to credit by the few in terms of securitisation and 
hedging, in order to shore up capital returns in the face of too easy loans to the 
majority, is not indefinitely sustainable. One cannot really do without the final 
securitisation of the abstract on the concrete, on real profits and real wages 
derived from real production and consumption of things with use-value, 
understood in however generous a sense. Hence our current impasse. 
These observations suggest that the supposedly pure economic logic, old 
and new, at work here, is not the logic of a market economy as such. Far 
from being necessary or inescapable, it is entirely contingent and avoidable Ð 
a logic only of capitalism that acts out certain theoretical assumptions, linked 
to the loss considered in chapter 1 of the psychic as integrating body and 
mind and the contradictory modern rendering of everything as Ôentirely 
naturalÕ, yet equally Ôentirely artificialÕ. These assumptions are as follows: 
1. That material reality is securely trumped by abstraction. Yet even the 
bankers themselves scarcely knew what was going on, because they were 
speculating in terms of ciphers about ciphers and guesses about other 
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peopleÕs guesses concerning the future, while assuming that property 
prices would go on rising forever.6 By these means, they were 
increasingly entangling us all in the shifting rules of their own game. 
2. That the well-being of the corporate firm takes second place to that of the 
individuals who run it, and the shareholders who benefit from it, as 
encouraged by a culture of Ômeritocratic extremismÕ.7 This is best 
illustrated by the yawning gulf between executive pay and the salaries of 
ordinary workers (with top-to-bottom pay ratios of around 300:1 in com-
panies listed on the London stock exchange and over 450:1 in many US 
corporations) and the perverse Ôbonus cultureÕ that excessively rewards 
risky success, mere chance or even failure. 
3. And, most fundamentally, that resources are naturally scarce, given the 
supposedly random character of human desire. Thus axiologically neutral 
markets are the best means to palliate the agon resulting from fantasised 
scarcity. 
Interrogating these three assumptions will be the later focus of this chapter. 
But first we will further explore (a) the specific nature of the capitalist sys-
tem; (b) its inherent tendency to generate inequality and inertia; (c) its human 
contingency, as opposed to historical fatedness; and (d) the way in which it is 
also, and increasingly, itself an intensified liberal politics, besides being an 
economic process. 
2. THE LOGIC OF CAPITALISM 
The dominant strands of both liberal and Marxist thought tend to consider the 
emergence of the capitalist economy as an inevitable occurrence that was 
necessary for the transition from medieval feudalism to the emancipation of 
modernity. In each case, the strong sovereign state is seen as indispensable for 
the dismantling of ÔfeudalÕ structures and consolidating the hold of capitalism 
by boosting merchant trade and driving forward the conquest of colonies. For 
most liberals and Marxists, capitalism is therefore an economic system of 
production and commerce that determines a new set of social relations based 
on private property, capital accumulation and wage labour. 
However, Karl PolanyiÕs economic anthropology showed that it is much 
more than an economic system. Beyond Smith, he argued that capitalism fuses 
state with market power and, thereby, disembeds the economy (and, one can 
add, a newly professionalised politics) from society, while inversely 
embedding social relations in economic transactions, in a manner that is 
intrinsically indifferent to personally and socially beneficial outcomes. And 
beyond Marx, Polanyi showed that commodification, especially of labour and 
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land, is not just a matter of the reduction of use value to exchange value, but 
also a loss of the symbolic exchange of irreplaceable social realities. Shorn of 
the symbolic link of thing with value, capitalism exhibits a deeper logic than 
Marx envisaged: not simply the suppression of real usage, but rather the end-
less commodifying division of reality between the usable in an instrumental 
sense, leached of meaning, on the one hand, and symbolic meaning reduced 
to algebraic abstraction and equivalence on the other. 
Thus the capitalist market is a social system governed by a secular logic, as 
commodification has to do with desacralising nature and life. It means that 
one buys, sells and trades without reference to tradition, association, duty or 
end, because things and people now lack intrinsic worth and their true value 
is their exchange value according to the iron law of supply and demand, or 
else the concrete but amorphously amassed value of Ôraw materialsÕ. The 
crucial point is that the capitalist economy rests not primarily upon a mode of 
production and exchange Ð the extraction of surplus value from labour and 
surplus desire from consumers Ð but, rather, upon financial speculation and 
material aggregation. Its indifference either to meaning or to natural variety, 
accordingly, renders capitalism first an iconoclastic system of destruction 
before it is a system of production. 
This character can also be confirmed insofar as, for modern economic 
capitalist theorists, the destiny of production itself is always consumption, 
which means, again, a final destruction.8 That destiny is only evaded insofar 
as one aspect of consumption (as, most obviously, with food) is the enabling 
of reproduction Ð but that is just a postponement of aggregate, asymptotic 
demise. For the denial of the symbolic dimension of consumption or its 
character as reception of a gift means that one cannot any longer construe 
consumption as also a reception with meaning, a kind of interpretative 
absorption that is accumulation in another register. One can think, here, of the 
consumption of bread and wine in the Christian Eucharist, but every meal 
received and eaten with gratitude has a dimension of ÔthanksgivingÕ: a shared 
meal festively reproduces the social order, not by the conversion of entropic 
energy into a new physical resource, but directly through the meaningful 
compounding of eating as a symbolic act. In this way, one could ethnographi-
cally generalise AugustineÕs view that the bread and blood of the Eucharist do 
not become us; rather, we become them Ð the body of Christ, which is both 
the corpus mysticum and the source of the social body. 
The capitalist system of primary destruction, as we saw in chapter 1, was 
actively promoted by the liberal sovereign state since its inception. However, 
one cannot simply say that the state invented the capitalist market and colonial 
commerce.9 A capitalist economy always hovered in the background as a 
shadowy possibility and was prophesied by Aristotle, as Polanyi empha-
sised.10 Within traditional economies, human beings exchange gifts Ð even if 
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this is eventually regularised in terms of money and commodities. With very 
remote strangers, with whom we share no common language, again the only 
language that we share in common is that of gift.11 We exchange one strange 
thing for another: transistor radio for rare coral. But in the middle, with 
known strangers across the sea, as for example in the antique Mediterranean, 
humans tend to operate more in terms of contracts, loans and mercantile self-
seeking. Maritime trade in the Ômid-seaÕ has always approximated to a kind of 
piracy. Hence city-states at the margins of nations have tended to Ôdiagonalise 
outÕ of those nations in a free-booting fashion, including cities such as Genoa, 
Venice and Rotterdam. 
Nonetheless, Polanyi also argued that the function of maritime states was 
strangely to keep separate reciprocal inland trade from reciprocal remote 
trade, as well as from more zero-sum accumulative overseas trade. For 
instance, the London East India Company remained pro-monarchic and 
Cavalier because it engaged in a traditional remote reciprocalist trade. But the 
unofficial and guild-excluded merchant class were Roundhead parliamentary 
supporters because they engaged in a more piratical mode of enterprise. 
Furthermore, they joined this up with the commercial activities of often 
Calvinist agricultural capitalists who invested the surplus they extracted 
coercively into the speculative activities of merchant enterprise.12 Thereby, 
material landed assets tended to be further subverted in their stability through 
their connection with a more abstract and (literally, as it were) fluid form of 
maritime wealth linked to more speculative fortunes. Such nominal profit 
often ended in debt-fuelled bubbles that burst and destroyed real wealth, of 
which the Dutch Tulip Mania of 1637 and the English South Sea Bubble of 
1720 were early examples. 
Thus a more searching genealogy of capitalism reveals that the key trans-
formation away from an earlier mode of market economy towards capitalist 
exchange is less primarily to do with production and exchange than with 
simultaneous speculation and material agglomeration. In the first instance, 
capitalism commodifies money in such a way that it has no longer any con-
nection to real goods, but is now purely nominal and tradeable for a profit Ð 
making more money out of money. Speculative profit is itself predicated on 
the endless turning of the solid and symbolic into the abstract, and yet the 
ultimate securing of the abstract on the now conglomerated concrete (as, 
paradigmatically, the conversion of the ecclesial patrimony into the economy 
of assignats by the French revolutionaries). If so, then financial crises are not 
an accidental phenomenon within capitalist process but a necessary 
occurrence. 
Indeed, financial crises tend to be the culmination of a process whereby 
irrational expectations lead to investments, funded by excessive credit 
creation, that result in speculative manias, involving mass herd behaviour 
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and systemic distortions in the market mechanism13 Ð not least the failure to 
price-in real risk and externalities. As soon as state action contravenes mar-
ket expectations (e.g. not bailing out Lehman Brothers or, conversely, taking 
Ôsystemically importantÕ banks into national ownership, as with Northern 
Rock), contagion spreads to the core of the financial system, inducing panic 
and exacerbating the crash. When panic sets in, banks stop lending and call 
in collateral, while businesses and investors hoard cash and other liquid 
assets, so that governments and central banks have to inject ultra-liquid 
liquidity to keep the capitalist wheels going round in the fond hope that it 
will not be hoarded Ð precisely what happened when the Western financial 
system teetered on the brink of collapse in October 2008. This downward 
spiral only stops when the lender of last resort Ð the central bank in concert 
with the Treasury Ð injects yet more liquidity by recapitalising banks and by 
launching a programme of quantitative easing, creating new money and 
acquiring financial assets such as government bonds to stimulate private 
sector spending. 
By oscillating between illiquid and liquid security, financial speculation 
connects two core characteristics of the capitalist system: first, a permanent 
process of Ôprimitive accumulationÕ, on which capitalism depends for eco-
nomic expansion and which requires no-cost coagulated material resources 
that mitigate the consequences of the need for incessant internal growth in 
the pursuit of increased abstract ÔwealthÕ.14 Second, an ever-greater finan-
cialisation of the everyday economy through the relentless creation of credit 
and exponentially growing levels of debt (generally starting with state debt, 
followed by a transfer of debt and risk to households).15 
To further understand why capitalism is to do with paradoxically conjoined 
financial abstraction and appropriative materialisation, more primarily than 
with production and exchange, it is also instructive to see that, as realised by 
the Marxist theoretical legacy, colonisation and globalisation are later exten-
sions of the capitalist logic: a response to falling rates of profits leading to 
sagging demand Ð hence the need for ever-further Ôprimitive accumulationÕ.16 
But Marx saw capitalism as inevitable, and so offered an insufficient explana-
tion as to how primary accumulation permitting the absolute commodification 
of land, labour and money initially started. Polanyi and Robert Brenner, by 
contrast, see (from diverse theoretical perspectives) how it has to do with an 
always-present diabolically ÔmiddleÕ sphere of relatively anarchic international 
relations escaping the reach of any ius gentium. The full incursion of the sea 
into the land that engendered capitalism only occurred in England because of 
the unique capitalisation of the land in terms of a free market in property and 
the establishment of the agricultural labourer as a dispossessed wage labourer 
Ð contingencies that both liberal and strictly Marxist accounts of the nature of 
capitalism neglect. 
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Capitalism, Credit and Contingency 
These things, as we saw in chapter 1, were consequent upon the disappear-
ance of the English peasantry at the end of the Middle Ages and the later dis-
solution of the monasteries, both of which events vastly increased the amount 
of land held by the gentry in primarily economic terms, with fewer social or 
political duties attached. The gravitation of the English gentry towards 
Calvinism, which sharply separated human contract as regulating fallen, 
quasi-ethical conduct from the divine gift of now sheerly elective grace, is in 
this respect unsurprising.17 Thus the dissolution of the monasteries and the 
English Ôenclosure movementÕ started the process of repeated Ôprimitive 
accumulationÕ, providing the surplus capital for financial investment in non-
reciprocal, piratical trade, as the High Church Anglican socialist historian 
R.H. Tawney first argued.18 
Another dimension of the emergence of capitalism concerns the break-up of 
Christendom. Once there exist competing nation-states linked to different 
religious bodies, then material organisation for war and self-defence becomes 
a priority. In these contingent circumstances, mercantilism is the inescapable 
consequence. So the complete invasion of the land by the sea in England pro-
duces also for the first time a comprehensive internal market organised upon 
contractual and competitive rather than reciprocalist lines. This internal agon 
is seen, in line with an economic version of MachiavelliÕs martial logic for 
republics, as increasing internal power through a trial of strength and through a 
resulting greater size of national wealth. 
The end of Christendom also led to greater competition and conflict 
between rival states, starting with absolutist-tending monarchs who com-
manded unprecedented fiscal control and military might.19 Even when 
absolutism was eventually overthrown, the foundations of the modern state 
were firmly built on permanent central taxation and standing armies. Thus 
modernity created the conditions for a fiscal state and a warfare state that 
have reinforced each other ever since Ð from the wars of religion via colonial 
conquests and the two world wars to the Cold War and the global war on 
terror.20 Connected with the concentration of power in the hands of the 
sovereign centre was the concentration of wealth also in the hands of the 
new but variegated Ôcapitalist classÕ that backs the stateÕs quest for more 
resources because it opens up new market outlets. Charles Tilly rightly 
described this in terms of Ôthe two interdependent master processes of the 
[modern] era: the creation of a system of national states and the formation of 
a worldwide capitalist systemÕ.21 
However, the point that both Marxist and liberal theories tend to underplay 
is the role of credit and debt in the transition from empire to nation-state and 
from market economy to capitalism. As the modern sovereign state built up 
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its military and administrative apparatus, neither taxation nor trade provided 
sufficient resources to sustain state and market expansion. That is why public 
credit became a central part of the capitalist system, first at the hands of the 
whigs and later the revolutionaries in France. As the historian J.G.A. Pocock 
argued, it was 
Queen Anne Tories, of the school of Swift and Bolingbroke, [who] had thun-
dered against Whig rule as that of a monied interest, made up of men who owned 
no property or rather had substituted property of an altogether new kind: the 
paper tokens of a fluctuating public confidence, in which the determinants of the 
rate at which money could be had, and the value of all property created, had 
themselves become a species of commodity.22 
ÔOldÕ, more constitutionally organicist and more republican-leaning 
whigs, whose perspective Burke finally reverted to and developed, similarly 
cautioned against the multiplication of national debt, which undermined 
prosperity and stability. As we saw in chapter 1, the creation of public credit 
reached a new acme with the French Revolution. The revolutionaries brought 
about, according to Burke, a new settlement whereby 
Everything human and divine [is] sacrificed to the idol of public credit, and 
national bankruptcy the consequence; and to crown all, the paper securities of 
new, precarious, tottering power, the discredited paper securities of impover-
ished fraud and beggared rapine, held out as a currency for the support of an 
empire, in lieu of the two great recognized species that represent the lasting 
conventional credit of mankind, which disappeared and hid themselves in the 
earth from whence they came, when the principle of property, whose creatures 
and representatives they are, was systemically subverted.23 
BurkeÕs critique anticipated not only political totalitarianism and looming 
terror, but also the Ôpaper-money despotismÕ that consists in expanding 
simultaneously public credit and state debt, which had built up as a result of 
corruption and expensive wars, by converting the property of Crown and 
Church into money. In this manner, the power of the state and the monied 
interest of capitalists converged, with the latter lending to the former and the 
former turning property into money in order to pay to the latter the interest on 
the growing stock of debt. This produced an Ôignoble oligarchyÕ composed of 
state agents and private speculators who colluded against society, as Burke 
observed.24 Pace Marx, capitalism does not primarily substitute one set of 
property relationships or one dominant class for another, but is driven by 
speculative capital and a Ôdreadful energyÕ of the state (Burke), which is 
disconnected from any property relationships and ends up dissolving real in 
nominal value. 
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Since then, the oligarchic system of state functionaries and capitalist 
speculators has evolved and expanded, predominantly in the course of colo-
nial conquests and the two world wars, after which the weight of the state in 
the economy across the West has rarely dipped below 40 per cent of national 
output (compared with around 10 per cent prior to 1914). 
Over time, the edifice of public credit and debt on which the fiscal and the 
warfare state are built has also been expanded to accommodate the welfare 
state. For as Polanyi further pointed out, the emergence of state welfare struc-
tures in the second half of the nineteenth century was not primarily a reaction 
against laissez-faire capitalism but, rather, an aporetic extension of it. First, 
just as the capitalist market tended towards monopoly, so too the state con-
centrated power in its hands at the expense of worker self-organisation and 
more mutual businesses that foster free and fair competition to the benefit of 
all stakeholders, not least suppliers and consumers. Second, state bureaucracy 
balanced anti-strike or industrial relations legislation with compensatory 
welfare measures intended to resign workers to a proletarian status and to 
inhibit their mutual organisation, which naturally tended to revert towards the 
human norm of reciprocal benefit. In this manner, state welfare compensates 
for market failure, including involuntary joblessness, ill-health or lack of edu-
cation and skills. In most advanced economies across the West, the Ôwelfare 
billÕ is now the biggest single item of the annual budget at a time of budget 
deficits and growing public debt as a proportion of GDP. Insofar as in-work 
benefits have the effect of subsidising the low wages paid by employers, and 
thereby keeping workers quiet, the welfare state subserves capitalism while 
increasing national debt. 
In summary, capitalism differs fundamentally from a market economy in 
that it rests on a permanent process of Ôprimitive accumulationÕ and financial 
speculation that undergirds its appropriative production and exchange. This 
abstraction leads to the destruction of private and communal property in 
favour of paper money and ever-greater levels of national debt through public 
credit creation under the auspices of a new oligarchical collusion between the 
sovereign state and the monied interests of a growing capitalist, rentier and 
functionary class. 
3. CAPITALISM, INEQUALITY AND INERTIA 
Within the ranks of this class there are the super-rich and then again the super-
super rich.25 As Thomas Piketty has shown, the new tendency to extreme 
concentration of wealth combines the resurgent importance of inherited wealth 
in a period of low growth with the newly excessive salaries encouraged by the 
climate of Ômeritocratic extremismÕ.26 In consequence, we 
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see, both nationally and internationally, the emergence of a new Ôaristocracy 
without honourÕ. Its continuity both with the debased aristocracies of the 
various ancien rgimes and with the new moguls of nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century industry reveals just how little, in the long term (bar the 
effect of mass warfare), either revolution or redistribution or social rights 
have been able to temper the inegalitarian tendencies of the capitalist market. 
The reversion to low growth compounds the theoretically ascertainable and 
historically demonstrable tendency of capital accumulation to outrun profit in 
all economic circumstances. 
Yet there is nothing systemically inevitable about either of these tendencies. 
As to the augmentation of the percentage of landed assets and money in 
relation to national revenue, the constraints upon this in terms of legal regu-
lation, income tax, wage policy and trade union power were dismantled in the 
United Kingdom, as in the United States, after 1970. In considerable part this 
was because of a misperception that Keynesian social-democratic models were 
causing the Anglo-Saxon countries to fall behind both Continental Europe and 
Japan. Curiously, the question rarely seemed to be asked why variants of this 
model should work well in some parts of the West but not in others. This 
applies especially to the key characteristics of the German economy such as 
regional banks lending to SMEs, a national investment bank supporting an 
industrial and manufacturing policy as well as co-determination and workersÕ 
representatives on company boards. In reality, the growth lag of the Anglo-
Saxon countries was more truly the catch-up enjoyed by the more war-torn 
countries during the post-1945 trentes glorieuses. 
Here ideological parity requires one inversely to confess, as Piketty allows, 
that this would probably have occurred to a considerable extent in any case, 
even if more free-market policies had been followed in Japan and on the 
Continent. His main point is that minor variations in capitalist policy pale into 
insignificance compared to the disruptions caused by mass mobilised warfare. 
This includes the massive increase in public wealth and the huge transfer of 
assets that are necessary to support the generally higher level of health, 
education and well-being, which such mobilisation requires.27 The further we 
get from the effect of the two world wars, the more long-term tendencies of 
capitalism reassert themselves: first, for returns on capital to exceed rates of 
economic growth; second, for capital to assume a relatively constant ratio to 
national revenue in terms of the division of savings by rate of growth; third, for 
inheritable capital holding to increase exponentially in relation to the growth 
rate, which historically tends to be low, even (and, indeed, especially) under 
the conditions of capitalism.28 
This thesis, as Piketty says, resembles both RicardoÕs notion that land, 
which is in scarce supply, will consume an increasing amount of capital 
resources and, thereby, undermine production, and MarxÕs view that 
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ever-rising profits undermine demand, leading to an over-accumulation of 
capital, which, thereby, Ôdigs its own graveÕ. Ricardo was wrong insofar as he 
did not foresee the massive nineteenth-century transfer from static agricultural 
to dynamic industrial capital. Marx was wrong insofar as he did not foresee the 
huge technologically powered growth in productivity that somewhat offset the 
capitalist contradiction by allowing more money to accrue to wages and social 
infrastructure without seriously damaging the returns on capital.29 However, the 
unprecedented effects of twentieth-century mass war eventually came to 
obscure the sense in which these nineteenth-century economic theories remain 
perennially true. Whether in neo-classical or in Keynesian terms, capitalism 
was thought to be self-adjusting (automatically or by means of capitalist state 
regulation) as between capital ownership and overall revenue, which is capital 
return plus incomes. Yet now that inequalities are returning to the levels of the 
pre-1914 belle poque, we can better see, after all, the renewed relevance of 
both Ricardo and Marx. For even if industry has now displaced agriculture, in 
our own day ownership and inheritance of urban and rural land, as well as of 
financial resources, is once more assuming a disproportionate economic, social 
and political role Ð and here we see one aspect of incessant capitalist 
ÔmaterialisationÕ. Equally, despite the way technology boosts growth, and so 
demand, this does not prevent the continued excess of return on capital over 
economic growth, which Piketty rightly insists must increase inequality and so 
threaten the culture of democracy.30 
One can agree with Piketty against Marx that capitalism is not bound to 
collapse, hence providing a negative economic self-solution that obviates the 
need for the socio-political.31 However, it is notable that he himself attributes 
considerable importance to the decline in demand that ensued after 1970, and 
recognises that capital owners eventually found this detrimental to their rates 
of return and so resorted increasingly to financialisation.32 And while Piketty 
is right to argue that Anglo-Saxon neo-liberalism was based in part upon a 
chauvinistic misperception of the reasons for its growth lag, the eventual 
spread of the neo-liberal model to some degree everywhere was not just a 
result of a reciprocal, Continental misperception of the reasons for the slowing 
of their own growth rates after 1970. It also had to do with a general 
recognition that the Christian-Democrat and Social-Democrat models were, 
indeed, constraining profits, at least in larger countries, through the ever-
increasing need to expand over-stretched government resources. 
To what extent should one agree with Piketty overall? One can argue that 
his analysis is largely accurate (if somewhat historically foreshortened), but 
that his proposed remedies are woefully inadequate. 
As to analysis, the key objection to Piketty is usually that the admitted 
tendency of capital (meaning abstract profit, not the red herring of Ôhuman 
capitalÕ, etc.) to outrun production and engender increased inequality does not 
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matter, because of a long-term Ôtrickle-down effectÕ witnessed by the Ôgreat 
enrichmentÕ ever since 1800. This same objection claims that both the outrun-
ning and the inequality were essential to this enrichment. And yet, Deirdre 
McCloskey, who has articulated this objection most decisively, herself admits 
that the great enrichment has not been due to capitalism: ÔOur riches were not 
made by piling brick upon brick ... or bank-balance upon bank-balance, but by 
piling idea upon ideaÕ.33 To say this is to say that our ÔwealthÕ (however 
understood) has increased because of human ingenuity Ð though it is not cor-
rect to sunder intellectual from material human labour. Wealth has increased 
because of improvements in technology, medicine, transport and communi-
cation, besides the widening operation of commerce. If, indeed, capital has 
played a role in this, then this is not on account of the primarily speculative 
role of capital within capitalism, but because of its productive investment 
within a market system. 
What is more, PikettyÕs evidence that return on capital far less outran 
growth during the periods of war-time mass mobilisation, and their after-
maths, suggests that wealth has considerably increased when capital has been 
state-channelled (in diverse ways) in more productive directions, and relative 
equality has acted as a greater stimulation to labouring forces. McCloskey 
also ignores the evidence adduced by Piketty to the effect that the presence or 
absence of social democracy has made little difference to either inequality or 
the rate of increase of capital over growth, compared to that of mass warfare. 
This tends to negate any inflated claims for the crucial role of government 
non-interference in the market process. 
The tragic success of war economies also helps to give the lie to the myth of 
trickle down. In reality, over the long term, and especially in our own day, this 
effect tends to slow or even go into reverse. Nor can a large equality gap be 
regarded with any complacency, because it can depress aspiration and produce 
increased relative poverty that is very genuine poverty, given a loss of social 
participation that can quickly result in real material need. Therefore, the 
slowing in relative peace-time of growth in relation to capital and the 
accompanying increase in unequal wealth cannot be just ahistorically written 
off in the name of the supposedly eternal and eventually benign tendencies of 
the capitalist market when Ôleft to itselfÕ. To the contrary, McCloskey is too 
confined by the liberal (and Marxist) idea that capitalism is primarily a system 
of production. But, to the contrary, as Burke saw, the more the right to make 
money by any means is ethically legitimated, the more one is unleashing 
speculation as a power of material as well as symbolic destruction. The long-
term tendency of capitalism may then be towards not just increased inequality, 
but also economic stultification34 and devastation of both cultural and natural 
ecological systems of interconnected and reciprocal balance.35 How can 
McCloskeyÕs optimistic prognosis make sense in a world where 
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increasing numbers of migrants are prepared to risk death in order to escape 
ecological, economic and political horror in parts of the Near East and the 
Global South? 
It is interesting that she claims, falsely, both that capitalism has always 
existed, and that the great enrichment was not owing to capitalism but to ideas 
engendered by liberalism. Yet we have already seen that, if capitalism was a 
liberal invention, then it is for this reason subject to the same sort of meta-
critical contradiction as liberalism itself. This contradiction has to do with a 
fundamentally negative assumption of ontological violence and original evil. 
Given this assumption, liberalism will propose ways in which this negativity 
may be held at bay. Yet, since Machiavellian or Hobbesian fear- and greed-
driven leaders remain in place after the forging of the social compact, all that 
liberalism can really propose is the monopolisation of fear and greed by an 
absolute sovereign power whose tendency will then be (as history has proved) 
to pursue mass warfare.36 A kind of monopolisation, in fact, of the original 
right to murder in the state of nature, which Hobbes clearly affirms Ð and in 
such a way that his remedy for civil war eventually pays too high a price in 
terms of ever-increasing international violence, which ultimately perturbs the 
civil peace also. But equally, liberalism implicitly proposes an endemic enter-
taining by many of a ÔcriminalÕ tendency to escape the lawÕs monopoly. In this 
way, the normative liberal actor is a destroyer and is held back, but only for a 
time, by a concentration of destruction, of which capital monopoly is but one 
avatar. Therefore, productive ideas were rarely engendered by liberalism Ð 
scientific and technological inventiveness ascribes to no ÔliberalÕ politics if it 
ascribes to any at all, while the creative artistic energies of romanticism, 
symbolism, modernism and the best post-modernism have often been allied to 
a critique of liberal nihilism. 
As to remedies, Piketty suggests that international taxation upon capital 
could provide real stability between capital and labour in wealth creation, and 
seriously mitigate the structural tendency of capitalism towards inequality.37 
The simplicity of this solution involves too Ricardian a view of capitalist 
wealth as a kind of innocent mathematical sum, and ignores the contention of 
Marx and Polanyi that it always passes through the sieve of commodifica-tion 
before it can be ÔcountedÕ as wealth in capitalist terms at all. Capitalist wealth 
is never in material gross, but must always be priced as abstractly equivalent 
to other wealth, and so as exchangeable. For this reason, an anticipation of 
demand must enter into its very pricing. Yet, in order to increase, capitalist 
wealth must restrict labour costs, and therefore must saw away at the branch 
of demand, in terms of either reduced sales or lowered consumer prices, 
thereby diminishing the security of the very perch upon which its profits 
ultimately hang. Inversely, salary and wage earners cannot ultimately be 
indifferent to the profits of their employers, however far they are tempted 
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to eat into them. That is because they do not generally receive as payment a 
direct ÔstakeÕ in the capital and profits of the business they work for. Rather, 
as Marx argued, they receive a residue of the value of their labour, which is 
itself commodified as ÔstockÕ in terms of the exchangeable wealth that aver-
age labour time can be calculated to generate. 
So by virtue of commodification, it is not only the case, as Piketty after 
Ricardo and Marx argues, that return on capital tends to overtake growth and, 
therefore, labour in the long term. It is also true, as Marx saw, that it can only 
do so aporetically. The exceeding by fixed and inheritable amounts of capital 
over the flux of growth that is produced by labour (including the increase 
allowed by the stored human work of technological innovation and improve-
ment of land and property) is only possible in relation to active humans Ð 
workers of any kind, inhabitants of property or consumers of goods. For the 
gradual appropriation, storing and passing on of greater and greater fixed 
sums has to be at the expense of general income and consumption. Yet it can-
not under any circumstances be completely indifferent to the ever-renewed 
dynamic realisation of these sums in the market. Hence PikettyÕs tendency of 
return on capital to increase over economic growth never transcends the 
cycles of contradiction and crisis, even if it does not inevitably succumb to 
them. 
In consequence, excessive inequality and tax evasion by the rich threatens 
not just, as he says, eventual political rebellion, but also militant economic 
protest and pressure on corporations by governments to respond to this cir-
cumstance (as the revelations in the ÔPanama PapersÕ demonstrate). In pursuit 
of his thesis that only war seriously tempers the long-term tendencies of 
capitalism, he somewhat glosses over the fact that trade union pressure and 
new welfare measures were already well in evidence in Germany, France and 
Britain before the First World War, even if the latter increased their instance 
exponentially.38 Indeed, following Ernst Jnger one can suggest that worker 
organisation linked to state control and modern warfare are two manifestations 
of a single Ômass mobilisationÕ, which, as Marx already realised, industrial 
capitalism itself encourages.39 Thus, significantly, the German war effort 
sought at once to constrain and to co-opt already politically dominant socialist 
forces, and in this conjunction lay one crucial seed of Ônational socialismÕ. 
This observation can therefore correct a tendency in Piketty to regard 
twentieth-century mass wars as an accidental intrusion upon the perennial 
plot of capitalism that he wants to narrate. In reality, one can see that they 
were fought on both sides in extension of capitalist-statist aims and, yet, on 
the German side also in a state nationalist and collectivist reaction against 
those aims in their individualising and globalising tendencies: a reaction that 
the more democratic nations had rightly to resist, twice over. Such an 
analysis should today warn us against a renewed, semi-fascistic possibility 
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of a Ômass mobilisingÕ, atavistic counter to late capitalism Ð albeit one more 
based on a ÔcitizenÕ rather than Ôworker solidarityÕ in an era of disorganised, 
post-industrial capitalism. This new mobilisation, as evidenced in the rapid 
resurgence of semi-fascist parties across Europe, could once more lead 
eventually to various modes of conflict, themselves of an unpredictable, post-
industrial kind. 
4. CAPITALISMÕS SUPPRESSION OF THE MARKET 
PikettyÕs strong emphasis on historical contingencies as impacting on eco-
nomic growth needs to be yet further augmented in the face of his even 
stronger and countervailing stress on constant capitalist laws and tendencies. 
For his contingencies tend to be extra-economic: war, culture, political fashion. 
All this is to be admitted, yet one also needs to acknowledge a greater measure 
of intra-economic contingency. Here Piketty appears never to distinguish 
capitalism from the economic as such and different modes of market economy, 
a lack much encouraged by his flattening, Cartesian approach. This reduces 
class to incremental centimes for the sake of measurement, thereby ignoring 
the economic impacts of a culturally and consciously constituted group, 
capable of acting collectively and, thereby, making a real difference.40 Equally, 
this approach sees a constancy of the proportion of ÔcapitalÕ wealth from pre-
modern to modern times, without allowing for the often less absolute and less 
extracted nature of ancient and medieval ownership and the way it was 
conditionally attached to functions and duties, which involved a certain greater, 
not readily measurable, sharing out of this wealth, after all.41 
However reprehensible it was in many ways, there is an evident difference in 
this respect, as Marx saw, between the role of a ÔfeudalÕ proprietor and a 
modern absentee owner of a vast house in London and grouse moor in the 
Scottish borders today. Piketty does, indeed, acknowledge, citing Michael 
Young, that modern meritocrats assume yet more judicial and cultural control in 
consequence of their social position than did the nineteenth-century gentry of 
Jane Austen or Honor de Balzac. They despise much more the indigent and 
poor, since this status is now regarded as Ôtheir faultÕ, rather than as an accident 
of birth.42 However, one needs to add that, traditionally, disparity of wealth also 
appeared more acceptable because ownership was correlated with high levels of 
humanist education and with the exercise of duty, honour and protection by law 
and arms of the property, work and status of the less well-off. 
Equally important is the further point that recruitment from below by 
talent, honour and prowess into the upper and governmental classes or into 
their patronage was most certainly important from the time of ancient Rome 
through medieval knighthood to the early modern monarchic or aristocratic 
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civil service Ð also remembering here that the clerical hierarchy of the Church 
was yet more meritocratically based. Given all this, the real point of contrast is 
not the old inequality of legacy versus the modern inequality of supposedly 
pure merit. Rather, it is a matter of contrast of older guardianship exercised (at 
least in theory) according to social duty, with modern status disjoined 
altogether from honourable responsibility. Moreover, modern status itself has 
often been acquired in semi-dishonourable ways. The transition from status to 
contract has a dark side that today grows ever darker. 
If it is allowed that the laws of capital are not the laws of the economic or 
even of the market as such, then we can see more clearly, in modification of 
Piketty, capitalismÕs chronic instability, and, therefore, not only the contingent 
role of social and political responses to this crisis-ridden flux, but also the 
never-banished haunting of capitalism by other economic possibilities. Such a 
haunting has more than spectral effects in the socio-economic realm. Thus in 
recent Western history we can recognise, with Piketty, not just the chauvinistic 
and economically false factor in the rise of Anglo-Saxon neo-liberalism, which 
was a political contingency. In addition, we can also acknowledge the defeat 
through law and propaganda of militant trade unionism in the 1970s. Herein is 
found a socio-economic contingency that we can put alongside the failures of 
Anglo-Saxon management, government development and investment strategy 
in the same period.43 It then doubly follows, in accentuation of PikettyÕs 
perspective, that even though the laws of capitalism may be constant, and 
constantly non-ameliorative for most people (in default of technologically 
powered growth), that the eventual post-war return to their rule was not in any 
way fated. A more realistic assessment of the temporally slower British growth 
might have been made, and the post-war social concordat could have been 
renewed in more social market terms. Looking to the British shaping of the 
post-war German approach in the Rhineland,44 many voices recommended this, 
including the possibility of offering trade unions more partnership, managers 
and shareholders more responsibility and workers more training and a greater 
stake in both their work and their firms. 
When it comes to the recent situation, there is nothing inevitable about it 
either. We have already seen how the new power of inheritance is not simply 
a return to the more normative conditions of the nineteenth-century in the 
wake of mass war, but is also the result of misplaced Anglo-Saxon pride and 
the defeat of both labour-power and worker self-organisation, as well as 
establishment refusal to consider even modifications to the operation of the 
capitalist market. More recently, the newly increased stratification of capital 
ownership (both property and equity) has been joined and multiplied by the 
huge increase in income disparity. But again, the causes of this are 
economically, culturally and politically contingent. The fall of communism in 
Eastern Europe and its transmutation into an oligarchic hybrid in Russia 
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and China left capitalism without a feared ideological rival and removed any 
need to pander to those who might be attracted by socialism in the face of 
capitalist predations.45 This in part allowed a new ideology of capitalist self-
legitimation to grow and flourish. 
Extremist meritocracy, exacerbated into a kind of generalised Hollywood 
star-cult, now meant that a culture supposedly based on ability must award 
extreme ability extremely much. Meanwhile, high salaries were taken to be 
the automatic result of education and applied talent in a self-confirming 
circle. In reality, international comparisons show that the much higher dis-
parities of income in Anglo-Saxon countries can by no means be correlated 
with factors of merit. Once again it would seem that Anglo-Saxondom is in 
the grip of a dangerous cultural fantasy.46 Dangerous because it is economi-
cally lethal: it was excessive levels of inequality that led to the speculative 
exploitation of the desperate by the extremely wealthy in the sub-prime 
crisis, and so to a global economic recession. 
As we have already argued, the new compounding of inherited by earned 
economic disparity is generating a new aristocracy shorn of all vestiges of 
chivalry and honour. To some degree, this new aristocracy is in direct con-
tinuity with older ones of ancien rgime bastard feudalism and nineteenth-
century quasi-feudal industrialism. In this light, metropolitan meritocracy is 
the ruse of the landed and capitalised in an era of mass democracy and liberal 
rights. For now power must justify itself before the bar of competition, but 
much evidence would suggest that ÔmeritÕ can also be bought through inher-
ited and accumulated advantage. The wealthy enjoy greater access to educa-
tion and the power to grant legitimacy to their own modes of culture, while 
profitably palming off the populace with a debased mass variety. In either 
case, culture gets commodified and is, thereby, divorced from substantial 
social action and virtue. 
This new cultural ideology and practice of a vacuous elite has combined 
with the contingent, if capitalistically logical, recourse to financialisation in 
order to compensate for both deficiency of profit and lack of demand. It has 
equally combined with the political underwriting of this recourse in terms of 
bank rescues and programmes of austerity for everyone else. Such a strategy 
can only further compound inequality and its consequent economic and social 
implications. As an alternative to austerity, it would indeed be logical, as 
Piketty recommends, to tax capital at a one-off high level, since the rich could 
readily afford to wipe out all our debts, which are moreover often internal 
rather than external Ð that is to say, debts of the populace to their very own rich. 
To the degree that capital is now international and would readily find means to 
evade such measures, then, as Piketty also suggests, we need an internationally 
enforced capital gains tax. Yet here he is rightly pessimistic Ð even if such a 
measure might be approached gradually through transregional 
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action by bodies like the European Union, who would enforce it, and who 
would successfully police the inevitable attempts at evasion? How, in any 
case, one might add, could this escape the sieving of capitalist wealth by 
commodification, such that all such taxes would perforce be either too great, 
discouraging enterprise, or too little and, therefore, not sufficiently inhibiting 
either inequality or the decline of demand? 
Instead, in lieu of massive inflation or debt forgiveness by monetising 
some government debt (which may come in the end, since the stock of 
national debt looks too large ever to be significantly reduced), we are stuck 
with austerity. While fiscal discipline is ethically and economically impor-
tant, austerity has rendered people yet more reliant on credit. Cutting public 
spending might have reduced budget deficits, but by slashing capital invest-
ment and local expenditure, it has depressed aggregate demand and national 
output, adding to the total burden of aggregated public debt, including long-
term state indebtedness.47 By contrast, austerity has done nothing to address 
the structural problems of many Western economies, such as low wages, low 
innovation, low productivity and low growth. While central bureaucracy has 
sometimes undermined both a vibrant market economy and civil society, stra-
tegic state investment in, and tax-relief for, infrastructural projects, research 
and manufacturing is indispensable for genuine and sustained production, 
which alone can reduce debt permanently. 
5. CAPITALISM AS POLITICS 
We have seen how contemporary late capitalism now manifests a kind of 
metacrisis that seems more to do with the difficulties of sustaining abstract 
growth as such Ð a growth for which any sum, even one extracted from 
material destruction rather than production, counts as ÔgainÕ. Unlike a normal 
economy that binds material value to symbolic meaning, the capitalist double 
movement of abstraction and materialisation tends to separate matter from 
meaning and reduce materiality to calculable numbers representing 
ÔwealthÕ.48 Such a conception of wealth rests on the aggregation of abstract 
numbers that cuts out all the relational goods and the ÔcommonsÕ on which 
shared prosperity depends.49 
These difficulties are by no means new, but they do seem now to have 
surfaced to an unprecedented degree. Quite plausibly, they have not so much 
to do with the ÔinternalÕ contradiction of capitalism (i.e. its need at once to 
extract profit from the worker-consumer, and yet ensure that she can go on 
consuming) as with the contradictions that inevitably ensue upon the setting 
of capitalist practice within an extra-capitalist margin that both precedes it 
and continues to accompany it. This margin is complex and various: it 
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includes uncapitalised economies, besides the social, cultural, political and 
international relations spheres, insofar as these remain external to a purely 
capitalist logic.50 In a globalised post-traditional world that yet remains 
fraught with political and religious rivalries, where increasingly deskilled and 
deprofessionalised workers are seduced by leisure and spectacle, a global rate 
of growth may prove harder to sustain. 
What new spheres are to be found to capitalise? How are political and 
religious passions to be quelled in favour of supposedly ÔeconomicÕ ones? 
How is one to re-motivate working populations long depressed by poor pay, 
welfare reliance and quiescent passivity in the face of mass entertainment? 
Equally, how can one expect the oligarchic profiteers of neo-liberalism to 
suddenly change their habits and forego their privileges, even if a strictly 
objective capitalist logic might suggest that they need now to boost sustain-
able demand sacrificially if they are to guarantee a steadier long-term profit 
rate for themselves? A class and political power preference for financialisa-
tion can readily emerge, in defiance of even capitalist economic logic, which 
would remind the wealthy that capital in its inherent need for dynamism 
requires some increase of labour-power and demand if it is to be able to 
extract yet further value from it. 
But the driving force of capitalism is ultimately as much or more political 
as it is economic.51 That is, it tends indeed to engender a class struggle 
between a few large owners-cum-power-brokers and the mass of petty own-
ers, workers and consumers (including the middle classes) Ð however much 
this struggle and the lines of class division may constantly mutate. Therefore, 
todayÕs growth of the super-rich cannot be met in merely Ôrational-economicÕ 
terms. These people are not about to renounce their privileged interests to 
which they have become all too well accustomed, in the name of economic 
good sense. To the contrary, they now represent one side of an entrenched 
politico-economic culture, an ethos, to which they are so emotionally, not to 
say narcissistically, attached that this cultural allegiance has become an eco-
nomic factor in itself, even if it is also an extra-economic one. 
The other side of this culture is an extended and novel proletarianisation of 
most people, proceeding often under the apparently opposite guise of the 
bourgeoisification of the upper working class.52 This novel proletarianisation 
means the resignation of most people to a modicum of comfort and passive 
diversion, alongside routinised and uncreative work, married to increasingly 
poor social prospects and aspirations. All this has the effect of corroding 
character and undermining older virtues of craftsmanship and striving for 
excellence allied to ethos, while both manual workers and new professionals 
are haunted by the spectre of uselessness.53 
Given all this, financialisation is a logical response to the metacrisis that it, 
nonetheless, increases, for deeper cultural reasons than are usually seen, 
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besides the structurally economic ones. It has proved easier for the Ônew 
menÕ of our times to offer the mass of people easy credit than to re-skill them 
or induct them into vocational commitment more likely to result in 
productive hard work and innovation.54 Equally, it is easier to do this than to 
offer higher wages with expectation of increase that would encourage family 
solidarity, time spent by parents with children and a greater sustainability of 
familial relationships. For to do so would both eat into the easy extraction of 
surplus value through depressed wages and popular consumption of shoddy 
goods, and threaten the equality gulf upon which today a very dominant and 
ruthless few rest their sense of prestige and self-recognition. It would also 
tend to undermine the foundations of the reigning ideology of Ômeritocratic 
extremismÕ, which confuses merit with monetary return and even skill in 
monetary manipulation with the luck of the draw. 
Within the older, normal cyclical operation of capitalism, the need for ever-
greater return worked in antithesis to demand, alternatively against and for it, 
and likewise, inversely, the level of normal citizensÕ income in relation to 
profit extraction. Today, on the contrary, a shared interest in endless credit 
expansion apparently binds ordinary citizensÕ interests together with those of 
the super-rich, such that lack of real demand and deficiency of truly productive 
investment in the material economy are positively related through the demonic 
compact of debt. This is the case even though the interest of ordinary citizens is 
increasingly in bare survival, while the interest of the super-rich is in ever-
further monopolisation of wealth and power. But this new positive bond of 
(erstwhile dialectically opposed though also positively connected) requisites 
for demand and profit does not betoken any shared positive content of the 
bond. On the contrary, since the bond is debt (with this fact itself contradicting 
at a meta-level the usual apposition of the debt of some to the assets of others), 
its content is negative: a new devilÕs bargain to cement together, by a mutually 
repellent glue, a lack of solidly wage- and asset-based demand with an equal 
lack of real, concrete investment opportunity. 
CapitalismÕs founding amorality, aiming magically to distil public benefits 
out of private vice, was, indeed, a Faustian gesture.55 But the sampling of the 
new elixir of financialisation represents a desertion of even its own amoral god 
of the extraction of abstract wealth by appropriation and division of the real 
material body of the earth. For this new elixir is proffered by a 
Mephistophelean sub-demon who whispers in the ears of financial magi that 
abstraction might perpetually be made merely from the already abstract Ð 
making yet more money out of money. Then the whole new order of the mar-
ket and society is legally and politically underwritten by the third corner of this 
viciously negative, virtual triangle.56 That third corner is the state, whose own 
increased indebtedness (in the face of a falling tax revenue from threatened 
rates of profit and an increased welfare bill to shore up a precarious 
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populace) confirms and legitimates that of the other two. Meanwhile, greater 
state debt also further exacerbates inequality, since government debt is upheld 
by wealthy bond-purchasers and benefits them alone.57 And only this vicious 
triangle allows a vicious circle to be constantly re-inscribed around it. 
6. SYMBOL, MATTER AND ABSTRACTION 
We have seen that liberal capitalism does not represent the logic of the 
economic as such, but, rather, one particular economic system that acts out 
certain theoretical assumptions, peculiar to liberalism. As outlined in the first 
section of this chapter, these are threefold: the division of cultural symbolic 
reality into pure abstraction and pure materiality; the assumption that the 
well-being of any corporation, even an economic one, takes second place to 
the self-interest of the individuals who compose it; the view that human 
beings are basically self-seeking animals whose greedy competition for 
scarce resources can only be coordinated by fusing the invisible hand of the 
market with the visible hand of the state. Although financialisation drives the 
capitalist system to a new pitch of intensity, this occurs precisely through an 
exacerbation of liberal economic principles and a purer adherence to their 
implicit logic. They now demand further interrogation, but with specific 
respect to the way in which they tend to contradict, not dialectically, as for 
Marx, their own capitalist premises, but, rather, perversely the imperatives of 
human economy and exchange as such. 
First, the dominance of abstraction is rooted in the tearing of culturally 
material things apart into a sign-aspect, on the one hand, and an object-aspect, 
on the other. This is unnatural, because the house I live in, for example, affords 
me at once material shelter and emotional significance. We naturally see 
everything in this integrated way. Yet our inherited capitalism depends for its 
very operation upon the sundering of thing from sign. Thus material things 
without meaning can be treated always as objects to be manipulated. When the 
land itself is treated like this, the surface of the earth threatens to become as 
naturally desolate as it is culturally desecrated. Marx failed to grasp this most 
crucial aspect of capitalist logic, because it is invisible to materialist, as 
opposed to realist premises (which unite matter to meaning via form, deemed 
to be an ÔidealÕ ingredient of any reality, as with Aristotle). The very idea of 
matter as a meaningless base is produced by liberal capitalist understanding, 
within whose remit Marx therefore remains. 
Equally, when human beings are reduced to bodies without souls, they can 
be regarded as simply sources of labour supply. Even money itself, as Polanyi 
realised, in the tradition of Aristotle and Aquinas, is treated over-abstractly.58 
Instead of being regarded as an instrument of exchange that measures 
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economic comparative value in accord with moral value, it is usuriously seen 
as something one should try to accumulate in its own right, and as something 
that can be validly bought and sold and so used to constrain peopleÕs natural 
freedom of choice. In this way, genuine meaning floats off into the ether of 
sheer quantification, while material reality is cruelly wrenched away from all 
affective attachments. 
However, if globalisation encourages this nomadic abstraction, it also 
increases the way in which abstraction must in the end relate back to the real 
material economy. For if you live on one globe, there is eventually nowhere 
to hide, and over time even offshore tax havens afford no real refuge. Since 
we are embodied creatures, disembodied capital must in the end be 
securitised against material resources. Otherwise, we have no way finally to 
guarantee its value, without which it loses its purpose. 
This scenario cannot, however, be read in over-optimistic terms of an 
inevitable collapse of the virtual into the ÔrealÕ material world, or as the 
revenge, after all, of modern foundations over post-modern delusion. This is 
the temptation of a certain simplistic Marxist materialism. Rather, it is the 
case that bare materiality is merely the reflex of the enterprise of pure 
abstraction: once sacred symbolic value has been transmuted into exchange 
value, things stand naked to offer themselves only as the crudest, most 
detached sort of use values. Quite simply, they become mere resources to be 
exploited for the extraction of further abstract value by whomsoever. Thus 
abstraction takes the lead and this concomitant mode of ÔmaterialisationÕ is, 
indeed, but a reverse consequence of its process, although it is a consequence 
that always takes immediate effect and is clearly the negative aspect of 
abstractionÕs very possibility. This fact is starkly advertised in the moment of 
primitive accumulation, or the original bringing of things and people within 
the orbit of commodification. It marks a moment that not only stands at the 
outset but must later on be repeatedly resorted to for the enabling of capitalist 
increase, and today often takes the form of outright criminal seizure Ð 
whether in the Arctic, the Amazon or Siberia. 
Therefore, current securitisation on bare material resources is well symbol-
ised by the ever-further reduction of dwelling-space, which is a fundamental 
human need, to the nakedness of ÔpropertyÕ and Ôretail estateÕ. Although it 
serves to anchor pure abstraction, it does not really escape it, but only makes 
further entries in its shadow-ledger of materialisation. These entries further 
appear to dissolve solid entities of resource and production into the ink of 
abstraction. Yet they can never be entirely written off in their concretion, and 
the more they are written up, the more they are released into sheerly 
insignificant corporeality. Nevertheless, the very reflex condition of ecologi-
cal dereliction serves, and can be made to further serve, the primary drift to 
abstract accumulation of nominal wealth. 
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So recourse to material securitisation betokens no imminent collapse of the 
current system, which will no doubt treat even exponentially increased 
ecological hazard as an opportunity for an unprecedented speculative 
bonanza. Equally, every return to matter in order to find a fixable measure for 
monetary conjecture can only be temporary, since this very recourse must 
simultaneously evaporate the ground on which it temporarily treads. It is only 
human beings and not fate that can dissolve this spiral, if they should 
eventually tire of economic insecurity, cultural alienation and homelessness 
amidst nature. 
Materialisation or ÔspatialisationÕ is consequently exacerbated the more land 
as productive resource becomes less economically important than the sheerly 
instrumental fixed capital of landed plant, and the sheer abstraction of liquid 
capital as profit or return on financial loans. This tendency, unlike the tendency 
of return on capital to outrun growth demonstrated by Piketty, does, indeed, 
transcend the sieving of wealth by commodification. For the impersonal bent 
of capitalism as a process is thereby sustained and further compounded by the 
cultural-economic interests of a capitalist class increasingly devoted to pure 
financial abstraction through the destruction of concrete and symbolic value, 
which yields newly astronomical returns of profit and salary, less and less 
reined in by the requirement of material equivalence. 
In consequence, one also gets the increased instances of the capitalist 
phenomenon of simultaneous over-production and under-provision (as de 
Sismondi noted before Marx).59 For example, rotting stocks of food, and yet 
a starving populace, or less dramatically but more immediately, farmers and 
supermarkets in the West throwing away large amounts of food on the one 
hand, yet ever-greater numbers of food stamps and food banks on the other, 
or a growing stock of unoccupied houses owned by the super-rich and an 
increasing number of families priced out of the property market because of 
an apparent lack of supply. 
But, of course, this process of abstract-material divergence, of the sunder-
ing of the bond between the symbolic and the real, goes clean against the 
instincts and ritual orderings of most human cultures. And although it is the 
condition of possibility for commodification, it cannot itself escape the con-
tradictory logic of the commodifying process, which it allows and unleashes. 
The drift to abstraction is, nonetheless, constitutively linear rather than 
cyclical, and the more it is augmented, the more it seeks to ignore cyclical 
constraints (as it does to a new degree today). However, in the end it cannot 
evade the need for abstraction to be materially realised and measured, and so 
for the rate of return to answer, after all, to the rate of demand. Arithmetic 
numbers that pile up to infinity cannot be assessed or fixed as to ownership 
and liability, except by some ultimate tie to geometrically leached, yet still 
actual and concrete, material space. 
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Here one can say that a required bare reference of the abstracted arithmetic 
(monetary) sign to the denuded, meaningless, geometrised earth is the nega-
tive tribute that capitalism must perforce pay to the integral symbolic truth of 
culture that it most denies. Even a monetary sign must make some minimal 
referential indication if it is to make minimal sense. And, inversely, material 
space, however leached, must be accorded some ideal significance in order to 
figure culturally at all. Moreover, in an unnaturally divorced, symbol-cleaving 
system of logic, the bias ultimately runs into the ground, even if abstraction 
appears to dominate aerially. Thus, within capitalism, mostly matter is 
mediated by abstract value, but for value itself to retain any finally measurable 
value whatsoever, it must ultimately be referred to the gold-standard of 
matter. Thus the value of the finest refinement in the end consists in the 
crudest dominion, the rawest occupation of terrain. 
Herein, as we have already suggested, lies the hidden logic of the sub-
prime crisis. It was not simply that finance capital found a bizarre new way 
to exploit even indigency by the bundling together, selling on and 
speculative hedging of mortgage debts. It was also that in extreme crisis, 
finance capital needed to do this sort of thing. Unrealisable, unplaceable 
and immeasurable abstraction must in the end anchor itself in matter. And 
logically it does so in the most barely reduced material sphere, which is the 
most measurably geometric as least contaminated by either symbolic reso-
nance or abstract sign. This category certainly includes supposedly ÔnakedÕ 
natural assets, regarded purely from the perspective of appropriation, but so 
far un-appropriated. But it also includes the bare property of the poor or 
relatively poor, which is their minimal living space that they rarely ever 
own outright. 
This claim may seem strange, because in the end housing was dragged into 
the world of extreme abstract speculation, compounding its lack of ascertain-
able measure, and thereby pulling the real material misery of millions in its 
wake. Yet the converse also remained true initially: a new ultimate launch 
pad for unlimited leverage became possible because the ultimate equity was 
so completely concrete. Just because it was really concrete, its abstract 
substitutes could be treated by all as if they were concrete: financiers were 
seduced by their own cathecting dream-illusions. Yet, paradoxically, a newly 
uncontrolled fantasy of the ultimate anchoring of the abstract in the concrete 
was possible because there really was an anchor in the end, however rusted 
and buried in the sand. 
To summarise, capitalism tends by a linear drift to let abstraction and 
spatialisation pull away from each other in such a way that the two com-
plicitous processes, nonetheless, cannot any longer be readily correlated. This 
circumstance translates into an increased difficulty of alternating, as already 
discussed, between a boost of the rate of return on the one hand, and a boost 
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of consumer demand on the other, in cyclical succession. In consequence, 
one gets, as today, a simultaneous crisis of both the level of demand and the 
rate of capital return. Yet, because correlation remains inescapable, and the 
transcendental straight vector of abstraction-spatialisation must still take a 
constant detour through the cycle of contradiction, correlation then takes an 
extreme form. Now, the most remote degree of abstraction must somehow be 
linked and referred to the barest instance of materiality. The high must meet 
the low, the richest the poorest, in a kind of perverse economic coincidence 
of opposites. This necessity is more generally exemplified by the remote 
anchoring and yet unmooring of abstract capital in seed patents, the eco-
system, third-world debt, child exploitation and welfare dependency for an 
increasing number. 
7. THE ESSENTIAL FIRM 
If our current economic system divides sign from thing, it also, in the second 
place, tries to divide the individual from the group. But there are limits to this 
trajectory also. After all, even bankers do not operate as lone rangers, but 
within firms. Why also firms and not just markets? Neo-classical economics 
was simply about markets: it concerned market equilibrium and the idea that 
markets automatically record exact information. But today, alternative tradi-
tions of economics are once more coming to the fore, which recognise that no 
system is stable in the long run, that (in reverse of the invisible hand) rational 
individual acting can sometimes produce irrational general results, and that the 
feedback of market information often arrives too late for the benefit of the 
individual speculator.60 
This is where the role of the firm comes into play. People have to get 
together and cooperate under both horizontal and hierarchical consensual 
norms, precisely because, within a firm, they can create for themselves a 
niche market that becomes relatively predictable and that supplies reasonably 
reliable information in sufficient time. Most economic activity operates in 
this institutional space and not through patterns of exchangist negotiation. As 
the Italian economists Luigino Bruni and Stefano Zamagni put it, Ôwe work 
far more than we shopÕ.61 
Yet, despite recognising the necessity of collaboration, economics for a 
while tried perversely to understand even the firm in individualistic terms. 
This encouraged an appeal to Ôpublic choice theoryÕ, with its roots in the 
work of Enlightenment figures like Condorcet, and advocacy by influential 
economists like Kenneth Arrow and Amartya Sen in recent times. In Britain, 
Ôpublic choice theoryÕ helped shape New LabourÕs political economy and has 
been applied to governmental as well as private organisations. 
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For the crudest version of this theory, employees and civil servants remain 
utility-maximising creatures whose main aim is to cream off benefits of pres-
tige and wealth for themselves. But even in the subtler variants, individual 
actors are seen as trying to realise their own goals in accordance with their 
own diverse capacities. This rules out any objective shared ends.62 In conse-
quence, firms cannot trust their employees, giving rise to our current culture 
of targets, incentives, bonuses and the endless employment of new 
employees to check up on other employees. Ultimately, the workforce is 
reduced to a series of isolated automatons who have to follow rules and 
procedures rather than exercising substantive judgement about their actions 
and outcomes. The compliance culture and the system of surveillance have 
led to a situation where individuals, indeed, start to pursue their own narrow 
self-interest instead of acting in the firmÕs best interest, while serving equally 
as scapegoats for the top management.63 
At the same time, an anti-corporatist theoretical individualism itself reflects 
the increased individualism in practice of Ôdisorganised capitalismÕ or Ôneo-
capitalismÕ ever since the 1970s. In this model, partly encouraged by new 
technologies and partly by a reinforcement of the inherently individualist logic 
of capitalism itself, an older managerialist ÔFordistÕ model of production has 
been replaced to a considerable degree by outsourcing from central to satellite 
companies and networking between apparently more independent individuals 
and parties. Yet, in reality, this has disguised an ever-increased agglomeration 
and dominance of monopolistic firms, often at the global level, and often in the 
same mega-civic sites Ð as today in London, supremely. Their attraction of 
such enterprise has more to do with the money to be made from the spectacle 
of being seen to be in the right fashionable place than with any supposed 
creative benefit of huddling together. (In reality Ð to contradict current vogues 
Ð creative people need isolated peace and quiet as much as they need the 
stimulation of contact and teamwork.) The apparent but actually superficial 
disaggregation itself permits a greater control by a centre whose power benefits 
from the very fluidity and evanescent nature of its parts.64 
Equally, the preponderance of ÔnetworkingÕ ensures that a contractualist 
logic, fundamental to capitalism, increasingly operates at the intra-firm as well 
as at the inter-firm level. Often, this applies in such a fashion that seeming 
interactions at the latter level are in reality covertly manipulated interactions 
within the former, as for example with outsourcing, trading with subsidiaries or 
squeezing suppliers. And the supposedly greater scope for individual initiative 
that the new system seems both to encourage and to thrive upon is to a degree 
but another screen of delusion: for, in reality, what drives the system, and what 
it benefits from, is the attraction of the mere rhetoric of enterprise, and the mere 
trappings of difference to the various players within the system. Their greater 
energy and cooperation is recruited (as compared with Fordism) 
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to the degree that they are manipulated through the enjoyment of apparently 
increased choice within an always severely restricted range of options. These 
are more like Ôshopping selectionsÕ than genuine opportunities for creativity Ð 
spectacular branding as opposed to genuine innovation and competition in 
terms of quality and ethos. In this way, the disorganisation of capitalism, by 
reducing the esprit de corps of the more organised firm, decreases trust and 
security and reduces even productive decisions to simulacra of consumer 
choices. In consequence, a capacity to innovate, which capitalism itself would 
seem to require, is in some measure compromised. 
And yet this may only be a seeming. For the ultimate interest of capitalism 
lies not in the promotion of labour, or of all and every mode of human 
creativity. This is true despite the fact that it is only labour, in one guise or 
another, that can produce any sort of wealth, including capitalist wealth. It is, 
instead, in the creaming off of abstract wealth by owners of capital, however 
few or many. And this is perfectly compatible with the inhibition of human 
talent and creativity, the production of shoddy goods and even low standards 
of material infrastructure, food and clothing Ð as one sees so clearly in the 
most capitalist of countries, which is the United States. 
Therefore an individualistic bias in both theory and practice is actually 
inimical to a genuinely free market, as opposed to a capitalist one. A culture 
of pervasive mistrust inevitably inhibits those qualities of initiative, risk and 
creativity on which competitive enterprise depends. Moreover, one can argue 
that an overly ÔliquidÕ capital, which moves so fast that it can be increasingly 
indifferent to local limitations, is just as subject to the loss of Ôtacit knowl-
edgeÕ only available at the local level, as Hayek argued was the case for 
central state planning.65 If, for example, a speeded-up economy requires that 
people frequently change jobs, which now become so automated (in every 
respect) that they are not difficult to move in and out of, it will pay the price 
of losing that patient slowness that real creative innovation and prudential 
skill require. 
Even capitalist wealth creation must deploy this patience in some degree, 
yet it can relatively easily dispense with the genuine conditions for excellent 
work, or just make instrumental concessions in certain areas and at certain 
times to Ôsocial benefitÕ, but always in the compromised interests of abstract 
accumulation, which will resort to short-cuts when it can. Capitalism as such 
has no permanent interest in seeing socially good business practice prevail 
over bad. However, the productive and exchanging economy, as more fun-
damental than one that is one-sidedly yoked to the concerns of capital, does 
have such an interest. The economic in the most basic sense, as the production 
and exchange of real wealth, is, indeed, contradicted by any inhibition of 
creative labour. Hence, while capitalismÕs tendency to this inhibition is not 
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a contradiction within capitalism, it does place capitalism in contradiction to 
the economic as such and to a market economy in its purest sense. 
Therefore the restoration of trust, the re-localisation of the economy, and 
the use of ÔlighterÕ technology to empower individuals and small groups, 
rather than to render them evermore replaceable (a kind of alternative dis-
aggregation to that of post-Fordist disorganisation), is actually in line with 
the logic of a free market, though not with that of capitalism. These things 
are also desirable in more properly social terms, and it is impossible to gain 
the sheer economic benefit without also gaining (or re-gaining) the social 
benefit. It is just this ethical sincerity for inherently ethical reasons, despite 
its additional pragmatic usefulness, that tends to prove beyond capitalismÕs 
remit. 
So at a new dialectical limit, the market economy requires some re-embed-
ding in a genuine social ethos for market economic reasons, even though this 
re-embedding will paradoxically tend to remove the very idea of such Ôpurely 
economicÕ reasons, which belong to a capitalist disembedding that needs to be 
overcome. But the proviso must be added that nothing dictates that even good 
economic logic will be followed: the swiftness of late modern capitalism has 
an enormous momentum that establishes a habit which can often survive the 
evidence of its economic insanity. The United States well illustrates the inertia 
of an extreme capitalist system: it survives and dominates despite the fact that 
it tends to quash local enterprise in favour of sluggish monopoly and 
engenders much material squalor and absence of real quality and choice, even 
for the possessors of moderate wealth.66 As we have already suggested, the 
current recovery merely reinforces this tendency and exacerbates the twin 
crises of economics and ethics. 
8. RESTORING THE PRIMACY OF THE SOCIAL 
Modern economists claim that human beings must accept resource scarcity, 
especially in conditions of population growth. However, resources, as we 
have already argued, are only ever scarce in the short term. Over time, it is 
arguably the case that nature combined with human labour, ingenuity and 
creative production can generate an almost infinite flow of finite resources 
that help mankind meet real, objective needs and provide universal basic 
goods Ð food, shelter, health, education, friendship. Scarcity is nearly always 
something artificially engineered by both monopoly capital and the fabrica-
tion of fake desires. Indeed, cartels and monopolies generate rents that accrue 
to the few while restricting genuinely free and fair competition that can help 
generate prosperity for the many. 
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The myth of scarce resources ultimately rests on a perverse moral philoso-
phy that we owe to Thomas Malthus. Surveying the deprivation and struggle 
of the poor from the comfort of his vicarage in the late eighteenth century, he 
denounced what he saw as the greed of a Ôreckless rabbleÕ. That is why he 
attributed human vice to Ôthe constant pressure on man from the difficulty of 
subsistenceÕ,67 which is exacerbated by growing populations Ð hence the 
modern, neo-Malthusian tendency to control reproduction through state 
intervention and market incentives. Thus Malthus presented a vision of Ôman 
as he really is, inert, sluggish and averse from labour unless compelled by 
necessityÕ.68 
So not, after all, so unlike Bernard de Mandeville before him, Malthus 
claimed that humans are naturally immoral and that, paradoxically, Ômoral 
evil is absolutely necessary to the production of moral excellenceÕ Ð another 
variant of the liberal logic of pessimism and necessity.69 But where the 
libidinised Huguenot Mandeville was content to see vice flourish to the end 
of common benefit, the prurient Low Church Anglican clergyman Malthus 
wished to promote a bourgeois version of heroic virtue in reaction to the spur 
of natural and moral evil. This spur was, above all, that of scarcity of 
resources, which was supposed to teach by fearful example the puritanical 
need for thrift, self-discipline and sexual continence. It is partly in conse-
quence of this dual Calvinistic legacy of double predestination to both the 
festively diabolic and the dismally divine that the modern economy must 
demand at once an unnaturally excessive hedonism and yet a tight restraint of 
all our natural desires.70 
So what is in question is human nature. Like liberal political thought, 
modern economics assumes that mankind is fundamentally selfish and indif-
ferent to mutual recognition or the public good, even if Mandevillian vice can 
be tempered by the pursuit of rational self-interest. Adam Smith, indeed, 
embedded his market in networks of social sympathy, but this embedding 
was limited by a double distrust. First, in the human ability to extend virtue 
beyond the Ôthick tiesÕ of family relations and friendship,71 and second, in 
human association, which Smith claims nearly always leads to the vice of 
corruption.72 For Smith, both markets and states ought to be amoral and neu-
tral because only the pursuit of individual self-interest Ð without regard to the 
well-being of our butcher, brewer and baker, or they for us Ð can produce 
social benefit.73 
It is therefore little surprise that post-Smithian economics no longer locates 
the market within the realm of civil society or the moral virtues of civic life. 
Yet ethically construed markets may be also economically more profitable and 
socially more sustainable. A Ôcivil economyÕ model, which advocates this 
ethical inherence, is the only genuine alternative to the pessimism in modern 
economics about either individual or social motivations. The roots of this 
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model go back to the Middle Ages and the Italian Renaissance, but it was 
explicitly articulated in the later Neapolitan Enlightenment by SmithÕs near 
contemporary, Antonio Genovesi.74 The next chapter sets out a post-liberal 
alternative to liberal capitalism that renews the Ôcivil economyÕ tradition. 
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Chapter 4 
The Civil Economy Alternative 
Before detailing the character of a Ôcivil economyÕ, we will briefly consider 
the three main economic options that are usually entertained today as resolu-
tions to the current crisis of capitalism: (a) a broadly Keynesian Ôembedded 
liberalismÕ, (b) repristinated neo-liberalism and (c) the Ôsocial marketÕ based 
on a German model. 
1. THE MYTH OF EMBEDDED LIBERALISM 
Part of the reason for the triumph of liberal capitalism is that it has told an 
easily believable story of Ôthe great enrichmentÕ. According to this story, 
capitalism has been the biggest success in the whole of human history, pro-
viding untold wealth, eliminating disease and lengthening human life. But it 
is also generally admitted, especially by the New Right, that capitalism is 
intrinsically amoral.1 
The updated application of this story declares that until the 1970s, trade 
unions secured excessively high wages and made workers too unproductive. 
Meanwhile, governments extracted too much tax, spent too much on welfare 
and interfered too much in business. Once that was corrected by Reagan, 
Thatcher and their imitators, unprofitable industry vanished and the business 
of Wall Street and the City of London boomed. The promise was that a gush-
ing spring of wealth in New York and London would progressively trickle 
down every provincial gulley. Industry would learn from finance that it 
should be purely about making money, not also about making specific things 
and sustaining the traditions and well-being of a workforce. (For industry had 
always somewhat sustained this hybrid character of motivation, and in this 
sense been but impurely ÔcapitalistÕ.) 
1 2 9  
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What has the left had to offer in place of the story told by the so-called 
right, but actually by economic liberals? Only a modified version of it. After 
all, even Marx thought that capitalism, with all its evils, was a necessary 
stage in the evolution of society and that is what they still think in China 
today. The Western left goes further: capitalism will always be with us, the 
pact with the devil has to remain in place. For although our current system is 
an evil monster, its essential forces can be tamed and channelled through 
nationalisation and state corporatism, as for much of the post-1945 era. Thus 
was born the myth of Ôembedded liberalismÕ.2 
In fact, Ôembedded liberalismÕ sowed the seeds of its own destruction at the 
hand of the neo-liberal revolution. For it accepted the neo-classical approach 
and sought to regulate capital instead of entangling it in strong institutions, 
productive activities and interpersonal relationships. Compared with laissez-
faire capitalism that ended in the Great Depression of 1929Ð1932, the post-
1945 Keynesian model sought to institutionalise a balance of interests between 
capital and labour and to restrict the domination of international finance. 
However, this relied far too much on the central state (bureaucratically 
administered borrow-tax-and-spend), and far too little on professional 
associations, regional banks and other intermediary institutions. 
So the eventual failure of Keynesianism was predictable, because post-war 
Western governments were partially in thrall to liberal norms. Any notion of 
Ôembedded liberalismÕ turns out to be a contradiction in terms, since liberalism 
by definition can only be auto-referring, rooted only in rootlessness. What may 
look like real embedding on the liberal model is the apparent subordination of 
market to state in terms of a social-democratic correcting for the inadequacies 
and tensions of unbridled capitalism. Yet such corrections are more likely to 
be further enabling devices for capitalist functioning, and they largely tend to 
share the mainstream economic assumption of private utility maximisation. 
More intangible goals of community belonging, work satisfaction and 
aspirations to cultural richness and beauty are here set aside. That is what the 
angry children of the unprecedentedly comfortable post-war era inchoately 
realised in the course of their various rebellions in the 1960s. 
So during the ÔKeynesianÕ period, whenever there was an economic crisis 
(as in the 1970s), the government intervened with a range of central mea-
sures: work programmes to generate demand, devaluation of the currency, 
modification of interest rates, nationalisation or subsidisation of agriculture 
and selected industries or the operation of a prices and incomes policy. But 
all these measures were undertaken mainly in the interests of governmental 
and capital power. They were not undertaken in order to render market 
exchange intrinsically more just and, thereby, less prone to class conflict. 
Here it should be said, in agreement with Marx, that capitalist cyclical 
instability is the inevitable consequence of this conflict, since the endemic 
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lack of balance between return on capital and consumer demand is ultimately 
traceable to a lack of sufficient shared interest and perceived mutual justice 
between shareholders, management, workers and consumers. This is itself 
consequent, in elaboration of Marx, upon two ÔmovementsÕ: one is the ever-
increased appropriation by capital interests of extra-market resources, 
property and productive labour. The other is the ever-extended subordination 
of all substantive economic purpose to the accumulation of abstract wealth, 
which, thereby, ever-further directs all accumulated human resources towards 
this sterile future end.3 The resulting lack of concrete common purpose and 
disparity of shared interest in economic growth ensures that a slow-burning 
struggle must ensue between different interests and classes. This is negatively 
evidenced by the relatively low degree of such tensions and an ensuing market 
stability over the long term in some northern European countries where there 
is a relatively great shared perception of justice in terms of economic 
distribution. The perception arises from the presence of higher wages, worker 
stake-holding, investor risk-sharing, a larger shared physical environment, a 
hitherto shared ethnicity and culture and more recognition of the need to 
integrate work with family life. 
The more restricted social-democratic measures taken elsewhere were 
more clearly undertaken in resignation to supposedly inevitable market 
amorality, and in keeping with capitalist market assumptions. This was done 
in the fond belief that they were something more than the external political 
adjustments required by capitalism itself in one phase of its crisis-prone cycle 
Ð as Keynes, a Liberal, not a Labour man, knew perfectly well. 
Whether during the Keynesian or the monetarist period, the amorality of 
this game was not questioned and yet the liberals on left and right continued 
naively to suppose that an amoral market monster can be securely held at 
bay. No genuine ÔcivilisingÕ of the market itself was seriously entertained. 
And, in reality, all that was shored up was the legitimacy of capitalism, by 
dampening economic discontent with welfare palliatives. At the same time, 
this involved rendering the economic agon yet more normative through the 
mantra of equality of opportunity. 
But today this liberal story is a lot less plausible. Over recent years, 
capitalism, and especially finance capitalism, has appeared evermore self-
interestedly sordid. More significantly, it now looks as if it is not even work-
ing very well in its own pragmatic terms. Is the devil finally letting us down, 
not keeping his side of the bargain? Vast swathes of capitalism are starting to 
look incompetent as well as semi-criminal in terms of the extra-legal seizure 
of primary assets, the concealment of accounts and evasion of taxation. What 
is more, their immorality is often the very thing that renders them unworkable. 
For it increasingly appears to be the case that sometimes self-interested 
behaviour just serves the self-interested individual and does not 
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serve society at large, not even economically. Moreover, it often only serves 
business interest in the very short term. US and UK company law gives too 
much power to shareholders and thus helps to bring about corporate short-
termism Ð depressing investment, innovation, productivity and workersÕ pay.4 
2. THE FAILURE OF NEO-LIBERALISM 
The failure of this amoral bargain casts doubt on the validity of liberal 
economics, which underpins not just late nineteenth-century laissez-faire 
capitalism but also the post-war Keynesian settlement and the neo-liberal 
combination of monetarism with fiscal austerity that has dominated the West 
in recent years. All three models share a further commitment to the presup-
positions of neo-classical economics that rests on the utilitarian theory of 
ÔmarginalismÕ that runs into two problems.5 First, it disregards the intrinsic 
worth of individual goods and it rules relational goods out of the equation, 
thereby reducing everything to exchangeable commodities that maximise 
utility; second, as already argued, the quest for maximal utility is itself sub-
ject to the law of diminishing returns, since even qualitatively higher goods 
are treated as if we derived less satisfaction from increased consumption, 
whereas in this case the reverse applies. 
The key question in contemporary Western politics is whether the main 
aim of government should be to increase peopleÕs freedom of market choice 
in accord with these curious assumptions, or whether its main aim should be 
to seek to encourage human flourishing or eudaimonia. The latter can be 
conceived in triple terms of those things in which most humans already think 
such flourishing exists, those which the best traditions have handed down to 
us, and a perpetual dialectical attempt (in the lineage of Socrates) to deter-
mine more precisely wherein such flourishing objectively consists. Without 
any trust that such objectivity can be discerned one would, of course, be back 
within the confines of liberal presuppositions. 
If this diagnosis is correct, then the real issue of contention is, to reiterate, 
no longer Ôstate versus marketÕ. The central theory of neoclassicism is that 
when the individual calculators of utility are acting rationally, then markets 
will achieve perfect equilibrium, balance or clearance. Insofar as they fail to 
act rationally, the state can make adjustments. This much is common to 
marginalists of both the right and the left: the difference arises in terms of 
how far it is supposed that the conditions for perfect market operation arise 
automatically through market processes themselves and how far they have to 
be engineered by the state. Thus both the invisible hand of ÔprovidenceÕ and 
the visible hand of the state are deemed to be seeking the same goal of perfect 
rational equilibrium that coordinates egoistic wishes, without any mutual 
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agreement as to the common good. In the case of both left and right, the real-
ity of the aspiring and discerning soul has been tacitly abandoned in favour 
of the wilful and power-seeking manipulation of animal appetites Ð as 
Thomas Carlyle argued in his presentation in Past and Present of the first 
effectively Ôpost-secularÕ analysis of modernity.6 
Can a new emphasis on the common good and the promotion of human 
flourishing be truly relevant to hard economic questions? It can, because 
liberalism also, as an indication of its fatal theoretical tautology, is subject to 
that very law of diminishing returns which it has itself articulated.7 We can 
see this especially with respect to finance. At first, as the history of the 
modern world attests, liberalisation of financial markets leads to growth, but 
in the long run, too much financial liberty tends to market anarchy and state 
coercion. The components of this condition include over-abstraction from the 
real economy; the creation of credit and debt that dissolves property and 
other assets into purely nominal value; self-interest that can be aligned to 
market failure rather than market success; the non-constraint of capital by 
labour; and a multitude of transactions that are only about shifting around the 
existing monetary symbols of wealth, not about creating new wealth, even in 
abstract terms. In the same way, the spirit of greed tends to replace small 
businesses with large and monopolising ones, which are reluctant to pursue 
real innovation for fear of damaging existing products and merely engage in 
an endless exercise of re-branding. 
So if the quest for maximal utility is subject to the law of diminishing 
returns, then capitalism undermines a market economy that promotes quali-
tatively higher goods such as music, where attention and practice serve to 
heighten future enjoyment. Therefore, the basic assumptions of modern lib-
eral economics occlude from view a basic part of our exchanged, produced 
and consumed reality Ð a range of goods that vary in qualitative intensity and 
satisfy our souls just because they fulfil our creative talents and natural 
desire for beauty. 
Liberalism, by contrast, treats all goods as if they could really be subject to 
a flattening quantitative calculus, because they are seen as mere measurable 
stimuli for a soulless organism. Far from such an outlook representing the 
most basic, governing realities, it rather substitutes what Carlyle called a 
ÔsuccedaneumÕ for concrete and variegated interpersonal existence. This is 
akin to the way that Cartesian natural science substituted Ôbare extensionÕ for 
the secondary qualities, such as colours, of the formed world that we inhabit. 
As Carlyle declared, ÔIt is your souls that lie dead [...] and are not souls at all, 
but mere succedanea for salt to keep your bodies and their appetites from 
putrefyingÕ.8 Instead of vivid reality, liberal economists posit a grey simu-
lacrum. Yet, thanks to mass manipulation, it becomes increasingly the case 
that the colours of quality get washed out of the lives of all but a few, who 
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can afford to paint their private lives in more interesting shades. To natural 
economic reality there indeed ÔsucceedsÕ a curious mechanical substitute. 
And the mechanism is far less neutral than the primary, vivid world of 
various intensities. For the whole point of the grey machinistic calculus is 
that it can be more readily manipulated by the oligarchic few and their Ôpro-
fessionalÕ economic advisers. The unnatural leaching of the economic realm 
can only be secured by the dominance of large primary powers that force all 
to think in terms of marginal quantification. Thus liberal capitalism tends to 
turn people into automatons devoid of character and creativity, ushering in 
first the Mechanical and now the Digital Age in which Ônothing is now done 
directly, or by hand; all is by rule and calculated contrivanceÕ.9 In this man-
ner, the oligarchy seduces the masses to consume more and more shoddy 
goods whose appeal will, indeed, soon pale Ð causing them to seek to earn 
more in order to be able to buy a new variant or new seductive novelty. Just 
this logic has led to the contemporary dominance of large producers and 
massified consumers Ð the cartel capitalism of the contemporary West (not 
just the Anglo-Saxon countries) with big banks, large energy companies, 
media empires and various conglomerates that dominate the high street in 
every town or city. 
The rise of Ôclone townsÕ is directly related to the decline of independent 
shopkeepers, and small- and medium-sized enterprises, which tend to com-
pete in terms of ethos and excellence as opposed to low prices based on poor 
wages and precarious employment conditions. These have been largely 
replaced by supermarkets and chain-stores, which eventually tend to have an 
economically deleterious effect.10 For one thing, they can afford to grossly 
under-price certain products, such as milk, in order to entice people into their 
stores rather than those of their competitors. Yet this illogically threatens the 
viability of their own farming supply chain and the sustainability of, 
especially, smaller-scale agriculture, upon which human health relies. More-
over, the imperative to stock ÔeverythingÕ instead of specialising eventually 
leads (as we see today) to over-reach through customer confusion and the 
remaindering of unsellable items. 
By contrast, in the retail sector, as elsewhere, small businesses and midsized 
companies were once the foundation of the Western economic success, while 
even today family and smaller-scale enterprises constitute the industrial and 
manufacturing backbone of Germany, the WestÕs economic powerhouse along 
with parts of the United States. The German model of a Ôsocial market economyÕ 
that combines robust growth with high employment and social cohesion is now 
widely seen as the best alternative to Anglo-Saxon market capitalism and 
ÔAsian-styleÕ state capitalism. However, starting in the 1970s, the Germans 
adopted their own version of the neo-liberal settlement by reviving the post-1919 
tradition of ordo-liberalism, as the following section narrates. 
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3. THE LIMITS OF THE GERMAN ÔSOCIAL MARKETÕ MODEL 
By contrast with neo-classical, Keynesian and monetarist economics that all 
rest on marginalism, the Ôsocial marketÕ model that underpins GermanyÕs 
economic success since 1945 draws on a much richer tradition of political 
economy that includes many elements of Catholic Social Thought.11 Against 
both liberalism and Marxism, this tradition has sought to fuse ideas of the 
common good and human flourishing with new institutions in order to entan-
gle the operations of both state and the market in the skeins of interpersonal 
relationships. This offers an important alternative to KeynesÕ political econ-
omy, which did not sustain the post-war trentes glorieuses precisely because 
it lacked the ideas and institutions that made Germany a continual success, as 
Maurice Glasman has argued.12 
There is much that other Western countries can learn from the German 
model, in particular the importance of regional banks for channelling capital 
into productive activities and thereby involving it in longer-term investment 
rather than letting it roam around in search for short-term speculative profit; 
sector-specific arrangements such as wage bargaining and guild-like licenses 
to diversify the economy; vocational institutions to preserve and renew 
knowledge, trust and innovation, as well as to provide alternative avenues for 
labour market entry; a proper governance model for firms to broker coopera-
tion out of the conflicts between the management and workers by allowing 
co-determination and workersÕ representation on company boards, plus the 
importance and honouring of place in terms of tradition and ethos.13 
However, GermanyÕs economy involves a compromise between Catholic 
Social Thought and ordo-liberalism. Faced with the crisis of laissez-faire lib-
eralism in the Great Depressions of 1873Ð1896 and 1929Ð1932, ordo-liberals 
argued for a much stronger role of the state in ensuring that market competi-
tion produces outcomes that are both efficient and equitable. The state should 
enforce central regulations that create the conditions (Rahmenbedingungen) 
for free and fair competition in the marketplace, on the debatable assumption 
that where these prevail, they will automatically tend in the direction of equity 
and fair reward. Indeed, ordo-liberals assumed that a more genuinely post-
feudal market would perforce be a fairer one, less intrinsically tending 
towards inequality.14 This follows Wilhelm RpkeÕs illusory view that the 
grosser tendencies to inequality within a market system were but the result of 
a feudal hangover.15 But in reality, capitalism relies upon, augments and de-
ethicises pre-capitalist inequalities. Over time, and at an increasing distance 
from Nazi dirigisme and the exigencies of warfare, it is largely because of 
these incorrect assumptions that ordo-liberalism, becoming since the early 
1980s evermore convergent with neo-liberalism pure and simple, has shifted 
GermanyÕs Ôsocial marketÕ economy away from the pursuit of the common 
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good towards the defence of the combined interests of the largest players in 
the private and public sectors. 
The ordo-liberal version of a Ôsocial marketÕ combines bureaucratic state 
control with an amoral economy that does not, after all, ÔautomaticallyÕ share 
the proceeds of export-led growth with ordinary workers, whose real incomes 
have stagnated for much of the past fifteen years since the introduction of the 
euro.16 These and other market failures are partially compensated by rational-
ised welfare and a significant role of the state in the economy. 
It is, nonetheless, true that the German model still differs fundamentally 
from Anglo-Saxon capitalism that fuses a Benthamite utilitarian ethic with 
Rawlsian political liberalism. By contrast, ordo-liberalism weaves together a 
Kantian ethics of context-less duties with Weberian rationalist (and sternly 
amoral) statecraft and Bismarckian welfarism: strict rules, multiple layers of 
bureaucracy, and a Prussian desire for more efficient and quasi-military 
management of civilian populations thereby become evermore the order of 
the day. 
At its core, this compound combines a large measure of Kantian 
formalism with a dose of Schmittian decisionism. Thus it dictates rules to the 
rest of the Eurozone based on the heinousness of national debt allegedly 
arising from fiscal profligacy and over-consumption (when in reality it was 
largely to do with a credit bubble, a heavily indebted private sector and 
reckless financial speculation).17 Meanwhile, it regards itself as a justified 
exception by virtue of its effective economic sovereignty, and, so, as 
uniquely permitted to run a persistent current account surplus sustained by 
domestic under-consumption (because of stagnating real wages and lack of 
investment), which in a different way is equally damaging. For this surplus, 
which amounts to over €250 billion per year or 8 per cent of national output, 
neither benefits ordinary German workers, nor is re-invested in the peripheral 
countries or even at home. In fact, the surplus was a cause of the crisis and is 
an obstacle in resolving it. Before the 2008 crash, it fuelled the irresponsible 
lending by German banks to Ireland and the southern Eurozone members, 
above all Greece. Since then GermanyÕs depressed domestic demand 
(through excessive wage restraint) is exporting deflation to the heavily 
indebted countries, thus deepening their debt problems. 
It follows that GermanyÕs export mercantilism is largely responsible for the 
balance of payments crisis, which is the true reason for the Eurozone turmoil.18 
The combined banking and sovereign debt problem was mostly a consequence 
of the trade imbalances between the Euro countries and uncontrolled financial 
flows between banks (within the Euro-area and between the Eurozone and the 
United States)19 Ð combined with the influx of substantial savings from 
emerging markets (especially in East Asia). Therefore, debt was the result of 
other structural trends Ð not the original cause of the Eurozone 
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crisis that is now undermining the remnants of the social market model. 
Moreover, GermanyÕs export-led growth and persistent surplus cannot be 
adopted by the rest of the Eurozone or the Union as a whole because most 
Euro or EU members trade more with each other than with the rest of the 
world, which inevitably involves deficits; not all countries within a trading 
and monetary union can run a surplus at the same time.20 Thus the current 
version of the German social market economy runs against the interests of 
European workers, including those in Germany itself. 
Whereas the social market economy tends to restrict the role of the state to 
providing a legal framework for the supposedly neutral operation of competi-
tion in pursuit of abstract wealth, the Ôcivil economyÕ alternative requires that 
the state assist in crafting a different sort of market altogether.21 The purpose 
of a Ôcivil marketÕ is not to engender growth as a purely quantitative sum, but 
the real wealth of human flourishing in every dimension Ð which dictates an 
imperative to a different sort of ÔincreaseÕ. If such real wealth be pursued, 
then the first aim of all economic activity must be social benefit, with accept-
able rates of profit related to such benefit, in terms of both proportion and 
rates of successful achievement. Accordingly, state promotion of economic 
development naturally includes at its heart an encouraging and rewarding of 
virtuous behaviour. From our post-liberal perspective, the latter is best 
understood not as a sort of moral addendum to purely economic activity, but 
rather a performing well of the economic construed to be the securing and 
distributing of human consumable and renewable benefit, as we argue in the 
following sections. 
4. THE CIVIL ECONOMY TRADITION 
For over three hundred years, Anglo-Saxon and French economic theory has 
largely followed liberal presuppositions such as foundational self-interest 
and the separation of contract from gift. But certain Italian economists, 
standing in a more classically humanist and Christian tradition, have thought 
in more associationist terms. Accordingly, an economic contract itself can be 
a ÔsympatheticÕ negotiation about shared value and community benefit as 
well as self-interest, which is itself more socially and, so, realistically 
construed.22 Here it is salutary to compare the thought of Adam Smith with 
that of his near contemporary, the Neapolitan philosopher-priest and Ôcivil 
economistÕ, Antonio Genovesi.23 
Of course, Smith was no proto-Benthamite philistine, nor even an advo-
cate of early capitalism. Indeed, he desired a market with few monopolies; 
modest prices; high wages; a vocational, not a functional (factory-like), 
division of labour; and one that tended to return more people to work in 
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the countryside. This almost ÔecologicalÕ factor in his thinking was driven by 
his insistence that a healthy economy puts concrete real wealth before 
abstract, notional wealth, and that the most basic of all wealth is human 
food.24 A post-liberal political economy should critically embrace such 
objectives and reclaim Smith from both right-wing caricatures of him as a 
precursor of free-market neo-liberalism, and left-wing misconstruals of him 
as a proto-Keynesian social-democrat. He by no means thought that market 
equilibrium always results automatically, and therefore considered that it has 
to be constantly shaped by state intervention. However, in terms of just this 
notion of a cooperation of the ÔinvisibleÕ and the ÔvisibleÕ hand, he did to 
some extent anticipate neo-classicism, and one could even say that in certain 
(perhaps Ôproto-ordoliberalÕ) respects, he relied already too much on public 
intervention and did not allow for any direct relational and reciprocal social 
role in securing prosperity. Instead, he evacuated the social in favour of the 
economic and the political. 
It is true that Smith still viewed the economy as embedded in a network of 
civil society ÔsympathiesÕ. However, by contrast with Thomas Reid, Burke, 
Cobbett and Carlyle, these sympathies were over-confined to a resonance with 
the other personÕs private needs and feelings and were not enough to do with 
the co-shaping of a shared sensibility. Therefore, the Glaswegian professor of 
moral philosophy did not allow ÔsympathiesÕ to enter into the economic 
contract itself. Luigino Bruni and Stefano Zamagni are right to conclude that 
for Smith, Ôthe market itself doesnÕt require them, and works even better 
without them (hence the praise of weak ties)Õ.25 Economic production and 
trade based on contract is sundered from mutual sympathy and concern for the 
personal well-being of fellow Ôeconomic actorsÕ. Notoriously, it is not from 
the butcherÕs benevolence that I can hope to secure from him a supply of 
meat. The notion of Ôcooperation without benevolenceÕ negatively links 
SmithÕs moral philosophy in The Theory of Moral Sentiments to his political 
economy in The Wealth of Nations.26 
It is just here that Genovesi offers a crucially different model, starting with 
his account of sympathy, which is much more expansive than that of Smith. 
For the Neapolitan, Ô[we are] created in such a way as to be touched 
necessarily, by a musical sympathy, by pleasure and internal satisfaction, as 
soon as we meet another man; no human being not even the most cruel and 
hardened can enjoy pleasures in which no one else participatesÕ.27 In terms of 
the economy, which is for Genovesi no exception to this rule that enjoyment 
inherently involves the convivial, this means that you and your butcher might 
well care about each other as neighbours, and this could influence even your 
economic transactions: ÔFor contracts are bonds and civil laws are also 
compacts and contractsÕ.28 In this affirmation, we see how there is no strict 
distinction of formal law and individual free action, the political and 
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the economic, since both must always be informed by, and sub-serve, what 
Genovesi calls Ôpublic faithÕ (fede pubblica): ÔPublic trust is therefore a bond 
that ties together and binds persons and families of one State to one another, 
with the sovereign or other nations with which they tradeÕ.29 Public faith is 
not so much the aggregation of private trust (or individual fate) as a kind of 
universal sympathy that includes a genuine love for the common good. 
Moreover, within more strictly economic terms, long-term considerations 
might temper any short-term selfishness. You and your local butcher would 
equally like each other to remain in place. Hence, by implication, both social 
and economic reasons could influence an agreed price: a ÔgiftÕ element might 
be added to its strictly indicated contractual setting, in terms that are realistic 
as well as imbued with mutual feeling. In this way, one can see how for the 
Italian civil economy tradition, the market itself remains more social and 
more directly mediated by interpersonal relationships. The operation of both 
the ÔinvisibleÕ and the ÔvisibleÕ hand is not seen in purely mechanical terms, 
but, rather, as building on an existing interpersonal network that constitutes 
Ôcivil lifeÕ (vita civile). 
Smith (as we saw in chapter 1) followed Jansenists like Boisguilbert and 
Huguenots like Mandeville in regarding the heterogenesis of ends Ð the way in 
which goal-directed activities can lead to new goals that are different from 
those originally intended Ð as a ÔphysicalÕ device of providence or nature to 
produce order from the amoral disorder engendered by fallen human depravity, 
even if he thought this impersonal artifice could be somewhat furthered by 
state action. By contrast, Genovesi followed the more Catholic humanist lead 
of Giambattista Vico in viewing deliberate intention and accidental result as 
complementary, in the sense that heterogenesis providentially supplements 
human virtue by building up public goods on the basis of private desires.30 
Accordingly, individual virtuous action, whose truth is a search for an equally 
constructed and relational upshot (VicoÕs verum-factum-bonum),31 is itself a 
participation in the heterogenesis of the divine providential governing action. 
In practical terms, this means that a good economy must allow for a complex 
mixture of self-interest and concern for the well-being of others.32 So Genovesi 
recognised, like Smith, that intentions can lead to unexpected outcomes, but he 
followed his exemplar Vico in thinking that there was more continuity between 
original motive and unintended end than SmithÕs Jansenist and Calvinist-
influenced legacy allowed. 
For Genovesi, an individualÕs intended action already has a certain 
ÔonlookÕ towards the formation of society (as when you and the butcher try 
to keep each other going). In that case, later actions can ÔreadÕ earlier ones in 
terms of their general social implications in a way that is impossible if an 
individual action is ÔblindÕ from a social point of view. The latter is true 
when all you care about is feeding yourself as cheaply as possible without 
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any regard for the longer-term consequences of consuming junk food. So the 
Genovesan model envisages economic outcomes to be like the architectural 
ones of an ancient Italian city: the whole is beautiful, though never planned 
that way, because later buildings ÔinterpretÕ earlier ones. But the Smithian 
model envisages economic outcomes (ironically against SmithÕs own ruralist 
intentions) as being something like modern Atlanta, Georgia ...... 
In terms of both contract and the Ôheterogenesis of endsÕ, it is arguable that 
much of the actual market economy of the modern world has operated more 
like the Neapolitan civil economy (whose influence on later Italian economics 
remained sporadically present) than like the Anglo-Saxon political economy. 
This means that perhaps we have never been as capitalist as we imagine Ð 
and, after all, much of the more relentlessly consistent capitalist practice has 
arisen but recently. 
And while the Italian economy has often shown in exemplary practice 
some ÔcivilÕ features, sometimes Italian Ôcivil economistsÕ react against the 
lack of social trust shown at many levels of Italian society and politics. For 
example, Genovesi stresses more than British or French thinkers the need 
for a conscious exercise of fede pubblica in economic life precisely because 
he is resisting the excessive fiducia privata of feudalism turned decadent 
and gang-like in southern Italy. Much of later Italian economic history can 
be regarded as a conflict between a good spirit of direct interpersonal 
cooperation and its perversion in the mode of the mafia and camorra. With 
the increasing criminalisation of global capitalism, which evermore 
falsifies the Franco-British sanguine confidence that market realism will 
engender a Weberian simulacrum of virtue, this local history now acquires 
a universal relevance. 
As we have seen, the crucial concepts that distinguish Neapolitan civil 
economy from Scottish political economy in its Humean-Smithian version are 
those of reciprocity and civil virtue within the market domain itself. Reciprocity 
shifts the emphasis away from the Ôcash nexusÕ to the social nexus.33 For 
Genovesi, society is not primarily about the division of labour and the 
harmonious balancing of rival self-interest in the marketplace (as for Smith). 
Rather, human beings have shared needs that can only be satisfied through 
mutual assistance.34 When properly placed in the context of Ôcivil lifeÕ, 
reciprocity Ð which is governed by ÔsympathyÕ Ð combines mutual duties with 
individual freedom and personal flourishing. Thus, in his correspondence, 
Genovesi emphasises conviviality: ÔIt is a universal law that we cannot make 
ourselves happy without making others happy as wellÕ.35 Felicity is a 
paradoxical ÔecstasyÕ in which we are only perfectly happy ÔwithÕ others, 
beyond the seemingly exhaustive alternatives of either egotistic pleasure-
seeking or altruism. Accordingly, Genovesi renders sympathy a yet more 
integral part of the pursuit of happiness than is the case, on the whole, for the 
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Anglo-Scots tradition.36 In consequence, he can allow that economic activity 
is basically a pursuit of well-being, and yet understand this pursuit to have an 
innately cooperative dimension, which is not just a moralistic supplement. 
If human beings are naturally political, social and gift-exchanging animals, 
they need to cultivate habits of personal and communal living that sustain the 
polity, society and the economy. GenovesiÕs civil virtues outflank the divide 
between political and moral virtues in thinkers like Machiavelli, which over 
time led to the liberal separation of the private, moral sphere from the public, 
amoral realm. It is for this reason that the Neapolitan tradition tempered the 
complacent agonism of their more northern contemporaries. Thus Genovesi 
insists that, in the long run a merely vicious pursuit of private interest  la 
Mandeville would corrode all public wealth.37 Later, Gaetamo Filangieri 
stressed that economic inequality has the same corrosive effect and that wealth 
cannot be defined in terms of a merely abstracted quantity: 
Exorbitant riches of some citizens, and the laziness of some others, presumes the 
unhappiness and misery of the majority. This civil partiality is contrary to the 
public good. A polity cannot be said to be rich and happy save in that single case 
where every citizen through a definite labour in the course of a reasonable time 
is able commodiously to supply his own needs and that of his family.38 
There could not be a more ringing endorsement in the eighteenth century of 
Ôthe family wageÕ and concomitant justice in terms of prices and profit-
sharing. 
It is also significant here that Genovesi, while deploring the degeneration 
of guilds into self-serving monopolies, still upholds their role as tending to 
safeguard the standards and virtues integral to any particular trade.39 In this 
respect, as in others, he continues to adhere to certain Aristotelian and 
Thomistic attitudes within his economic theory. And while he is more 
accommodating of returns of interest on monetary loans, his defence of them 
(however overly revisionist) remains within the basically Thomistic perspec-
tive of claiming that such loans must really be understood as investments 
within the enterprise that the loan has supported, and so the interest accrued 
as a just share of the profits arising.40 
Moreover, Genovesi himself extends the principle of reciprocity to the 
international context. For this reason, he appears to exhibit a certain 
ambivalence about the spirit of commerce in relation to his commentary on 
Montesquieu. On the one hand, he agrees with the Scots that a more devel-
oped commerce Ð by inter-entangling nations and revealing that the poverty 
of one is to the detriment of the wealth of another Ð tends towards pacifica-
tion.41 On the other hand, he is more aware that commerce also intrinsically 
tends (as we argued in chapter 1) to de-sublimate back from economic into 
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open warfare where just reciprocity and, so, inter-cultural communion are not 
sustained. 
The Italian Ôcivil economistsÕ also differ from the Scots Ôpolitical econo-
mistsÕ in their limiting of civic virtues to the ÔcompensatoryÕ roles of the 
exercise of manners and governmental programmes of utility.42 Their more 
authentic humanism realises that the more that contracts between people 
remain relatively informal, involving a convivial exchange of benefits, the 
less you need the intervention of state control, because social embedding is 
sustained and enhanced by economic processes themselves. Here one can 
point out that if, after Mauss, gift-exchange is Ôthe fundamental social factÕ, 
then an element of economic contractual bond is already basic to the social 
bedrock.43 It would then rigorously follow that if the economy is not civil, 
society as such will be but deceptively so.44 That is why the undoing of the 
human bond by the individualistic and amoral version of the market then 
requires, as Polanyi saw, the artificial salve of state action if something like a 
simulacrum of human unity is thenceforward to be sustained.45 
But this ÔcivilityÕ only appears as alien to the economy as such if we accept 
the Ôpolitically economicÕ norm of economics, which scarcely corresponds 
even to the modern operations of market economy under this normative 
influence. In reality, a civil economy is also a more economic economy, more 
naturally functional and stable, because it is more in keeping with the psychic 
self-management of human beings. For example, it will be relatively freed 
from cyclical fluctuations or speculative bubbles that are ultimately to do with 
a clash of interests between capital and worker, producer and consumer, sup-
ply and demand. These clashes can be avoided or mitigated where economic 
contracts are habitually the subject of social, ethical and, sometimes, legal 
negotiation, and all parties feel that they have been fairly dealt with and share 
a common stake and pride in the success of an enterprise and the quality of its 
products. 
5. CIVIL ECONOMY AND CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT 
In the face of the economic and ethical crisis of capitalism, we need to learn 
from traditions that always stood outside the totalising logic of modern poli-
tics and economics. It is here that the civil economy tradition and Catholic 
Social Thought (CST), which has sometimes been independently echoed by 
Anglican and Orthodox thinkers, can offer an altogether different story. This 
story challenges not just the story told by the right since the 1970s, but also 
the story told by liberalism about the whole of modernity. 
Both traditions insist on the fundamental difference between the market 
economy per se and capitalism as its arbitrary distortion. The former means 
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functionally the division of labour, the freedom to work and to trade, to enjoy 
reasonable returns on investments and make reasonable profits that are justi-
fied in terms of degree of input, risk undergone, benefit secured and ultimate 
social well-being. It means teleologically the attempt to increase wealth in 
the real sense of trying to improve human life Ð make it more comfortable, 
exciting, various and fulfilling. Thus a pure market economy per se can 
properly be described as a civil economy, which really does pursue the 
common good: the good of each and every one of us as we concretely are in 
our families, workplaces, communities and associations.46 Such an economy 
is not ÔcapitalistÕ in the sense of regarding the accumulation of abstract and 
aggregate ÔwealthÕ as its proper goal and confining this accumulation to an 
appropriating minority, nor in the sense of imagining that the typical eco-
nomic actor simply pursues the same goal for himself along with other 
modes of self-gratification. 
But how can the typical economic actor be construed otherwise? Part of the 
answer is that a person can be both pursuing a reasonable profit for herself, 
and at the same time trying to offer to other people a social benefit, in 
response to socio-economic benefits that she herself is receiving in turn. One 
can trade in real human goals as well as in hard cash. Likewise, a contract can 
be a reciprocal agreement about a shared goal and value, not just the joint 
meeting of two entirely separate individual interests. The latter applies when I 
take a cab: I want to get to the station, the taxi-driver needs to feed his chil-
dren. But it does not apply if villagers collectively agree to buy some vacant 
land to build a new village hall or if a town-council and a business consortium 
agree to financially support the growth of a certain industry as appropriate to 
the townÕs needs and capacities. It does not even apply if I am familiar with 
the taxi-driver or offer him an unnecessarily generous tip. 
The second element binding together the civil economy tradition with CST 
is the balance between competition and cooperation. Instead of a purely indi-
vidualist and competitive contract that characterises capitalism, a civil market 
economy possesses a price mechanism that operates to a degree cooperatively 
as well as competitively. So, for example, it is not assumed that you would 
always charge the highest possible price that the market would tolerate. You 
might lower that price to help your neighbour because you did not want to 
destroy her and it would not even make economic sense to do so.47 
This involves the sustaining of a gift element within contract and so as a 
part of the social fabric. For example, if you refrain, for neighbourly reasons 
that may also be reasons of sustainable business, from charging your 
neighbour the fullest possible price, then there is a sense in which you are 
making her a discreet donation. Likewise, if you pay your worker rather 
more than you need to. Or if you offer your debtor a lower rate of interest 
than you might have extorted. In Ôfor-givingÕ him his debt, in keeping with 
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the evangelical exhortation (which had a much more economic ring than the 
substitution of ÔtrespassÕ might suggest), you are once more granting him a 
gift Ð in this case as a substitute for monetary revenge. 
Alongside this fusion of contract with gift, the civil economy is a vocational 
economy. In general, people in all walks of life should do apprenticeships 
whose completion ought to be a condition of entry to the workplace. Various 
forms of professional association, or renewed ÔguildsÕ (whose continued and 
revived role was supported by the English Levellers in the mid-seventeenth 
century)48 should, as in the case of medical and legal representative bodies of 
professional peers, oversee both professional formation in apprenticeships and 
continued maintenance of high standards of practice alongside the protection 
of the workforce. Such guilds (into which trade unions need to mutate, thereby 
at once further ethicising their role and increasing their possible reach) can 
help ensure the quality of product and proper treatment of customers alongside 
the well-being of workers.49 
The third element that is common to CST and the civil economy model 
concerns the nature of the firm and the market. If social recognition is fun-
damental also for the economy, then trust is basic for the economic firm. One 
could say that the economic firm should constitute a sort of benign semi-
monopoly, which prevents the emergence of malign monopoly. For on the 
basis of naked individualism, people strive for monopoly in order to produce 
the shoddiest possible products, buy the materials for those products as 
cheaply as possible and sell them as dearly as possible. In this way, they 
undermine competitors, and bad practice drives out good. But in the case of 
the firm that is a Ôcivil enterpriseÕ or partnership between owners, managers, 
workers, consumers and suppliers, good practice can drive out bad in a 
tendency that is actually more stable and more profitable at one and the same 
time. One can see this for much of the history of a firm like the UK-based 
John Lewis retail partnership, and also those credit unions, mutualised banks 
and building societies that survived the de-mutualisation of finance as part of 
the Ôbig bangÕ in 1986. There are also many new examples, including social 
enterprises and Ôfair tradeÕ companies. 
Such firms will tend to thrive in the long term, not by driving out all other 
competitors, but, rather, by forcing other firms to compete in terms of quality 
of produce, fairness of pricing and humane treatment of workers and custom-
ers. And a crucial aspect to Ôquality of produceÕ is, as has already been men-
tioned, the fact that real goods (including Ôrelational goodsÕ that we can only 
enjoy in common) are less subject to the law of diminishing returns. 
It is perhaps at this point that ethical considerations about economics pass 
over into metaphysical and religious ones. For much of human existence, it 
can seem as if bad habits are more powerful than good ones. But in the end, 
we discover that the reverse is true, and that otherwise we could not survive 
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as social and linguistic animals. Where might one locate such self-sustaining 
and intensifying good habits? One thing that economic theorists often ignore 
is that many elements of CST Ð opposition to usury, the just price, the just 
wage, guilds, corporations, distribution of assets, the primacy of land as 
sacred, solidarity and subsidiarity50 Ð exist in certain degrees in many parts of 
the world where they have been tried and successfully tested. This is, above 
all, true for two of the most successful economies in the last half-century Ð 
those of Germany and Italy (despite the recent problems of both). In different 
ways, they tend to define global lifestyles in terms of high-quality 
automobiles, machinery, food, cafes and clothing rather than the low-quality 
commodity consumerism of the United Kingdom and the United States of 
America. The German and Italian models are not really the products of the 
rationalist Enlightenment, but of a Renaissance that remained in continuity 
with the Middle Ages and shaped elements of a somewhat alternative moder-
nity whose scope could be greatly extended in the future. 
What we mean by this is that they combine a Renaissance exaltation of the 
creativity of human labour with a neo-medieval sense of constitutional 
corporatism that is neither statist nor merely free-market but, rather, 
mutualist in character. Worker participation in management, control of entry 
conditions to labour by voluntary associations and high-status technical 
education are all predicated on a greater relative primacy of labour with 
respect to capital. And labour, not capital, is the dynamic factor in any 
economy, because it is to do with the release of personal, creative human 
power. This is quite different from the negative freedom of the Anglo-Saxon 
will Ð for creativity goes along with the power to judge and discern the 
aesthetic and social value of oneÕs product. Herein lies the difference 
between Italian cars, food, fashion and design compared to their American 
equivalents. Of course, it will be objected that many American commercial 
products are excellent Ð but then certain aspects of the Middle Ages and the 
Renaissance survive in the United States also. 
Other than Germany and parts of Italy, further examples for the successful 
operation of civil economy type models include Austria and the Basque 
country, as well as the new Economies of Communion.51 The latter operate 
in Brazil, Portugal and elsewhere, bringing together businesses, social enter-
prise and educational institutions in deprived areas so as to create a local 
economy that blends private profit with social purpose. Business profits are 
shared between three distinct kinds of purposes that are considered to be of 
equal importance. First, helping people in need by creating jobs in neglected 
areas that have been abandoned by the central state and the free market. 
Second, instituting a Ôculture of givingÕ grounded in human relationships of 
mutual support. Third, sustaining and expanding the business that has to 
combine efficiency with solidarity. The objective is to fuse investment with 
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charity, and to change the market from within by locating the logic of gift-
exchange at the heart of ordinary economic processes. According to some 
estimates, some 735 businesses have in recent years joined such Ôeconomies 
of communionÕ, with a majority in Europe (notably Italy and Portugal) but 
also more than 245 in the Americas. Small numbers, perhaps, but a concrete 
example of how ethical enterprise can be good business. 
So, alternatives to capitalism are emphatically not medieval survivals or 
nostalgic throwbacks. As Antony Black has argued, it is rather the case that 
both ÔliberalÕ freedom to choose (oneÕs career, living place, and marriage 
partner in particular) and the principle of free association are equally products 
of Christianity and equally things bequeathed by Christianity to modernity. 
The ÔmodernÕ can here be understood as the gradual emergence of a more 
technologically dynamic, more commercial and more urban society, as 
opposed to a rural and military one from the twelfth century onwards. As 
Black also argues, while the seventeenth century and the Enlightenment saw 
the one-sided triumph of ÔliberalismÕ, mutualism Ð including the constitutive 
socio-political role of the corporate guild and other intermediary bodies Ð 
persisted both in modern practice for a long time (for example in Germany and 
Italy) and in alternative but clearly modern theories. Examples include the 
work of Althusius in the seventeenth century (for all his excessive subor-
dination of guild structure to a single sovereign centre), Otto von Gierke in the 
nineteenth, and Emile Durkheim in the twentieth century.52 
But what has all this got to do with advanced Western economies today? 
A good place to start is recent history. In the case of Victorian England, 
which engendered the real modern economic take-off, it is certainly true that 
there was a considerable Benthamite intellectual influence, which led to 
utility-maximising economic theory. Yet, in the complex reality of practice, 
there were Quaker manufacturers trying to care for their workers; regional 
banks operating in partnerships with cities; and a fusion of heritage and eco-
nomic effort that combined cultural and economic flourishing. Despite all the 
Dickensian horrors, there existed a certain modicum of trust and common 
purpose, and quite soon people tried Ð however inadequately Ð to amend the 
worst horrors through extraordinary efforts of socially minded business and 
philanthropy. In that atmosphere of mutual help the Labour Party was first 
born Ð in tune with the real story of Western economic success and not in 
opposition to it. 
It is, of course, possible to say that the bad practice of capitalism has pro-
duced an immense amount of wealth in terms of its own understanding of what 
wealth is. It has, indeed (though by accident, for that is not its intrinsic aim),53 
produced material benefits for many, alongside palpable exploitation, 
impoverishment, uglification and lack of meaning in work. One can argue 
about how far it could all have happened differently. But what is for certain 
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is that now a more extreme form of capitalism is simply not working well 
any more. Unlike the capitalist system of vice and exclusion, maybe virtue 
and inclusion can be more successful, even in economic terms. 
This is the new story that a civil economy of virtue might be able to tell Ð a 
story whose narrative logic points to a new mode of action.54 The centre of this 
action must be linkage of cultural renewal and civic pride with economic 
recovery. For if we remain sick in the West, then this is also a psychological 
besides an economic sickness. We need to recall who we are as cultures and 
nations and that means who we are in our localities and also across national 
borders. Without that kind of pride and self-belief, we will not want to work in 
the future to any purpose. And instead of relying mainly on state redistribution, 
we need to forge an economy that operates justly and fairly in the first place: 
both through the internal ethos of firms and professional associations and 
through a new legal framework that demands that every business deliver social 
benefit as well as reasonable profit. 
But this does not imply that the state has no role. We need rather a new 
notion of the ÔpublicÕ that slides between the social and state-direction or 
answerability. It is here that at the centre of the emerging post-liberal pro-
gramme could stand the idea not of tactical government intervention but of the 
strategic shaping of new economic institutions: for example, of private/ public 
partnerships in infrastructural and public service broadcasting projects (now 
being disgracefully dismantled in the United Kingdom, as with Eurostar, 
Channel 4 and the BBC); national research-banks; technology trusts to 
promote and share new knowledge at the service of human needs; systems of 
apprenticeships; of entry conditions to work through the operation of pro-
fessional bodies; of new technical colleges that offer a hybrid training, which 
combines academic knowledge with vocational learning; more visionary 
business schools; regional financing banks, and partnerships between such 
banks, local business and new city-based parliaments; renewed guild halls that 
could help not just with the exchange of good practice but also with new forms 
of cooperation in terms of ethical certification and greater ties between ethical 
enterprises across local, regional and national borders. 
6. BUILDING A ÔCIVIL ECONOMYÕ TODAY 
The civil economy model has been developed and extended in new ways by 
Emeritus Pope Benedict XVIÕs social encyclical Caritas in Veritate, along 
with the works of Bruni, Zamagni and other economists writing in this tradi-
tion.55 More recently, civil economy ideas have helped to shape post-liberal 
economic thinking in Britain, Australia and elsewhere. In this section we 
explicate some key practical implications of a post-liberal civil economy 
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of virtue before we set out a number of policy ideas in the remainder of the 
chapter. 
Anti-Usury and the Sharing of Risk and Rewards 
Usurious interest rates allow banks and other financial institutions such as 
payday loan companies to make profits that are vastly disproportionate to the 
economic and social contribution of their lending activities and their risks. 
They also take advantage of the financial distress of many people who are left 
with no choice but to take out credit at interest rates that are economically 
inefficient and ethically indefensible. Therefore, the lending of money needs to 
be tied as much as possible to real investment, and banks made stakeholders 
and therefore risk-carriers in the enterprises that they fund. In line with the 
principle of reciprocity, a truly ethical economy would establish the sharing of 
risk and reward in all financial transactions Ð including house mortgages Ð 
between lenders and borrowers, investors and owners, shareholders and 
managers, employers and employees. In order to transcend capitalismÕs 
simultaneous abstraction and materialisation, at every level financial sign 
needs to be reconnected with material power in order to prevent the specula-
tive, social and ecological threats of their disjuncture. 
Lenders of money, from high street banks to building societies, should as 
much as possible be regarded as investors in the businesses they purport to 
back: as part-liable for the risks incurred by borrowers on the one hand, and 
also as co-partners and advisors in the enterprises that borrowers undertake, 
on the other. This would involve a mutualisation of banking and real estate 
financing wherever possible. A loss of excessive economic power would be 
balanced for such bodies by an increase in social power, provided this is 
linked to an increased exercise of social responsibility. Equivalently, a slight 
loss of economic autonomy for the individual owner is balanced by three 
elements: greater shared economic security; heightened rights to a stake in the 
success of the bank to which one belongs; and an increase of influence over 
community agreements about the shape of the built environment and 
collective projects of many diverse kinds. Hence, such proposals retain the 
realism of an appeal to collective and individual interest, yet also require a 
cultural transformation in which people somewhat modify their aspirations Ð 
even trading some isolated power to choose against an increase in social 
power and community involvement. Since the latter allows more complex 
psychological satisfaction and more intense social recognition and convivi-
ality, such a transformation is by no means inconceivable. But while it can be 
encouraged at the political level through new incentives and rewards, in the 
end this change in ethos requires a cultural renewal. And people cannot opt 
for what they have never been offered. The realism of renewal is that it 
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must perforce begin among a minority, whose convictions can, nevertheless, 
realistically prove contagious if they begin to be successfully exemplified in 
practice. 
As to investment in manufacturing and other productive enterprises, the 
primacy of short-term shareholder value needs to be replaced with a legal 
requirement that companies pursue primarily a clearly stated purpose of long-
term economic and social benefit. This is not, however, to be taken as a sim-
ple attack on the shareholder: rather, it would necessarily involve a favouring 
of the longer-term over the short-term shareholder Ð whose holding today may 
sometimes be a matter of indifferent seconds. Longer-term investment would 
be made more attractive in terms of both higher and securer dividends, and an 
increased measure of responsibility for the firm, that would tend to hold in 
check any executive exploitation. Equally, executives would be more 
empowered to guard against rogue shareholders who have not identified their 
own with the corporationÕs interest. 
Just Wages, Just Prices and the Distribution of Assets 
As part of this cultural alteration, the divorce of the meaning of material mar-
ket ÔgrowthÕ from its root meanings of organic, moral and spiritual growth 
should be called into question. If we could collectively imagine a shared scale 
of priority in desiring, we would also remove the scarcity-driven oscillation 
between the relative emphasis on the respective imperatives of consuming and 
production, demand and supply. For this shared scale would tend to infuse into 
transactions Ð prices, wages, shares Ð a greater sense of its natural justice, over 
and above prevailing market conditions. We could then have some sense of a 
ÔproperÕ price paid for a thing of such and such moral as well as economic 
value; of a ÔproperÕ wage or salary paid for such and such a social task 
involving different degrees of talent, labour, scope, risk and need for a 
strenuous exercise of virtue; of ÔproperÕ shares in a firm as between the 
appropriately weighed contributions of owners, managers and workers. 
All these things need first and foremost to become habitual through the 
growth of a new ethos. But at the same time, they should at the limits of 
claimed infraction come within the purview of law and judicial debate. For 
once a company is required to have a social as well as an economic purpose, 
then all contractual exchanges should by law be required to be equitable as to 
substantive content as well as to formal consent. Subsidies to large corpora-
tions need reducing in any case, but where corporations of all sizes are in any 
way subsidised, the degree of subsidy needs to be indexed to the degree of 
just economic practice. By the same token, sheerly financial transactions 
need to be taxed much more severely, and the proceeds given to the 
encouraging of research, technological and manufacturing development. 
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Far from all this being an infringement of a contract freely entered into, it 
is its very precondition. For where a contract is in any way unjust, or finally 
lacking in substantial purpose of human benefit, then this implies that some 
element of risk-taking, or of committed labour or of valid desire, has been 
alienated and removed in a unilateral and coercive fashion by one party from 
the process of market exchange itself. 
Free Guilds and Vocational Entry Points to the Labour Market 
What is also needed is a general re-creation and reinvigoration of professional 
associations, which still play a considerable role in countries such as Germany, 
Austria and Italy. Such institutions can instil an inter-firm ethos based upon the 
idea that one achieves self-respect and social recognition by making and trading 
something good and not by merely making money. Furthermore, it is the work 
of the guild that truly resolves the aporia of monopoly whereby state anti-
monopoly legislation can often constitute an unwarranted intrusion within 
market competition that can even help to further the rise of alternative 
monopolies or cartels.56 Here, once more it is Polanyi who had the vital insight: 
monopolies and cartels tend to be generated by the most free-booting and 
egoistic participants in the market. Hence a guild restriction of competition to 
those signed up to guild principles actually tends Ð through a paradox that 
resolves the aporia Ð to ensure competition by slightly restricting competition. It 
thereby achieves what the ordo-liberals desired, but failed to realise through an 
insufficient allowance of a justifiably corporatist dimension. 
However, to avoid monopolistic corruption consequent upon guild operation 
itself we need a new idea of free guilds that enjoy no legally established sole 
right to trade. Licensing by a guild organisation could then become eco-
nomically advantageous in the way that a Fair Trade label is today, because 
customers would receive, a certain guarantee of good quality of produce, fair 
treatment of all stakeholders in the enterprise, and of consumers themselves. 
This notion of a Ôfree guildÕ also helps to meet the objection that guilds cannot 
cope with new trades and industries, which arise with ever-increasing 
frequency (for example in the services sector). For the latter need not be 
inhibited by the vested interests of established corporations, yet at the same 
time are provided by them with a model of the benefits of submission to guild 
standards that they can then imitate. Equally, guilds might facilitate the con-
tinuity and transfer of pension and other entitlements between changing jobs 
and employers. Inversely, a certain subordination of technology to relatively 
stable human ends might be served by bringing new technologies within the 
scope of existing guilds: we could then more easily ask, for example, what 
social purposes the mobile phone and the computer precisely serve and under 
what best permissions and restrictions. Likewise a guild-encouragement of 
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the pursuit of more integrated ends might somewhat restrict in the future con-
stant job-shifts related more to the distorted objectives of pure finance than to 
technological innovation and creative flexibility. Thereby the purposive 
conservatism of guilds could also have a radically protective function. 
In addition, we need to put in place more robust institutions that initiate 
people into professions through vocational training Ð especially for profes-
sions such as law and banking that have lost this dimension in relatively 
recent times.57 One might distinguish here between compulsory professional 
associations overseeing entry qualifications and then safeguarding a minimum 
of good practice, and the free guilds, which would be voluntary and exist in 
order to shelter and encourage more stringent standards. 
A New Political-Economic Corporatism 
If businesses, professional associations and other corporate bodies (for exam-
ple universities) are to be officially encouraged to take social responsibility, 
then reciprocally they should exercise a share in political governance. There 
needs to be a more modern political participation through mtier, alongside a 
more traditional (and ecologically crucial) one through terrain. This is a radi-
cal theme all the way from Durkheim via G.D.H. Cole to Paul Hirst, as well 
as a conservative one from Burke via Hilaire Belloc to Christopher Dawson.58 
It has been perverted into totalitarianism only when (a) it has altogether 
displaced the representative government of individuals and localities, (b) it 
has been centrally directed and made compulsory and (c) it has disguised a 
continued capitalist exaction of surplus value from workers with an organic 
gloss of kitsch falsity. 
Here Pope Emeritus BenedictÕs support for stake-holding and share-distri-
bution seems to indicate a break with the German Catholic legacy of Cardinal 
KettelerÕs reading of Ôco-determinationÕ as if capitalists were the authentic 
equivalents of feudal overlords rather than people whose wealth had mainly 
been acquired through unjust exploitation. Thomas Carlyle had been more 
adamant about the need for transformation Ð if this ÔfeudalÕ equivalence, in a 
more democratic form, were now to hold: his ÔCaptains of IndustryÕ were 
required in future to heroically subordinate their ownership and direction of 
resources to the more dispersed needs of now free workers.59 But one can add to 
Carlyle that we also need far greater levels of participation in the ownership of 
the Ômeans of productionÕ Ð though not outright enforced collective or 
democratic ownership, which always cedes to a tyrannical bureaucratic control 
by a new activist elite. These degenerations can be discouraged and even 
avoided if the churches and other religious and philanthropic bodies help to 
coordinate inter-corporate governance without all this being routed through the 
centralising administration of the state. 
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Fostering Virtuous Enterprise 
The dominant business model of most advanced economies is based on two 
elements: (1) individual incentives that influence ex ante motivation Ð 
whether in the form of private sector performance-related pay and bonuses or 
in the form of public sector policies ÔnudgingÕ our behaviour towards greater 
efficiency and happiness; (2) individual rewards, usually conferred without 
regard to social, ecological or ethical purpose. The problem of the underlying 
logic is fourfold: First, it sunders ex ante motivation from ex post outcomes, 
which leads to the perverse situation of rewarding failure (bonus payments 
and golden handshakes even in case of losses or bankruptcy). Second, it 
privileges private self-interest and views social benefit merely in terms of 
indirect, unintended outcomes. Third, it designs incentives purely in extrinsic 
ways, and reduces the question of reward to a principalÐagent relation 
whereby the principal rewards the agent and makes herself better off too (e.g. 
top management and large shareholders). Fourth, it separates monetary from 
non-monetary rewards, which divorces material value from symbolic worth. 
In order to change all this, the idea that economic ends are not inherently 
ethical ones needs to be challenged. It is crucial that virtue be pursued for its 
own sake. Yet at the same time, virtuous behaviour may yield pleasure or 
even profit while also making a contribution to the common good.60 For this 
reason, it is not inappropriate that it can also be publicly encouraged by 
monetary recompense (e.g. tax breaks, preferential treatment in terms of gov-
ernment procurement or public service tenders). 
The Primacy of Land, Locality and Craft 
Amid a general rural exodus, we need to remember that it is the countryside 
and the organic relation of the city to the countryside which most guarantees 
our animal rationality. The countryside is basic in terms of food provision, 
ecology and our sense of beauty. It remains, therefore, the focus of prime 
concern as to how we maintain our human creativity and sustainable 
economic innovation alongside our sense of wonder and purposive place 
within reality. A failure to comprehend the primacy of the land threatens the 
integrity of cities most of all, because a false primacy of the urban has 
encouraged an over-concentration of population and the rise of the sprawling 
mega-city (symbolised in London by the dwarfing of the sublime spires of the 
peopleÕs churches by the monstrously vulgar temples to Mammon) which 
inevitably destroys its real function as the fulcrum of trade, craft and artistic 
flourishing as well as philosophical discussion. Instead, the mega-city has 
often become a site for debased modes of mass manufacture, monopolistic, 
self-serving financial services, middle-brow culture often masquerading as 
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the avant-garde, and media diversion of our attention from the real issues of 
power and complexity towards a trivial politicisation of personal life. 
Intellectual failure with respect to our understanding of our place within 
nature has also a physical equivalent. The more that land is enclosed, the 
more also local ecologies are destroyed, as the earth depends increasingly 
upon one fragile global ecological balance. But in the end, of course, the 
global ecology of gaia itself depends upon the various local ecologies, and 
with their evermore reduced functioning, it would eventually collapse.61 We 
therefore need to grasp the ways in which new lighter and green technologies 
can permit once again a wider inhabitation of the surface of the globe. Rural 
and now remote areas can be brought to life once again, while cities can 
recover their functions as centres of human meeting, and concentrations of 
excellence and example. 
But this means rejecting the fatalism that assumes that an evermore 
advanced economy requires an evermore automated labour and the gradual 
replacement of human labour altogether by anonymous processes. For this is 
not, in reality, the implication of ÔprogressÕ, but rather of a liberal capitalist 
process directed towards the abstraction of profit instead of the genuine 
ÔeconomisingÕ of human effort towards the end of human flourishing. To its 
end, capitalism requires endlessly to save on labour costs, even though it must 
eventually reckon with a consequent decline in demand, which it is 
increasingly tempted to make up through the credit mechanism and modes of 
employment that tend evermore to modes of slavery without the security that 
was sometimes the slavesÕ compensation. But the pursuit of human flourish-
ing suggests, instead, that technology should be used to extend rather than to 
displace individual human creativity. This makes sense both insofar as work 
satisfaction is an irreplaceable aspect of human existence (as opposed to the 
eventual tedium of leisure without contemplation), and insofar as the blend of 
craft with automatic process produces superior results. This is most abun-
dantly true with respect to agriculture, where food quality and environmental 
sustainability benefit from a more labour-intensive approach that resorts less 
to drastic and rapid ÔsolutionsÕ such as crop-spraying. And in all fields of pro-
duction, this approach helps to ensure that fewer people are confined to those 
marginal, temporary and precarious jobs that are still required to paste over 
the communicational and organisational gaps, which even the most exhaustive 
extension of the automatic tends to leave in place.62 We need, therefore, to 
revisit attempts such as that of Glasgow at the turn of the nineteenth century 
to combine mass manufacturing with craft design. 
Such moves would also strengthen the link of craft between city and 
countryside, as still pertains to some degree in Italy today. We also need 
something like the traditional Italian sense of locality, comprising city and 
commune as a relatively self-sustaining economy in accordance with an 
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economic application of the subsidiarist principle. This should include the 
local owning and organising of energy companies, geared whenever possible 
towards renewables, in order to undercut giant private companies (which 
would be either mutualised or, if necessary, broken up). Such local 
economies are more stable and resilient and more productive of excellence 
and social solidarity. At the same time, their existence can drastically reduce 
global transport costs, which are only ÔefficientÕ in terms of a near-hysterical 
search to reduce the price of labour. 
These things would increase the appeal of staying on the land in order to 
achieve a more stable agriculture and to sustain that rural beauty which is ulti-
mately our cultural lifeblood. On the basis of a wider distribution of property, 
Western countries need to reinforce intensive small-scale farming requiring 
crop rotation, common grazing, a much greater number of agricultural workers 
and many practices of mutual assistance. All in all, this beneficial circulation 
would allow the emergence of a good natural and social ecology: a fine 
balance of interaction between person and person and between person and 
nature, as Pope Francis argued in his social encyclical Laudato SiÕ.63 
It is within this cultural soil that revolutionary Western advancements in 
technology and natural science were able to take root in the past, from the 
early Middle Ages onwards.64 Hence there is absolutely nothing merely 
romantic about the insistence upon rural primacy, which (as we saw) was 
upheld by Adam Smith himself. To the contrary, romanticism here coincides 
with realism, because the long-term Western technological and industrial 
take-off is connected to the uniquely country- and town-based character of 
medieval civilisation. Pagan antiquity was focused on large cities and a slave 
economy that drained the wealth away from the countryside and depleted its 
resources, often leaving behind wildernesses, as the appearances of the 
Mediterranean littoral sometimes attest to this day. By contrast, the familiar 
ÔpatchworkÕ landscape of Europe attests to a productive ÔinfillingÕ that 
occurred in the twelfth century, accompanied by many technological 
advances in milling and ploughing. The same Ôtown and countrysideÕ pattern 
helped to foment the more culinary and craft-based character of the French 
industrial revolution and even the early English industrial revolution in 
Shropshire and Derbyshire, just as the city and commune pattern of Italian 
human geography shaped the craft and design-based character of eventual 
Italian industrialisation. 
Today it is possible to restore the primacy of land and craft in an extended 
ecological sense of a primacy of nature as a whole, and of humanity taken as a 
part of nature, albeit as wisely governing over it in order to perfect it through 
further beautification and intensified flourishing. Such a primacy would 
uniquely guard against the siphoning-off of real benefits for overly abstract 
urban purposes with a consequent leaching away of the meaning of nature, 
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which then remains as merely so much material detritus to be expropriated 
and exploited. 
Securing the Wise Use of Land 
We have argued that capitalism is a simultaneous abstraction and materiali-
sation and that financialising destruction is a primary aspect of the capitalist 
logic. However, today materialisation in the mode of primary accumulation 
is becoming ever-harder to come by, and thus we see a speeding up of finan-
cialisation secured by already accumulated material resources, besides an 
increase in sheer speculation on the already abstract. 
Yet in this situation, just as ultimate securitisation remains material, so too 
do ultimate rewards to individual persons, and to some degree even to corpo-
rate bodies. Ultimate rewards tend increasingly to take the form not so much 
of fluid resources, honours or titles, as of estates, hunting grounds, houses 
and possessions such as yachts Ð in what might seem like an almost feudal 
reversal. But such possessions are much freer of any ties or obligations than 
any ÔfeudalÕ domains Ð hence their tendency to exacerbate the dispossession 
of the many, local economic decline and ecological damage, as today with 
grouse-moors and excessive sheep-farming on high ground in the United 
Kingdom. Moreover, they are often not put to any even reasonably produc-
tive use and tend to remove from the public domain both land and property 
that might sometimes be used for greatly needed housing in both urban and 
rural areas. 
In covert recognition of this materialisation of reward, neo-liberal policy, 
ever since Mrs Thatcher, has tended more and more to tax income and com-
modity rather than land. Post-liberalism ought to reverse this. Unproductive 
land and land owned sheerly for prestige or disproportionate and unshared 
private enjoyment should be heavily taxed, compared to land being put to 
good uses of all kinds. However, this would have to be imposed in a subtle 
and discriminating way. There would be no intention to repeat the disinherit-
ing of the aristocracy (by the Tory party and in its own interests) after the 
First World War, which has had ambivalent consequences, including the 
eventual purchase of large estates by irresponsible (and usually left liberal) 
celebrities. Instead, the framing of any such measures would attempt to 
discriminate between genuinely rooted, responsible and ecologically and 
socially beneficial owners on the one hand, and distant, irresponsible and 
highly wealthy owners, on the other. 
This would not be easy, yet it is essential in order to tackle both the new 
hoarding of land as reward and a more ancient process of dispossession that 
belonged to a more original primitive accumulation permitting capitalist take-
off. The more equitable distribution of land itself should stand at the base of 
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a more equitable distribution of assets in general that tends to inhibit wage 
exploitation and restriction of independent social participation. Increased 
taxes on those who buy only to rent would be matched by stringently 
enforced local rent controls, aiming to prevent the current absurd situation 
whereby governments and banks subsidise exploitative landlords through 
welfare payments and student loans. 
It is by embracing a specifically rooted vision of the common good that 
the West can address the metacrisis of capitalism. However, people will 
claim that this is not possible because the debt burden means we must 
ruthlessly retrench public social provision, while withdrawing all restraints 
on the market systems that generate growth and jobs. 
To this extent they are right: the state of the public finances is not viable, as 
the service of growing debt levels reduces investment while transferring tax-
payersÕ money to those who hold national bonds. Moreover, public credit cre-
ation has fuelled the very finance capitalism that triggered the global financial 
crash and plunged the West into the deepest recession since 1929Ð1932. But 
this problem is precisely the opportunity to change things. In the remainder of 
this chapter, we outline a series of approaches that could transform quarterly, 
cartel capitalism into a functioning and just market economy Ð starting with 
the issue of debt. 
7. DEALING WITH DEBT 
The key problem with the dominant, liberal conception of finance is that it 
treats debt as absolute and primary vis--vis assets, and, in consequence, 
privileges the interests of creditors over those of debtors. Such an inversion of 
the natural order and of common sense, which attempts to steer a course into 
the future by the light of the pole of destructive negation, follows necessarily 
from the liberal capitalist account of value as abstract. By this measure, if the 
sums in the dual-entry books do not yield a positive amount, an entire 
economy and society will then come to define itself in terms of lack. But to 
accept this scenario is to remain, in CarlyleÕs image, transfixed by the gaze of 
the sphinx, in deluded denial of the actually unprecedented natural and 
artificial surplus abundance that lies all about us. Thus, Ôwe stagger spellbound, 
reeling on the brink of huge perilÕ but quite unnecessarily, because we are 
seduced by contrived appearances and ignore the underlying reality of 
continued great wealth provided by labour and technological ingenuity.65 This 
has, in consequence, become, again to apply Carlyle to a new context, Ôan 
enchanted wealthÕ, which Ôbelongs yet to nobodyÕ, by virtue of our fascination 
with abstract quantification and its mistaken fantasy (in keeping with 
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an aspect of modern mathematics questioned by the pre-critical Kant and 
others)66 that negative sums are every bit as real as positive ones.67 
But were we to deny this fantasy, we would cease to see the merely 
nominal amounts ÔowedÕ to creditors as more primary than these amounts 
possessed by debtors who have generally put them to actual productive use 
and, thereby, already turned them into more actual positive wealth. For 
example, the well-maintained, repaired and beautified house should surely be 
considered a collective asset that outweighs in the economic balance the 
outstanding amount of mortgage debt still owed (or perhaps ÔownedÕ) by its 
occupiers. By another, gift-exchange logic, indebtedness could be seen more 
as a positive personal and social bond, whose essence is a grateful promise to 
make a counter-payment in the future. Were building societies to construe 
themselves in this fashion as truly mutual, the occupiers could be considered 
as already part-owners and thereby investors in the mortgage company, who 
would reciprocally be held to have incurred an equal share of the risk of the 
loan. Licentious ease of credit is only allowed by the refusal of all responsi-
bility and guilt on the part of the creditors and, therefore, the eventual com-
plete non-ease of the debtor. 
Under the currently prevailing logic, transfixed and enchanted by abstrac-
tion and negativity, the logic of easy credit is of a single piece with the ineq-
uitable separation of profit from risk between institutional investors and top 
managers on the one hand, and customers and employees on the other hand. 
By contrast, the Ôcivil economyÕ tradition, like primordial gift-exchange, 
views debt in more relational terms, and argues for arrangements whereby 
both profit and risk are shared more equitably among all the stakeholders: 
lenders and borrowers, investors and owners, shareholders and managers, 
employers and employees, producers and consumers, as well as suppliers and 
sellers. As the West and other parts of the world risk drowning in debt, the 
civil economy model offers a number of closely connected policy ideas. 
In terms of public debt, governments should combine gradually induced 
(and not arbitrarily timetabled) fiscal discipline with a debt reduction plan that 
ultimately reduces the burden of interest rate payments and thus frees up 
resources for strategic investment and tax cuts for low-income families. 
Reducing debt in a realistic way will require an end to the old policies of tax-
and-spend and excessive new borrowing. For near-bankrupt states that face 
debt default (in both Europe and the Global South), this means a dose of debt 
forgiveness by writing down the value of existing liabilities and a large 
measure of debt restructuring, starting with longer grace periods and maturity 
extensions. Parliaments in such states should legislate to restrict debt issuance 
by national, regional and municipal bodies, limiting them to low- or no-
interest-bearing bonds primarily for capital projects. The issuance of such 
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bonds should be linked to devolving tax-and-spend powers to lower levels 
and reducing the size and costs of the central bureaucracy. 
For indebted states such as the United States or the United Kingdom that do 
not face the prospect of debt default, public debt reduction will require, first 
of all, converting a number of bonds on central bank balance sheets to low- or 
non-interest-bearing debt, as Adair Turner has suggested. In this manner, the 
government would spend less on debt servicing (currently about £53 billion a 
year in the United Kingdom) and could use this fiscal leeway to reduce the 
overall public debt burden faster and generate growth based on productive 
activities that engender real value. Second, public bonds might be 
supplemented by GDP growth warrants in order to break the vicious circle of 
debt-deflation and link sovereign debt more closely to a virtuous cycle of 
shared prosperity. Growth warrants would provide an alternative to replace 
regular fixed or variable interest rate bonds, by offering a security that would 
use the growth rate of nominal national output as its interest rate (with some 
variation dependent on the country and expected inflation). Therefore, weak 
GDP growth would slow down the increase in public debt, whereas strong 
GDP growth would simultaneously benefit the holder of sovereign debt and 
the government.68 The concerns about the pro-cyclical nature of this scheme 
are outweighed by the economic and ethical advantages of the reciprocal 
arrangements among stakeholders, which realign risks with rewards. 
In relation to private debt, it is important to recognise that the majority of 
debtors have not fallen into debt by virtue of greed and the sheer squandering 
of resources, but much more by the need to provide positive assets for 
themselves and their children in terms of shelter, nourishment, clothes, books, 
toys, education and holidays. To assess their situation merely negatively is to 
ignore the fact that Ômoney owedÕ has already been ÔalchemicallyÕ converted 
into physical and psychic positivities that benefit not only individuals and 
their families, but also the communities in which they are embedded, and, by 
extension, the nation as a whole. 
Thus a measure of debt forgiveness in certain circumstances is ethically 
imperative and economically sensible as well as egalitarian, since it breaks 
the vicious circle of ever-greater debt and puts a floor under the increasing 
value of real assets such as personal saving funds and property, as well as the 
social and physical capital of businesses. Tying money to real assets and 
binding material things to a monetary mirroring more tightly linked to their 
symbolic social meaning helps restore the primacy of real worth over 
nominal valuation. 
In addition to debt forgiveness, Western economies need debt restructuring, 
whereby the most short-term, high-interest government bonds, mortgages and 
consumer loans are converted into longer-term, lower and (in some cases) 
fixed-interest credit. Of course, certain creditors will effectively forfeit 
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some of their investment, but they stand much more to lose in the event of 
mass bankruptcy, the prospect of large-scale home re-possession and further 
financial crises. 
Another proposal to deal with household indebtedness in a ÔcivillyÕ eco-
nomic perspective is to convert mortgage debt into equity in order to reduce 
the risk of home re-possession and make the relationship between lenders and 
borrowers more reciprocal, as the economist Willem Buiter has argued.69 
Personal bankruptcy and home re-possession are economically costly, socially 
traumatic and culturally destructive, as they humiliate people and rob them of 
the symbolic meaning and emotional stability that a house affords its owners. 
Insofar as re-possessing homes frequently involves auction, it marks a loss for 
mortgage lenders too. By contrast, mortgage brokers and other professionals 
who receive their fee upfront are the main beneficiaries of the current system. 
For these reasons, debt equitisation makes both economic and ethical sense. 
Here we can learn from some principles of Islamic finance, in particular the 
idea of equity transfer. For a new equity mortgage, the bankÕs primary role 
would not be that of a money lender but, rather, that of the co-owner of the 
property that secures the mortgage. A more mutualist contract could be drawn 
up along the following lines. Based on a 25- or 30-year mortgage, the 
borrower/tenant would pay the bank a rental fee that could be indexed on, or 
linked in some other way to, the local market for rented properties. This would 
replace the service of interest and, therefore, not be calculated in relation to 
central banksÕ rates. In addition, a periodic payment would transfer part of the 
equity in the property to the borrower/tenant. 
Similar restructuring programmes could be extended to other sectors that 
are crippled by debt, including commercial real estate and consumer loans. 
This would help restore the primacy of peopleÕs savings and investment over 
the servicing of debt Ð in better abstract reflection of the natural primacy of 
the positive at the concrete level. In this manner, a more relational concep-
tion of debt would also prevent the destructive bubble cycle whereby debt-
financed speculation leads to a huge hike in asset and commodity prices and 
creates trillions of dollars in fake wealth. 
The civil economy model can also be used to demonstrate the economic and 
ethical case for converting debt into equity in relation to banksÕ liabilities and 
sovereign debt.70 Instead of a taxpayer-funded bailout, banks and other 
systemically important financial institutions should be re-capitalised through 
mandatory debt-to-equity conversions via special resolution mechanisms that 
either already exist or would have to be created. The overriding occasion for 
this recommendation is that the unsecured creditors of banks and other 
financial institutions have benefitted for decades from free default insurance. 
Their free-riding on government bail-outs underwritten by the taxpayers has 
created perverse incentives for excessive risks and rewards without any 
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responsibility or obligation towards other stakeholders. By turning unsecured 
creditors into shareholders and stakeholders who for a certain period would 
not receive dividends or the right of share repurchases, the conversion of 
debt into equity would create a more economically and ethically viable 
model of risk- and profit-sharing. 
8. REWARDING WORK: FAIR WAGES, JUST PRICES  
AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS 
A post-liberal political economy requires an ethical as well as economic 
negotiation of wages, prices and profits among owners, workers, sharehold-
ers and consumers who would all be given the opportunity to acquire real 
political and economic stakes in every enterprise. Such practices would be 
encouraged by different corporate governance arrangements that favour the 
representation of estranged interests and the participation of all stakeholders; 
legal and taxation arrangements that incentivise risk- and profit-sharing 
models; and greater involvement of professional associations and courts of 
justice in arbitrating disputes over such matters. We cannot trust either the 
state or the capitalist market to deliver these new arrangements, and we need 
to make this matter something that comes first within the advisory power of 
professional associations and other economic corporate bodies Ð defined by 
their pursuance of social and political, alongside economic purpose. Guilds 
could be organised according to sectors and regions (including cross-border), 
defining standards and offering advice to those firms that voluntarily belong 
to them. 
To reverse growing asset and income inequality as well as the de-
professionalisation and the proletarianisation of the workforce, ownership of 
capital Ð whether of property and plant capacity, or of financial investment in 
oneÕs own or other firms Ð needs to be far more widely distributed through 
employee-ownership and other forms of stake-holding. In this manner, assets 
can supplement wages and salaries, and provide an extra layer of security. 
Everything possible should be done through local banks, credit unions, mutual 
manufacturing investment funds, cooperative housing associations, worker 
share-ownership, and so forth to ensure a general re-professionalisation of the 
population. National and local government should deliberately encourage the 
emergence of such institutions by offering tax advantages, privileged condi-
tions of access to credit and so forth. 
In terms of specific policy ideas, this includes, first, ensuring a genuine 
Ôliving wageÕ at the national level, while empowering the negotiation of 
higher Ôfamily wagesÕ that will vary according to location and area of 
activity.71 Besides the small negative impact on employment and the very 
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large positive impact on reducing welfare dependency among the Ôworking 
poorÕ, paying the living and family wages can begin to generate a virtuous 
circle: higher household income, lower personal debt, more consumer spend-
ing, higher tax revenues and lower spending on in-work benefits, which in turn 
offers scope for tax cuts for low-income families and small businesses. A 
higher-wage economy tends to involve lower staff turnover (and hence lower 
costs of hiring and firing), higher staff morale, more incentives for efficiency 
savings and for innovation, as well as higher labour productivity. 
It follows that one needs, in the second place, some kind of index between 
wages and productivity growth such that a flourishing business with sus-
tainable growth/performance shares its prosperity more evenly. Labour 
productivity is notoriously hard to measure, but if executive pay is linked to 
performance, then it should be possible to extend this to all employees. 
Third, wage and salary level should be more yoked to a dimension of stake-
ownership. That could include the award of shares in the business for a 
private sector enterprise or a sharing in the budget surplus for a public sector 
organisation. 
Fourth, Western countries need to distribute ownership of capital far more 
widely than is currently the case Ð whether ownership of property and plant 
capacity, or of financial investment in oneÕs own or other firms (including 
universally portable pension funds). 
9. MUTUALISING WELFARE 
From a civil economy perspective, the post-war Keynesian and the neo-liberal 
welfare settlement represent two sides of the same coin. In different ways, both 
rely on the strong state and centralised power at the expense of intermediary 
institutions and popular participation. Both also fragment mutual organisation 
and undermine the pursuit of reciprocal benefit based on contribution and 
reward. Together, they produce our present reality, which is continually 
controlled by impossibly distant external forces rather than created through our 
own efforts, individual and communal. 
In the wake of such manifest failure, and the comparative international 
evidence of the permanent underfunding that ensues upon a purely tax-based 
system, there is an even greater case for mutualising social security. This is 
not just about linking rights to duties but also about reciprocal assistance 
based on personal need and decision making taking place at more proximate 
levels. 
If we are to escape from state indebtedness, which we have seen to be a 
crucial component of capitalist logic, welfare can no longer rely either on a 
policy of tax-and-spend (plus borrowing) or on rationalisation through 
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outsourcing to the private sector, which in any case results in cruel neg-
ligence. The alternative to both means testing and a ballooning welfare 
budget is a twofold contributory model: first, an expanded version of the 
current National Insurance system to insure everyone against risks such as 
unemployment and long-term care; second, funding both health and social 
security by creating a new insurance system (modelled on health care mutu-
als in Scandinavia, Germany and France) Ð with a contribution from general 
taxation (much lower than the current health budget) to cover those who can-
not pay for health insurance. It is clear that people are more willing to make 
substantive contributions when these are more specifically directed than is 
the case with tax. 
To avoid central government meddling and a permanent managerialist 
revolution, the health care system should be run as a mutual trust accountable 
to its members (especially patients and front-line staff), with a much greater 
role for health care cooperatives that are co-owned by patients or citizens (not 
just partnerships among qualified professionals).72 In the same interests of a 
relational and holistic approach to the integral person, social and health care 
should be combined: the relevance of this to the elderly is particularly clear. By 
the same token, a mutualised social security system should also shift the focus 
away from a reactive approach that mostly deals with the effects of problems 
(e.g. unemployment or ill-health) towards a proactive stance that tackles the 
root causes by adopting a strategy of early intervention.73 
As to unemployment benefit, we need both greater generosity and also a 
more genuine and well-judged beneficence. First, benefit should be indexed 
to insurance contribution, to ensure that the relatively well-off do not 
suddenly fall into relative destitution, which does no one any good and may 
cause people to fall further into despair, incapacity and even suicide. Second, 
as to the chronically and long-term unemployed, we should abandon all 
tedious, unkind and time-wasting talk of threats and sanctions. Certainly 
work should pay more and provide a strong incentive to get back to work, 
and certainly too many families are surviving on benefits through more than 
one generation. But this is primarily a problem of the development of bad 
family habits in the face of general economic collapse and regional economic 
decline and not usually just the fault of individuals: the real economic 
problems should be collectively addressed and families and localities 
holistically assisted. Of course, there will always remain some cases where 
there is no work to be found or people are temporarily or permanently 
unemployable. This has to be just accepted and no one can be allowed to 
starve or suffer a lack of basic comforts and necessities. 
But beyond such basic provision the long-term unemployed should be 
offered either educational programmes to undertake, or socially and environ-
mentally useful tasks to perform by the local council, in return for increased 
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benefit. And further, to remove from this any possible stigma, and to assist all 
those who do not want to undertake conventional work, such as emergent 
writers, artists, composers and actors, the taking on of all such modestly paid 
roles should be regarded as a normal, acceptable option for citizens in general. 
After all, if we can, as we should, begin to adopt a human, educative and 
restorative approach to the imprisoned, then all the more should we do so in 
relation to those out of work. 
10. ACHIEVING VOCATIONAL, ACADEMIC  
AND ARTISTIC EXCELLENCE 
Raising wages alone will not deliver the long-term solution that those trapped 
in relative poverty need. Different solutions are required to enable all indi-
viduals to properly develop their skills, talent and character. For those stuck on 
low pay and in critical working conditions, one idea is to foster longer-term 
work contracts as well as personal and professional development that will open 
up new opportunities. However, many people are excluded from viable and 
justly rewarded jobs by a major skills gap. On the one hand, many employers 
need skill sets that are rare to come by and, on the other hand, many people 
have rare talents and skills that employers do not recognise. This mismatch is 
damaging to individual flourishing, employment, entrepreneurial success, 
shared prosperity and competitiveness. 
To correct it, Western countries (especially the United Kingdom) need to 
promote a more holistic education Ð not just harness restricted and under-
developed skills for narrow state-administrative or market-commercial 
purposes. For decades we have sustained in many ways the worst of all 
educational worlds: an excessive focus on transferable formalistic academic 
skills in conjunction with the wrong kind of subject-specific specialisation Ð 
narrowing people in their substantive theoretical scope, and, yet, not eventu-
ally preparing them for a specific practice. As a result, pupils are woefully 
lacking in general knowledge and culture, but not inducted into any specific 
vocation either. This is an aspect of an ever-greater division of labour and the 
expansion of low-skilled service-sector jobs. 
To amend this situation, we need first of all a new system of through-life 
education and training, offered to all as a national civil right, however this 
might be variously funded and delivered. It would start with early years 
intervention and programmes for disadvantaged households, followed by a 
broader primary and secondary education, less specialised higher education 
and a much greater provision of vocational training.74 It would include 
hybrid pathways that fuse academic knowledge with vocational induction for 
professions that require both, such as law, banking and finance.75 
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Second, all countries require a national programme for on-the-job training 
and mentoring. In the case of the United Kingdom, together with the partici-
pation of employersÕ associations and trade unions, a new Royal Commission 
needs to re-think and revamp lifelong learning. This approach, grounded in 
common ownership, would ensure that employers can more readily find skilled 
and adaptable employees, while workers could equally find fitting and 
properly remunerated labour. By tying employment and education firmly 
together, we can help people escape powerlessness and cycles of debt and 
demoralisation, while ensuring that both the public and the private sector are 
well supplied with skilled labour. 
Third, Western countries (and especially Britain) need greatly to expand the 
provision of apprenticeships within and across different sectors, industries and 
manufacturing productions. Sectors like the car industry in Europe offer a good 
example of how apprenticeships could allow young people to learn their trade 
in more than one country. In this manner, mobility would help the spread of 
good practice and create new networks of professionals. Here, the rest of the 
West can learn from GermanyÕs apprenticeship programme, at the heart of 
which is the idea of blending hands-on vocational training with academic 
learning at a local technical college, which is monitored by local chambers of 
commerce Ð a role that in Britain could revert to guildhalls. It can also learn to 
offer apprenticeship and training for almost every job, however humble it may 
be considered Ð thus, for example in Germany, construction workers who train 
for at least three years are required to develop broader practical skills such as 
management, civil engineering and carpentry; lorry drivers are trained in 
logistics and foreign languages; shop assistants learn about all aspects of the 
retail trade. In every case, this encourages both more work satisfaction and a 
better service to customers.76 
Fourth, new institutions are needed that can help build and sustain a voca-
tional economy, starting with greater employer and employee cooperation at 
the local and the sectoral level (under the aegis of a renewed and expanded 
guildhall structure). This could extend to a new national Vocational Fund 
that could bring together all estranged interests to explore ways of raising 
product quality and workplace standards Ð including government (as a major 
procurer), business, the trade unions, universities, colleges and training 
associations. 
11. PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS  
AND COMPETITION POLICY 
In the face of a loss of trust in professions and the growing number of cor-
porate scandals, there is now throughout Western countries and elsewhere a 
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considerable growth of alternatives to stock-listed companies: social enter-
prises; mutual businesses, cooperative ventures linking owners, workers and 
consumers; hybrid firms pursuing both profit and charitable goals; voluntary 
membership in new modes of guild (e.g. Compagnie delle Opere in Italy) of 
mutual support networks between companies who also uphold certain shared 
values of production and treatment of workers.77 The common factor here is 
the qualification of sheerly economic motivation and the re-embedding of the 
economic in the social for partially economic reasons that have nonetheless to 
do with the pursuit of greater financial security. 
But only a groundless ÔeconomismÕ would rule out the idea that we are also 
witnessing a certain, if sectorally confined, change in ethos Ð a growing desire 
on the part of some people to combine the pursuit of material well-being with 
honourable social service. As already suggested in chapter 2, where wealth 
commonly prevails, one starts to need other markers of prestige. And the 
more honour itself becomes a currency, the more consumers will ally them-
selves through their choices to an honourable style of life78 Ð to fair trade and 
fair treatment of workers, which tends to go along with reliability of product 
and fair treatment of the consumer herself. 
This is directly relevant for a post-liberal civil economy in the West. Its 
particular brand of cartel capitalism has produced an economy where most 
markets are dominated by a small number of players and the barriers to entry 
are far too high. It is not an exaggeration to suggest that, in many areas, from 
energy to banking to groceries, the West has a type of monopolistic rentier 
capitalism rather than a properly functioning market economy Ð a system in 
which certain individuals or small groups cream off excessive profits through 
price-fixing, monopsony (excessive buying power through market dominance 
that crowds out modest-sized businesses and drives down prices paid to sup-
pliers) and other anti-competitive practices. Such a situation conspires against 
innovation and is detrimental to the smaller enterprises that most of all gener-
ate growth, provide employment and spread prosperity. 
The argument that globalisation requires a cost-centred Ôrace to the bottomÕ is 
nonsense, as developed economies will never be able to compete for ordinary 
jobs with low-wage countries such as Vietnam and Cambodia. On the contrary, 
the only route towards sustainable, high growth is to compete in terms of both 
quality and responsible behaviour. As Genovesi showed in his Lectures on Civil 
Economy, what matters is not the absolute cost of labour or the relation between 
foreign and domestic production of goods. Rather, what matters is who you share 
your labour market with. Paying higher prices for locally produced goods not 
only encourages domestic manufacturing, industry and a greater division of 
labour within oneÕs polity, but Ð since traders are interconnected Ð it also raises 
real wages in all trades from agriculture and manufacturing upwards, promoting 
both higher productivity and greater economic justice. In this manner, we 
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can realign fair wages with just prices and defend the interests of all 
stakeholders, including workers, suppliers and consumers. 
By emphasising location and vocation equally, democratic decision making 
would be fused with a legitimate role for hierarchy in terms of professional 
excellence and judgement. Without such a new institutional structure, local 
manufacturing and industry cannot thrive in an increasingly globalised, 
interdependent world and are quickly swamped by the control of more distant 
elites, subject to no democratic checks whatsoever. Above all, the West 
requires a new strategy to foster innovation, including new public ÔtrustsÕ for 
the pooling of technological knowledge to replace the current patenting 
system.79 That is because at present, the dominant model favours large private 
corporations over smaller, more innovative and social enterprises. 
In relation to competition, the following reforms are required.80 First, a 
new legal and regulatory framework of competition policy that links the 
prohibition of monopoly, monopsony and rent-seeking behaviour with the 
promotion of new market entry and lower consumer prices connected with 
higher quality (as with organically produced food, where falling price levels 
now make it increasingly affordable). Second, a broadening of competition 
rules and regulations beyond the sole goals of either more business efficiency 
or more consumer welfare in the direction of promoting market diversity, a 
plurality of business models and supply-chain resilience. This should be 
coupled with a recognition of social, environmental and ethical purposes in 
economic activity. Third, a widening of the competition framework to defend 
the rights of not only consumers but also owners, producers, suppliers and 
the members of communities where business activity might generate adverse 
social, environmental or cultural impact. 
12. SHARED VALUE AND GOOD BUSINESS 
In the period roughly from 1990 till 2015, an increasing proportion of the value 
generated by economic activity has been concentrated in the hands of top 
managers and shareholders in the form of corporate profits. Since 2002, large 
corporations have been net savers rather than net investors. It is precisely the 
obsession with profit maximisation that has undermined the ability of 
enterprise, both large and small, to generate shared prosperity. This, combined 
with the alignment of extremely high executive pay with short-term 
shareholder returns, has reduced long-term investment in production, research 
and development, innovation, training and infrastructure. Many Western 
businesses are suffering from a lack of strategic vision, a lack of honourable 
leadership and a lack of commitment to the long-term sustain-ability of a 
company and its ability to optimise profits over time. 
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In terms of concrete policies, we would argue for extending and trans-
forming the notion of Ôshared valueÕ that is now embraced by certain busi-
ness theorists, who argue that attention to the social and environmental 
welfare of business partners and the hinterland promotes rather than hinders 
economic profitability.81 As they point out, even large corporations are today 
sometimes ahead of most theory in some of their practices, which tacitly 
acknowledge the market limits of globalisation. Even firms as ruthless and 
monopolistic as Nestl in Europe, Unilever in the United Kingdom or Wal-
Mart in the United States are starting to see the economic costs of socially 
and ethically unsustainable action. If one over-controls oneÕs labour force, 
shifts oneÕs labour base too often, pays suppliers as cheaply as possible, 
extends the division of labour round the globe, buys out local rivals and fails 
to benefit local communities, schools and ecologies, then eventually the costs 
outstrip the benefits. One is left with unreliable and non-innovative 
workforces, poor-quality suppliers, botched components shipped round the 
globe at enormous cost, falling demand in local hinterlands and weak local 
supplies of talent in increasingly impoverished and undesirable habitats (as 
with corporate scandals such as in Bhopal in the past or BP in the Gulf of 
Mexico more recently). 
Thus it becomes possible to argue that the pursuit of long-term stable and 
steadily augmenting profit requires, for strictly economic reasons, an 
attention to mutual benefit. Corporate contributions to social and ecological 
costs should not, therefore, be thought of as Ôcoming from withoutÕ and as 
constraining business, but rather as naturally embraceable by business and 
for purely business reasons. On this reasoning, one should be able to 
persuade businesses to Ôcost inÕ the social and environmental demands that 
their economic projects make, or to compensate for the social and ecological 
deficits that they tend to cause, without any need either for any draconian 
legal constraint or for fiscal encouragement. 
However, we should rightly question the tendency of Ôshared valueÕ theo-
rists to suggest that ethical considerations should be pursued only for reasons 
of a strictly economic cost-benefit calculation, because there is an economic 
as well as moral flaw in this very claim. The problem is that, from the outset, 
the lure of Ôbad practiceÕ Ð of social, psychological and ecological depletion Ð 
as a way of cutting corners and, so, costs, has been one driving motor of 
capitalism as such. For example, the underlying perverse logic propels 
massive Ôprimitive accumulationÕ of as yet non-capitalised lands and people, 
with little given back to either in return. This process has been endlessly 
repeated and intensified ever since the beginning of the Western-imperial era. 
And even in the case of later steady-state capitalist practice, a continued 
appropriation of environments, communities and individual people remains a 
fundamental source of its unprecedented profitability. 
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If, for example, one removes from people their tribal lands, then those left 
destitute may be constrained to work cheaply for their new masters. Or if one 
lays claim to ownership of a hitherto common stretch of riverbank, then there 
is no need to face the expense of compensation. While one claims to ÔownÕ 
this water-frontage, one equally ÔdisownsÕ the polluting detritus that now 
flows down the river into the sea, and fails to Ôcost inÕ this adverse ecological 
factor. This occurs alongside the extraction of surplus value from labour, as 
noted by Marx. One can accept the latter notion in a qualified and expanded 
sense to mean the denial to workers of a fair share of profits (rather than a 
wholesale denial of the legitimacy of returns to shareholders) and of Ôsurplus 
desireÕ from consumers (when excessive prices exploit situations of either 
scarcity or over-aroused desire through the lures of fashion, glamour and 
advertising). 
Thus the Ôshared valueÕ theorists remain capitalist theorists just to the 
extent that they deny the need to supplement supposedly amoral motivations 
as the prime economic ones and ignore the way in which immoral practices 
are actually constitutive of capitalism. Nevertheless, they are not wrong to 
suggest that such bad practices can be eventually self-defeating, even in capi-
talistic terms. For while they tend to favour the making of a quick buck, they 
equally tend to kill the goose that lays the golden eggs of sustainable profit-
ability. Therefore, although it is true that capitalism is partially built upon a 
tendency of bad practice to drive out good, it is equally the case that, even in 
its own terms of success, it can constantly give rise to an opposite process, 
whereby good practice drives out bad. 
This may be exactly why capitalist history offers such striking proof of the 
greater success of relatively ethical enterprises at certain times and in certain 
circumstances Ð like those of the Quakers. In this sense, the modern economic 
market already is to some degree a competition in virtue as well as in naked 
force and persuasion. There can be a genuine encouragement of honourable 
demand for the most honourable suppliers and modes of supply that remains 
within a market logic of free exchange of goods and labour. One can call this 
the element of ÔcivilÕ economy that may be encouraged even within capitalism, 
while still looking for a more normative dominance of good practice that 
would break with capitalistic norms. 
Such a break can be genuinely and realistically entertained precisely 
because the Ôshared valueÕ theorists fail to see that capitalism is also Ð and 
arguably more primarily Ð constituted by bad practice driving out good. This 
is for two reasons: First, as already mentioned, it can be in oneÕs short-term 
interests of rapid profitability to cut corners in order to decrease costs. In par-
ticular, a business may make a sordidly rapid and exploitative profit in one 
domain, solely in order to accumulate quick capital to be invested in another. 
Indeed, it may initially flirt with marginally criminal economic activity 
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and then advance to a less momentarily spectacular but steadier income 
based upon more respectable trading and an increase in shared value. Thus 
Wal-Mart, having made its ruthless pile, is not surprisingly growing more 
benign in order to head off a damaging ill-repute. In the same way, Nestl 
now offers Ôfair-tradeÕ coffee and no doubt we will live to see the organic 
McDonaldÕs burger farmed from free-roaming and humanely hunted bison. 
The second reason is that, once damage has been done through bad prac-
tice, sometimes it cannot be readily undone. The tribes have lost their lands 
forever; the fish upstream no longer spawn; the local artisanal businesses 
and traditional skills handed down over generations for centuries have 
finally been lost. Wal-Mart, for example, might find it an uphill struggle to 
try to put back in place the local working, self-educating, saving, and 
exchanging culture that it now self-interestedly sees that it requires after all. 
Its insight may arrive too late. This point is perhaps not unrelated to certain 
dimensions of the economic crisis in Anglo-Saxon countries: a totally 
thinned-out culture proves too poor a soil to support a richly flourishing 
local, regional and national economy. 
From these two points about the likely place of bad practice within capital-
ism, it follows that while, yes, the ethical runs with and not against long-term 
business interests, it must still be pursued for its own sake if it is more gen-
erally to prevail. This means that Ôshared valueÕ must also combine motiva-
tional priority with the profit motive, beyond the norms of capitalism as such. 
In turn, that would rule out a systemic justification for exploiting labour and 
the consumer, besides land and community. In this way, one would have 
moved beyond a specifically capitalist market system in the sense of one that 
puts the accumulation of commodified and appropriated wealth before a 
growth in the real flourishing of both humans and nature in general. 
However, realism is here doubly on the side of the ethical, beyond the 
Harvard Business School purview: for unless virtue is embraced as virtue, 
and not simply for reasons of self-interest, whether liberal or utilitarian 
(Kantian or Benthamite), it is unlikely to be embraced at all. It was, after all, 
not merely simulated Quakers who built model factories and workersÕ 
villages. Therefore, in merely economic terms, one requires a detour through 
the Ôextra-economicÕ in the interests of the economic itself (assuming here, 
for the sake of argument, the dubious generally accepted understanding of 
the economic as in itself ÔamoralÕ). Or one can put this the other way around: 
if a good working and trading ethos is pursued for its own sake, then ethical 
practitioners will embrace market success because it can extend a shared 
human flourishing. 
For such a dual embrace to occur, one requires a slow development of the 
habits of shared practice both within businesses and between them. However, 
although this growth in a good ethos is primary, it is not entirely or always 
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sufficient. For all human beings require the just exercise of law as both stick 
and carrot, in order to compensate for our endemic moral lassitude. This is 
one point at which a new embrace of the primacy of ÔsocialÕ or ÔsocialistÕ 
solutions by no means neglects the role of the state and of legality. In 
particular, even though the Ôcosting inÕ of social and ecological costs should 
be embraced by businesses for internal reasons, they should also be insisted 
upon by legal and fiscal measures. Following the same line of reasoning, 
with respect to the treatment of workers and consumers, a post-liberal politi-
cal economy should legislate to inhibit movements of labour and capital that 
drive down labour costs. This could be done through specifically targeted 
setting of minimal wages (for example in the construction industry), local 
direction of capital via national and regional investments banks and perhaps, 
in extremis, reciprocally negotiated limits of labour movement between states 
within federal entities of various kinds (the European Union and the United 
States, for example). By the same token, governments, and especially in the 
United Kingdom, should acknowledge the economic as well as obvious 
political and social importance of ensuring that a reasonable number of 
strategically important business and manufacturing concerns operative within 
their countries remain under domestic ownership. 
Equally, a civilly economic approach should intensify anti-trust laws, 
support some levy on financial transactions (both at home and abroad) and 
seek to impose firmer divisions between the high street and speculative arms of 
financial trading. And it should advocate the severe curtailing of limited 
liability for both business and finance, in order to ensure that insane risks are 
less likely to be taken by persons whose own wealth is ultimately implicated. It 
is, though, a nominalist mistake to regret the ÔfictionÕ of corporate personality, 
since this (finally Christian) legacy acknowledges both operative character in 
common and the importance of liberties collectively held and exercised, 
besides serving to limit the liberal collusion between individualism and 
unrestricted state sovereignty. Nevertheless, this actually realistic notion is 
abused if corporate personality is seen, in completely fictional terms, as 
operating altogether independently of the individual persons who compose it in 
succession through time. This impersonal diachrony gone mad tends, indeed, 
to licence irresponsibility and to allow individual folly to hide behind a 
disownable mask. We need, then, a balance between a limitation of liability to 
allow enterprise undertaken in solidarity with others and a finally locatable 
personal responsibility in order to guard against unnecessary risks and the 
subordination of real economic purpose to purely speculative one. 
As already suggested, to demand that risk, as well as profit, enter fully into 
the processes of contractual exchange is surely to insist on an extension rather 
than a diminution of market principles. Otherwise, without this element of 
social and ethical balance that constitutes a genuinely civil economy, one has 
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a reality in which profit is increasingly privatised only because risk and not 
benefit has been socialised. 
13. CIVIL ECONOMY AND THE POLITICS OF VIRTUE 
The civil economy model can be summarised as follows. Overwhelmingly, it 
ties economic profit to ethical and social purpose, and seeks to ethicise 
exchange. In the same spirit, it replaces the separation of risk from reward 
with risk- and profit-sharing models. In both respects, it publicly requires an 
economic pursuit of honourable practice and genuine benefit rather than just 
abstract wealth and power. It assumes that the seemingly Ôother-wordlyÕ and 
soul-regarding pursuit of the truly good is, in fact, in natural alignment with 
the various goods of concrete flourishing (work, housing, food, health) and 
higher fulfilment (work satisfaction, subtle cuisine, beautiful environment, 
educational development) that human beings everywhere naturally seek. For 
this reason, it believes that the real economic task is the shared coordination 
of all these pursuits in terms of a Ôcommon goodÕ. 
Just because human beings naturally pursue real flourishing and stable, 
relational goods, the pursuit of virtuous economic practice is not merely 
desirable for its own sake, but is also more practically effective than an 
apparently pragmatic amoralism and misplaced cynicism as to peopleÕs most 
consistent motives. Thus honourable behaviour Ð economic justice seen to be 
done Ð simply because it inspires and runs with the natural grain of human 
endeavour, tends to foster higher innovation, higher productivity, higher 
growth and higher remuneration. This is only utopian in terms of the current 
capitalist logic and liberal ideology, but it can be achieved under the 
carapace of a different set of practices that combine novel incentives, 
rewards and sanctions with the shaping of an altogether different cultural 
habit. Of course, this sine qua non is the hardest of all to attain and the least 
subject to blueprint, which is not to say that it is totally immune to a 
purposive and deliberative shaping. 
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Chapter 5 
The Metacrisis of Democracy 
1. THE LIBERAL PERVERSION OF MIXED CONSTITUTION 
Western democracy has in the past faced periodic crises characterised by a 
collapse of public trust in politicians, a lack of popular participation and a deep 
scepticism about whether the democratic system can cope with pressing 
problems or serve the long-term interests of a country as a whole. But todayÕs 
crisis is qualitatively different insofar as it concerns a doubt as to whether we 
still live under a substantive democracy at all and whether democracy and 
liberalism are mutually compatible. This ÔmetacrisisÕ is, however (as in the 
case of the metacrises of liberalism and capitalism), but the upshot of an ever-
increased unravelling of the founding logic of liberal principles Ð in this case 
those of representative democracy. 
The latter, it has now been cogently argued by several scholars, is actually a 
misnomer insofar as the only true democracy was always in the past under-
stood to be direct and participatory: thus in ancient Athens political actors 
were often chosen by lot rather than as elected representatives.1 The modern, 
liberal system is best described as unqualified ÔrepresentationÕ because it is, in 
reality, a hybrid of a democratic and a necessarily aristocratic or oligarchic 
element, given that representatives have rarely been conceived as simply 
mandated by the people, but rather remain trusted actors, ideally supposed to 
be men and women of outstanding ability, integrity and virtue.2 In this way, 
the liberal constitutional settlement did not, after all, wholly abandon the 
ancient logic of Ômixed constitutionÕ, which we will suggest below is the 
unavoidable grammar of any complex polity as such. For this logic, human 
rule over humans always requires a balance of the consent of Ôthe manyÕ with 
the advice of Ôthe fewÕ (however constituted) and the executive decisions of 
Ôthe oneÕ (or his representatives), which normally has to be in some fashion 
1 7 9  
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literally embodied in one person, as it still is today, throughout the world, in 
the mode of monarchic, presidential and prime ministerial functions. 
Traditionally, this mixture was variously allied to a notion that Ôthe manyÕ 
might concur in and help to shape the discernment of the just and good by Ôthe 
fewÕ, and that Ôthe oneÕ would act upon the basis of this wisdom. It therefore 
assumed a shared horizon of purpose, even though it was also felt that 
constitutional balance would tend to guard against the respective vices of the 
three parties: the potential tyranny of monarchy; the factional divisions and 
interests of aristocracy; and the anarchy and violence of the masses. Such bal-
ance was not a negative, liberal safeguard Ð rather, it was but the reverse face 
of a positive, organic vision of naturally combining contributions: monarchy 
yielding political unity and defence; aristocracy, wise counsel; democracy, not 
merely consent but much more vitally Ôliberty, and the courage and liberty 
where industry beginsÕ.3 
For this vision also, sovereignty, and even legislation in the broadest sense, 
was thought of as distributed across all three functions, with each preserving 
certain prerogatives. Inseparably linked to this distribution of sovereignty, 
especially in the medieval as opposed to the classical era, was the idea that Ôthe 
fewÕ do not just offer their own wisdom but also embody or ÔrepresentÕ the 
interests of various local and corporate bodies. ÔRepresentationÕ is a term that 
was first coined within Christian theology in sacramental and Christological 
contexts, and from the outset it had a double face: the representation of the 
central power by local ÔrepresentativesÕ like bishops, but also their 
representation of their own people to the centre and ultimately to God Ð just as 
Christ, God in human form, was taken to be the representative of both God and 
humanity.4 This paradigm naturally meant that representation assumed a 
certain common symbolic and axiological horizon. In this, now more 
decentralised way, Ôthe manyÕ were not represented as an aggregation of 
individuals, but, rather, as individuals always found in natural or legally 
recognised smaller groupings that tended already, at a microcosmic level, to 
operate both a mixed and a representational logic: ÔThe representatives who 
appeared in parliament were not representatives of inorganic collections of 
individuals, they represented shires and boroughs. ... The county was already a 
highly organised entity. County and county court were oneÕ.5 
The rights of these bodies were part of what was recognised by Magna 
Carta, alongside demands that barons reciprocate in their treatment of sub-
vassals and freemen the securities and liberties that they were demanding of 
the King.6 In most Western European states, these lower, commoner repre-
sentatives eventually also came to be represented at either regional or national 
level in cortes, parlement or parliament. In this way, the circle was closed: just 
as mixed government implies decentred distribution of sovereign power, so 
also this distribution came to be fully represented at the heart of the polity. 
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Usually, liberal representation is taken to be an advance upon this broadly 
described medieval system of government and to have guaranteed more 
peace, balance and liberty beyond its vagaries, besides a greater granting of a 
political voice to the many. But there are several problems with this claim. 
First, there was no complete break with the older system in the early modern 
period, nor even the eighteenth century. In reality, eighteenth-century whig 
Britain relied upon an uneasily organic mixture of executive, legislative and 
judicial powers, rather than upon a Ôbalance of powersÕ, which Montesquieu 
mistakenly identified to be at work therein.7 The same thing was true for so-
called ÔabsolutistÕ France, once one has realised that its ÔcheckingÕ functions 
were more distributed in the many regional branches of parlement and that it 
possessed, correspondingly, a far greater degree of survival of local and 
corporate independence.8 Power in Britain was relatively more contested at 
the centre, in France more so at the peripheries. But even these are but 
relative contrasts. 
Second, as some English tories and, later, Burke realised, the liberal irrup-
tion against this inherited system involved a destruction of diversely varying 
corporate liberties and privileges, often perceived as ÔirrationalÕ and merely 
customary. But in this way, many highly substantial modes of participation 
and popular influence were destroyed Ð especially if we remember that 
individuals do not possess any real democratic power when acting alone. This 
raises a considerable doubt as to whether there is unambiguously more 
democracy in modern times than in the past Ð especially when we realise that 
ÔrepresentationÕ in medieval England, even if it excluded outright serfs (of 
whom there may have been far fewer than once thought), extended right the 
way down, at least in principle, to the sub-vassals or freemen of the vill and 
manor who acted for example as constables, churchwardens or ale-tasters.9 
Such units were in any case represented by knights or lords.10 
Liberalism, instead, is only able to recognise (as Hobbes saw with ultimate 
clarity) as politically relevant either the literal individual who is a human 
person or the artificial, aggregate person of the state Ð a fiction that must be 
sustained through a monopolisation of power by the fictionÕs real personal 
embodiments. LeviathanÕs absolute sovereignty is necessary to guarantee the 
social contract and the negative peace of a cessation of natural hostility. The 
freedom of the contracting individual is the prime site for liberal ideology; the 
sovereignty of Leviathan, as the expression of mass will, is the prime site at 
once for the ideology of absolutism and the ideology of modern ÔdemocracyÕ. 
Suspended between the many real wills and one, armed fictional will, 
liberalism has, in principle, extirpated mixed government. Just for this reason, 
the shadow of absolutism always lurks over it. And it turns out that in 
eighteenth-century England the absolute sovereignty of Crown in Parliament, 
as insisted upon by Blackstone over against the power of precedent, amounted 
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more to the absoluteness of the royal prerogative (which had in many ways a 
wider extension than that of the French monarch) than to the absoluteness of 
Parliament.11 As Nicholas Henshall explains: 
The king continued to appoint ministers, make war and peace, grant pardons, 
issue charters, incorporate companies, coin money and willed all the other pow-
ers subsequently listed by Blackstone. Legislation in the English [as opposed to 
the more extended French sense, which overlapped with the executive function] 
sense was ragged indeed. Some Georgian statesman believed a time would 
come when there were no laws left to be made.12 
And in this respect we encounter a further aporetic oscillation as to whether 
this ÔabsolutismÕ will be conceived in the name of an active governing author-
ity, or, rather, in the name of a ÔimprescriptibleÕ and essentially unaltering law, 
which in a sense renders government or statute unnecessary, save as a judicial 
application.13 Whether the ruler or rule itself be taken as absolute, either could 
be seen as purer safeguards than is democracy of a contractual, market 
freedom of the individual. 
On this scheme then, mixed constitution is, in reality, abandoned. The 
ÔrepublicanÕ role of the few is excised; the political as opposed to the eco-
nomic role of the many is rendered redundant. Instead, liberalism at its 
Hobbesian heart is really a suspension between the entirely political one and 
the depoliticised many. 
Nevertheless, as we saw in chapter 1, both Locke and republican theorists 
argued, contrary to Hobbes, that political representation was necessary to 
preserve the economic liberty of the few and the free consent of the many. In 
this sense, they sustained elements of both aristocracy and democracy and, 
therefore, offered a bastardised mixed constitution. Bastardised in theory, and 
in practice partially corrupted, because the aristocratic function tends to 
become reduced to the guarding of negative freedom, with a concomitant 
diminution of the link of aristocracy to local corporate privilege, which is 
necessarily political, representational and guild-guided as well as economic. 
For this reason, though Montesquieu was wrong, he began to be right and was 
consciously adopted as right in America. Without the bond of teleology and 
virtue, the three constitutional elements came to be seen as having innately 
disparate interests, including the notion that intermediate corporate interests 
were necessarily at variance with those of the centre. 
In this way, ÔmixtureÕ came to denote in the main not the cooperation of the 
needed different parts of a social body (with the checking function being nec-
essary though secondary) but, rather, a negative ÔbalancingÕ. One can see this 
as having taken four main forms: first, the division of rule, as in the United 
States, between the executive and the judiciary (with the further negative 
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balance of senatorial and popular congressional) powers, which leads in the 
end to rival sovereignties and, so, to both conflict and stasis. Second, with the 
lapse of a shared symbolic horizon, representation is aporetically caught 
between sheer mandation on the one hand and mere substitution on the other. 
This means that there is a permanent threat either of oligarchic rule or of an 
anarchic mode of democracy. Third, and in consequence, the interaction of 
the three ancient elements tends to be displaced (in the nineteenth century, but 
already anticipated by Machiavelli) by a permanent Ôclass-struggleÕ between 
the potentially democratic many and the potentially oligarchic few. Karl Marx 
failed to see that only capitalism produces endemic, necessary and 
foundational class-conflict. Fourth, and overridingly, there remains always the 
real bipartite constitutive tension of liberalism between the political one and 
the economic many. If sovereignty lies originally with the people, then how 
can it be so alienated that they may only express this through an unquestioned 
sovereign centre and an unquestioned legal formalism that is self-sustaining 
and totally outside popular control? Above all, in the case of the United 
States, it is unclear who is really in charge Ð the people or the divided powers 
at the centre, constantly contesting, but thereby reinforcing through patronage 
and lobbying the single power of the centre as such. 
If today we can validly speak of a metacrisis of the liberal state, then this is 
just because this bipartition is threatening finally to shatter the lingering 
tripartition of the ancient Western constitution. This lingering alone upholds, 
against a latent Hobbesian logic, democracy as one dimension of representa-
tion, whose other dimension is necessarily aristocratic. It is our contention 
that all the usual suggestions for saving democracy in reality increase this 
bipartition, insisting that the one more accurately and immediately reflect the 
many. Thereby, they only reinforce its ultimate liberal logic of removing any 
political relevance of the many Ð and so of democracy Ð altogether. 
2. CONSTITUTIONAL MIXTURE SAVES DEMOCRACY 
It follows that one can only save democracy through paradox: by trying to 
restore, albeit in a more democratic way (which Christianity has always 
innately demanded), a genuine ancient constitution, pivoted about shared telos 
and virtue. The state must, indeed, become once again a true (and not 
ideological) universitas, or community of common purpose, because any mere 
Oakeshottian societas, or bond of only formal agreement, now manifestly 
secures a community confined to the economic participation and banned from 
real political participation.14 It is not possible, as both Otto von Gierke and 
John Neville Figgis half allowed, to have a political unity of corporate bodies 
sharing sovereignty if the political whole be not also conceived 
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in a corporate or ÔuniversalÕ rather than ÔsocialÕ fashion, in OakeshottÕs 
specific sense. For one thing, as Augustine realised, any social formation has 
also the ÔuniversalÕ dimension of unification round a shared object of desire 
(even if this be the shared liberal desire to pursue individual desire only).15 
For another, if the political state be merely neutral with respect to the 
purposes of the communities it contains, allowing a kind of liberalism of 
groups rather than of individuals, then this neutrality will tend to erode both 
the public pursuit of these purposes and their primary reality for the members 
of such communities, as we see today with the dissolving and privatisation of 
religious belief. 
Inversely, a polity that is in itself a corporate universitas cannot be sustained 
if its purpose is not participated in and variously exemplified by sub-groups. 
For without their mediation, citizens will tend to become mere individuals and 
their perception of the state will be that of a single ÔsocialÕ force over against 
them. Just for this reason, the pre-Christian, relatively non-plural and in a sense 
Ôproto-modernÕ polities of the ancient world Ð both the Greek polis and the 
Roman Republic and Empire Ð tended already towards this sort of sophistic 
disintegration. Therefore the real alternative is between state as societas, 
mediating individuals or merely instrumental composing groups, or the state as 
corporation, itself composed of sub-corporations.16 
For accidental reasons, Britain sustains in some areas certain features of 
this classical and gothic antiquity. It escaped revolutionary settlements, 
which were themselves the results of accidentally successful rebellions and 
no historical inevitablities whatsoever.17 Nevertheless, also for the contingent 
reason of Henry VIIIÕs state-led and parliament-endorsed Reformation, 
EnglandÕs parliamentary sovereignty has been itself in some sense the most 
ÔabsolutistÕ and the most abolishing of intermediate associations and local 
government, which survive till this day better on the Continent. Just for this 
reason, the United Kingdom has tended to oscillate between a dogmatism of 
the absolute power of Crown in Parliament on the one hand and an equal 
dogmatism of the absolute rule of law, on the other.18 In this way it is also 
inescapably a modern constitution, though unwritten, and equally subject to 
alternative executive or judicial capture. 
All the same, since neither of these visions has ever triumphed in practice, it 
retains a certain mixture at the centre that is organic rather than agonistic and 
ÔbalancedÕ. In practice, as Burke envisioned, precedent, statute and equity 
remain a seamless whole, refusing any illusory ÔfoundationalismÕ of, respec-
tively, positive precedent, positive authority, and moral authority reduced to a 
set of formal rules about rights. Law in England, Wales, Northern Ireland and, 
now, independent Eire (and in Scotland in a different Roman version) remains 
benignly ÔtautologousÕ and unfathomably self-founded.19 Law is not arbitrary 
custom, again as for Burke, because the transcendent, eternal divine 
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law expressing the intrinsic Good can be gradually mediated by interpreted 
custom through time.20 
It is in part for this reason of accidental antique survival that we focus 
especially on the contemporary fate of the British constitution below. The 
usual arguments to the effect that it should ÔmoderniseÕ and assume a specific 
written form like the constitutions of other countries miss the point that their 
liberal models are themselves now proving inadequate. And one can in any 
case note that only the United States possesses a truly unrevised constitution 
Ð the many revisions undergone in Continental countries belie any rationalist 
notion of an absolute distinction between constitutional law and the normal 
law of statute. Moreover, the polities of other countries (including some 
established by the United States) more often follow versions of the British 
parliamentary system than the American division of powers, even if they 
hybridise this with a presidential model Ð though precisely, one could argue, 
in order to sustain a ÔmonarchicÕ moment. 
But in the case of all liberal constitutions, liberalism is here also hollowing 
itself out, because it is poised between the double void of two mere wills Ð 
that of the many and that of the one. Between their sway falls, inevitably, not 
a third vacuum, but, rather, the inextinguishable substantive space of loyalty 
and collective belonging, without which human beings cannot even form lan-
guage communities. Unrelated to the good, to transcendence or to the univer-
sal, these have often taken, and continue to take, unpleasant, atavistic forms. 
But with this unsavoury substance, the liberal blandness of mere form is in 
constant collusion. To escape it, one can only try to recover the sublimated 
substance of the true mixed constitution. 
The United Kingdom is in some ways well poised to set an example here, 
by the very reason of its apparent belatedness, and can now leap ahead of the 
more drastic fate that is overtaking the newer constitutional rivals. Yet at the 
same time, this advantage should not be exaggerated. The equally modern 
British legacy of Ôcommon law sovereigntyÕ is recovering and forming a dev-
ilÕs alliance with the German exportation of the legally dominated Rechstaat 
where democratic anarchy and oligarchic oppression are avoided only at the 
cost of an inflexible legal rigorism and the thwarting of democratic expres-
sion.21 Simultaneously, the absolute sovereignty of Crown in Parliament, like-
wise a common-law upshot, local government and much of the independence 
of other corporate bodies. In a situation where the very survival of the United 
Kingdom now depends upon the invention of some sort of subsidiary, federal 
arrangement, there is no future for a project that merely tries to resurrect what 
lies within the island of Great Britain. 
To the contrary, we must urgently reverse the shocking miseducation of 
the British people in this respect, and connect British self-government with 
shared sovereignty and federalism of the Roman legal legacy. Yet, 
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ultimately, any absolute Germanic-Romanic contrast is an illusion: the truth 
is that such importation could also help us recover the real high medieval, 
non-absolutising spirit of the English common law, which owed much to 
Roman, feudal and Canon law sources.22 Often, under ecclesial influence, as 
with Magna Carta itself, the original tradition of English liberties and 
English representation was inseparable from an acknowledgement of the real 
ÔpersonalityÕ of corporate bodies, rendering England herself, like 
Christendom as a whole, a Ôcommunity of communitiesÕ.23 In many ways it 
was the strange division of Europe into the entirely overlapping jurisdictions 
of secular regnum and ecclesial sacerdotium that in the medieval period pre-
vented any emergence of absolute sovereignty and upheld the primacy of the 
rule of law in a way that did not render this a sovereign ÔfoundationÕ. Instead, 
it left it as inseparable from pre-legal custom at one end and the actual enact-
ment of statute, at the other.24 
This point should today be related to the new resurgence of religious loyal-
ties, too often in an atavistic and ideological manner. A post-secular approach 
needs to see a certain dialectical inevitability here, and to allow that public 
religiosity can be chastened but not removed from the scene. At the same 
time, it should further see that the major world religions themselves offer a 
certain critical chastening of loyalty through its pivotal link to transcendent 
norms that allow for a certain self-checking. Thus, in the case of the United 
Kingdom, the continued and theoretically central religious aspect of its con-
stitution should also not be seen as an embarrassment. Rather, if the Anglican 
settlement is given (in continuity with Hooker, Andrewes and LaudÕs decisive 
Ôreforming of the reformÕ) a more Catholic than Protestant gloss, it can once 
more act as a carapace for the protection of substantive corporate liberties and 
a wider political participation. 
3. LIBERALISM UNDERMINES DEMOCRACY 
Today liberalism poses a triple threat to democracy. First of all, liberal forces 
favour the rise of a new oligarchy composed of both old elites and Ônew 
classesÕ who have abandoned any code of honour and consider themselves 
beyond the rules, on account of shallow claims to meritocratic superiority. 
Second, the same forces, with seeming contradiction, exacerbate the resur-
gence of populism that is connected with the liberal indifference to truth and 
goodness, as well as the triumph of a global capitalist ÔspectacleÕ that drains 
everything of its particular meaning. Given this double drift, it is the rights of 
mass manipulated feeling that incrementally and inevitably acquire universal 
legitimacy, however much elite liberals may tremble at its predilections. 
Third, in counterpoint to this massification, liberalism, with its cult of 
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aleatory preference, reinforces the spread of a new anarchy in terms of social 
atomisation and exacerbates the increasing inability of the modern sovereign 
state to command the loyalty of its citizens. 
In this way, beyond even a modern parody of the ancient, a more nakedly 
liberal late modern era pulls the now debased ÔmanyÕ, the tyrannical ÔoneÕ 
and the merely opinionated ÔfewÕ substantively apart. But the resulting con-
fusions and tensions can only conspire to increase both the insecurity and the 
resultant further-assumed power of the directing ÔoneÕ, which is also the 
most elite ÔfewÕ, now drained of any even lingering aristocratic sense of 
virtuous responsibility. Thus liberal democratisation has coincided with the 
self-serving rule of elites who behave like an exclusive mob rather than lead-
ing by example. LiberalismÕs increasingly authoritarian response to popular 
resistance tends to combine direct state dominance with indirect market 
commodification and a ÔcultureÕ of spectacular mass surveillance and social 
control. Taken together, the now doubly parodied, late modern forces of oli-
garchy, demagoguery and anarchy conspire to engender a new Ôdemocratic 
tyrannyÕ wherein key traditions, institutions and embedded practices are 
swept aside. Instead of peace and prosperity worldwide, liberalism is increas-
ingly associated with war, economic exploitation and the decline of both 
local and high cultures. 
Thus liberal democracy is undergoing a metacrisis (again, not a ÔfinalÕ cri-
sis) whereby the modern oscillation between the sovereign power of the state 
on the one hand, and the sovereignty of self-possessed citizens on the other, 
removes people from their embeddedness in families, communities and tra-
ditions. The attempted removal of substantive loyalty legitimates the liberal 
claim that only the visible hand of government combined with the invisible 
hand of the market can save society from the anarchical Ôstate of natureÕ, 
which liberalism really produces as its fantasised presupposition. 
4. THE DECLINE OF DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION 
Democratic representation has been undermined by the liberal emphasis on 
the formal separation of power between the three branches of government. 
This in reality privileges the executive, which tends to usurp the powers of the 
national legislature, just because it is not seen as an organic expression of 
legislative representation, whose necessarily ÔexceptionalÕ decisions are still 
concerned with national justice and identity and not merely with national 
(degenerating to the governmentÕs own) survival.25 While globalisation has 
empowered multinational corporations and many unaccountable supranational 
organisations that limit national sovereignty, it has also given rise to a new 
system of transnational governance in which the executive is key. 
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Governments remain central to the exercise of power, as they retain the pre-
rogative to implement international agreements, laws and regulations within 
their respective jurisdictions, and often without much parliamentary scrutiny 
or judiciary oversight.26 
Meanwhile, the liberal tendency towards oligarchy is differently reinforced 
by an arriviste aristocracy of lawyers and judges who are becoming part of the 
Ônew classÕ operating without honour. The judiciary seems unable to resist the 
temptation to aggrandise its jurisdictional power and either to help the 
executive to impose uniform laws, with too little respect for circumstance, or 
to compose these laws for themselves out of a questionable claim to be 
checking inflated governmental authority. 
This is particularly true of the judiciary across Europe, including Britain 
(and often in conjunction with the judicial activism of the European Court of 
Justice and the European Court of Human Rights), and even more so in the 
United States with the Supreme Court, which in the 1954 Cooper v. Aaron 
case simply stated that the ÔUS Constitution says what we say it saysÕ. Just as 
some British judges are now suggesting Ð with seeming contradiction Ð that it 
is the process of law itself that sovereignly authorises the sovereign power of 
the Crown.27 In the United States, it is also the case that federal judges can 
exercise executive functions and deploy tax-raising powers Ð as in Kansas 
City where a federal judge took charge of the municipal school system and 
doubled local property taxes against the express will of residents who, 
according to Missouri state law, had to be consulted and had voted no. 
Democratic representation suffers at the hands of the Ôjudicial aristocracyÕ 
because, as Tocqueville pointed out, the latter has, in the end, a much greater 
affinity with the executive than with the people and privileges public order 
over all other considerations: Ôthe greatest guarantee of order is authority. 
One must not forget, moreover, that if they [lawyers] prize freedom, they 
generally place legality well above it; they fear tyranny less than arbitrari-
ness, and provided that the legislator takes charge of taking away menÕs 
independence, they are nearly contentÕ.28 In a country where, as a result of 
separating state from church and instituting a civil religion, there is no higher 
authority than the constitution and its guardians (executive and judiciary), 
democracy is dominated by what Tocqueville describes as an aristocratic 
class of magistrates and lawyers who Ôform a power that ... envelops society 
as a whole, penetrates into each of the classes that compose it; works in 
secret, acts constantly on it without its knowing, and in the end models it to 
its desires.29 Europe is fast catching up in terms of becoming a characteristi-
cally litigious culture. 
There are at least two fundamental reasons why, in a liberal system, 
democratic representation is undermined by the quasi-monarchic behaviour 
of the executive and the quasi-aristocratic power of the judiciary. The first is 
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that an overly ÔindependentÕ executive is forced to grow on its own account, 
like the American presidency or the British prime ministerial office. And the 
expansion of new technological capabilities exacerbates the entire tendency 
to algorithmic self-regulation and simultaneous openness to surveillance and 
remote manipulation.30 
The other reason is that a self-expanding executive and judiciary will tend 
to protect themselves through secrecy. This is negatively witnessed by the 
fact that, whether in the case of the financial crash or phone hacking and the 
MP expenses scandal in Britain, debates in parliament and in the press 
quickly focus on personal greed rather than systemic dysfunction. A few 
heads roll, but most of the senior figures get away with it and the system 
remains largely intact. The public profession of liberal values such as 
ÔtransparencyÕ and ÔfairnessÕ has created a procedural faade that barely 
masks an all-too-visible complicity among numerous politicians, bankers, 
regulators, business tycoons, journalists and policemen who collude to 
undermine civil liberties and expand the authoritarian market-state into 
evermore areas of life. 
In the face of this moral vacuum, we are starting to see that the romance of 
virtue and teleological purpose is no mere luxury. For, given this void, people 
are turning to various ersatz romances that articulate at once their spiritual and 
their material discontent. Typically, these debased romances pivot upon 
blaming an unlikely other for modern discontents Ð people of different colour, 
class or creed. Amid the collapse of democratic representation, popular 
responses consist in a combination of anger, alienation, apathy and scape-
goating.31 Moreover, as Colin Crouch points out, Ôthe active engagement of the 
ordinary population is not wanted, because it might become unmanageable; but 
their feeling of exclusion is also feared, as that might lead them into equally 
unmanageable rebellion, or at least to an indifference undermining the 
legitimacy of those elected to ruleÕ.32 Hence we see concerted calls by the 
mainstream parties to boost voter registration ahead of national polls, but few 
efforts aimed at a proper longer-term engagement with the electorate. 
Another indicator for the collapse of democratic representation is the 
demise of mass membership of mainstream parties and their mutation into 
cartel parties that represent narrow and priggish ideologies, single-issue 
causes such as ecology, or sectional interests such as corporate capitalism Ð 
or both at once.33 As the late Peter Mair observed, there has been a trans-
formation of both the goals of Western political parties and the way in which 
they govern: since they view the accession to power as Ônot only a standard 
expectation, but also an end in itselfÕ, political parties have ceased to be 
socio-cultural movements but, instead, Ôhave become more office-seeking 
agencies that govern Ð in the widest sense of the term Ð rather than represent; 
[that] bring order rather than give voiceÕ.34 
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A further indicator for the collapse of democratic representation and the 
emergence of cartel democracy is the nature of party funding and the influ-
ence of wealthy donors, especially in the United States Ð whether on policy, 
on the selection of candidates, or the wider direction of the party. The 
increasingly close ties between politics and business elites confirm that 
power in the modern state rests largely on clientelism, with private patronage 
dictating public policy without any effective parliamentary accountability or 
popular participation in the process.35 
With the collapse of popular participation, the executive has been free to 
suspend core constitutional provisions as part of the global war on terror. 
This tendency of liberal democracies to operate in a permanent Ôstate of 
exceptionÕ evokes parallels with the collapse of democracy in the 1930s. As 
the late Sheldon Wolin rightly remarked: 
Democracy [then] signified not an active citizenry but a politically disengaged 
and alienated ÒmassÓ, whose support was useful for conferring legitimacy on 
dictatorship and extending its control over the population. An artful combina-
tion of propaganda flattered the mass, exploited its antipolitical sentiments, 
warned it of dangerous enemies foreign and domestic, and applied forms of 
intimidation to create a climate of fear and an insecure populace, one receptive 
to being led. The same citizenry, which democracy had created, proceeded to 
vote into power and then support movements openly pledged to destroy 
democracy and constitutionalism.36 
Amid the rise of populism and the resurgence of nationalist forces, democracy 
faces another existential crisis, which unqualified liberalism is exacerbating. 
5. THE NON-MEDIATION OF LIBERALISM AND DEMOCRACY 
The global spread of democracy after the end of the Cold War has coincided 
with the debasement of democratic models in the West. The main reason is 
the complete fusion of democracy with liberalism, which goes back to the 
rise of neo-liberalism and its adoption by the elites.37 As we have already 
seen, and as Chantal Mouffe has observed, ÔThere is no necessary relation 
between these two different traditions [the liberal and the democratic 
tradition], but only a contingent historical articulationÕ.38 
Liberalism is about the individual will; democracy is about mass will, 
directly or representatively expressed. The former may not require or even 
disdain the latter; the latter may entirely override the former. Whenever this 
intrinsic diversion at depth manifests itself on the surface, it tends to be 
arbitrated by the power of the central state that is ruled by elites who 
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act as a self-interested party to form what is, in effect, a third, oligarchic, 
quasi-aristocratic and dishonourable basis for our current political order. But 
this constitutes less a mediation than an opportunistic attempt to divide and 
rule. 
For it would only be possible to mediate, rather than to overrule and sub-
vert, the more valid concerns of both liberalism and democracy in terms of 
some sort of extra-voluntarist understanding. Such an understanding would 
have equitably to exceed a merely temporary consensus as to just when, 
where and to what extent we should balance spheres of individual decision 
with spheres of shared determination. Equally, one can only justify the role of 
democracy, or of collective assent, if one assumes that there is, in fact, an 
objective common good, including a region of shared substantive flourishing 
to be sought Ð to whatever degree its nature must remain a matter of continual 
debate and discernment. Thus, paradoxically, the real rationale for democracy 
is extra-democratic: the legitimacy of popular assent consists not in an aggre-
gated will (because we have known ever since Robbespierre that this can be 
anarchic, tyrannical and anti-human). Rather, it consists in the likelihood that 
a relatively well educated Ð morally trained and informed Ð populace will be 
better able to sift and refine proposals as to what is ÔbestÕ for them by 
genuinely ÔaristocraticÕ thinkers and innovators at every level. 
It is also crucial that the good not only be done, but that it be done willingly 
and with general assent Ð else it will be constantly and inevitably thwarted. 
Without this extra-democratic rationale for democracy, democracy will be 
identified with a new kind of mass tyranny. And it will appear redundant in the 
face of ÔinvisibleÕ government by the hand of the marketplace that avowedly 
acknowledges only the rights of choice and of court judgements, and executive 
decisions recognising solely the ground of Ôhuman rightsÕ as according any sort 
of legitimacy. In this burgeoning liberal utopia, popular democracy is rendered 
superfluous because a Ôprivate democracyÕ of each and every one is, instead, 
allowed tacitly to triumph. 
In reality, this utopia is undermined by the irrepressible face of populism, 
or the coagulated voice of that majority who are relative losers to the victors 
in the game of privatised Ômarket democracyÕ. Yet, as a result, all the more 
power eventually accrues to these economic victors who are becoming one 
and the same group with the political oligarchs. For only oligarchic power 
can, in liberal terms, mediate between liberalism and populism through a 
mixture of palliatives and increasingly authoritarian security measures that 
serve to keep populists at bay. 
In this way, the impossible, and, therefore, always oligarchically subverted 
convergence of liberalism and democracy in the West has not only nearly 
extirpated the lingering remnants of the ancient mixed constitution, but also 
destroyed what is best about the liberal and the democratic tradition 
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themselves. For lack of a teleological balance between the two, in terms of a 
discernment of the common good, they tend, rather, towards mutual destruc-
tion, to the accruing benefit of the unacknowledged third foundation, which 
is oligarchy. 
This accrual means that the sophistic culture of spin, PR, focus groups and 
endless media stunts, which has come to dominate Western democracies over 
the last half century, has turned politics into a mass spectacle that makes a 
mockery of democratic representation. Without a genuine debate concerning 
substantive shared values, there can only be market mediation of an anarchy 
of desires Ð of course, ensuring the triumph of a hierarchy of sheer, if subtly 
exercised, force. The hierarchies of liberalism are, in fact, absolute spatial 
hierarchies of fixed power and control rather than organic hierarchies of 
shared purpose that grant dignity, necessity and relative autonomy to persons 
of every degree. Thus one can climb up the ladder of power but only in order 
to displace someone else, exert more of oneÕs own will and ensure that the 
lower rungs are instrumentally subordinated. The purpose of control here is 
simply utility and not the sharing of excellence. 
This is reflected perhaps most clearly in the commitment to social mobility 
as the shibboleth now most beloved of liberals.39 Since the mock-hierarchies 
of liberalism concern the quasi-material organisation of individual or collec-
tive power at the expense of interpersonal relationship and mutual flourishing, 
social mobility is about acquiring transferable skills that enable some young 
people to fetch a better market price and move as far away as possible from 
those they love and know. Of course, most young people will be left behind in 
an ÔedgelandÕ (physically manifest in strips of ragged nature linking bleak 
islands of debased urbanity)40 now further robbed of both identity and guiding 
talent. 
One can contrast the liberal hierarchy of meritocratically justified force and 
competition with certain aspects of traditional and organic notions of hierarchy 
that were in principle less oppressive, albeit in practice insufficiently guarded 
by a more developed sense of personalist democracy against tyrannical 
degeneration Ð although this sense was there in germ. In a traditional hier-
archy, different levels of achievement are not despised, and the criterion for 
being Ôon the topÕ is more architectonic than formally superior or controlling. 
Thus, for example, a literal architect is, indeed, finally in charge, but would be 
impotent without the no less refined skills of the craftsperson or engineer. At 
the same time, as the anthropologist Mary Douglas argued, members of an 
organic hierarchy have a strong sense of belonging and contribution (allowing 
a sense of self-worth and appreciation even to the humblest).41 Meanwhile, 
general needs and complaints can be articulated through known channels of 
representation, extending to the lowest rungs, and it is relatively clear, at every 
level, who is to be held accountable. In contrast, a totally fuzzy 
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and fluid situation (as fatally recommended by many radicals of the 1960s) is 
subject to unhealthy oscillation between anarchic anomie, failures of 
decisiveness, responsibility and representation on the one hand, and extrinsi-
cally enforced alienation and domination by a usurping ÔrepresentativeÕ but 
scarcely accountable force, on the other. 
It is in this respect, just because market relations are themselves fuzzily and 
fluidly competitive and anarchic, that liberalism relies on a secret and brutally 
hierarchical commanding of peopleÕs desires by manipulation. If nothing 
should be desired, then desires can only be forced. And if no desire is ever 
unexampled, or free of imitation, then people can only find out what they 
ÔshouldÕ desire, or even about the possible objects of desire, from the very 
ÔmassÕ processes that are supposed to represent only the generally assumed 
and supposedly unquestionable desires of the people. Thereby, atomistic lib-
eralism turns proper political representation into a spectacle of general mass 
opinion. In liberal democracies, since only what is generally represented is 
regarded as publicly valid, the spectacle of representing always dominates the 
purportedly represented people. This ensures that what they think is always 
just what they are already portrayed as thinking. Thus liberal democracy is 
doomed to specularity: citizens are increasingly reduced to being consumers 
and passive spectators, with the result that the represented themselves only 
represent to themselves the spectacle of representation.42 It was Tocqueville 
who first noted that in America, the freest society on earth, there is least of all 
public debate, and most of all tyranny of conformism to majority tastes and 
preferences.43 
As to the content of public opinion, the same indifference to substantive 
values ensures that often it is the exploitation of opinion that wins the day. 
Thus, increasingly, liberal-democratic politics revolves around a supposed 
guarding against alien elements: the terrorist, the refugee, the foreigner, the 
criminal, the dissident, the welfare-scrounger, the shirker, the spendthrift, the 
non-Ôhard-working familyÕ and those deemed deficient in ÔentrepreneurshipÕ. 
Populism seems more and more to be an inevitable, if ironic, consequence of 
liberal emptiness of purpose and its founding assumption of a reactive ward-
ing off of violence and evil. In consequence, a purported defence of liberal 
democracy is itself deployed in order to justify the suspending of democratic 
decision making and civil liberties. 
So this is not just an extrinsic and reactionary threat to liberal values. On the 
contrary, it is liberalism itself that tends to cancel those values of liberality (fair 
trial, right to a defence, assumed innocence, habeas corpus, a measure of free 
speech and free enquiry, good treatment of the convicted), which it has taken 
over, but which as a matter of historical record it did not invent.44 For the 
principle of liberality, as we have previously indicated, itself derives, rather, 
from Roman and Germanic law transformed by the infusion of the Christian 
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notion of charity, which, in certain dimensions, means a generous giving of 
the benefit of the doubt, as well as succour, even to the accused or wicked. 
These substantive values relate to the dignity of the human person, rather than 
the collective projection of inwardly subjective bias, and to processes of 
relatively egalitarian inter-relating, which are part and parcel of a substantive 
democracy. But liberalism replaces a sense of respect for each person in her 
uniqueness and concrete set of interpersonal and ecological circumstance with 
formalistic, procedural standards that are but a shallow mask for pure power. 
ÔLiberalism puts democracy in crisisÕ, as Marcel Gauchet has said.45 
6. DEMOCRACY UNDERMINES LIBERALISM 
But if there is no real mediation, then the reverse is equally true. Democracy 
also threatens liberal principles such as incontestable property ownership, the 
rule of law and the rights of individuals defined as belonging to a recognised 
minority. Like atomistic liberalism, unqualified democracy has a kind of spa-
tial bias: it supposes that we are all contracting and compromising individuals 
within a sort of eternalised agora. But this is to deny life Ð indeed, it is part of 
the culture of death of which Pope John Paul II spoke Ð for life flows as a 
perpetual glissando through time. Life is not simply democratic, because it is 
both spontaneously creative and giving: with the arrived child, something new 
emerges. We must give to this child nurture, but from the outset the child 
reverses this hierarchy by revealing her unique creative power of response. 
No social contract can be involved here, and for this reason, pure unqualified 
democracy tends to deny the priority of time, the sanctity of life, the 
importance of the child, old age, death and political participation beyond mere 
synchronic procedure. DemocracyÕs ÔnormalÕ person is rather the freely 
choosing and contracting, Audi-owning autonomous 31-year-old. But no 
human person is forever like this; it is, rather, only a moment in a coming to 
be and passing away. 
However, in a further permutation, there can also be a bad modern, liberal 
mode for the dominance of time over space. For it is actually the case that pure 
spatialisation will also tend to subordinate every given spatial form to the 
process of time leading towards the future. But this is not the time of gift: 
rather, the empty time of pointless accumulation of a new spatial hoarding of 
ÔpowerÕ or ÔwealthÕ. Equally, and ironically, it is a time of utilitarian ascetic 
sacrifice, as the great French poet and thinker Charles Pguy pointed out in the 
early twentieth century, to a future perfected happiness that, by definition, will 
never arrive, since the future always remains to come.46 Hence, pure con-
tractual democracy is spatial, and, yet, it also nihilistically evacuates material 
space in favour of an abstract time that is perpetually postponed. 
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Thus by ignoring the time of gift, purely representative democracy fails to 
consider the necessarily constitutive cultural dimension of transmission, 
learning and guided debate. For this it inevitably substitutes a formalism of 
spatial aggregation and temporal agglomeration in such a way that form itself 
must substitute for the removed possibility of content. In consequence, all 
that can finally be voted for is the triumph of the will Ð the collective will, 
which, in order to be ÔcollectivisedÕ without real educative influence or 
debate, must be shaped and led by a secretly or avowedly tyrannical leader-
ship. From Rousseau onwards, the Ôgeneral willÕ and the role of the over-
ruling ÔlegislatorÕ are necessarily linked. 
Liberal, formally representative democracy is therefore self-subversive 
unless qualified by seemingly opposite supplementary factors of both Ôaris-
tocraticÕ guidance and informal and dispersed popular participation. But a 
purely participatory, direct democracy, without representation, is an illusion 
under any conditions, ancient or modern. For, prior to the complex decisions 
made for itself in whatever ways and by whatever means by the multitude, 
there always lie persuasions attempted by the ÔfewÕ Ð historically ranging from 
the local squire and the innovative peasant to the upstart agitator. At the same 
time, the execution of these decisions involves, once again, heteronomous 
interventions by both the ÔoneÕ and the ÔfewÕ, since all cannot attend to the 
business of all, for all of the time. If there are no criteria for the legitimate 
operation of these processes of ÔaristocraticÕ and ÔmonarchicÕ education and 
mediation, then the covert and tyrannically perverted operation of these pro-
cesses will corrupt any ventures in extended democratic participation, which 
most certainly should be promoted and nurtured in the future.47 
For there is simply no truth in the liberal (and Marxist) assumption that, 
once freed from the shackles of oppression, people will Ôby reasonÕ choose 
equality and justice. To the contrary, in the light of a mere reason that is not 
also a vision of the good, an attraction towards it and a faith in its ontological 
possibility, people may well choose to prefer the petty triumphs and supe-
riorities of a brutally hierarchic agon of power. They may opt for the sheer 
excitement of a social spectacle in which potentially there remains always 
the scintilla of a chance that they may themselves be exhibited in triumph Ð a 
chance that appears vastly increased by the allure of social media. This is 
exactly why the vast numbers of the poor in Europe and the United States are 
not waiting to rise up in revolt. 
For a kindred reason, ÔpureÕ democracy would be a mise en abme Ð a 
permanent positioning in the void.48 One would have to have endless Ôpri-
mariesÕ before ÔprimariesÕ in any electoral process. Instead, it is, in reality, 
inescapable that at the end of the line someone always puts herself forward 
as a ÔcandidateÕ (in some sense) and stands up and says something that no 
one has voted on or contractually agreed that she should say. Unelected and 
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spontaneous ÔofferingÕ, besides informal reciprocity, always precedes both 
organised choice and official contract. The reason is that no formal pre-
arrangements can entirely control the content of what we propose to others in 
our words and symbolic actions, which inevitably sway them in a certain 
fashion. In the United States, part of the problem is that there is a yearning 
for the madness of pure democracy: thus, for example, there is no Ômonar-
chicÕ body that organises boundaries of voting districts, because this would 
be considered ÔundemocraticÕ. In consequence, this task is left to the reigning 
political parties, and the resultant gerrymandering is seen as just a fact of life. 
In this way, the lure of the democratic abyss abolishes democracy, whereas 
some admission of ÔaristocraticÕ and ÔmonarchicÕ principles (as in Britain, 
Australia and Canada Ð at least hitherto) actually secures the space of its 
possibility. 
It is precisely the destruction of this space that has plunged Western 
democracy into its metacrisis. The same abyss exerts its fascination when 
governments obfuscate the irreducible moment of extra-democratic final 
executive decision, which they should be obliged to take responsibility for. 
This has been done in the name of appealing to Ôopinion-soundingsÕ that 
purport to gauge not just what the people want (as though this were a pre-
influenced ÔgivenÕ) but more crucially what they will permit a government to 
get away with. Such apparent sensitivity to public opinion, in reality, subverts 
democracy, because it fails to acknowledge that democracy operates through 
an exchange of trust that also exceeds an impossible ÔabsoluteÕ democracy. A 
government has been trusted to take its own decisions on the basis of justice 
and integrity, precisely because the electorate has previously endorsed its 
general principles, record and ethical character. No plebiscitary process of 
whatever kind can displace this ÔmonarchicÕ need for self-grounded decision 
taken under some overarching oath or covenant with the people that goes 
beyond mass opinion and majority decision. The reason is that the people can 
never collectively be placed in the exact position that an executive power 
should occupy: of being (ideally) of the right human type, having enjoyed the 
right experience, receiving the right information, being able as an individual or 
small-group mind to arrive at a complex conclusion on the basis of complex 
reasoning. Alongside the contemporary subversion of legislation and 
democracy by the executive, therefore, one can also (and with no contradic-
tion) detect a subversion of the executiveÕs own true function. 
For if a government pretends not to decide, or not to have to decide, it will 
always, in reality, decide in a disguised way through manipulation of opinion, 
or the following of the most debased mass opinion, or else of the course that it 
can most easily get away with. And where a government has no sense that it 
has a duty to decide for justice and the long-term national and global good that 
is in excess of democratic norms, its horizon for decision will be only 
Milbank and Pabst_9781783486489.indb 197 5/31/2016 3:20:32 PM 
The Metacrisis of Democracy 197 
that of increasing its own power and influence. Today, party-political and 
corporate-capitalist concerns have largely displaced that long-term linking by 
a political class of its own interests with that of the nation as a whole as 
recommended by Hume and Burke.49 
It is, above all, this necessary pandering to a populism that it has itself 
both provoked and promoted that tends to ensure that a government theoreti-
cally guided by the lodestar of pure democracy will override the interests of 
minorities and the protection of individual freedom of conscience. By con-
trast, it is government that retains a sense of its extra-democratic duty to take 
just decisions that will tend to try to balance the desires of majorities with the 
legitimate interests of groups and individuals. For this reason, one needs to 
see the frightening rise of untrammelled central power not only in terms of a 
democratic deficit, but also in the sense of a liberal deficit. By that we mean 
not the more limited, ego-based liberalism of a Locke or a J.S. Mill, but, 
rather, a much older concern for ÔliberalityÕ Ð for a generous balancing of the 
claims of individuals with those of the collective and a respect for cautious 
procedures that tend to inhibit arbitrariness. All this has to do with extra-, but 
not anti-democratic, considerations about the nature of honourable and 
decisive ruling. 
Just for this reason, what, for liberals, is the anomalous contradiction that 
the British Prime Minister is at once the representative of a popular mandate 
and, yet, the mediator of the sovereign power of the Crown, is, in reality, an 
advantage. It holds together the executive with the legislative function, just 
as it traditionally combines royal council with popular representation. The 
latter had been primarily extended, during early modernity, in England as in 
France, not as the result of baronial or popular struggle, but as a function of 
the better operation of royal power itself. This representative council was 
also a court (again like the French parlements), thereby also ensuring that the 
judicial, interpretative function can share in the legislative function. Tony 
BlairÕs ill-conceived reform that removed the Law Lords from the upper 
house has therefore destroyed a vital link between legislature and judiciary. 
In consequence, the novel and unnecessary British Supreme Court has 
become a temple to the new common law constitutionalism, which is actu-
ally a common law foundationalism, increasingly and bizarrely merged with 
a foundationalism of ÔrightsÕ that are regarded as immune to either precedent 
or equity. 
Both the prime ministerial and the lordly judicial function can, at least in 
principle, inhibit the erosion of liberality by democracy. For not only does 
the link to the Crown tend to uphold the need for government to take deci-
sions and to take full responsibility for those decisions. It should also tend to 
ensure a greater attention to continuity of political and social projects 
grounded in long-term and well-sifted, implicit and widely shared (and so 
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truly democratic) desires. This occurs beyond the see-sawing vagaries of 
electoral politics, which can often mean too much chopping and changing 
and too little radical reforming ambition as to the projects that get proposed 
and pursued Ð think of the endless top-down re-organisation of health care or 
education without ever tackling the structural problems of a lack of excel-
lence, ethos and vocation. 
Somewhat in the same fashion, the idea that the same people, the Law 
Lords, may both vote on legislation and apply it in practice is not some sort of 
corrupting anomaly, but, rather, a salve against the ultimately false division of 
legislation from applicative judgement. Such a division favours the 
conceiving of law as impersonal rationalistic rule without exception, or alter-
natively, the conceiving of court judgement as mere inflexible application of a 
past decision, not regarded as implying any latent germ of general principle or 
as imbued with the original spirit rather than letter of statute Ð as for the false, 
Coke-recension of the common law legacy. It is, to the contrary, a boon to 
have, at the apex of the legal system, men and women who are themselves 
involved with legislation that must attend to first principles, to natural law and 
an ethical horizon. Such an intertwining of functions can then somewhat 
percolate down the whole legal hierarchy. Inversely, the involvement of leg-
islators in judgement can help to ensure that law envisages from the outset 
some of the complexities of application in specific situations and to specific 
persons. It is in part for this reason that the House of Lords has often proved 
such a good Ð and liberal and democratic Ð amender of laws proposed by the 
lower chamber. 
So when unqualified by more objective considerations concerning a con-
tinuous pursuit of the common good, liberalism and democracy tend to under-
mine each other. In consequence, taken together, the unstable hybrid Ôliberal 
democracyÕ engenders, instead, an oligarchic simulacrum of the necessary and 
unavoidable influence of Ôthe fewÕ and the decisions of Ôthe oneÕ. In order to 
resist this oligarchy, one cannot simply appeal to Ôpure democracyÕ, since this 
appeal is just what leads, dialectically, to the oligarchic decay. Rather, one 
must seek, in various and unpredictable ways, to re-invent genuine executive 
and judicial functions in close proximity to the legislative. 
7. LIBERAL POLITICS AS CAPITALISM 
But how does our analysis of the metacrisis of democracy relate to our earlier 
analysis of the metacrisis of capitalism? 
Central, of course, to liberal democracyÕs recent self-corruption has been 
its response to 9/11, as already indicated. By launching a Ôglobal war on ter-
rorÕ, Western countries have declared a Ôstate of exceptionÕ and suspended 
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core constitutional provisions such as habeas corpus in order to protect the 
constitution from what they believe to be an existential threat.50 But when the 
executive decrees the Ôstate of exceptionÕ, the conceptual difference between 
democracy and tyranny enters a zone of Ôin-distinctionÕ where formal demo-
cratic structures remain in place, but the lived differences between democratic 
and despotic rule begin to dissolve. The fundamental reason is that modern 
sovereign power blends the juridical-constitutional model of state sovereignty 
with the Ôbio-politicalÕ conception of power in terms of domination over life 
itself, thereby ensuring at once that such life, including human life, may be 
granted exclusively ÔcivilÕ or ÔhumanÕ rights, or else be denied even its natural 
given existence through brutality or destruction.51 
Such a conception, it could be said, represents the rising to the surface of 
the very deepest stratum of liberal assumption. This concerns at once the 
primacy of the natural Ð ÔgivenÕ amoral liberty, ÔgivenÕ pleasure-seeking and 
pain avoidance, ÔgivenÕ power-seeking Ð and, yet, its sharp division from the 
cultural order. Aporetically, the latter is later and less fundamental with 
respect to subjective ÔrightÕ. Yet, at the same time, it is in practice prior and 
all-consuming, since only by supposed Hobbesian contractual aggregation 
and mutual tempering of natural forces can ÔrightÕ be recognised or enforced 
at all. In this way, exclusively civil right, denying real natural law, is, never-
theless, ironically nothing but raw, amoral nature, compounded and mythi-
cally validated as ÔLeviathanÕ. The self-identity of this beast is naturally and 
anarchically forceful, and, yet, by this very token, its entire aim and raison 
dÕtre is artificially to dominate and alter Ôall other natureÕ, especially the 
biosphere. This then plays out, for example, in the genetic manipulation and 
patenting of crops, or, equally, the various compounded attempts to unharness 
all links between human sexuality and procreation. The fact that few people 
worry about the de-personalising implications of removing children from 
specifically human and gender-reciprocal origins in physically mediated 
elective love is a sign of just how far extraordinary and peculiar liberal 
assumptions are now seen as unremarkable. 
In consequence, one has to go further than simply observing that both 
liberal democracy and capitalism are governed by the same basic dialectical 
tension. It is true that capitalism oscillates between accumulative expansion 
and over-accumulative contraction, just as democracy oscillates between 
constitutionally guaranteed popular sovereignty and constitutionally sanc-
tioned absolute sovereign power exercised by the executive alone. But, in 
reality, there is something far more fundamental than this dialectical process 
at work. For this reason one has to move from the perspective of crisis to that 
of metacrisis. 
Both democracy and capitalism claim that unity emerges naturally out of 
multiplicity. The argument is that a natural multitude of rival individual 
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egos will somehow produce a single artificial order, either based on a social 
contract (Hobbes and Locke) or via pre-contractual innate passions of sym-
pathy and benevolence (Smith and, in some sense, Rousseau). In either case, 
the violence of competing self-interest is regulated by appeals to self-
preservation, but this original violence also needs policing via the law (Carl 
Schmitt) and the central state monopoly on the legitimate use of physical 
force (Max Weber). So from Hobbes via Locke, Kant and Rousseau to 
Weber and Schmitt, modern biopolitics has not just extended political power 
to all areas of natural and human life but also, according to a logic just out-
lined, subordinated the sacredness of life to state and market power, thereby 
reducing life to Ôbare lifeÕ. Similarly, capitalism splits the naturally symbolic 
combination of thing and sign as ÔgiftÕ through a symbolic abstraction and 
materialisation. The dominant modern conceptual dualities and ideological 
paradigms have, indeed, at every level entered a zone of Ôin-distinctionÕ 
where nominal differences remain in place, but where real boundaries vanish 
Ð between the state and the market, ÔleftÕ and ÔrightÕ, mere nature and pure 
artifice, democracy and despotism. 
In the face of the liberal slide into a new form of democratic despotism, it is 
now the hour to recall the classical tradition, which tended to predict just such 
a slide of a ÔdemocraticÕ ethos into tyranny. It recognised that no complex 
polity can avoid the interplay of decision, advice and assent. As we have seen, 
where the co-constitutive role of the first two is denied, they are perverted in 
the hypocritical name of the third which then in consequence itself loses its 
role and integrity. Tyranny is the oppressive rule of the ÔoneÕ and the ÔfewÕ that 
follows upon the spurious claim to rule only in the name of the ÔmanyÕ. As the 
next chapter suggests, it is not liberalism that can offer more genuine 
representation, but rather a renewal of mixed constitution. 
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Chapter 6 
The Mixed Constitution Alternative 
1. RENEWING MIXED GOVERNMENT 
We have seen that, in order to meet the metacrisis of liberal democracy, 
Western politics needs to return to certain older themes of its constitutionalist 
legacy, but for radical and not reactionary reasons. 
A mixed constitution outflanks in advance the tendency of liberal democra-
cies to oscillate between debased popular will on the one hand, and the power 
of the executive allied to the oligarchic interests of a few, on the other. Even 
today, despite much erosion of the WestÕs best traditions, freedom under the 
law and public cooperation offers resources potentially to create a polity that 
pluralises politics and extends the public realm beyond the modern duality of 
the state versus private association. Such a civic covenant might encompass 
the peoples and nations within and across different countries, in a double 
refusal of both autonomous nationalism and suppression of regional identities 
and self-government. 
As we have seen, what is missing from liberal democracy is the crucial 
mediation of Ôthe fewÕ Ð virtuous inspirers and architectonic leaders that act 
honourably and lead by example in all sectors of society, in natural alliance 
with the diverse corporate groups that they tend to embody. For the problem 
is not exactly ÔelitismÕ, but rather our dominance by technocratic and 
monopolising elites. What we need, instead, is more genuine elites (at every 
level and in very field) who operate not through the attempted manipulation 
of individuals, but, rather, via the educative influence of persons and groups 
who are, thereby, inducted into the further exercise of their own creative 
capacities. Freedom is not a given, but, instead, a gift that can be provided 
for all and in diverse ways through the right processes of formation. 
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So an enhanced role for Ôthe fewÕ does not merely concern that of virtuous, 
rather than corrupt, elites. It also concerns the relative self-government of 
regions, minority groups and free associations. This should occur not just in 
their own interests and in terms of their own natural rights, but also in terms of 
what they can, thereby, contribute by example and influence to the political 
whole. For this whole is properly thought of as a dynamic synthesis rather than 
as a given totality or top-down imposition. Its architectonic rule should emerge 
and be elicited from the subordinate diversity itself, rather than being abstractly 
forced upon a passive or recalcitrant social body. 
For this reason, mixed government involves not the separation but, rather, 
the organic cooperation of powers at the centre. Whereas separation only 
compounds the dominance of the executive, while yet sterilising the potency 
of the centre, organic cooperation involves a balancing of central with local 
power. But such balancing provides a mutual check without eventual state 
usurpation only if there is also the sense of a symbiotic shared operation. 
In its current predicament, Britain and other Western countries require new 
constitutional settlements that recover the natural link of mixed government with 
modern traditions of sovereign pluralism and federalism. Whether at the level of 
over-centralised states such as the United Kingdom, France and Spain, or at the 
level of supranational groupings such as the European Union, what is needed is 
the equivalent of Royal Commissions or constitutional conventions with strong 
parliamentary and popular involvement tasked with setting out a complete re-
balancing of power between capitals on the one hand and localities and regions on 
the other hand. Transforming the centralised, unitary state into a federalised, 
plural polity would carry through the logic of devolution based on the principle of 
subsidiarity, which means locating powers at the level that is most appropriate for 
the dignity and flourishing of the person. This tends to be in lower tiers such as 
regional or local government, neighbourhood councils and even the parish level, 
but it can, of course, require action at higher levels of supranational and global 
institutions for problems such as migration, cross-border crime, terrorism, 
environmental devastation and financial regulation. Thus devolution inwards, 
properly understood, also entails, as its logical inverse, extension outwards. Over 
time, this requires a much greater international involvement on the part of 
traditionally reluctant countries, above all the United Kingdom. 
2. MIXED GOVERNMENT AND PLURALISM 
Beyond the Secular Settlement of Left versus Right 
Historically, much of Western politics was a battle between a Conservative 
and right-wing advocacy of Ôthe oneÕ and a Liberal and left-wing advocacy 
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of Ôthe manyÕ Ð even if right and left can sometimes change places in this 
respect. By contrast, as we have already seen, ÔsocialismÕ was not originally 
situated on this spectrum at all.1 It rejected the ÔconservatismÕ of those who 
advocated a return to the entirely modern, unity-obsessed, technocratic and 
ÔspectacularÕ ancien rgime, but also criticised the new tyranny of liberal 
industrial modernity, obsessively concerned with the emancipation of the dis-
persed ÔmanyÕ. For this reason, it tended to resurrect, yet democratise, the role 
of Ôthe fewÕ Ð skilled elites in different crafts and professions that can uphold 
ethos and excellence, alongside the self-government and self-organisation for 
shared ends of trades and localities.2 Socialists like G.D.H. Cole argued for a 
more radical version of mixed constitution that properly democratises the 
entire economy through the interplay of participation, advice with foresight 
and overall coordination at many different levels.3 The original Labour 
movement in Britain, thereby, sought to develop the best surviving traditions 
of mixed government by building a more plural and organic commonwealth 
through a more democratic and egalitarian rendering of English and cognate 
Celtic traditions. 
This means that, in seeking alternatives to liberal democracy, we need to be 
critical about the secular settlement of both left and right. They exist in a 
liberal space, which attempts a bipolar subversion of ancient tripartition Ð 
suppressing the role of the few in the name of a suspension between the one 
and the many. The tension between left and right makes sense only within this 
subversion and suspension. Thus it typically concerns the irresolvable tension 
between the freedom of the individual and mass decision, the primacy of the 
political unity versus economic variety, and the class tension between 
oligarchic and mass forces. Each of these poles can and has presented itself in 
either Ôleft-Õ or Ôright-wingÕ guises. Socialist and associationist alternatives 
need, therefore, to think outside this shared paradigm concealed by a 
supposedly absolute opposition. And that means recovering in a new mode 
the ancient tripartition. 
Restoring the Rule of the Personal 
The three elements of antique mixed constitution Ð monarchy, aristocracy and 
democracy Ð tend to be more ÔpersonallyÕ mediated by representatives who 
also attend to the needs and flourishing of people in their personal 
peculiarities by ÔeconomisingÕ their rule in a ÔpastoralÕ fashion beyond the 
mere imposition of legal edicts. Today, renewed personal rule, in refusal of 
the increasingly inflexible reign of an often prissy normativity, can therefore 
blend, in a likewise equitable fashion, the social, the political and the eco-
nomic. The Christian version of this rule in a sense revived and universalised 
the ancestral local, tribal wisdom of reciprocity that confirmed its social rule 
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by personal proposal or offering with regular (economic) circulation and 
democratic (political) acceptance. In this manner, it intensified the personal 
dimension by combining it with the symbolic in requiring that the voice of the 
guiding king or aristocrat be also the voice of the representative of the people. 
For with the new prominence given to the theological virtues of faith, hope and 
charity, which all can exercise (unlike Homeric military prowess, or 
Aristotelian magnanimity of the noble and wealthy), the voice of the people is 
now regarded, not as ÔcorrectÕ by entitlement, but rather as proximate to the 
truth through wide consensus and harmony of dispersed practice. 
As Krzysztof KieślowskiÕs film Blue suggests, liberty, equality and 
fraternity, if they are to escape liberal aporias, require a grounding in the 
Ôtheological virtuesÕ. For, in order to pursue justice, we must believe that the 
discovery and implementation of justice is objectively possible, just as we 
must believe in the reality of the human spirit and hope that all the capacities 
of each and every human spirit will eventually be fulfilled. If this faith Ð in 
the sense of trust (pistis, in Plato) Ð is justified, then ÔfraternityÕ will prove 
more than a vain sentimental gesture through the realisation of charity in 
human reconciliation. 
These beliefs and hopes undergird the longer-term practice of represen-
tative government in the Western legacy precisely because it is personally 
mediated. Right up to the nineteenth century, almost everyone assumed that 
all human rule, of whatever kind (including the most democratic), was by 
Ôdivine rightÕ.4 Legitimate government must govern and judge in the name of 
the good and not merely in the name of the people. Popular mediation of the 
divine will was seen as essential, otherwise the sovereign (however con-
stituted) might rule in the name of all-too-acceptable evil, or more probably 
in the name of its own manipulations of the popular voice. At the same time, 
legitimate government submits in various ways to the peopleÕs judgement in 
terms of its own discernment of the nature of goodness. 
This can sound less democratic than our current assumptions, but, in real-
ity, it far more safeguards the real exercise of the democratic component of 
representation. For without any belief in the legitimation of authority through 
participation in the good, the inevitable ÔalienationÕ of power exercised by 
representatives can only be self-interested and must augment the entrench-
ment of an oligarchic class. Since that which is ÔproposedÕ to an electorate is 
not itself democratically decided, without the shared ÔthirdÕ horizon of 
discernment of the public good, the only common language between rep-
resented and representatives must be one of naked power. Accordingly, the 
competitive tension between the government and people becomes, in prin-
ciple, irresolvable, such that genuinely democratic conversation, rather than 
warfare by the other means of language, is rendered impossible. Where this 
conversation is truly nurtured by dialectical and educative discernment of the 
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truth, it should become far more possible to escape the ironic limits of faction 
and work towards a genuine political representation of the entire social body in 
all its corporate diversity. In this manner, we can begin to address those 
neglected if widely perceived issues of environment, poverty, transport, for-
mative education, crime and so forth, which are for now perpetually relegated 
to second place and so in practice never really dealt with. 
Constitutional Corporatism 
As we saw in the previous chapter, pluralism is subtly falsified if it does not 
allow, in an Aristotelian spirit, that the overall political formation is always 
already there, or at least anticipated. For this reason, the organicism of 
pluralism and the organicism of the political whole as a mixed constitution 
naturally hang together. As we also saw, autonomous and democratically 
self-governing associations Ð in their dispersed and plural ÔfewnessÕ Ð 
combine in a microcosm the virtuous guidance of Ôthe oneÕ with the assent of 
Ôthe manyÕ around shared notions of excellence and ethos. 
Inversely, given the natural combination of the two organicisms, neither 
representative nor associative democracy will work except under the cara-
pace of a sense of government as ultimately answerable to the Ôdivine rightÕ 
of objective justice. That must be secured by an executive monarchy or 
presidency in combination with the judicial role of the wise who need not 
necessarily be formally elected in order to be counted as representative. 
Ineluctably, this group is an auto-forming and self-reproducing ÔclubÕ.5 But 
to see only danger in this truth is to overlook its necessity and non-
preventability, since we all live in time and must first be inducted before we 
can decide for ourselves. To be sure, this process is habitually subject to 
corruption, but then that is partly why it is so crucial that all education (as the 
Ciceronian tradition insisted) be allied to formation in virtue. Just this extra-
democratic communicative and shaping process through time paradoxically 
enables the democratic element and its extension. 
It does so in three ways: first, by better guarding against propagandistic 
manipulation of opinion than liberal representation, which is readily capturable 
by oligarchic interest; second, by reminding us that democratic debate should 
be an attempt to discern the objective truth and not an airing of arbitrary 
emotions or prevailing prejudice and finally, by helping to sustain and shape 
spaces for popular involvement and participation outside the increasingly 
warped mode of formal representation. In negative confirmation of this thesis, 
one can note that the purer, more liberal and revolutionary democracy of the 
United States is deficient, at least at national and state levels in terms of 
democratic involvement, liberty of opinion, freedom of the individual, security 
of the citizen, welfare provision, humane punishment and social equality. 
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But neither the recognition of group rights nor the supplementation of 
representative democracy by corporatist and monarchic-aristocratic gov-
ernance by any means implies a neglect of individual rights. Rather, in order 
to avoid a slide into Ôdemocratic despotismÕ, it is necessary to defend 
individual rights in more ÔpersonalistÕ terms, which regard the individual not 
in isolation, but as the most basic rung in a subsidiarist vision that is in 
continuity with older ÔdistributistÕ notions of dignity and honour.6 The need 
to defend the individual person sometimes formed the basis of a radical 
popular argument for monarchic as against merely aristocratic power: the one 
must sometimes defend the many against the virtuous few turned corruptly 
oligarchic. 
This is one of the reasons why alternatives to Ôdemocratic despotismÕ may 
in fact involve, in the British case, a strengthened role for the Crown taken in 
the abstract,7 or its equivalent in a republican system. The monarchy remains 
divided today between a more authentic, if elusive, role of ultimate guardian-
ship, and a danger that it will be entirely recruited by the capitalist market 
spectacle and the liberal state machine and so reduced to a largely ceremonial 
kitsch function.8 The latter development could help spell the end of democ-
racy, whereas the former shelters an alternative future in which monarchy or 
Republican presidency could play a role in constantly mediating between 
mass participation and virtuous leadership, as between populist causes and 
minority interests and concerns. Some of Prince CharlesÕ interventions in 
public debate have demonstrated a sense of this possibility. 
The Gift of Rule 
To say all this is to ask that we subordinate also political contract to reci-
procity or gift. A government may be contractually legitimate as elected and 
its laws may be legitimate as proceeding from sovereign powers, and yet 
engender tyranny Ð as the Nazi and Fascist examples show. So beyond this 
formalism, which can only think of the people as a compounded mass of 
individuals, it needs to be supposed that truth (to the degree that it is already 
perceived and embodied) usually lies with the people in a more dispersed and 
variegated way. Different people and different groups have diverse talents 
and insights Ð these they effectively share for the good of the whole body 
politic. It is in keeping with these dispersed roles and functions that the 
people should variously proffer the fruits of their insight and talent to the 
sovereign representatives who act in their name and, thereby, enjoy proper 
popular assent. Just as a gift is a thing as well as a sign, so also a chain of 
personal relations is equally an organic compound of things, works and 
instruments, even though an organic whole is not ÔclosedÕ to further relation, 
like a collective aggregation. 
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Inversely, the sovereign power must think of itself as acting reciprocally 
and distributing gifts Ð gifts of ordering and nurturing, not simply as imposing 
a fiat in order to expand the utility and productiveness of a nation-state and its 
people. This is an outrageous notion Ð for example, the view of successive 
governments that Britain should only accept skilled or exploitable immigrants 
and refugees who can increase national output Ð often at the consequent 
expense of indigenous citizens whose potential is neglected. A government 
that gives must rather pursue the intrinsic fulfilment of its citizens and resi-
dents. To rule in this way means that the ÔsubjectsÕ of rule can participate in 
the ruling and can appropriate its task to themselves. To be thus properly ruled 
renders them, indeed, ÔsubjectsÕ even in the ontological sense since, thereby, 
something is proposed to them that can form their own good if they respond to 
it. And no one is self-originated or self-possessing. 
So to be a subject of a ÔcrownÕ is actually a more radical idea than to be a 
citizen of a republic in the contractualist sense of Rousseau (though not in the 
ancient Roman, or aspects of the modern French or American, sense). For the 
liberal citizen is a natural individual before the State comes into being, and a 
citizen only as co-composing the state. This means that she is always 
implicitly threatened by Ôthe state of the exceptionÕ and Ôbare lifeÕ.9 If she 
lapses back into being a natural individual like the denizens of Guantnamo 
Bay, she now lacks all human dignity. This will only be granted to her as long 
as the contractual co-composition of the state holds good. 
By contrast, if there is, metaphorically speaking, a Ôconstitutional monarchyÕ 
(we are not advocating its adoption everywhere in the literal sense), then 
according to natural law and not just natural right, the sovereign authority is 
only ÔsubjectingÕ human beings because it is obliged to offer them the gift of 
good and just coordination of diverse talents and needs. St Paul de-sacralised 
and redefined human rule as only concerned with justice and not with the 
totemic protection of religious power or a sacrally bounded domain (all termini 
being in origin sacred).10 Hence, no human animal can fall outside this 
beneficent subjecting (in principle), which is in excess of contract. For this 
reason, the Christian principles of polity stand totally opposed to any idea of 
the Ônation-stateÕ as the ultimate unit, and, rather, favour at once natural pre-
given persons, ÔregionsÕ and nations (not defined by statehood) on the one 
hand, and the universal human megalopolis on the other. This positive feature 
of ÔmonarchyÕ does not, of course, mean that the ÔmonarchicÕ power should not 
be in some sense always elected or proclaimed. To the contrary, it should be 
regarded as able to give rule because it has, in part, first been constituted by the 
mass donation of varied talents and points of view. 
Reciprocity or gift-exchange is a particular mode of politics. Its spontaneous 
formation of an ethos and of tacit conventions restricts, without entirely 
removing, the need for the operation of codified and enforceable law. 
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Monarchy in some sense enters into the picture here, because mass popular 
movements, along with the centralising ambitions of Ôthe fewÕ can tend to 
subvert the more genuine operation of local participatory democracy. Here the 
function of a somewhat ÔtranscendentÕ single power should be to secure, 
uphold and intervene occasionally in favour of the subsidiary dispersal of 
power to its levels of appropriate exercise Ð of which Prince CharlesÕs various 
charitable trusts are a certain example. In this manner, the function of the rule 
of Ôthe oneÕ that we are invoking runs against, rather than in support of, the 
modern doctrinal and practical upholding of an absolute sovereign centre. The 
latter tends to ensure that even a supposed rule of the many Ð Ôthe sovereignty 
of the peopleÕ Ð is, in reality, an over-emphatic rule of the one. 
The following sections attempt to describe post-liberal constitutionalism in 
more detail, using the example of the United Kingdom. Parallel examples 
and proposals could be taken from and applied to other countries, but we 
have already seen why the reworking of BritainÕs apparent constitutional out-
datedness may be especially relevant to the renewal of the human political 
future. 
3. A NEW FEDERAL SETTLEMENT 
Britain, one can argue, has never been an unqualified nation-state and never 
completely acquired the crucial marks of modern statehood Ð the sovereignty 
of the people, citizenship, ÔpoliceÕ control by the state, juridical formalism, 
state-administered finance and civil politeness.11 (The absence of the latter 
may be why the British are still so cheerfully rude and robust in debate.) 
Instead, even the British empire Ð as earlier the Spanish Ð arose in continuity 
with its medieval empire, where a group of diverse local territories, ethnicities 
and cultures was already held together, albeit in problematic and endlessly 
contested fashion, by a common set of symbolic loyalties. Even after the rise 
of a monarchic absolutism, in considerable consequence of the KingÕs 
appropriation of headship of the English church, Tudor statecraft, far from 
straightforwardly inaugurating state centralism, often extended royal reach by 
supporting the relative independence of local and vocational institutions: by 
giving the Greenwich Maritime College land and authority, by enabling the 
Royal Exchange in the City of London to compete with Amsterdam, and by 
endowing both KingÕs College and Trinity College in Cambridge with 
specific professorships in key sciences in order to catch up with the European 
Continent Ð as Maurice Glasman has argued. 
It was not otherwise in France, where absolutism was initially less in evi-
dence by virtue of the continued allegiance of the Church to the Pope. From 
Francis I onwards, the Valois and then the Bourbon kings administered their 
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terrains more efficiently by bolstering the power and prestige of local corpo-
rations and parlements Ð whose functions as we have seen, extended, 
contrary to myth, to legislative and executive as well as judicial functions.12 
Today, this early modern legacy points to the importance of a strategic state 
that can endow localities and restore vocations, such as regional and city 
banks or specifically orientated technical colleges. Yet, with the irreversible 
decline of the modern nation-state, it also needs to do so in a more neo-
medieval spirit, prepared truly to share sovereignty in a federated manner 
with regions, corporations and adjacent foreign territories, as in the case of 
the European nations and the European Union. 
In the case of the British Isles (in the long term not excluding the already 
troubled Eire, lacking sufficient influence over a London whose dominance it 
cannot really escape), this implies the need for a new, overarching federal set-
tlement. Such a settlement cannot be a top-down, Ôone-size-fits-allÕ construct 
by the Westminster elites, nor conformable to a liberal formalist fairness that 
just does not fit the complex facts, but has to reflect the countryÕs diversity. 
Transforming Local Government 
The starting point for a new constitutional arrangement that can revive 
democracy in Britain is a renewal of local government, which has been 
emasculated for decades Ð losing many of its traditional responsibilities for 
education, health, housing, transport and much besides. With the exception 
of London, it has been reduced to little more than a managerialist bureau-
cracy.13 Self-government of towns and cities should happen for all parts of 
the United Kingdom, including Scotland and Wales, where devolved powers 
do not provide sufficient opportunities for greater local autonomy and 
popular participation. 
Britain needs to establish a system of mixed government also at the local 
level by way of the following three transformations. 
The first would strengthen the microcosmic rule of Ôthe oneÕ through the 
introduction of directly elected mayors. London mayoral elections have 
revived democratic debate not just in Greater London but nationally. In 
France, there are nearly 37,000 mayors in 13 regions (following President 
HollandeÕs 2014 reforms), and mayors are by far the most popular politicians 
across the country, including those from the mainstream parties Ð even 
though they are not directly elected but, rather, stand in local elections as the 
heads of party lists. 
The second transformation of local government relates to the microcosmic 
role of Ôthe fewÕ. Currently, the dominant model combines a politically 
powerless council with an increasingly managerialist bureaucracy. Councils 
are run like quasi-companies by CEO-type figures (on six-figure salaries) 
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who focus on short-term results for their supporters rather than long-term 
outcomes for the locality as a whole. The alternative is to create a bicameral 
model, with the local assembly functioning as the lower house that represents 
democracy locational and a newly established upper house that represents 
democracy vocational. The natural institution to fulfil the latter role is the old 
guildhall that still exists in many towns and cities across Britain. An expanded 
version would allow all the professions and trades to be represented and to 
contribute to local decision making, including key decisions about levels of 
taxation and spending. 
Taken together, directly elected mayors and a bi-cameral assembly would 
be a better institutional platform on which to locate place-based public sector 
spending, and integrate the competing and conflicting arms of the central 
state that rules over cities and localities.14 For such a new structure to work 
one would require the merging of existing wasteful overheads and the 
pooling of resources into a single fund whence decisions and spending can be 
re-directed in ways that address different needs in different contexts Ð 
housing, transport, skills, mental health, education. Key to this are new ways 
of combining bottom-up, community-based solutions with larger-scale 
models of delivery Ð for example, by bringing together voluntary associa-
tions and social enterprises under the guidance of the mayor, the assembly 
and local civil servants. In this manner, local government neither provides all 
services, nor outsources them to the cheapest for-profit supplier, but, rather, 
promotes mutualist arrangements by connecting and coordinating different 
providers and stakeholders. 
The third transformation of local government aims to strengthen the micro-
cosmic rule of Ôthe manyÕ by giving citizens a much greater say over how 
their representatives are elected and how they are governed. Here we suggest 
open primaries for candidates in both mayoral and municipal elections and 
town-hall meetings (at the appropriate level) where residents can put forward 
suggestions about key priorities (not unlike participatory budgets in certain 
cities, such as Porto Alegre).15 
Devolution to Regional Assemblies 
In addition to the transformation of local government, Britain requires real 
regionalism if she is to become more democratic Ð including city-regions 
where appropriate (as for Manchester, Liverpool, Birmingham, Bristol and 
Newcastle) that help reconnect urban spaces to their rural surroundings. This 
is true not only for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland where politicians in 
the capital cities denounce the elites in Westminster while concentrating 
powers in their own hands. Above all, it applies to England whose regions 
currently lack any proper constitutional recognition and political status. 
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As to devolution to either counties or regions, it is wise to remain some-
what agnostic. England is much smaller than France and, therefore, has been 
less naturally divided into regions, but, rather, into smaller units, the coun-
ties, which all refract a decidedly English identity. Yet, at the same time, the 
sense and reality of county identity has today somewhat lapsed in favour of 
a broader sense of region, which itself has an earlier historical root in the 
Anglo-Saxon kingdoms of Northumberland, Mercia, East Anglia, Wessex 
and the yet smaller kingdoms of the South East. These roughly correspond 
to the regional divisions from 1994 and operate some dissolved political 
functions. 
In addition, any realisation of some parity in terms of self-government 
between England and the Celtic nations, which the English will understand-
ably demand following the granting of Scottish home rule, has to occur at the 
level of substantive population blocks. For it to occur at the level of England 
as a whole would probably destroy the Union and would not be compatible 
with demographic asymmetry. At the level of population, though not to the 
same degree at the level of cultural identity, the English regions have, 
therefore, to be considered the equivalent of the Celtic national areas. 
Attachment to them is quietly stronger than might be apparent, and resistance 
to regional assemblies is more likely to do with indifference to party-
dominated political processes than to ancient areas. The trick then is to 
ÔpoliticiseÕ existing cultural attachments and this could readily arise if 
regional assemblies became speedily associated with local pride, increased 
economic development and popular involvement in shaping regional char-
acter. It can also be added here that, however desirable city-regions may 
sometimes be, they can run the risk of a local metropolitan overriding of the 
many middle-sized towns that tend to form the chains of conurbations, 
especially in the north of England. 
4. CROWN AND POLITY 
Amidst a crisis of trust in public institutions such as political parties, parlia-
ment, the press and the police, in the United Kingdom the generally still 
trusted and admired monarchy can potentially shelter some new forms of 
popular political, social and economic involvement and participation beyond 
formal representation. However, today as already said, the British monarchy 
remains divided between two rival roles: an authentic traditional role of 
holding elected politicians to the higher standard of the common good both 
symbolically and by private admonition on the one hand, and a danger that a 
mere ÔdignityÕ of the royal family is too easily co-opted by the capitalist 
spectacle and the liberal state machine, on the other. It can be argued that if 
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the latter role prevails, then the monarchy should be abolished, but that there 
may lurk a radical potential in the former. 
Constitutional Monarchy and Parliamentary Democracy 
For liberals, the separation of powers between the three branches of govern-
ment provides the most effective limit on any form of political absolutism. 
But constitutional monarchy, or a republican presidential equivalent (as in 
France), can achieve this aim to a superior degree. Just as royal powers have 
in the past come to be restrained by parliament, so too the King in Parliament 
can today operate as an inverse check on the democratic despotism of the 
elected executive. For the constitutional monarch to whom the Prime Minister 
and his government is answerable stands for a deeper principle than that of the 
elected politician Ð the endurance of BritainÕs four nations in unity and time 
from the past and into the future beyond any electoral cycle and short-term 
factional or ideological interests. The Queen or King symbolises the polity as 
crown and personifies it as monarch. According to this conception, she or he 
implicitly holds politicians to a more transcendent standard. The monarch, or 
executive-transcending president (with their advisers), can force attention to 
questions concerning the true long-term nature of national flourishing upon a 
secular politics otherwise always liable to succumb to the lure of the partisan 
and to causes more temporary than seriously enduring. 
Since democracy by itself is not sufficient to ensure the survival of 
democracy, monarchical succession paradoxically supports democratic rule 
and guarantees continuity in relation to the salutary alternation of different 
parties in power (as the history of Scandinavia and Benelux, besides that of 
the Commonwealth, tends to confirm). The monarch and the institutions 
emanating from monarchy can embody the interests of the country that face 
the constant threat of being either manipulated or simply ignored by 
temporary majorities. 
Just as the Crown can potentially balance the oligarchic usurpation of 
executive power by legislating ministers, so also it can balance the usurpa-
tion of both legislation and executive by the judiciary. Often, this occurs in 
the name of Ôhuman rightsÕ. Instead of the judiciary being restricted to the 
application and interpretation of distributive measures taken by sovereign 
legislation, ÔrightsÕ standing alone have started to be treated as absolute and 
foundational and, yet (contradictorily), infinitely expansive, which in effect 
turns the courts into an original arm of government. 
Today, in the name of rights and international corporate norms of property 
that begin to uphold a shadowy liberal super-state, national judges, as argued 
in the previous chapter, are either subordinate to, or in league with, 
international courts. These bodies are too much in danger of becoming 
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quasi-legislatures, given the weak powers of supranational parliaments such 
as that of the European Union and the matching impossibility that nationally 
elected politicians would ever be able to deal in sufficient detail with all the 
arising detailed questions of European-wide or even global policy. And there 
is surely no justification for the segregating out of ÔrightsÕ issues from those 
of justice in general. For, on the one hand, the clash of equally ÔabsoluteÕ 
rights becomes non-adjudicable if questions of distributive justice have been 
bracketed by a court of rights, while on the other hand, the legitimate claims 
made by individuals and the particular interests of individuals as persons 
may be relatively neglected by a court of justice that does not see rights as 
falling within its purview. If legislative, executive and judicial powers should 
not be absolutely and formally divided, but persist in symbiosis, then equally 
the judiciary should not be internally divided from within Ð between areas of 
supposedly absolute and supposedly merely comparative treatment of human 
persons in dispute. Re-emphasising the mediation of the one, indivisible 
commitment to justice, as symbolised by Crown or Presidency, can assist in 
the restoration of this integration. 
In parallel fashion, constitutional monarchy can help to sustain democracy 
and mitigate elective dictatorship by mixing the rule of Ôthe manyÕ with the 
rule of Ôthe oneÕ.16 The power of the Crown operates in principle as a kind of 
umpire, which ensures that democratic processes themselves follow certain 
principles of justice and rules of fairness. By virtue of itself being constitu-
tional, held to upholding the law and to a drastic sharing of power, monarchy 
secures the knot of the wider constitutional framework within which it is situ-
ated. It is surely no accident that constitutional monarchies are renowned for 
their respect of the constitution and the institutions of the law, as well as for the 
overall levels of economic development and human flourishing. Seven of the 
top ten and sixteen of the top twenty countries in the world, in terms of quality 
of life, are constitutional monarchies. This is all the more remarkable when one 
realises that republics outnumber monarchies by a ratio of 5 to 1 (150 vs. 
approximately 31).17 It is also striking that some Islamic monarchies (where 
they are not subject to Salafist subversion) offer a certain balance between 
conservation of Islamic tradition and influence on the one hand, and secular 
rule on the other (as in Jordan and, to a lesser extent, Morocco). This balance 
notoriously evades the republican formations in the Middle East that tend to 
lapse into either secularism, absolutism or theocracy. 
Of course, there are factors explaining these performances that are unrelated 
to the monarch. Yet constitutional monarchy is one factor, since it can sustain a 
democratic dimension while preventing it from overriding sectional interests in 
the name of a single power or source of authority Ð including numerous Ôcivil 
societyÕ initiatives under royal patronage. In the case of the British nations, the 
monarchy Ð together with Parliament and the Church Ð has 
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helped to create and defend a space between the individual and forms of free 
association on the one hand, and the institutions of the state and the market on 
the other hand Ð the Ôcomplex spaceÕ of corporate bodies and intermediary 
institutions.18 Constitutional monarchies are, arguably, better at promoting civil 
society because they are non-revolutionary regimes that adapt rather than 
ossify (as with absolutist systems) or lapse into internecine violence (as with 
republics that emerge from revolutions and do not later modify). 
Personal against Impersonal Rule 
The personal rule of the monarch exceeds the impersonal forces of the 
nation, the state or the market, reminding us at the top that the entire edifice 
of structure and process is in the end a human work, a human emergence, 
dependent on an amalgam of private human decisions. For this reason, 
monarchy can today symbolically and actively uphold the sanctity of labour 
(human beings are first and foremost workers), land (the shared commons) 
and life (the dignity of the human person). The House of Windsor has to 
some degree already, and commendably, started to take on this international 
role19 Ð even if it could be greatly extended, to potential global benefit, 
potentially somewhat reviving at a supranational level the lapsed (but 
arguably theo-politically indispensable) role of the Holy Roman Emperor in 
the older polity of Christendom. 
The monarch represents the common good because her single personal 
frailty at the apex of the political organism witnesses to our human existential 
isolation. In the end, all of us, however situated or coerced, must constantly 
decide for ourselves and, so, alone. We do so in the face of a merely internal 
witness who, if also other to us, must be our divine centre of true identity that 
is also beyond ourselves as our creative source (as of every other creature).20 
The finally ÔsovereignÕ power of the Crown implies some power to override 
the usual norms, in an emergency of warfare or revolt, or else of attempted 
subversion of constitutional freedom (even by an elected or populist power). 
This can seem scandalous because it is ultimately unchecked. But it is just this 
uncheckedness that (as so often witnessed in ShakespeareÕs plays) most allies 
kingship with the naked situation of everyman. Here our lone non-
answerability coincides with our ultimate answerability to ourselves and to 
God. Just because we are ultimately alone, we are also without excuse or alibi. 
The political equivalence of this is just the point where the monarch or her 
immediate representatives stand for the nation and so are nakedly confronted 
with the question as to what this nation is for and, so, what it is supposed to 
do and how it is to compose itself. What is its general good and how does that 
relate to the good of humankind in general? The monarch, her advisors 
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and ministers can be sometimes crucially freed of the alibis of representative 
consensus and formalistic norms of balancing competing wills or utilitarian 
norms of distilling a kind of order out of peopleÕs baser instincts rather than 
their pursuit of virtue. As such, lone (but not unqualified) sovereign power at 
the top (with nothing further human between itself and the heavens) occupies 
just that space where we have to ask: What are we Ð all of us Ð for? 
Those who dispute the existence of this objective good to be discerned 
(albeit problematically) and pursued (albeit haltingly) are at best inconsistent. 
For they view individual rights and representative democracy as goods, but 
cannot tell us why this might be so. And the objection that we do not need 
any single symbolisation of the pursuit of the good at a hierarchical summit 
(whether by monarch, president or prime minister) ignores the role of 
symbolic mediation in human coming-together and the fact that collective 
decision can only be mediated by a once-more individual voice. Here 
Rousseau was, after all, considerably right: the general will has to be 
mediated, expressed and interpreted finally by the individual voice of Ôthe 
legislatorÕ if it is to be at all coherent. 
Monarchy beyond the Sacral-Secular Divide 
As already intimated, the monarch straddles the sacral-secular divide, for the 
King possesses this power by the double virtue of his sovereign sway over the 
integrity of the realm and of his baptism. This means that he is answerable to a 
higher authority than simply his own private inner conscience. Roger Trigg 
puts this well: 
In England, the Cross on top of the Crown, coupled with the symbolism of the 
Coronation service, demonstrate the fact that temporal power is not the final 
source of authority, but is itself answerable to a higher Power. The Queen, 
personifying all government in this land, is subject to principles and standards 
that are not the making of herself or her ministers. All are under the ultimate 
judgment of the God who created all. Denying that is to make something else, 
whether the interest of the stronger, or the fickle will of the people, an untrust-
worthy guide.21 
Such divine answerability helps to secure the sense that Britain remains an 
imperium not reducible to any mere Ônation-stateÕ that is rife with nationalism, 
exceptionalism or supremacism. For British patriotism and pride in her 
indigenous culture is not divorced from a sense that its unique culture has 
value only insofar as it continues traditions that it inherited but did not invent 
Ð the Christian fusion of Greco-Roman reason with biblical faith, the prin-
ciple of free association in Germanic common law, the Latin sense of equity 
and participation in the civitas. 
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As Defender of the Faith, the monarch provides a sense of unity that is real 
precisely because it is symbolic (which Bagehot failed to understand). 
Perhaps Richard HookerÕs most famous statement is that it is a Ôgross errorÕ 
to suppose Ôthat regal power ought to serve for the good of the body and not 
of the soul, for menÕs temporal peace and not their eternal safety, as if God 
had ordained kings for no other purpose than to fat up menÕs souls like hogs 
and to see that they have their mashÕ.22 On the contrary, for Hooker the 
Crown in the person of the Monarch as the head both of Church and state is 
in part responsible for human virtue in its entirety for two reasons: first, she 
is the mediator of the Christological convergence of the divine with the 
human; second, she is the symbolic representative of human integrity and 
therefore one who rules with legitimacy only because she turns the usages of 
the earthly city towards the ends of the heavenly. 
The fact that the monarch is the supreme governor of the Church of 
England extends this gift of ruling to the ecclesial polity too. Unlike the 
absolutist tendency of the US executive and the Germanic judicial 
Rechstaat, the British constitution can balance the coercive powers of the 
state with the persuasive powers of the Church precisely insofar as both 
co-constitute the public realm. The establishment of the Church means that 
a merely suasive authority, which derives from beyond the political and 
beyond the human, is granted a significant political status in such a way 
that the more purely political becomes Ôself-denyingÕ. Otherwise, only the 
coercively authorised is granted any political status and political authority 
becomes tautologous within a circle ultimately closed by mere force. The 
religious grounding of the British settlement is clearly one important 
source for its habitual moderation and tolerance, since it is bound to regard 
all human standards and proposals as being of merely relative worth. By 
comparison, a purely secular settlement tends to oscillate between a tyran-
nical absolutising of one faction on the one hand, and a drift into anarchic 
relativism on the other. 
5. THE POLITICAL ROLE OF ARISTOCRACY 
A constitutional monarchy, or else a constitutional presidency, could and 
should provide spaces in which citizens can participate in the governance of 
the public realm outside the formal mechanisms of liberal representation that 
are in crisis. But, of course, monarchy (and in an extended sense, presidency) 
is not really separable from an aristocratic principle in the broadest sense. 
Monarchy emerged because it stood at the apex of an aristocratic order. So 
before we propose reforms of the British monarchyÕs political involvement, 
we will provide a qualified defence of the aristocratic role. 
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Power and Accident of Birth 
It might well be objected that a greater political role for the monarchy flies in 
the face of the fact that many monarchs in history have been weak, foolish or 
brutal. But the answer to this is that it poses a counter-naivet yet more naive 
than the apparently obvious naivet that it seeks to oppose. For there is no 
freedom from the accidents of birth and placement relating to talent. Our 
apparently thoroughly sifted systems endlessly throw up the incompetent, 
indigent and even half-mad in positions of crucial power. This exigency is 
compounded by the fact that the downside of meritocracy is the tendency to 
advance the ruthless and self-regarding. Even when they have been suppos-
edly Ôfound outÕ at an early stage, it is extraordinary the way others will take 
people at their own self-estimate and submit to their incessant pursuit of a 
sense of self-entitlement. 
In the face of this socially existential truth, there is a certain need to 
balance meritocracy with inherited rights that also involve inherited and, 
therefore, more objective responsibilities. It is equally necessary even some-
times to meld an aristocracy of virtue with an aristocracy of birth, which can 
help to ensure the greater tying of public and family destinies to that of the 
public as a whole. Indeed, for all the partial abolition of the privileges of 
formal aristocracy (only partial, even in France), this generally means their 
replacement by an upper tier of the bourgeoisie and then various successor 
cadres. These classes still, in effect, and inevitably, sustain advantages of 
birth, which cannot be abolished without removing also the general public 
benefit of inherited tradition, or by intolerably weakening the institution of 
the family and increasing the power of the state to intervene in its affairs. The 
interests of the polity as a whole, for example, lies in their being a supply of 
good lawyers, and if this is in part aided by dynasties of lawyers (as music 
was enhanced by the Bach dynasty), then it is superficial to suppose that this 
is democratically problematic. Political society is not a kind of individual 
sporting competition in which Ôequal accessÕ to the legal profession is more 
important than its excellence, even though a strong degree of such access, 
indeed, guards against the lapsing of the dynastic into decadence. Here law is 
but one example; one could equally speak of farmers, house-builders, artists, 
academics, ecologists and even bankers. 
The problem today is, rather, the reduction of the role of inheritance to 
land, cash and privilege, uncoupled from any sense of inherited duty and 
identification of the ÔleadingÕ role with the public good. Yet, if virtue, of 
course, more primarily defines aristocracy than does lineage (in every sense), 
then it needs also to be seen that virtue as such is inseparable from succession. 
Thus the natural aristocracy of talent and virtue cannot be sundered (as Burke 
argued) from the aristocracy of birth in the widest sense of familial 
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legacy, even though good education can democratically make up for initial 
deficiencies. This point sounds far more incendiary than it really is: for we are 
temporal and influenced creatures, and parental and local influence cannot be 
escaped, nor should they be escaped for fear of a destruction of all excellence 
in the name of a formal flattening. Specifically, parental influence can be both 
the greatest force for good and the greatest force for evil Ð which is why the 
parenting of parents, their support and assistance, should be a social priority. 
This does not mean any sort of nannying, ÔexpertÕ interference, but rather the 
encouragement of a wider and previously natural neighbourhood support for 
families and a general sharing of the child-rearing task, which has now 
become well-nigh impossible for working families, and in the climate of 
hysteria over appalling child abuse. 
Aristocracy and Politics 
All this constitutes one roundabout approach to the truth that one cannot 
readily separate the role and reality of monarchy from the role and reality of 
inherited aristocracy. No Ð but then in principle, the link of personal ties to 
the land should serve to create a class that connects its own interests to the 
common good, including the ecological good. 
Of course, ever since the whig ascendancy in the eighteenth century, this 
link has been subverted and poisoned: land has been capitalised and agricul-
tural interests have been thoroughly conjoined with industrial and financial 
ones.23 Part of the answer to this corruption is, indeed, a Ôleft-wingÕ one Ð 
much greater distribution and mutual, public ownership of all lands Ð wild, 
agricultural and exploitable. Yet, short of an undesirable and anti-creative, anti-
personal abolition of all private property, it remains crucial as far as possible to 
conjoin ownership with public interest through a sense of inherited or received 
ÔguardianshipÕ or ÔtrusteeshipÕ. This principle has informed originally radical, 
and continuingly publicly beneficial, ventures like the National Trust 
(ultimately inspired by both Coleridge and Ruskin). However, we need to take 
the further step of constitutionalising such bodies by allowing them the full 
status of incorporation, removing the English empirical and post-Reformation 
common law muddle of the Ôunincorporated associationÕ, as if there were 
really any regular union without a certain implicitly regulated and, so, ÔlegalÕ 
status.24 Such a conjoining of ownership and guardianship through more 
explicit incorporation (often under Crown protection) of beneficial 
associations, though genuinely ÔradicalÕ, remains also a conservative and 
aristocratic principle. Today we need large landowners to recover their sense of 
responsibility, perhaps mainly through ecological commitment, so long as this 
retains a humanist and aesthetic concern for the environment, and is not 
swamped by an impersonal, bio-technologising concern with mere 
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ÔconservationÕ.25 Some large estates need to change along these lines and 
others (especially in Scotland) should be mutualised and, if necessary, be 
broken up for wider public usage. 
But more crucial than the restoration of a true sense of hereditary aristoc-
racy amongst the upper classes or landed arrivistes is the ÔdemocratisationÕ of 
the aristocratic principle itself: the distribution to smaller landholders and 
even to mere householders of a sense of holding something in trust for future 
generations and of a link between oneÕs own fortune and that of oneÕs 
property, surroundings and community. Undoubtedly, more locally based 
economic communities, besides more labour-intensive green agriculture, 
could help in this direction by creating a more settled, locally rooted popula-
tion in the future. Such an aspiration can sound nostalgic, but, in actuality, it is 
in dialectical harmony with ever-increasing globalisation. In a world where it 
matters less where you live because of instant communications and rapid 
transport, it becomes evermore possible to stay most of the time in one place 
and it is also more desirable to do so, in order to balance an appropriate sense 
of the international with an equally crucial sense of rootedness. 
6. THE POLITICAL ROLE OF MONARCHY 
These remarks concerning aristocracy are necessary for a full defence and 
exposition of the monarchic role, which, indeed, makes no sense unless it 
stands at the apex of the aristocratic Ð however distributed. Yet at the same 
time, monarchy also transcends it in such a way as to Ômeta-aristocraticallyÕ 
identify its personal interests with the entirety of the ÔmanyÕ rather than simply 
those of the local ÔfewÕ, here and there. The monarch is born into an entire 
tradition and formed from birth into this unique role. Moreover, as again with 
aristocrats by birth in general, natal accidence has a certain democratic aspect. 
The ruler by birth is, thereby, ÔanyoneÕ called forth from the human mass, like 
the juror in a court of law simply as a human person, to be a general human 
representative, or the political representative by lot in Athenian democracy. 
The crucial judgements made here, even in an emergency, may be all the better 
if emerging from a representative ÔordinarinessÕ, provided the person has both 
the intelligence and the humility to attend to wise and popular advice. 
Monarchism is a humanism, one might say. 
Monarchy and Civil Service Reform 
The same set of considerations about excellence and virtuous leadership 
should be applied to considerations of civil service reform Ð the first proposal 
regarding the renewal of the monarchic (or, elsewhere, presidential) role in 
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the political order. Britain today faces a decline in the quality of the civil 
service that is consequent upon the routinisation of its role and its undermin-
ing in favour of the role of political parties and private government advisors. 
What is required, instead, is that once more civil servants should mediate 
between elected powers and the more continuous powers and institutions. In 
order to counteract the erosion of the sense that they simultaneously serve 
and temper the will of Parliament, Britain needs to reinforce independent 
lines that link them to the Crown and powers emanating from the Crown. 
Such moves could increase substantive democracy at the seeming expense 
of formal democracy, since it would restore civil servantsÕ capacity to have a 
sense of the long-term public interest somewhat independent of that of elected 
politicians Ð who are, after all, far more Ôhere today, gone tomorrowÕ. 
Restoration of civil service ethos and continuity could also be served by the 
setting up of Higher Education programmes (aimed to fuse expertise and 
ethical considerations) leading into this sort of role at central and local 
governmental level or in the world of business. Such a development might at 
once help to increase bureaucratic calibre and increase democratic access. 
Here again, dynasty and recruitment are not necessarily in antithesis. 
Re-Imagining the Privy Council 
The second proposal is about reforming the Privy Council itself. Historically, 
the Privy Council used to have extensive executive, legislative and judiciary 
functions Ð another component of mixed government at the heart of BritainÕs 
polity. By the same token, it was sometimes used by the Sovereign to cir-
cumvent both Parliament and the courts both tyrannically and also in order to 
uphold equity against the formalistic inertia of common law precedent. Today, 
its key decisions are in the hands of the cabinet. While the Sovereign may in 
principle appoint anyone a Privy Counsellor, in practice appointments are 
made on the advice of the government of the day and tend to be confined to 
senior members of Parliament, the judiciary and the Church of England. The 
ensuing problem is that in its current configuration, the Privy Council is 
largely an extension of the writ of the executive, as the Prime Minister effec-
tively decides who attends the CouncilÕs meetings. 
Moreover, the actions taken by the monarch-in-council are a mere formal-
ity, approving every order that has been drafted by the relevant government 
department. Instead, membership might be extended to a much greater array 
of people representing towns, cities and regions, trade unions, businesses and 
professions as well as different faith groups. Instead of being a formal 
mechanism to rubber-stamp government decisions, the Privy Council could 
serve as a body where different groups or institutions offer advice and the 
Crown takes a more active role Ð scrutinising government proposals and 
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asking critical questions about whether proposed actions serve the countryÕs 
long-term interest. 
The main reason why this is democratically desirable is that it allows many 
different people to be temporarily involved in governing processes that concern 
them and to which they can valuably contribute. A rotating presence of many 
different people from all walks of life and all parts of the realm can help to 
qualify the rule of central representation with a more direct democratic 
involvement of more local, temporary and informal delegates. So again this 
proposal is a dilution of democracy only for wooden-minded and knee-jerk 
ÔprogressivesÕ who identify democracy with a univocal and unilateral equal 
spread of formal rights and representation. In reality, by further Ôincreasing the 
mixtureÕ, it could increase substantive citizen involvement. 
Royal Commissions and Royal Colleges 
The third proposal is connected to this point and concerns Royal Commissions. 
To re-balance power away from the executive and defend the long-term 
national interest, a number of royal commissions addressing key questions 
should be created, including education and lifelong learning, family, housing, 
environment, industrial policy and an export strategy. More specifically, the 
House of Commons should be able to establish royal commissions by majority 
decision on a free vote by all MPs and also consider its recommendations 
according to a similar mode. One possibility is that the Backbench Business 
Committee could be given a right to propose the creation of royal commissions 
and draft the terms of reference and the timeline. 
The fourth proposal in relation to the political role of the monarchy is the 
creation of royal colleges for many more professions than is presently the 
case, including in the service sector where there is far too little professional 
self-association and under-representation in the economic governance of the 
realm. Royal colleges and their charters can be vital institutions in fostering 
professional ethos and a commitment to excellence. Their remit could be 
expanded to co-determine (together with legislation passed in parliament) 
who has a licence to produce and trade, and on what conditions such licenses 
can be revoked Ð for example, for certain financial institutions in case of 
persistent criminal activity. 
Thus the Crown, or its symbolically sovereign equivalent in other countries, 
can update, re-invigorate and further democratise its traditional role: first, as an 
arbiter, helping to enforce constitutional provisions and the rule of law, which 
all must abide by; second, as a mediator and guarantor that the common good 
and the long-term national interest are taken into account by government, 
parliament and the judiciary; third, as an enabler and connector of people across 
the realm, working for the civic renewal of the United Kingdom. 
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Unrealistic? But otherwise the monarchy will die away in time or else be 
reduced to the apex not of aristocracy, but of the capitalist spectacle. To see 
the actually realistic nature of these suggestions requires conversion from the 
whiggish assumption that the liberal, revolutionary model for modernity is the 
only possible model and from the empirically falsifiable view that consti-
tutional monarchic paths to the modern have been by comparison an anomaly. 
To the contrary, in Britain, Scandinavia and the Low Countries, they have 
provided successful and balanced paths, often inciting more radicalism than 
republics. By contrast, the latter (and most notably the United States) quickly 
tend to turn statically conservative in terms of appeal to their revolutionary 
founding moments, which does not have the pliability of appeal to primordial 
and unfounded (since it is always already begun) tradition. There is simply no 
logical or actual reason why these paths cannot be repaired, re-signposted and 
re-trodden towards a subtler future. 
7. REFORMING PARLIAMENT 
Going back to Anglo-Saxon England in the seventh century, the rule of the 
ÔfewÕ consisted in central national guidance by the wise. The assembly of the 
Witenagemot or Ômeeting of wise menÕ anticipated, though it was probably 
not the genetic precursor of, the upper chamber of the British Parliament.26 
This body, coupled with the rule of the ÔmanyÕ, eventually mediated by the 
House of Commons (a much later arrival in the late fourteenth century),27 
progressively limited the power of the ÔoneÕ. 
Today, at its best, the British second chamber still promotes a politics of 
wise council that can counterbalance political party interest and excessive 
executive domination. In its current configuration, however, the Lords gener-
ally falls well short of this ideal. Its composition reflects the ruling business 
elites and governmental classes much more so than it does the people and 
society at large. Yet, to restore and renew this ideal function, the political tra-
ditions of pluralism and associative democracy provide a better resource for 
genuine reform than the formalism of majoritarian, electoral representation.28 
The House of Lords can be regarded as the natural, organic place for the 
culminative representation and participation of civil society in the political 
arena. By representing cities, regions, professions and faiths, a properly 
configured House of Lords could help to encourage and coordinate a plurali-
sation of power and ÔcivilisationÕ of markets by re-embedding politics and the 
economy in social bonds and civic virtues. So in principle and, to some extent, 
already in practice, the House of Lords embodies the ultimate top-level rule of 
Ôthe fewÕ as Ôguidance of the wiseÕ. As such, it is uniquely positioned to 
uphold and strengthen the mediating role of localities, communities, 
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professions and faiths. A wholly or mainly elected upper chamber would, by 
contrast, largely destroy this distinctive character and transformative 
potential. 
Changing the Composition and Selection of the House of Lords 
In terms of composition, the second chamber reformed along these lines 
might comprise the following: 
1. Representatives of all faiths in recognition of the contribution that reli-
gious communities make to community cohesion and the public, common 
good.29 
2. Representatives of towns, cities and counties to enhance the presence of 
localities and regions at the centre. 
3. Public and private sector employees such as doctors, nurses, teachers, 
managers, administrators and workers. 
4. Distinguished figures from an array of sectors and professions, including 
universities, trade unions, the civil service, the armed forces, the police, 
business, law, sports, the arts and the sciences. 
5. A continued self-elected number of representatives of the hereditary peer-
age, whose role must be re-thought in terms of the ecological 
guardianship of land and local culture, in the manner already argued. 
In terms of designation, an associative Lords could be in part elected, in 
part appointed and in part nominated. Currently, the mode of determining 
membership is mainly top-down, with the power of nomination and appoint-
ment in the hands of ministers and mandarins. A reformed upper house, by 
contrast, should combine local and regional with professional and religious 
representation through the participation of members who are designated by 
their peers and/or elected by their constituents. For example, some members 
in the Lords could be nominated or elected by citizens locally and regionally 
from the countryÕs largest prisons, hospitals, schools and estates. 
Moreover, just as certain bishops are members ex officio, so too other 
religious leaders would automatically join the Lords Ð for instance, the Chief 
Rabbi or the head of the Muslim Council of Britain. Similarly, trade unions 
and employersÕ associations would also have the right to send their duly 
elected representatives to the second chamber. However, there would be no 
fixed quotas, and all members would have to be confirmed by a re-
configured appointments panel. In order to limit and over time reduce the 
size of the House of Lords, party leaders would be much more constrained in 
the number and profile of people they can propose (especially celebrities and 
wealthy donors). 
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ÔAssociation of AssociationsÕ 
An associative Lords would not just enhance the legitimacy and authority 
of the upper chamber. It would also have the potential to transform the 
polity as a whole. In virtue of representing society in all its diversity, such 
an upper chamber could play a crucial role in fostering civic participation 
across the land. The presence of religious leaders would ensure that in mat-
ters of public importance, the voice of faith is heard. This is crucial, 
because no vibrant democracy can exist without a commitment to 
universally objective and transcendent standards of truth (however this be 
metaphysically understood) Ð even if these are never fully known and 
always deeply contested. Similarly, the membership of elected 
representatives from cities and counties would provide an impetus for 
greater devolution and more local democracy. That is indispensable to the 
survival and flourishing of the British Union, which was not originally a 
unitary state, but has effectively become so. 
By recognising the contribution of professions to the common good, an 
associative Lords would also help promote the self-organisation of workers, 
employees and managers Ð starting with a reform of trade unions and employ-
ersÕ associations that are dominated by their bosses to the detriment of their 
ordinary members. In this respect, an associative upper chamber could serve as 
a Ômeta-guildÕ or a Ôcorporation of corporationsÕ. In practice, this means that 
the Lords would defend the autonomy of guilds and associations, which were, 
historically, a key pillar of the polity. 
In a similar vein, guilds sought to develop and protect standards of 
excellence and honourable practices, if necessary by means of punishment 
and exclusion, based on an ethos that combined extensive rights with strict 
duties and moral codes. Frequently organised as confraternities, craft-guilds 
participated in the life of the polity based on their own distinct Ôlegal 
personalityÕ. In reviving such a sensibility, an associative Lords could 
encourage the introduction of a proper constitutional status for professional 
and other associations (linked to the creation of royal colleges with royal 
charters). 
Finally, an associative House of Lords would support the Commonwealth 
at home and abroad by providing a sense of organic unity and concrete forms 
of cooperation. The Commonwealth no longer forms an empire, yet it 
constitutes more than a glorified free-trade zone; it is, rather, an interlocking 
union of nations whose cultural unity exists independently of the ultimate 
sanction of a single sovereign centre.30 In this way, it offers some potential 
for the extension of the primacy of the principle of association into the inter-
national realm. The House of Lords, reconceived as an internal Ôassociation 
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of associationsÕ, could also be a fulcrum for extending associative rather than 
purely political, purely economic or merely cultural (though culture is central 
to association) bonds to the relations between different countries and 
civilisations. 
Of course, the crucial objection here is that no government has any self-
interest in carrying out this or any other reform of the Lords. But just for 
this reason, an associative reform might be more achievable that the liberal 
kind. For no real interest-group campaigns for the latter, whereas the for-
mer can potentially become linked to the causes of localities, professional 
bodies, trade unions, churches and other faith groups. Possibly, this change 
can only be promoted if the bishops, along with the representatives of other 
faiths, come to see that they can only defend the apparent anomaly of their 
peerages if they link their legitimacy to the cause of corporative representa-
tion. The same consideration applies to an imaginatively expanded role for 
the Crown. 
Reforming the House of Commons 
The most pressing problem with the House of Commons is its lack of repre-
sentativeness. Yet electoral reform involving PR has not only been rejected by 
a decisive majority (as with the 2011 referendum on AV) but also contains 
numerous problems, chief of all some form of party list that breaks the link 
between elected parliamentarians and their constituents. At the same time, 
First-Past-The-Post effectively excludes millions of voters who live in safe 
seats. Therefore, two reforms might be suggested: First, creating constituencies 
that coincide with local identity as far as possible. These will be bigger than 
existing constituencies and, thereby, also contribute to the reduction of the size 
of the Commons. Second, introducing some system of transferable votes that 
reflects the more complex preferences of voters (other than voting for a single 
candidate of a single party) and link this to multi-member constituencies 
(which existed in the past), such that citizens in the newly created larger 
constituencies can be represented by more than one MP. Such a system would 
balance the need to maintain a connection between people and their 
representatives on the one hand, with the need to break the monopoly of the 
two big parties and open up politics to other candidates. 
Other desirable reforms of the House of Commons include (1) much more 
parliamentary time to scrutinise government bills; (2) a new mechanism of 
reducing the sheer amount of legislation (e.g. for every new bill in one area, 
at least two or three existing ones should be scrapped or radically simplified); 
(3) considerably higher salaries for MPs, to augment their prestige, but no 
expenses system in order to avoid corruption. 
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8. RESTORING THE STATE AS ALSO THE CHURCH 
Besides the monarchy and Parliament, the other integral part of BritainÕs mixed 
government that is under attack from liberalism is the established Church of 
England. Our considerations here also apply to the established Presbyterian 
Church of Scotland. If the mode of establishment of the latter is weaker, then its 
sense of independence from the Scottish state and the ultimate answerability of 
Crown to Presbytery has often been stronger (and therefore more ÔCatholicÕ) 
than the Anglican claim for the answerability of Crown to Convocation (or 
Bishops and Synod today).31 But in any case, Scotland accepts its monarchÕs 
Anglican coronation.32 In the case of Wales, there is no establishment, though 
with the collapse of old dissent and Calvinistic Methodism in the Principality, 
nineteenth-century disestablishment already looks premature (if unavoidable at 
the time), and, increasingly, the Anglican ÔChurch in WalesÕ effectively plays 
the same role there as it does in England. The situation in Ulster (where 
Gladstone, with reason, passed the 1869 Irish Church Act, which took effect on 
1 January 1871 and disestablished Anglicanism in Ireland) is, of course, 
religiously divided and complex, though across the whole of Ireland 
Anglicanism is somewhat reviving in the face of Roman Catholic crisis and a 
rejection of Protestant distortions and extremities. 
The Case for Establishment 
For liberals, Anglican establishment is a relic of the past that is rendered 
obsolete by the great fall in church attendance and the pluralism of late mod-
ern society Ð not least the presence of growing religious minorities such as 
Muslims who might feel discriminated against by a Christian state religion. 
However, the established Church of England may have a vital role to play in 
renewing BritainÕs representational government. Anglican establishment 
sustains the idea that the Church is itself a polity and, indeed, the heart of the 
English polity, since sacramental coronation alone ultimately confers 
legitimacy upon a political system and a constitution that remains creatively 
unwritten.33 Thus, at the very heart of the English (and Scottish) state, they are 
turned inside out and elsewhere. Their own most inward identity and authority 
is after all not themselves but, rather, something remotely as well as 
intimately ÔotherÕ to which they are answerable and which is represented by 
an inner psychic community (as discussed earlier in the book). Such commu-
nities exist, of course, in other countries in other modes, whether taking the 
form of a formal religious establishment or not. But in every case they should 
also strive to play this role of inverting their apparent secular containment, 
albeit in a manner that also (on an inescapably Christian paradigm) respects 
the integrity of the secular sphere. 
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Such a community serves to link the real to the ideal in a way that is fully 
correspondent to the inevitable circumstances of all human society and polity, 
which is always poised between the strange irreality of the real Ð its imperfec-
tions, confusions and contradictions Ð on the one hand, and the curious reality 
of the ideal on the other. The perfection of the latter can seem, as for Plato, 
oddly more solid, just as the world of a great novel can appear to the reader 
more vivid than her everyday, as if it was the latter that was illusorily Ômade-
upÕ (as, indeed, all culture is, in a certain sense) and not quite believed in or 
assented to by its participants. Without the imperfect real reflection of the 
ideal, there is no social real as something normative, for this reality is ÔthereÕ 
at all only as a straining towards something beyond itself. Conversely, ideality 
has not even a shadowy substance for us, without a certain participated 
reflection. The work of the psychic community is, therefore, always to try to 
close more tightly this gap, which must perforce remain open and, yet, cannot 
do so without tension and even an element of the nonsensical. And the work 
of the Church is the most acute and liturgically continuous of all34 Ð in its 
attempted fusion of the ideal with the real, since it claims to reflect and 
sacramentally continue an actual incarnation of the divinely ideal in human 
and temporal reality. 
Secular alternatives can, by comparison, propose a tempering of sover-
eignty from outside, but only a religious conception can propose a ritual or 
liturgical tempering at its very core, which amounts to a paradoxical (un-) 
foundation. Thereby, the authority of the English and Scottish polities, and, 
so, effectively the British state, is defined from the outset and source as self-
qualified. It regards itself as a polity only because it stands within and defers 
to a polity inclusive of the nation but wider than the nation Ð a polity of not 
just global but also, finally, cosmic extent. 
As part of another, both cosmic and worldly polity in excess of the national 
polity, which it founds through constitutive constraint under divine right, the 
Church of England is able to uphold both religious freedom and the secularity 
of politics. For by grounding the polity in an initial distance from itself, the 
importance of an assent of conscience beyond legality or constraint is seen not 
as something to be just tolerated, but as the most primary point of political 
reference. Even though the Church of England represents one particular 
religious option assented to by a national majority across time, the perceived 
basis of the collective assent in individual conscience logically requires 
respect for all consciences, including dissenting ones Ð as has come to be 
accepted in the course of time and was advocated by some from the early 
modern outset. Equally, the grounding situation of the English polity within a 
higher one ensures that the former polity will be regarded as merely man-
made, provisional and always revisable. Just because the realm of England 
(and the realm of Scotland) is a church, its more secular apparatus is 
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radically secularised and cannot be sacralised in the manner that has accrued to 
the French and American constitutions. The political role of the established 
Church is, therefore, neither to sanctify the state nor to supplant the govern-
ment as elected and representative, but, rather, to ÔinformÕ public institutions in 
the direction of both individual virtue and public honour, without which 
democracy cannot function or thrive.35 
Church Establishment and British Democracy 
There are two objections to the continuation of Anglican establishment. The 
religious argument against an established Church is that credal Christianity is 
incompatible with a state religion. And the secular argument is that it violates 
the imperative of state neutrality and, therefore, undermines the pluralism on 
which democracy and the impartial rule of law depend. 
On the question of the theological principle, it is worth remembering that 
Christianity builds on the Jewish legacy of prophets holding kings Ð granted, 
in the Hebrew Bible/Old Testament beyond the role of judges only by divine 
concession Ð to standards of justice, righteousness, reconciliation and peace. 
Similarly, from its inception, the Christian tradition has, in a unique way 
amongst religions, distinguished religious and politically coercive and puni-
tively legal authority without divorcing faith from politics, or the answer-
ability of secular to sacred standards, as the writings of St Paul already attest. 
Perhaps for the first time in human history, it was Christianity that refused to 
endow coercive power with a sacral aura. It began to imagine faith not just as 
a more interior and world-exceeding matter, but also as something linked to a 
new mode of Ôpost-politicalÕ social existence orientated around continuous 
liturgy, detailed pastoral concern, penance, forgiveness and processes of 
reconciliation as new modes of social order. 
Of course, the boundaries between the political and the post-political have 
never proved clear: often, the Church has been part of state coercion, while, 
inversely, the new Christian modes of securing social order have re-shaped 
political practice, at once to the benefit of the latter and to the perversion of 
the former. Without the Christian irruption and its later distortion, we would 
have neither the politically economic state, nor the bureaucratic welfare state 
or the increasing surveillance state.36 Nevertheless, this same irruption has 
left a surviving and beneficial legacy in terms of a general assumption that 
the scope of the political is limited and that the scope of the social or the 
civilly social creatively exceeds it. 
Anglican establishment sustains the legacy of the Christian irruption in 
one possible, very imperfect but still surely authentic, mode. For the Church 
of England embodies a certain equilibrium between the distinction of 
political and religious authority, on the one hand, and the non-separation 
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of politics from religion, on the other.37 It sustains a sense that the secular arm 
is criticisable by and answerable to transcendent concerns, while also holding 
out the possibility that the political sphere can itself be informed by pastoral 
and reconciling aims that exceed the strictly political remit Ð as with the 
decisive Anglican influence on the post-1945 British political settlement, 
including the intimately linked establishment of the welfare state, universal 
secondary education and religious instruction in all state schools. In addition, 
it has the potential to be true to its own sources and legacy in guarding against 
the corruption of such information in the direction of a de-personalisation of 
the very Christian focus upon the interpersonal. For the latter, when routin-
ised, can strangely result in the most insidiously de-personalised and intrusive 
processes of all Ð the subtle coercion exercised by classification and the sta-
tistically supervisory concern with our health, and sexual and psychological 
lives.38 
At the heart of this sustaining lies the role of the baptised monarch. After 
Henry VIIIÕs break with Rome, the Church of England eventually sought to 
preserve the balance between priesthood and monarchy that reflects the 
patristic and medieval emphasis on ChristÕs priestly and kingly authority.39 
Richard Hooker, who by Ôreforming the reformÕ in a somewhat neo-Catholic 
direction at the turn of the seventeenth century became the founding father of 
Anglican theology, went further in his seminal work Of the Laws of 
Ecclesiastical Polity. He argued that it is the monarchy in communion with 
the Church that represents the unity of the Ôpriestly kingdomÕ and the Ôkingly 
priesthoodÕ to the people, whose assent is necessary for a just order. Hooker 
developed this argument against the Puritanism of Thomas Cartwright who 
(in defiance of the New Testament evidence) reduced ChristÕs government of 
the Church to mere priesthood and thus to pure mission, excluding any social 
governance or political outlook.40 By contrast, Hooker emphasised the 
interlinked unity of both ecclesial roles Ð in line with the notion that the 
Church is a polity in its own right and that together with the secular arm, it 
co-constitutes the public realm under the aegis of the secular monarch who 
is, nevertheless, anointed. 
In addition to these religious (but secular) reasons, there are secular (but 
religious) reasons to defend the principle of Anglican establishment. The 
established Church of England does not so much undermine secular politics as 
help to defend the principle of secularity against either aggressive secularism 
or religious fundamentalism. Here it is crucial that it is the independent 
sovereignty of the Crown and not the Crown in Parliament that was made 
head of the Church from the outset Ð this being arguably the main point that 
Parliament wished to challenge against the constitutional prerogatives of 
Charles I, and with arguably oppressive implications. Together with the 
anointed monarchy, the Church qualifies from within the imperium the 
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authority of Ôthe stateÕ as less than final and absolute, yet also upholds its 
regional secular legitimacy, including the space for religious diversity and 
toleration. Nor is this enabling of general religious freedom merely negative 
in character, because the higher space of Church polity is also one that offers 
a carapace for other denominations. Indeed, other faiths also can come to 
occupy the same space in a Ôquasi-establishedÕ fashion, thereby being further 
enabled to exercise a positive social and political influence in the name of 
their own beliefs. In the United Kingdom, this has already become true for 
Catholic and Jewish spokespersons and is becoming truer also for Muslim 
ones. 
At the same time, Church and Crown bind the universal ecclesial polity to 
the public realm Ð whether to the Crown in Parliament at the top or via the 
parochial system to local government at the bottom. Thus, in strictly contem-
porary and global terms, the Church of England embodies the Christian alter-
native to both secular extremism (as in post-revolutionary France or Kemalist 
Turkey) and absolutist theocracy (as in Saudi Arabia since Wahhabism). A 
careful examination of history, as Karen Armstrong rightly argues, suggests 
that both religious and secular extremism have been sources of extreme vio-
lence, and that there is nothing normative about a purely secular, religiously 
neutral state Ð this being, rather, the peculiar outcome of contingencies in 
European history.41 In the case of Britain, these contingencies have issued in a 
rather different direction, which is not necessarily eccentric and aberrant on 
account of its merely minority character. Instead, history could be read as 
suggesting that the relatively tolerant legacy of Britain has something to do 
with a constitutionally enshrined prevention of two extremes: the dominance 
of either an overly dogmatic and theocratic-tending mode of faith, or else of a 
militant mode of secularity, insisting on its own autonomous self-founding, 
without fearful reserve towards any sublime excess of the human. EuropeÕs 
shared history from 1914 to 2014 strongly suggests that the notion of a stable 
liberal mediation of the void between these two substantive extremes is a 
complete illusion. At most it prevailed for the decade of the 1990s, between 
the collapse of the iron curtain and the tumbling of the twin towers. 
These hundred years suggest that if the state does not acknowledge the 
need to be guided by higher principles than power or wealth, then one of two 
consequences will ensue: either the state invests politics and the economy with 
quasi-sacred significance, like Fascism, Communism and Neo-liber-alism, or 
else the state ends up adopting a political religion with theocratic tendencies. 
Either way, politics ceases to be genuinely secular because the secular is 
alternatively usurped or absolutised in a quasi-religious fashion. So the 
conundrum for militant atheists always remains that the secular, which should 
be prized, evaporates if it loses its active pole of sacred contrast. There is no 
secular beyond the merely ÔlayÕ, as the French term lacit records, with 
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an irony that subtly qualifies the seemingly absolute character of French 
secularisation. Lacit remains in certain ways a lay Catholic triumph over 
and resistance to a clerical caste, rather than to the religious as such. 
Fundamentally, the Church as the inserted national presence of a more 
universal community does not aim to be a rival government. This provides a 
basis not just for it to bear prophetic witness (which from disestablished or 
non-political religious bodies can become tiresomely priggish, moralistic and 
irrelevant) but also for it to begin to craft and assist in crafting superior 
human practices, more ambitious for the convivial beyond mere coexistence 
than is generally possible for the political arm. Establishment, therefore, 
allows the interplay of the stateÕs coercive powers and the ChurchÕs 
persuasive powers in ways that are both mutually limiting and mutually re-
inforcing. Equally, it sustains some balance between critical distance and a 
fruitful insemination. For its established status gives the Church of England a 
constitutional role in the wider governance of societies and people Ð both 
their bodies and their souls, in terms of marriage, death, the care of families, 
welfare and educational provision. It is for these reasons that the established 
Church cannot simply be dismissed as a communal conspiracy against the 
nation, whose very existence is to do with its Christian past. 
Not only does establishment sustain the secular aspect of the state, but it 
also serves to remind us that, as already argued, the only justification for 
democracy is ultimately theological. It is a genuine theological view that 
because the people are potentially the ecclesia, and since nature always 
anticipates grace, truth lies finally dispersed amongst all people, since the 
Holy Spirit speaks most infallibly through the voice of all. This may seem 
like a matter just for Christians, yet it is just this doctrine that seems to 
square the circle from an arising aporia concerning democracy and truth. 
If coercion is abhorrent, then only the persuasion of the majority should 
prevail concerning questions that must be generally decided. But this seems to 
subordinate truth and the morally non-negotiable imperative to Ôdo the truthÕ. 
What if the majority happen to be wrong? On the other hand, the imposition of 
perceived truth upon people against their will is not only distastefully violent, 
but also ineluctably risks a twisting and dilution of truth, if it is in consequence 
not Ôdone freelyÕ. The resolution of this conundrum must lie in a sense that, 
while new truth may first dawn upon the gaze of the lone visionary and be 
developed by her disciples, the ultimate clue to the certainty of the most 
important and fundamental truths is their general acceptability Ð not just to 
each and every one of us in dispersal but also to all of us taken together in 
community. For it is the communal realisability and illustration of truth that 
tends eventually to confirm it. It is not, as for pragmatism, that truth is Ôwhat 
worksÕ, but that shared insight and practice are the most reliable organs for the 
perception of truth, not merely the insight of the isolated individual. 
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Nor is this vox populi an emergent but formally a priori and unalterable 
general will, distinct from the Ôspecial willÕ of contingent circumstance, as 
for RousseauÕs secular translation of MalebrancheÕs distorted Baroque the-
ology.42 Rather, just as divine providence is only universal in all its special 
details, so also the general and relatively stable views only emerge gradually 
and haltingly through the development of custom in all its historical specif-
ics. For ÔvirtueÕ is not an isolated formal principle, but a realised and tested 
habit over time Ð and political truth consists in the exercise of the right set of 
virtues. The same insight demands that real democracy be considered a 
democracy of the ages and incorporate the wisdom of tradition. This does not 
belie the reality that radical new insights can arise, but if these do not 
eventually become embedded in common sense, they will prove to have been 
ephemeral shiny illusions. Vox populi, vox Dei alone, therefore, legitimates 
democracy, as the possible stable prevalence of truth in the long term, and 
not the view that the collective will, simply because it represents the highest 
common factor of arbitration, should always prevail. 
It follows that, outside a religious foundation, it is hard to see that the demo-
cratic dimension of representation can be regarded as an absolute value. In 
secular terms, the absolutisation of democracy endorses its always imminent 
collapse into a view that the most aggregated force in the present should for 
now triumph and seek to pre-empt the future. This despite the fact that we 
know in advance that current norms will need to be overthrown when this 
future comes into its own presence. Therefore, liberalism always gleefully 
anticipates a further emancipation from its already achieved ones: no sooner, 
for example, have we recognised the naturalness of gay status as a subject of 
rights, than we must seek urgently to be rid of it, in the name of a total sexual 
fluidity (the bisexual, transgendered, etc.), freeing the individual from all 
generic identities, in a staggeringly self-deceptive denial of evident biological-
historical reality, fully to escape which would be to abolish our humanity.43 
ÔHolistic MissionÕ 
So far we have argued that both Church and state represent distinct polities in 
their own right and that both co-constitute the public realm to which all citizens 
belong. If this is true, then it follows that establishment concerns both equally, 
albeit differently. For the Church, the key challenge is to make establishment 
work much better in terms of legislation and policies insofar as state decisions 
have contributed to the de-Christianisation of the nation. The decision to 
introduce same-sex marriage is a case in point. Despite the so-called 
Ôquadruple lockÕ that allows churches and other religious organisations to opt 
out, it is by no means inconceivable that people will try to challenge this opt-
out in the name of their individual, subjective human rights. Even if this 
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were to fail, the question that the same-sex marriage bill raises is whether it is 
legitimate for the state to modify the meaning of marriage and to effectively 
(and, of course, puritanically) deny any connection of a marriage contract with 
sex, since this component must now necessarily be left undefined.44 If for 
millennia marriage has been understood as a conjugal relation between men 
and women linked to procreation, then there is something dubious about the 
state arrogating to itself the power by law to change the definition of a natural 
and cultural reality that has historically preceded the existence of the state (and, 
indeed, the Church) itself. 
Coupled with contemporary Church opposition to welfare cuts hitting the 
poorest and a call for restrictions on usurious payday lenders, the Anglican 
position on same-sex marriage shows at once just how important ecclesial 
interventions are for public debate and the extent to which the liberal state is 
not at all neutral or impartial, but, instead, pushes an aggressively secular 
agenda. If anything, this reinforces the case for establishment and for an even 
more outspoken Church leadership working closely together with the laity, 
and people of other faiths and none who share similar concerns about secular 
aggression. 
However, establishment is not merely a matter for the Church of England 
alone. From the perspective of Church and state alike, there is an overriding 
need both for genuine participatory democratic assent, and for a hierarchic 
transmission of learning and formation by the wisely formed, in every walk 
of life and at every level of society. These two seemingly contradictory 
dimensions belong together, and each is the precondition for the other. 
The resurgence of faith as social involvement in Britain is linked with a 
stronger sense that people belong to society as long as they belong to some 
institutions in their communities, which tend to be either formal visible faith 
institutions or informal hidden social interactions often linked to faith 
groups.45 London now seems notably more religious than the northern and 
western British fringes, as a result of immigration, more civil activity and a 
more educated, culturally and historically informed populace in a vibrant 
metropolis. (A parallel phenomenon is seen in Paris and northern France.) 
But throughout the country, Christianity is still lived out in diverse ways 
through the medium of the various churches, in terms of involvements that 
can be liturgically sporadic, or more social and practical than liturgical in 
character.46 
The Church of England remains central to this diversity through its sustain-
ing of the ancient parochial system that allows it to offer more widely youth 
groups, dinners for the elderly, mums and toddlers groups and coffee morn-
ings, or economic and welfare services such as food banks, homeless shelters, 
debt counselling, credit unions and health services.47 In such arenas, people 
from many different backgrounds come together and the Church can reach a 
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greater variety of persons and groups than almost any other activity or form 
of human association. 
For many communities, where in recent years places such as pubs, work-
ing clubs and community halls have been closed down, the Church and its 
connected buildings provide the only visible focal point in which people can 
come together. This is visibly apparent in the way that Victorian Churches 
still stand like gothic beacons amidst the atrocious city-scapes of places like 
Leeds, where coherent Victorian development has been partially wrecked by 
areas in which high-rise dwellings are cut off from each other and from all 
social amenities by a hideous and dysfunctional tangle of roads seemingly 
going from nowhere to nowhere through a an unwalkable limbo of urban 
dereliction. In this landscape, the signs of transcendence also offer the only 
resorts of a shared humanity. Here, as elsewhere, many events organised 
through churches involve persons of other faiths and of none, broadening, 
intensifying and unifying through concentration in this physical focal point. 
So in very practical terms, it is the Anglican establishment that today 
uniquely sustains in Britain a parish system that helps to structure and coordi-
nate local life in diverse ways.48 This system provides a ready-made platform 
for a great extension of such involvement in the future by reaching further out 
into the spheres of education, welfare, health, business and finance. Such 
extension can potentially start to qualify the control of either the centralised 
bureaucratic state or the profit-seeking free market, both of which began to 
become dominant in part because of the ChurchÕs historical retreat from its 
civil role and social action.49 
To call for a revival of this role can sound simply nostalgic. But that is to 
ignore certain dialectical twists and turns of history. It now turns out that there 
is a financial, practical and existential limit to bureaucratic and impersonal 
care, while the mediations of the market always leave behind a social detritus 
in their wake that can prove politically dangerous to the existing system. Thus 
the secular appropriation of an originally ecclesial ÔpastoralÕ and ÔeconomicÕ 
rule that sought to govern through direct Ôpresence to detailÕ in every locality 
seems to come up against certain inherent limits. A de-personalised approach, 
unmotivated by immediate moral concern, has become organisationally over-
stretched, while the same approach has generally served to increase a sense of 
alienated passivity amongst the populace. Thus there are new exigencies 
already working to ensure a revival of religious social action Ð exigencies that 
tend to coincide with a new spontaneous populist drift towards revived self-
organisation. 
It is just this extension that can help to restore the ChurchÕs spiritual mis-
sion, by vividly demonstrating religious relevance in terms of a link between 
belief, practice and consequence. Inversely, it can be argued that in recent 
decades, mission has failed because of the mistaken and even craven retreat 
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of the Church from social, charitable, educational and cultural involvement. 
Frank Prochaska has written of this retreat that Ôthe bishops blew out the 
candles to see better in the darkÕ.50 In consequence, many people in Britain 
now see little or no connection between the ChurchÕs mission and the main 
spheres of public and even private life in which they are involved. Because 
most people think in practical, concrete terms, Christianity is not compre-
hensible to them unless they see its effects in transformative practice and 
through vivid, concrete instantiations. This, of course, includes uplifting and 
transfiguring liturgy, but it is notable that traditional liturgical expressions 
and structures (which, of course, constantly require a different repetition) 
bear far more strongly and objectively upon our entire cosmic, social and 
existential situation than do etiolated modern substitutes. It is just for this 
reason that the ritual and the socially engaged have tended to go together, as 
witnessed by both the Catholic and Anglo-Catholic example, and the same 
truth applies in another way to charismatic churches Ð for genuine ritual by 
no means precludes the spontaneous and variegated.51 
Greater Church of England involvement in society is, therefore, indispens-
able to the success of a post-liberal politics in the United Kingdom, besides its 
own survival and renewal, on which such involvement considerably 
depends.52 The crucial role of religion is not so much to complement existing 
processes as to indicate transcendent finalities that will sustain the ultimacy of 
social reciprocity or gift-exchange Ð in a word, of charity Ð as objectives 
beyond the realisation of freedom and justice.53 For if the point of these latter 
things is mere peaceful coexistence in personal security, then they are finally 
grounded in the pre-ethical, and this grounding tends, in time, to erode their 
own ethical substance. By contrast, if the ultimate aim of social life is itself 
community, associating together in free and mutually beneficial relation, then 
liberty and the distribution of resources are not instrumentally subordinate to 
ultimately lonely, egotistic goals, indifferent to our reciprocal recognition by 
others. Instead, the pursuits of freedom and justice begin and continue as 
ethical pursuits because they are seen as pointing towards the yet more ethical 
goal of simply being together in free harmony as itself the ultimate aim of 
social existence. 
9. DEFENDING DEMOCRACY NON-DEMOCRATICALLY 
So in order to defend and deepen the democratic element of constitutional 
government, we need more than democracy. Western history suggests that if 
there is only one principle of political legitimacy, then there will remain only 
one self-answerable power. A strict, formal separation of powers elsewhere 
has neither prevented a concentration of power and wealth nor enfranchised 
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the excluded nor enhanced popular assent. Instead, liberalism has proved all 
too compatible with the tyranny of the majority and an aggressive destruction 
of group rights, faith groups, local powers and the role of regions, besides the 
right to protest of individual dissenters. Under the guise of representative 
democracy that sees no legitimacy in anything but itself, an unrepresentative 
and non-virtuous oligarchy tends to be enshrined in power, thereby destroy-
ing participatory and informal democracy. Instead, we need to recover the 
mediating role of the few, the dispersed sovereignty of plural corporations 
and the universal pursuit of goals of virtue. This chapter has sought to 
explain and exemplify their natural conjunction. 
Ultimately, Western constitutionalism needs not just proper local govern-
ment and regional representation, but, above all, the participation of indi-
viduals and groups in public political debate and decision making. Whereas 
liberal democracy too readily slides into Ôdemocratic despotismÕ and the 
tyranny of general mass opinion, a post-liberal politics of virtue emphasises 
the need for a genuine pluralism in which different ideas can be set out and 
considered. The lifeblood of a representational system is a set of differing 
ideas and choices between real alternatives concerning our shared teleologi-
cal pursuit of a shared substantive future Ð not the liberal attack on non-
liberal positions while at the same time proscribing any scrutiny of 
liberalismÕs foundational premises. 
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Chapter 7 
The Metacrisis of Culture 
1. LIBERALISM TURNED LIBERTARIAN 
Liberalism became fully normative only in the second half of the twentieth 
century when it finally achieved a hegemonic domination of mass culture. 
Prior to the 1950s, essentially pre-capitalist norms were still to the fore in 
cultural life, but after that decade, the whole of social reality, including the 
family, became gradually capitalised and commodified, through the construc-
tion of Ôthe consumerÕ rather than Ôthe workerÕ as the crucial economic and 
cultural actor.1 But as with so many earlier dissolutions of ancient Europe, this 
first of all manifested itself as an anarchic, left-wing, emancipatory shift. Yet 
it quickly proved to be only a ground-clearing exercise for the increased 
control exercised by post-industrial capitalism as the main motor of liberal 
modernity Ð even if this dominance is ultimately determined by liberal ideol-
ogy and culture, and not by any supposed techno-economic determinism.2 
Thus, with antecedents going back to the Ôroaring twentiesÕ, the 1950s and 
1960s saw the rise to power of a vanguard that, for both good and ill, was 
eventually able to render its libertarian revolt normative, albeit in a curiously 
routinised form inevitably implied by massification.3 Its relationship to capi-
talism had, indeed, been ambiguous from the outset, with big business almost 
instantly grasping that money was to be made from a revolution that rapidly 
conceived itself, from the late 1960s onwards, so predominantly in terms of 
style and fashion. The contradictory notion of de rigueur conformity to a uni-
form resistance, to an individualism identified by the same outward badges, 
and to an expressivism guaranteed by stoned inarticulacy, was already tailor-
made to suit the requirements of late modern industrial enterprise. It provided 
capitalism with the key to unlock familial and educational barriers to the 
spread of consumeristic control through the apparently voluntary, beyond its 
2 4 7  
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hitherto wildest dreams. Those born in the 1950s will recall that every 
British rock festival of the 1960s, proclaiming that it already embodied an 
Aquarian Age bound to arrive by sheer force of contagion, was opened and 
closed by the appearance on stage of a cynical cockney entrepreneur still 
wearing the tell-tale sharp garb of pre-hippydom. 
This collusion was compounded by the rapid swerving of any real political 
critique and transformative activism in the directions of liberal feminism, an 
uncritical cult of sexual gratification, rights-based identity politics and the 
general release of the narcissistic, as confirmed in the early 1970s. Such an 
increased appeal to freedom as liberation and equality as superficially indi-
vidualised conformity ensured liberalismÕs victory over both non-capitalist 
conservatism and more ethically austere, responsible modes of socialism.4 
Emancipation from traditional religion, cultural taboos, deference, patriotism 
and patriarchy provided a new cultural centre-ground on which left and right 
could eventually converge, at the level of basic received opinion and lifestyle. 
Thus the shared liberalism of left and right can be described as ÔlibertarianÕ 
since it moves beyond a validly ÔliberalÕ sense of generosity Ð the upholding of 
constitutional liberties to ensure the exercise of justice, the humanitarian 
treatment of the weak and defaulting and the free creative flourishing of every 
person Ð towards a false grounding of justice itself in the prerogative of self-
selected ÔreleaseÕ in any direction whatsoever. Of course, these directions will 
always turn out to be but variations on the same spectacular idiom that the 
market reign of fashion then imposes. For, in reality, there is no possible social 
order without some form of mastery and direction, some sort of ÔproposalÕ. 
These are composed both popularly through the gradual crafting of traditional 
symbolic identities and more hierarchically through the educative inculcation 
of higher culture, which still permits a popular feedback, and, indeed, requires 
this if it is to flourish as genuine critique. Into the void left by the evacuation 
of tradition and educated influence flows the rule of the mass persuaders who 
equally despise folk and high cultures with their proffered if flexible symbolic 
identities that aim to propose some objective ÔgoodÕ for acceptance. Only such 
an acceptance can ÔassociateÕ people into a shared purpose, which is the sine 
qua non for any social or political grouping.5 
Yet, for liberalism, which thereby promotes an anti-politics, such substantive 
questions belong exclusively to the sphere of private opinion and private 
debate. This notion is not really metaphysically neutral insofar as the reverse 
face of an affirmed subjectivity as to value is always objectivity as to fact and 
procedure. For this reason, the liberal procedural formalism that is supposed to 
safeguard the sanctity of private freedom tends to collapse in favour of the rule 
of the material (the closed, immanent and artificial realm of the economic and 
the bureaucratic), which is seen as objective and as a surrogate good. For one 
thing, in default of tacitly shared traditional sanctions, individual Ôgood 
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behaviourÕ of non-interference with others can only be guaranteed by an 
unremitting extension of formal controls and sanctions to ensure our Ôhealth 
and safetyÕ and protection from each other. For another, to compensate for 
the anarchy of private views, more and more public weight is necessarily 
given to the purported absolute truth of contemporary science, which is 
closely allied to inherently technological criteria of prediction and control. 
Thus, an extension of scientific-technological manipulation in every sphere 
goes unquestioned by liberalism. As we saw earlier, it is for this reason that 
liberalism has a logical and historical tendency to mutate into utilitarianism. 
Yet today this unleashing of the manipulative already goes well beyond the 
merely utilitarian, since the Baconian Ôelevation of manÕs estateÕ requires 
some minimum consensus as to what constitutes a good birth, life and death. 
Where the only remaining good is free choice and the choice to be happy can 
take many divergent forms, nothing prevents the evolution of society as such 
into a kind of anarchic laboratory. The interest of technologised science is in 
the repeated production of any sort of regularity, regardless of content. Thus 
experiment tends to outrun purpose, and technical possibility any merely 
charitable or beneficial usage. Alteration of human nature and novel 
hybridisation of the natural with the technical in a bypassing of their spiritual 
integration now becomes the main end to be pursued, even though this goal is 
now the purest of free-fleeting ÔmeansÕ. And since capitalism always requires 
the novel for the sake of permanent profitability, it now finds in technologised 
science Ð and its increasingly shrill ontological claims to deliver final truth Ð 
the perfect partner in crime. 
At a more mundane and, yet thereby, more insidious level, the unleashing of 
desire tends in our day to erode the very capacity for desire. As Bernard 
Stiegler argues, marketing increasingly seeks to evade any degree of consid-
ered choice that will involve some reference to a hierarchy of goods and the 
discipline of a superego in order to appeal directly to relatively unreflective 
emotional drives.6 In consequence, we have entered into what the American 
novelist William Burroughs first described as a Ôsociety of controlÕ where 
people are increasingly subject to manipulation at a subliminal level. The 
spiritual or psychic is avoided in such a way that people become saturated by 
their own multiple choices, which must eventually bore them, but from which 
they no longer have the capacity to escape. Many pathologies inevitably ensue 
as a result of over-consumption and debilitation of our capacities to reason and 
select: obesity, anorexia, bulimia, attention deficit disorder, drug-abuse, 
depression, self-harming, as well as increasingly devious, uncivil and 
sporadically violent behaviour. It is then no longer clear even that liberty has 
degenerated into the pursuit of happiness. Rather, degeneration goes further, 
such that people are sublimely manipulated Ôbeyond the pleasure principleÕ, 
but in default of any capacity for personal sublimation. 
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In this way, as Stiegler further argues, the era of ÔdeindustrialisationÕ is, in 
reality, just the opposite. It is the era of the further industrialisation, rationali-
sation and routinisation even of the consumer, family and leisure existence 
insofar as all these aspects of our lives are now systematically subject to 
control, calculation and the extraction of profit. This occurs especially in the 
mode of the Ôservice industriesÕ of the Ôtertiary sectorÕ, which enclose 
evermore the once freely living ÔcommonsÕ as packageable commodities, 
thereby depriving us of many of our inherited craft and social skills of savoir 
faire and savoir vivre. In this way also, apparent ÔbourgeoisificationÕ is, in 
reality, an extended ÔproletarianisationÕ of both the working and private lives 
of almost everyone. By the same token, post-modernity turns out to be an 
exacerbated modernity, characterised by what Stiegler describes as Ôindustrial 
populismÕ, whose typical condition is one of Ôsymbolic miseryÕ. 
For these reasons, the supposed metaphysical neutrality of liberalism 
always collapses in the direction of a reductive materialism and a denial of 
the human spirit that is increasingly enacted in practice. Its duality of sub-
jective value divorced from fact and objective fact without value eventually 
works in favour of the latter, such that an exaggeratedly libertarian favouring 
of the emptily free subject encourages its seeming opposite, a stonily closed 
objectivity. In this fashion, liberalism is bound in the end to efface its own 
apparent humanism.7 For genuine value requires the weight of objectivity and 
the glimpsed seriousness of the Good. In default of this recognition, 
technological norms will dominate as the quasi-good, with human beings 
reduced to cogs in machines or moments within processes. The post-Fordist 
ÔdisorganisationÕ of capitalism away from the machine, the tool, the factory 
and local concentration towards ethereal process, code, dispersed labour and 
outsourcing as well as remote, abstract, central control has not resulted (as it 
might have done) in a greater space for personal creative intervention for the 
many. To the contrary, it has led to a technicisation also of symbolic and 
linguistic procedures Ð rendering the middle classes more the component 
operators of prescribed digital systems than the working classes were ever 
mere tools of their own machines. 
So, much of the shaping and usage of contemporary technology has a 
profoundly de-humanising effect. Paradoxically and perversely, the mantra of 
personalisation in the public and the private sector (whether in terms of work, 
benefits or consumption) has led to evermore impersonal, anonymous 
relations that breed distrust and are inimical to cooperation. One reason is 
that corporate business has reduced the workforce to a bare minimum and 
dumbed down customer service, with the client doubling up as worker as part 
of the trend towards Ôself-serviceÕ check-out counters and computer-operated 
Ôself-helpÕ. But a personal signature of random preference cannot increase 
oneÕs degree of social fortune. 
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2. LIBERALISM AS IMPERSONALISM 
It is, nonetheless, perfectly true that online, digital culture contains genuine 
resources for spiritual renewal. As Stiegler also insists, in a radicalisation of 
the thought of the anthropologist and archaeologist Andr Leroi-Gourlan, any 
idea of specifically human existence without technology is an illusion.8 
Intentional liberty mysteriously arose along with the tool and the word and not 
before them. It is never then a question of pretending to dis-invent, but, rather, 
of ensuring that the inherently positive and even curative properties of any 
given technology are not obscured by the equally ÔpoisonousÕ potential of the 
same ambivalent pharmakon. Such a poison is inherent in the flint tool that 
can double as weapon, speech that can serve sophistically to manipulate rather 
than Socratically to persuade, or writing that can substitute automatic 
formulae for intentional understanding and memory. It is present today in the 
laptop, mobile or internet, which may compound all these earlier dangers. 
Yet, despite their poisonous potential, they also have a curative and 
improving one: open-source software and ÔSmart programmesÕ can hugely 
enable new modes of symbolic association, cooperation and renewability, 
removing the distinction between controller and operator, producer and con-
sumer (as with Wikipedia). Potentially, they can empower localities against 
the centre, since the internet expands in a micro as well as macro direction 
(think of Googlemaps), while equally allowing interpersonal links over long 
distances. Such links can be periodically supported by physical meetings that 
make curative and positive use of long-range transport also (despite the 
manifold poison and congestion of its false use or over-use). 
Yet, in current reality, the apparently interactive gives more scope to hidden 
manipulators. It is not just technological development that has led from the 
radio and television to the virtual fusion of information, communicative and 
audio-visual capacities. For in theory, radio and television might have 
permitted more interaction from the outset. It is rather that commercial and 
political forces have grasped the immensely increased possibilities for power 
and profit when these things are exercised yet more indirectly (such 
indirectness having always been a feature of the politically economic regime) 
through the apparent elicitation of consumer response and even invention. 
That is because the core of what is offered here is predetermined, and the 
range of what is proposed likewise. The same consideration applies to pro-
cesses of direct digital democracy in the political field: here an apparently 
incontrovertible and specific democratic verdict conceals the endorsement of 
an unfranchised prevailing proposal that may well be ultimately sourced by 
either a commercial interest or a militant minority faction.9 
Above all, more and more human attention and brain-time is sucked into 
digital processes and spectacles, such that the time left over for the formation 
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of symbolic community with its own specific idiom, and the shaping of oneÕs 
own truly singular character (including through the same digital means), is 
thereby severely restricted. In consequence, people become addicted, con-
fused as to who they are, and frightened as to how they are regarded and who 
might be pursuing them, as so well divulged in Dave EggersÕ novel The 
Circle.
10 An increased sense of the right of all to know everything and of 
everyone belonging to everyone else engenders a uniformity of exposure and 
a shameless lack of secrecy and hesitancy that undermines integral identity 
while also paradoxically inducing a retreat into loneliness and isolation. 
Aldous Huxley projected the former aspect into a dystopian future in Brave 
New World. The French novelist Michel Houellebecq has more recently 
projected the latter into an ambivalent future.11 A world where everyone is 
watching everyone else is really a world where centralised and monopolising 
powers are surveying us all. Similarly, a world where machines associate with 
other machines is a world in which intelligence reduced to information and 
quantitative calculation can increasingly dispense with the social that was the 
original incubus for all human reasoning.12 Thereby, reason is depersonalised 
and reduced to rationalisation, while, inversely, human beings are de-sociated 
and consequently both ÔstupefiedÕ and ÔstupifiedÕ.13 
Of course, the growing impersonalisation of society and the consequent 
undermining of the human spirit is a problem that precedes the cultural 
triumph of liberalism. The maverick Catholic social theorist Ivan Illich, 
somewhat in keeping with the genealogies of Michel Foucault, warned about 
the dangers, already mentioned, of degeneration that always lurked within the 
personalising of the institutional, which lay at the heart of the Christian 
legacy.14 That danger was, almost from the outset, a reverse institutionalising 
of the personal that eventually allows essentially impersonal law, technology 
and money to pry into every detail of every home and heart, all the better to 
overwhelm them. Indeed, just as the Ôsociety of the spectacleÕ (Guy Debord) 
emerged in succession to the Christian iconic (in contrast to the predominant 
aniconism of other monotheisms such as Judaism and Islam), so also the 
combination of bureaucracy with the market has emerged as a specifically 
post-Christian logic. For Christianity tended to further merge, beyond the 
existing tendencies of late antiquity, polis and imperium with oikos and to rule 
through an oikonomia that entered pastorally into all the details of life. But it 
is the very attempt of the Church to insert, as Peter Brown has put it, a Ôrule by 
persons over personsÕ that has led in the end to the dominance of a machine 
more entirely impersonal than anything known to pagan antiquity: the market 
machine and the state-machine, now tending to merge as the market-state.15 
Thus liberalism remains unintelligible without its theological and ecclesial 
roots and, more specifically, the gradual post-twelfth-century and early 
modern perversions of Christianity.16 
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As we have also seen, liberalism has exacerbated the Ôbio-politicalÕ power of 
impersonal rule by endorsing the modern separation of nature from culture that 
rests upon the undoing of gift and symbol, which had rendered physical thing 
and implicit meaning inseparable. Separating the natural from the cultural 
implies not just a disconnection between physical reality and immaterial ideas, 
but also a denial of the psychic as the linking bond between them Ð the bond of 
self-moving and responsively aware life, risen to consciousness. As most 
supremely with Descartes, nature, including ÔanimalÕ nature, is deemed dead 
because it is not animated, but mind is equally removed from the living exterior 
shape and motor power of the body to stand at a mysterious, nonreflecting and 
Ôauto-affectiveÕ (as Michel HenryÕs revised Cartesianism has it) spiritual 
remove as a kind of conscious but lifeless mirror.17 Nature is now seen as a 
realm without inherent meaning, thought or even spontaneous and causative 
vitality Ð an anonymous mass of inert matter rather than a living cosmos. 
Equally, mind without soul is de-natured, disconnected from body, society and 
essential technological supplement. Eventually, it is reduced to the status of a 
purely physical brain, which is inexplicably conscious and willing. 
This is to suggest that mind knows a world without value on the one hand, 
and posits for itself values with no grounding in reality on the other. It is to 
deny the metaphysical in favour of the manipulation of nature unconstrained 
by values that constitute essences, and it is to abolish politics in favour of 
technocracy and pop culture. For the only objective aspect of the political 
process will now be the manipulation of humans also as part of nature, while 
all else will be handed over to whim, giving licence to a kind of demonic 
sustaining of degenerate habits not just beyond their natural shelf-life, but 
seemingly in all perpetuity. One-dimensional science to the soundtrack of 
bad music is then oneÕs cultural lot.18 
Liberalism, thereby, relegates the psychic to the realm of the purely subjec-
tive that has no role in politics or even educative formation. In consequence, 
the liberal tendency towards materialism must suggest that liberalism is not a 
humanism, because it denies the ontological space in which alone we can 
operate in a truly human fashion Ð integrating the mind with nature through the 
living, psychic medium of the body, and feeling and habit within spiritual 
communities committed to a symbolic sharing. Instead, liberalism views cul-
ture as arbitrarily constructed, and not as variously and partially disclosive of a 
natural order. Similarly, education is now seen in purely functionalist terms as 
something that serves utilitarian purposes of happiness or utility maximisation. 
Here the most seemingly trivial aspects of infotainment, prurient televisual 
intrusion and ritual humiliation of ordinary people has the direly serious 
purpose of further rendering people as bundles of controllable drives, 
increasingly persuaded to see leisure and work as a seamless whole, governed 
by a continuous hedonistic agonism embodying a virtual war of all against all 
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that may quickly and unpredictably mutate into real enacted violence, pro-
viding for us further diversion on the nightly news. Now, indeed, the loss of 
libido most recently produces a population less capable of formal crimes, but 
the instance of informal criminality and big-time criminality correspondingly 
increases, such that any crisis or rupture now threatens not so much legal 
infraction as the arrival of endemic disorder. 
Thus, despair of oneÕs sexual future in a world of increased infidelity and 
abandonment, fear of old age as a state of indignity rather than honour, a 
culture devoted to the cult of permanent youth, psychic overload and confu-
sion, perpetual banal sunlight with no nocturnal pauses, all tend to engender a 
literally suicidal culture, now obscenely encouraged by legalised medicinal 
murder.19 This means that liberalism is on a path that will either undo itself or 
finally undo humanity. In this sense, liberal culture faces a ÔmetacrisisÕ, in 
contrast to a mere crisis that would be to do with external threats to the 
valuation and practice of freedom, or the internal failure to secure a proper 
balance between the rights of liberty and the human requirement for comfort 
and material happiness. For, instead, it is the internal and central liberal exal-
tation of negative liberty that tends to its own undoing and the replacement of 
psychic freedom with the drugged pursuit of happiness and then subjection to 
systematic manipulation. This manipulation is at once highly abstract, in 
terms of virtual classifications and pathways, and yet evermore brutally con-
crete in terms of forced confinement to restricted spaces, physical recourses 
and competition over living space (the crises of housing and of refugees) for 
most of the population. The two are mediated by spectacular and endlessly 
substitutionary compelling images that keep people continuously in thrall. In 
short, without the psychic, liberalism cannot sustain the spirit even as mere 
observing, logical reason and will; instead, the capacities for the latter are 
subject to atrophy. 
However, this is not, as Bernard Stiegler contends, a kind of final crisis of 
liberalism as ultra-industrialised, consumeristic capitalism. He suggests that, 
prior to an ultimate displacement of capitalism altogether, it first needs to 
revert from financialisation to an earlier industrial phase when liberty and 
desire were still in command of machines Ð machines now being overwhelm-
ingly digitalised and automised.20 He deems this necessary, even for 
capitalist exigencies, because he supposes that capitalism requires a ÔspiritÕ 
and must suffer hopelessly depleted energies without it. 
But there are two objections to this relative optimism: first, the develop-
ment of capitalism to financialisation is not simply a late and ultimately fatal 
phase, as Giovanni Arrighi would have it. Rather, as we have seen, financial 
speculation was there at the outset in eighteenth-century England.21 Thus 
financialisation is no temporary recent accident22 but is, rather, the result of 
an intensification of the founding capitalist logic. 
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Second, from the Calvinist (and Jansenist) commencement that Stiegler 
invokes, the further unleashing of elective will was for the elect few, with the 
degenerate masses constrained passively to undergo a discipline that was not 
for them a self-discipline. As The Circle suggests, digital capitalism can just 
involve a further exacerbation of this process. The will and desires of the 
many may not be required by a system increasingly controlled by a techno-
cratically verbal and numerate elite who athletically combine intense ascetic 
discipline with hedonistic privilege.23 Certainly, the resultant pathologies of 
the many would then present problems, and in certain circumstances could 
lead to a total breakdown. But this is not quite inevitable: a society basely 
driven by drives, total bodily and mental exposure and an equivalent spiritual 
isolation remains unfortunately possible and is beginning to prevail. Humanity 
could be undone by a liberalism that remains all-too-much itself, even in the 
course of a mutation beyond all self-recognition. 
3. SOPHISTRY, DISCONNECTION AND DISSOLUTION 
If liberalism is indifferent to the Good, in a way that unravels into human 
self-domination by its own productions, then it is also indifferent to truth Ð 
defined as any mode of disclosure of the eternally valid and, as such, the 
ÔrealÕ counterpart of the good as the ÔidealÕ. In this respect, liberalism can be 
regarded as a mode of sophistry. Already for the ancient Greek sophists, as 
for the historian Thucydides, we must split reality between nature (physis) on 
the one hand, and law (nomos) on the other, eternal and objective truth being, 
thereby, squeezed out between the ever-arriving and given process of nature 
and a wilfully imposed valuation.24 The same irreducible dualism between 
nature and culture is revived by neo-sophistic tendencies in modernity, 
supremely in the case of Hobbes.25 It is much reinforced by the general 
breakdown of a ÔconnectedÕ view of the world as a causally linked 
continuum, in which every effect shares some ÔlikenessÕ with its cause and so 
all things some likeness with each other and all some likeness with a final 
originating and plenitudinous source in which all finite realities partici-pate.26 
The collapse of this ÔanalogicalÕ worldview had nothing to do with an 
objective progress in mathematics, scientific discovery and philosophical 
reflection (since most modes of Renaissance innovation Ð whose critical 
validity we still defend Ð retained this worldview and even augmented its 
ÔoccultÕ dimension).27 It was, rather, and strangely, occasioned by modes of 
nominalist and then Protestant, pseudo-Augustinian Jansenist theology, 
which rejected such immanent ÔconnectednessÕ as too neo-pagan, since it 
disallowed the divinely freely chosen arbitrariness of reality and its abyssal 
contamination by the Fall. 
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In consequence, for this new mode of piety, finite effects no longer pro-
claim their transcendent cause; they are only connected in ÔuniversalÕ patterns 
and likenesses by mental imposition, and a debased physical and human real-
ity must be controlled by formal, technological and procedural regulation. 
Supremely, this dis-connecting of the world removes subjectivity from a 
causal chain of mere things that is inherently formless and meaningless, leav-
ing subjectivity, as with Descartes, a surd mystery. Such a conception implies 
that the subject is linked to its ultimate cause not in terms of participating in 
truth or goodness, but in terms of its empty freedom and contentless self-
reflexivity. Thus the new modern sophistic subject imposes its own discon-
nected values on a realm of sheerly external facts, either under the constant of 
revealed divine norms, or else in a sphere of ungraced, purely natural control 
where God has left man to his own self-preserving devices. 
Like the sophists and the nominalists, but in contrast to almost the whole 
of the rest of humanity throughout history, liberals tend to assume that nature 
and culture have nothing to do with each other, because nature, for them, is 
inexorable and meaningless, inciting of blind passions, while culture, shaped 
by law, is entirely wilful, conventional and artificial.28 This ensures that indi-
vidual expressions of soul in artifice are just conscious manifestations of a 
blind will to power, vagaries of nature as it were, rather than revelations of an 
ordered cosmos. 
The same Nietzschean conclusion ensues, whether one sees culture (lan-
guage, art, technology) as the product of human intention, or whether alter-
natively, one sees it as an evolved fate Ð nature perversely pursuing herself 
by indirect, artificial means Ð to which human beings are subject. This is the 
aporia identified by Stiegler: no techne without human intention and antici-
pation, but no intention and anticipation (which constitute humanity as such) 
without tools and language. In order not to arbitrarily dissolve this aporia, 
one can argue that it is necessary to insist upon the paradoxical naturalness of 
culture: the latter is something contingently superadded to nature and not 
even in any straightforwardly ÔrepresentationalÕ continuity with it. Yet, if it is 
not simply unnatural, accidental and, so, ultimately illusory Ð since nature is, 
for materialism, all of the real Ð then in some sense it must be, in various 
degrees, strangely Ômeant to beÕ.29 Through the additional ÔmakingÕ 
performed by humans, which makes their very humanity, a certain as it were 
supernatural telos is at once constructed and yet pursued.30 
This suggestion points to a ritual or liturgical understanding of StieglerÕs 
aporia. The intentional gesture of making a knapped flint only arrives with 
the flint itself and yet must also (impossibly) precede it. But this impasse is 
somewhat palliated if one thinks of the initiating gesture as being not as yet 
merely instrumental and purposive, but rather as a kind of probing, playful 
and celebratory response to reality, which renders the technical also artistic 
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and symbolic from the outset. The utile is also gratuitous, as the Anglo-Welsh 
poet David Jones famously put it.31 However, palliation falls short of 
resolution: one is still left with StieglerÕs oscillation between the human ÔwhoÕ 
causing the technical ÔwhatÕ, or the technical ÔwhatÕ causing the human ÔwhoÕ. 
The conundrum can only be resolved if, indeed, a humanity-founding 
liturgical offering simultaneously receives from, and participates in, a provi-
dential, transcendent source. Many religious perspectives implicitly propose 
this theoretical scenario. But perhaps it is Christianity (especially in the theo-
logical work of Nicholas of Cusa, reflecting on the technological revolution of 
the early Renaissance)32 that offers a peculiar degree of insight into the 
strange notion of an objective telos that beckons just to the degree that one has 
already started to construct it Ð as in the way that the artist only realises her 
imaginary projection to the degree that this realisation alone completes the 
initial shadowy anticipation.33 Trinitarian theology is able to make sense of 
this aporetic paradox not through its dissolution, but through its ultimate 
sustaining: human work participates not just in an ÔastralÕ, unproductive 
contemplation, but also in a first divine paternal principle that is itself, both 
originally and exhaustively, the ÔtechnicalÕ generation of the Son or Logos. 
Without such liturgical palliation and theological resolution (however 
conceived) one is left with having to arbitrarily choose one fork in the road Ð 
either Ôthe whoÕ or Ôthe whatÕ. But the first is today (after Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and Jacques Derrida) unsustainable, and the second would sim-
ply dissolve human culture into an illusory ruse of natural forces, in which 
case the naturalness of human culture is undone. However, Stiegler is bravely 
right here: common sense indicates that human culture is at once a work of 
human intention and anticipation (after Edmund Husserl), and yet the work 
of the Ôoriginally supplementaryÕ works themselves (after Derrida). But how 
is one to understand the latter as not obliterating the human, unless the works 
are somehow truly sacramental? It is a step that Stiegler does not take, yet, 
otherwise, the only way to save humanism is to appeal, as he does, to a 
Kantian sublimely transcendental a priori ÔspiritÕ that precedes the technical, 
against StieglerÕs own real insights. The secular alternative to this is a sophis-
tic non-humanism, which he also wishes to reject, whereby words favour not 
truth but purely natural powers. 
Yet it is, therefore, surely the sophists, and not (as Stiegler alleges) Plato, 
who divorce the technical from the contemplative or theoretical, since they 
simply disavow the latter. By contrast, Plato arrives at the theoretical by way 
of technical practice and the observation of the cosmos. The latter things are 
rightly dubbed by later Neo-platonists ÔtheurgicÕ because they appear liturgi-
cally and magically to ÔrecallÕ to us certain constant patterns and norms that 
we have not just Ômade upÕ.34 Even in the case of Plato, a technically active 
combining is attributed in some sense to the transcendent level in which 
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our practices participate Ð this notion being much extended on the Christian 
Trinitarian model just expounded. 
All this, of course, sounds impossibly arcane. But it is just this subtle Western 
legacy that liberalism has rendered obscure by abandoning it in favour of 
something much cruder and apparently more universal. As a result, culture is 
problematically sundered from nature and Ôthe whatÕ from Ôthe whoÕ, alternately 
reducing either to mere nature, such that culture and humanity itself vanish 
down a black hole. Today this theoretical upshot is being really performed. 
The only alternative to the nihilistic drift of liberalism appears to be the 
perfectly traditional vitalistic assumption that the subjective and the symbolic 
have some sort of root in nature, which itself ÔrisesÕ to cultural expression, 
indicating a metaphysical participation in an overarching unity that binds both 
nature and culture together. In other words, a cosmos that shares in a 
transcendent principle that is the source of both. This is especially the case if 
such a view, although a ÔpietyÕ, would appear to have been historically a more 
natural piety than the novel piety of nominalism-voluntarism, of which 
liberalism is but the secularised echo, yet with no genuine, immanent secular 
self-authentication. Only a God conceived in a certain voluntaristic fashion 
(remembering that antique naturalism usually involved the indifference of the 
gods to nature and not their non-existence)35 ensured the ÔdisconnectionÕ of 
reality. Without the invocation of this dubiously arbitrary God, sooner or later 
connectedness appears the more obvious presupposition. Thus, even people not 
returning to an earlier transcendent piety tend often to evolve more 
immanentist, vitalist, ecological, Ônew ageÕ and explicitly metaphysical theses 
concerning the continuity of matter, life, sensation and consciousness.36 
Modern liberals, in effect, deny the possibility of a cosmos, but, thereby, 
they effectively also deny the holistic reality of the human. But a disintegrated 
humanity, reduced to will and then to drives, can inherently know no bounds 
and must converge with the will to unleash the unbounded though unwilled 
potentials of nature as an experimental venture undertaken for its own sake. 
This is a circumstance that must eventually encourage the creation of a post-
human superman, a bionic-robotic hybrid of which modern eugenics was 
perhaps but a pale precursor.37 Such a development would, of course, take to 
yet further lengths the division between an elite of experimenting controllers 
and a mass of humanity stripped of their psychic and spiritual essence. 
Its possibility also reveals that the height of non-teleological choice and 
construction must be a self-undoing and total reconstruction, as this would 
most prove our negative freedom, even if it brought about no substantive good 
or further flourishing. Similarly, but less spectacularly, if there is no assigned 
telos for freedom, no ÔtrueÕ choice that renders us genuinely free, then the 
nobility of freedom for the sake of freedom can only be manifested in the 
trivial irrelevance of what is actually chosen. Claims to the intrinsically 
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higher value of ÔartisticÕ creative choices that re-fashion matter, the self or 
society in a more ÔbeautifulÕ direction cannot survive the critique of the 
transcendent any more than claims to objective truth or objective ethical 
goodness. If it does not in some fashion ÔrevealÕ, then art in every sense 
becomes ingenious self-referentiality or the mere assertion of subjectivity 
variously through Ð ironically Ð the manufacture of a completely atomistic and 
anonymous, flattened, vauntedly de-hierarchised and contentless object (the 
sculptures of Donald Judd); the telegraphing of a public joke (the works of 
Marcel Broodthaers, which more or less consist in an anticipation of their own 
commodification, or Robert BarryÕs ÔworksÕ, which exist only insofar as he 
alludes to them and, more significantly, sells them); more or less harmless 
shock (the conceptual edifices of Damien Hurst) or not so harmless imaginary 
transgression of ethical bounds under the spurious claim that the imaginary is 
safely corralled against the real (the films of Ken Clark concerning degenerate 
provincial adolescents, sometimes depicted as abusing the elderly and infirm 
for recreation).38 
One can, therefore, argue that apparently ÔtrivialÕ consumerist freedom is 
simply a mass transcription of Enlightenment freedom. And it is far more that 
than the creative freedom of art, which, if it is taken to disclose truth, requires 
some sort of Platonic, participatory rationale in the lineage of early Romantic 
thinkers like Novalis, Friedrich Schlegel, Joseph Joubert and Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge. 
The Death of Beauty 
It is because of this populist, and yet retrospectively authentic, transcription of 
enlightened and idealist freedom that, as Malcolm Bull has suggested (and 
appears to celebrate), the idea of aesthetic value may now be subject to immi-
nent demise, even though beauty is the last of the transcendental trio finally to 
lapse.39 Indeed, as any city walk will now confirm, the obsession with perfect 
health and beauty of the few, alongside the careless despair as to dress and 
appearance of the many (in contrast to the sartorial dignity of most classes up 
till the 1960s), is giving way to a cult of expressive ugliness in both expensive 
and mass varieties. 
In the sphere of the arts, as Bull argues, nothing is any longer deemed 
ÔdecadentÕ Ð marginal, uncoordinated, unintegrated, narcissistic and perverse Ð 
because these things are now the new post-modern norm and aesthetic value is 
reduced to market value. Thus, in an exacerbation of modernism, works may 
be purely conceptual and even privately esoteric and invisible, so long as they 
can be traded.40 Furthermore, if, according to Nietzsche, aesthetic value 
proceeds only from a willed ÔvaluationÕ, why should we value even valuation 
any longer, or that ÔecologyÕ which favours the strong and their 
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prevailing? Would not a further perfected nihilism be ultra-Jacobin, as Bull 
suggests, in refusing all values and valuation in terms of an Ôecology of the 
weakÕ? Such an ecology would more fully realise anti-metaphysics in an 
hyperbolic utilitarianism as the greatest possible equality of the greatest pos-
sible numbers and, therefore, as the greatest possible dilution of value, given 
its inherent variation, concentration and hierarchy. But this advocacy of the 
lowest common denominator with the widest spread mistakes real democracy 
by ignoring the primacy of the temporal and educative dimension, besides the 
non-scarcity of the most valuable. The best, such as love, is the least rare and 
survives any spread, while excellence may be transmitted and grown into, 
just as it fades with age and death. 
Beyond these points, it can be insisted that the various minority posses-
sions of rare talents and capacities are seriously to the general benefit of the 
less talented, in contrast to the spurious supposed trickling down of value as 
mere wealth. The choice is between the one hierarchy or the other, and any 
spurious third alternative of debasement in hyper-egalitarian spread would 
merely celebrate a naturalistic misery that is ontologically impossible so long 
as we remain human. Yet, from Gracchus Babeuf onwards this has had the 
capacity to produce sufficiently miserable cultural approximations.41 
4. FROM PAIDEIA TO EDUCATION 
At the heart of the liberal destruction of the natural-cultural and humano-
technical hybrid lies the perversion of the formative or educational process, 
the paideia of the ancients. For the perspective of paideia, if education was for 
the purpose of producing philosophic and political virtue, then, inversely, 
politics was about producing virtuous citizens. Therefore, politics existed to 
further educative formation, at least as much as the other way around. 
It is true that, to begin with, the Enlightenment approach to education did 
contain genuine echoes of the classical humanist balance and oscillation 
between the political and the educative, but eventually it subordinated the latter 
in favour of the former, rendering education an instrumental affair. One could 
say that the ancient balance, which was also one between (political) space and 
(formative) time, was predicated on some sense of extra-human transcendence, 
which qualified the insight that man is a Ôsocial animalÕ with a sense that the 
destiny of the individual soul exceeds that of merely human society. But, in 
effect, in modern enlightened times, this transcendence has been entirely 
captured by the human in the form of the political. Thereby, the collapse of the 
transcendent into the immanently spatial, as already described, entails also the 
loss of the temporal. This ÔspatialisationÕ reveals, perhaps surprisingly, that the 
loss of the eternal entails also the loss of historicity.42 
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However, that is not the only option for the modern capture of education 
and the transcendent. One can describe political capture as the classical, 
enlightened option. But there is also an alternative, romantic (or quasi-
romantic) option, as first expressed in the thought of Rousseau. 
Because Rousseau, as we saw in the first chapter, made the inverse modern 
move of rendering the isolated individual purely innocent rather than purely 
amoral, he also made the inverse modern move of making education com-
pletely superior to the political, and time entirely superior to space Ð a theme 
that is later echoed by both Henri Bergson and Martin Heidegger. Because, 
for Rousseau, civil society and sophisticated culture could only have a cor-
rupting effect, this must also include education, and especially mass educa-
tion. It can only be education into discontent, envy, ressentiment and loss of 
pure, natural good taste in favour of fashion and unnecessary complication 
and refinement, which loses the raw edge of genuine creativity. From this 
perspective, all cultural assertions of superiority, like all claims to justified 
power and inequality, can only be viewed negatively. At best, power, 
inequality and official culture are but necessary evils, to be endlessly resisted, 
in a spirit of tragic pathos. 
It is easy to see what a tremendous effect this individualistic, quasi-roman-
tic way of thinking has had upon the political left right up to the present day Ð 
and, indeed, especially in the present day, when it is more and more domi-
nated by a pathetically tragic outlook. However, there is a crucial twist in the 
Rousseauian story. The great Genevan, of course, considered that we could 
regain our natural liberty at a higher level through the contractual concentra-
tion of all power at the political centre, which would then contrive to coordi-
nate the negative liberty of each with the negative liberty of all Ð projected as 
the might of the state that coincides with the general will.43 
This political programme naturally had its educational precondition and 
ultimate purpose. The ideal education Ð as described in mile Ð is natural and 
spontaneous, a matter of organic emergence, not of imbibing extraneous pre-
digested knowledge. Nonetheless, it is still possible to systematically organise 
and encourage such a spontaneity through a romanticised Cartesianism that 
methodically returns to what is supposed to be sheerly given by nature and to 
permit this to merely unfold.44 From this root derives the fact that purportedly 
Ôchild-centredÕ or else Ôskills-orientatedÕ approaches to education can be just as 
much linked to state-monopoly as the more ÔenlightenedÕ utilitarian-based 
programmes. By the most curious and yet crucial bio-political paradox, it is the 
state, within the individualist romantic paradigm, that claims to be the nursing-
mother of natural wisdom and, once more, to exist and to educate. 
So what can now be seen is that both the modern enlightened and quasi-
romantic approaches to education are predicated upon the loss of transcen-
dence, which disturbs the balance between space and time and so between 
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the political and the educational. An atheistic or agnostic refusal of transcen-
dence appears to be rational, yet, in reality, it gives rise to twin insanities that 
everyone, whether religious or not, can partially recognise. Either, insanely, 
we grant to the state a complete carte blanche to force us to learn whatever it 
wants us to learn for the sake of its own power, or else, with equal lunacy, we 
imagine that there is some kind of innocent pre-cultural knowledge that we 
should permit to emerge spontaneously. By an ironic twist, the latter also can 
become what the state enforces. Of course, outside the exception of experi-
mental schooling, what occurs in reality is an incoherent mix of the two: a 
utilitarian approach to what is deemed economically and socially useful, and a 
darkly romantic amoral and narcissistic approach to the arts and humanities. 
In this manner, liberalism fuses atomistic individualism with state collectiv-
ism, which is reflected in mass education. 
5. CRITIQUE OF MASS EDUCATION 
There is something dubious about the notion of the state as the prime educator 
and about its power to coerce us to learn what it thinks we ought to learn. But 
here one needs to go further and argue that it has been an unsuccessful 
educator so far, and that the effect of liberal mass education has been in many 
ways educationally deleterious. For one thing, liberal education has hardly 
promoted reflexive subtlety, and it has certainly been inimical to the complex 
connections between knowledge, popular belief and folk culture Ð just as offi-
cial ÔcareÕ often works less well than traditional and unofficial mutuality. This 
can prompt a controversial reflection. The usual modern view is that gradu-
ally, with the spread of enlightened education, reason displaces superstition 
and this gradually extends down the social class ladder. But an alternative 
view might be that the crude spectacle entailed by mass exposure to Ôthe truthÕ 
is just as unfavourable to the complexity of truth as it is to the indirectness of 
myth. It is a matter of common observation Ð and, indeed, something insisted 
upon by enlightened thinkers themselves, like Hume Ð that what tends to 
prevail in the public light and amongst most people, especially under the 
influence of the contagion of opinion, is not necessarily truth but, much more 
certainly, plausibility. 
A huge problem here is that the truth can often look Ð at least at first sight Ð 
implausible. One of the reasons for this is that a half-truth or even a falsity can 
sometimes tell a far simpler story that more readily appeals to peopleÕs 
memories or imaginations, especially if that story can be told in terms of two 
clearly distinguished sides fighting a battle with each other. This is notably 
true of the popular perception of the history of science, and especially of the 
interaction of science with religion. But this perception is largely encouraged 
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by poor academics, often seeking a mass audience. Therefore, it can be sug-
gested that the more one has mass education and mass culture, then the more 
half-baked ideas, obstinately middle-brow tastes and, eventually, sheer crude 
populist scepticism come to the fore. So much may this be the case that one 
can argue that folk-beliefs, including religious beliefs, tend to be rejected for 
the same social reason that complex and seemingly arcane metaphysical 
beliefs are rejected. On this theory, it is not the Ôaristocracy of knowledgeÕ that 
has triumphed in modern times, but, rather, a bourgeois marketing of 
knowledge, which also debases its currency. This bourgeois knowledge is in 
conflict with both subtle learning and folk-myth, which perhaps retain today a 
secret oppositional kinship and an extraordinary latent appeal Ð as the success 
of J.R.R. Tolkien and J.K. RowlingÕs fictions suggests. 
However, this kinship was, in the past, to a degree mediated at the folk-
level itself. The English cottager who had imbibed his store of local under-
standing of herbs, weather, fairy-tales and natural magic, had also often read 
his Shakespeare, Paradise Lost, PilgrimÕs Progress or Robinson Crusoe. In 
Victorian times, readers laughed at the way in which Gabriel Betteredge, 
house-servant and first narrator of Wilkie CollinsÕs novel The Moonstone, 
based all his life upon the wisdom of DefoeÕs most famous novel.45 Yet today 
we can stand almost in awe of BetteredgeÕs knowledge and elucidation. It is 
surely true that anyone who knew Robinson Crusoe thoroughly and had 
reflected on it deeply, never mind the works of Shakespeare, Milton and 
Bunyan, would be far more ÔeducatedÕ as regards the human condition, ethics 
and the foundations of Western culture, than the average proletarianised 
middle-class product of most British universities today. 
In fact, possessing only a thin spattering of information about this or that, 
plus a bundle of information-handling and presentational skills that anyone in 
urban modernity could swiftly pick up anywhere, such people are only 
prepared to become consumers or functionaries, not citizens in any genuine 
sense. Furthermore, the evidence is that mass literacy as improved after the 
Education Act of 1870 did not necessarily achieve higher levels than those 
achieved by home-schooling and ecclesial schools in the seventeenth century. 
In the following century, the British state, under whig influence that sought to 
limit the scope of Anglican catechesis, had resisted Church of England and 
tory attempts to extend the education of ordinary people in charity schools.46 
In the long run, since 1870, levels of literacy (by any serious standard) have 
eventually declined Ð even if the total number of literate people has gone up. 
And accompanying this has been a gradual erosion of interior working-class 
codes of honour, leaving little behind save a certain lassitude and tasteless 
hedonism, which the lower-end of the consumer market ceaselessly fosters. 
How is one to escape the conclusion that actually, for most people, self-
education Ð including cooperative education, given the crucial presence of a 
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learned clergy and the circulation of books Ð achieves far more than enforced 
learning?47 The problem here is that liberalism enforces an equality of learn-
ing and, thereby, gradually undermines the very hierarchy of value on which 
true education or vocational formation, whether by brain or hand, depends Ð 
since, by definition, not everyone will attain its realisation equally. Thus, the 
more that the required standards of learning and conduct are seen as equally 
reachable by all, and the more this minimum is seen as the essential, then the 
more these realities are, in fact, thinned out and diluted Ð and to this degree 
Malcolm Bull is right.48 Emancipation is, indeed, supposed to be from unequal 
power inhibiting freedom, yet the power to liberate still derives from 
knowledge, and so we need learning in order to free ourselves both from our 
natural condition and from unjust social impostures. But how can there be an 
Ôequal learningÕ, since learning by definition divides the learned from the less 
learned? Equal access of all, in principle, to that for which they may turn out 
to be suited is what is most certainly required here. But liberalism tends to 
undermine this just goal and so, paradoxically, the very possibility of a more 
authentic emancipation that can resist mere power or unjust power in the name 
of an insight into justice. It does so by increasingly educating all, in a 
Bebeuvian spirit as revived by the 1960s, without much respect for ability or 
inclination, into the same readily accessible minimum, which ensures that 
most people can be turned into state or market functionaries even at the level 
of the ÔprofessionsÕ, whose work has become increasingly routinised.49 
And is it not the case that state education has been less successful at 
imparting skills than confessional education in the past, which paid more 
attention to goals of flourishing and, so, to aptitude and the possibility of 
open, unlimited development? Indeed, what are most secondary schools 
today if not conspiracies against learning? For how is any child supposed to 
learn if it has to spend much of every day travelling, rapidly switching from 
one topic to another and quarrelling with other children, while being 
deliberately prevented from any sustained focus upon any one book, task or 
problem? It would seem that we only ÔeducateÕ people in order that they may 
fill certain pre-inscribed roles and not in any consistent sense in order to fulfil 
them as individuals or to develop their innate talents.50 Of course, we have to 
educate people to fulfil social positions. But if these latter are genuinely 
about building up society for its own sake, on behalf of human interaction, 
friendship and symbolic association, then we need to allow that different 
people will embrace these roles in different ways that will transform and 
renew the roles themselves, and constantly reveal their new potential for 
increasing social solidarity. 
For this reason, the business of self-realisation is far from irrelevant to the 
social purpose of the pedagogic process. Much education goes wrong because 
it fails to recognise that people cannot ever improve themselves by becoming 
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someone else: all that is genuinely open to them is to become better versions 
of themselves, which is always something unique. Moreover, the increasing 
attempt to impose one template upon everybody ignores the prosthetic reality 
at the basis of all human society as well as at the basis of every economic 
market to which we have already alluded. This reality is the human compen-
sation for its animal weakness by a ÔtechnologyÕ that includes the ÔpoliticallyÕ 
organised reliance upon the cooperation achieved through the division of 
labour and its architectonic coordination. In the end, it is a personÕs focus 
upon what she can do well and with integrity that renders her at once fulfilled 
and socially useful. 
Yet currently our educational system overvalues all-round minimal com-
petence of a certain restricted kind, and fails to be alert to the fact that a 
chronic lack of talent in one field is sometimes a sign of a great hidden talent 
in another. That is one of the reasons why contemporary Britain, in 
particular, has such a shocking shortage of people with certain vocational 
skills Ð engineering, medicine, nursing and teaching itself. So if our schools 
and even universities are increasingly a conspiracy against learning, they are 
also a system for stifling talent and guaranteeing the politically requisite 
quota of failure. An over-emphasis upon a pseudo-academic curriculum for 
too many for whom this is not really suited is a crucial aspect of the picture 
that we are describing. 
If much current education fails to be intellectually educative, then one can 
also argue, following the visionary Milanese priest, Luigi Giussani, that it is 
emotionally damaging.51 Left to herself or themselves, an individual or a 
community of people tends to build up a coherent symbolic worldview within 
which she or it can live happily and flourish. Obviously, one valid function of 
education is to question such worldviews and to encourage the appreciation 
and tolerance of alternative perspectives. However, the utilitarian/romantic 
oscillation encourages such a sharp and false pedagogic divide between facts 
and values that pupils today struggle to relate the sciences to the humanities, 
the humanities to each other or both to the religious or anti-religious dimen-
sion. Within this dislocated morass, they rarely develop any subtle capacities 
to discriminate between rival values or value-systems and may, instead, suffer 
severe emotional damage through a consequent inability to individuate 
themselves. 
In the face of this situation, Giussani invigoratingly suggested that it is the 
task of the real teacher to ÔriskÕ communicating her integral worldview, in the 
hope that the pupil will accept it, but with acceptance of her right not to. This 
proposal calls for an honest education, without masks or pretences, which 
accepts that the true stake of formation must be the chance of making some 
sort of integral sense of human life on earth. A more vocationally diversified 
education, therefore, needs to be combined not so much with a shared 
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minimum of low-level knowledge and skills, as with a shared maximum of 
concern, however approached and at whatever level, with overarching meta-
physical frameworks and existential stances. 
To be offered a version of such a framework and such a stance is to be 
given the chance of achieving it, whether by accepting this version or in 
terms of modifying it or rejecting it. Nor does this approach deny that one 
aspect of learning must come from the learner herself: for every vision will 
be appropriated differently, or refused differently. The good teacher is not 
only one who merely presents an integral vision, but also one who seeks to 
draw out what is latent in the pupil before her. However, her role is 
indispensable insofar as she offers to the pupil a certain guarantee that 
thinking Ôhas somewhere to goÕ. Without this guarantee, the fear of never 
arriving somewhere would tend to inhibit the creativity of exploratory 
thought. This is the main reason why the figure of the teacher is 
indispensable: not to instil fear, but rather to banish it. 
The fact that so many educated men and women in the West now fail to 
have children suggests strongly that Giussani was right Ð that the educative 
process induces such a state of psychological uncertainty that it becomes 
difficult to find a marriage partner or to know exactly why one should want 
to pass on oneÕs biological and cultural legacy. Thus one can after all agree 
with Rousseau that the usual upshot of modern mass education is a debase-
ment of character. What most people are educated into is easier, lazier means 
to achieve a modicum of material comfort. In consequence, liberal education 
produces servile consumers rather than critical citizens in the interests of the 
capitalist market and the bureaucratic state. The contemporary focus on trans-
ferable skills reflects this, and has the further effect of undermining genuine 
excellence and ethos that would promote character formation. Perhaps most 
of all, liberalism is inherently general and middle-brow, and as such, it 
destroys the fusion of high with folk culture. 
6. THE CO-DESTRUCTION OF HIGH AND FOLK CULTURE 
As already indicated, liberalism is a moralism that replaces the substantive, 
indefinable and, yet, inherently attractive ethical Good with alien abstract rules 
about the right versus the wrong, which tend to be fussily insisted upon.52 
In illustration, one can note that the category of ÔminoritiesÕ is frequently 
conceived as a genus that bizarrely lumps the needy and unfortunate Ð for 
example the disabled Ð together with natural groupings of race, sexuality and 
gender. This is done in such a way as to suggest a certain underhand exchange 
of idioms whereby the unfortunate are not helped by being seen as a natural 
grouping with rights, while natural groupings are symmetrically regarded as 
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necessarily permanent victims. Such sophistry undergirds a moralism that 
induces a false, always wrong-footing guilt, whereby one is deemed turn by 
turn to have failed to perceive an active, Ôotherwise ableÕ, and so on, claimant 
of rights instead of a victim, or, alternatively, an active claimant where one 
should have seen a victim in need of Ôpositively discriminatingÕ support. 
What is precluded here is the truly ethical discernment of the ways in which 
the other might flourish and be assisted to do so, including a questioning of 
any treatment of any altogether singular person under one particular species. 
In a similar fashion, liberal moralism, caught in a bio-political oscillation, is 
often unable to decide whether a gendered, sexual or even racial group 
possesses rights based in naturally given circumstances of birth, or rather in 
the claiming of an identity by a mere act of will. What is precluded here is 
the question of how any inextricably natural-cultural hybrid identity can be 
lived authentically in pursuit of an end that transcends either given nature or 
superadded culture. 
And once one has what is, in reality, the merely moral rather than ethical 
in this mode, one has also the instability of trying to ground political Ômutual 
benefitÕ upon basically individualistic presuppositions about the supremacy 
of mere survival and expression of a particular variation (not true individua-
tion) Ð so long as this is deemed healthy. This supremacy can always disturb 
such pseudo-reciprocal order through a resurgence of supposedly ÔnaturalÕ 
egoistic violence, or else the slumbering anarchy of sovereign political power 
and formal economic capital. Zygmunt BaumanÕs work shows in detail how 
the rise of a mass democratic culture involved an extreme destruction of local 
modes of political participation and of folkways that had been previously 
impervious to control by either dispersed market or remote sovereign state. 
This was inevitable, since their solidarity involved notions of shared good-
ness that could only arise through processes of sharing, including a shared 
sense of socially arising symbolic value.53 
Without a popular inculcation of virtue and without virtuous elites that lead 
by example and command popular assent precisely because they uphold and 
hyperbolically fulfil ideals that are open to all, culture becomes debased and 
descends into the empty vacuity of bourgeois, middle-brow pietism. This has 
something to do with both a left liberal rejection of any hierarchy whatsoever, 
whether of values or exponents of values, and a right-liberal defence of 
pseudo-hierarchy based on accidental privilege or manipulative skill that 
secures the possession of purely economic value. For the liberal left, there are, 
increasingly, not supposed to be any people who Ôknow betterÕ or Ôperform 
betterÕ than others concerning values as opposed to facts Ð a position that 
incidentally privileges technocracy over democratic rule. But do we not need, 
instead, a more modest notion of Ôorganic intellectualsÕ (in a non-Leninist 
sense) whose educative knowledge would be somewhat distanced 
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from immediate exercise of power and whose social experiments would be 
more subject to the test of populist feedback? Further, do we not need such 
intellectuals to be less contemptuous of the folk-wisdom of ages, which has 
stood the test of time? Is there not something highly ironic about the way 
elite experimenters tend to distrust the most long conducted experiments of 
all? The worst naivety is the naivety of the learned and the iconoclastic who 
nearly always over-estimate through caricature the naivety of the beliefs that 
they call into doubt.54 
And one can go further: metaphysical enquiries into the mystery of being 
are in harmony with the implicit questionings of folk-art and practice. By 
contrast, Enlightenment thought was suspicious of the latter because it either 
denied or circumvented the mysterious in favour of a self-produced and, so 
self-concerning, predictability. For this reason, from the outset, much 
Enlightenment thought was relentlessly middle-brow in character, such as 
that of Voltaire, and it possessed the more intractable naivety of the half-
baked and excessively cynical. 
If this is true, then it could be that typically modern, critical, secular thought 
poses the wrong sets of alternatives. In trying to get rid of the religious, it also 
threatens to get rid of demotic culture and of the kind of learned elite who are 
less likely to repress this culture, even though they are needed in order to 
criticise and guide it. This function is itself a component of the popular, from 
the beginning and for all times Ð just as folk tales so generally concern kings 
and queens. We construe our modern politics as high versus low, right versus 
left. But suppose, instead, the real political crux concerns the triumph of the 
mediocre middle (or Ôthe false fewÕ) and the possibility that only the natural 
organic alliance of high and low can question this triumph? After all, an 
aristocratic right without a popular left has engaged in either nostalgia or a 
kitsch gloss upon the mediocre middle. Meanwhile a popular left without an 
aristocratic right has usually, and in whatever complex disguise (including 
most Marxisms), merely removed symbolic barriers to the ever-greater victory 
of capitalism and bureaucracy; promoted a resentful aspiration of the masses 
towards the middling mode of economy and culture; and sustained a curiously 
inverted traditional dualistic assumption concerning the Ômore materialÕ 
inclinations of the masses, inherently linked to a metaphysical association of 
matter with the debased, confused and conflictual, rather than with a 
mysterious potential Ð as for the Aristotelian and Thomistic tradition. Is it not 
by now obvious that, as John Ruskin suggested, any viable resistance to the 
capitalist-bureaucratic liberal centre would have to come from a continuously 
dynamic and paradoxical blue/red fusion of guiding excellence with populist 
spontaneity? 
This is not at all to deny that sometimes religions themselves suppress their 
own more popular idioms. But if Charles Taylor is right, then they have been 
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in this respect the agents of their own destruction. Such suppression has been, 
in the European Latin West, the main cause of a unique secularisation that is 
neither necessary nor normative but, rather, historically contingent, largely 
arbitrary and, for that reason, in principle reversible.55 
The secular left and right are unable to properly criticise liberalism, includ-
ing capitalism, and it is mainly for this, undiagnosed reason that they are today 
suffering an ever-accelerated entropy. In particular, they are incapable of 
making the key argument that various different faith traditions are able to 
make Ð that nature is neither external to humanity, nor should humans ever 
aspire simply to dominate their own or external nature. If culture itself 
includes and is constituted by the nature/culture tension, then there is, for a 
meta-critique (in the positive sense) no critical possibility of deciding that 
meanings or imaginings, spontaneities or purposes, are not just as natural as 
they are cultural. Inversely, one cannot necessarily conclude that cultural law 
is any exception to the habituations of nature. For the ritual dimension, which, 
as we have already argued, initially composes human culture, is a kind of 
experimental risk that can itself only be established through habit.56 As risk, it 
is also the gift of instruction from an initiator, which sacrificially breaks the 
deadlock of potential human isolation. And as habit, it is something that has 
ÔworkedÕ with the populace, often through modification, and so has been 
received. Ritual is in this way indissociably aristocratic and democratic. The 
same applies to the authentically open-ended and genuinely purposive scien-
tific or social experiment. 
But a society like ours that has become excessively and anarchically 
ÔexperimentalisedÕ is one in which a positivist aristocracy (as envisaged by 
Auguste Comte) totally dominates the mass of people in the name of science, 
such that the real ÔsecretÕ of the attempted control of nature by this elite is the 
control of society itself.57 Here, ritual has ceased to be a gift of wisdom, but 
has become either an imposed law or a contract enforced by a wealthier 
party. And its reception is either punctiliar or identically repeated without 
variation. It is no longer received as an authentic habit, which imparts an 
artistic or craft skill. 
Instead, in a liberal culture, ritual is increasingly about the identical repeti-
tion of a generic vacuity masquerading as an endless succession of diversity 
and difference. This is reflected in the tendency of capitalism towards re-
branding essentially the same products and services and in the imperative to 
continuously change for the sake of attraction, profit and formal self-
justification in terms of dynamism and increased speed alone. More broadly, it 
can be observed that capitalist culture, especially in the United States, is 
homogenous, despite the extraordinary diversity in origin of its population. It 
deals in abstract, generic and kitsch ideals: ÔitÕs amazing to fall in love with a 
blue-eyed blonde, itÕs sad to grow old and best to try to avoid itÕ. This kind of 
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low-grade US culture is accessible to all, but it is corrosive of both universal 
high and particular local folk cultures. For this reason, people outside the 
United States resent it even as they consume it, as the American commentator 
Christopher Caldwell has suggested.58 
Liberalism has been so successful precisely because it has inculcated the 
sense that mainstream culture should follow wealth and prestige, as evidenced 
by the increasing resemblance of ÔseriousÕ newspapers to populist tabloids. 
But this runs against a still-not-quite-eradicated memory of the time of 
cultural survival of pre-capitalist norms up till the 1950s, which tends to 
refuse the lure of an increasingly tawdry mode of glamour, especially as its 
economic reachability has receded. That is why the backlash against 
capitalism and liberalism tends to take a cultural form Ð FranceÕs lÕexception 
culturelle, RussiaÕs insistence on traditional conservative values and ChinaÕs 
appeal to its own Confucian roots. However much one may refuse its atavistic 
aspects, the mainstream left and right are deluded if they imagine that here the 
masses are gulled by a false consciousness into evading the priority of class 
and international solidarity. To the contrary, the people are implicitly wiser in 
realising that only loyalty to the ineffable realities of always singular and, so, 
sacred identification can possibly resist capitalist abstraction and simultane-
ously ÔenclosingÕ materialisation. 
7. LIBERAL CULTURE AS POST-HUMANISM 
Liberalism does not just change the meaning of culture and education, it also 
redefines traditional social relations and the nature of life and its reproduc-
tion. In one sense, the freeing of sex from the law has always been ambiva-
lently implied by Christianity, as realised by D.H. Lawrence in his advocacy 
of its sanctity and seriousness. At the same time, what one saw in the 1960s 
was a kind of democratisation and commercialisation of ÔbohemianÕ morals, 
which had themselves earlier been newly legitimated and normalised for an 
elite. The problem here is that a released self-pleasuring can become either 
explicitly or tacitly a goal in itself, and that this twisting of freedom can 
become a new mode of political control through apparent submission only to 
oneÕs own contentment. 
Indeed, the ever-increasing separation of sex from procreation (such that 
the palliative and accurate sense that oneÕs natural sexual drive is the drive of 
nature to sustain itself scarcely comes any longer to male consciousness) is 
regarded naїvely if we do not realise that this is what the state covertly wants 
Ð such being the central theme of Aldous HuxleyÕs Brave New World. In 
terms of partially deliberate but mainly objective intentional drift, it desires a 
ÔMalthusianÕ control over reproduction that is more easily attained 
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through self-release and permission for any sexual pleasure than through self-
discipline. This allows the state to deal with the individual directly, rather than 
through the mediation of couples and families, which are too much like micro-
states within states. Much of liberal feminism and LGBT rights activism too 
readily colludes with this underlying reality, as with the allied commodifica-
tion of human reproduction, which becomes evermore a matter of the con-
tractual exchange of necessary components Ð whether by personal encounter or 
impersonal third-partner mediation. It is also too rarely noticed that sexual 
permissiveness has today, as Huxley already noted in his later foreword to his 
dystopian novel, become a kind of opiate that covertly reconciles people to the 
loss of other freedoms Ð in relation to both the state and the workplace.59 
The Abolition of Gender Difference 
Thus one has here, objectively regarded in terms of semantic implications and 
likely social outcomes, a further extension of bio-political tyranny as the state 
arrogates to itself the power to re-define anthropological rituals and social 
institutions whose origins and ÔownershipÕ precede and transcend it. The same 
tyranny is also exhibited in the unisexuality of modern culture. As Ivan Illich 
argued in his book Gender, modern sexism, systematic subordination and 
increasing endangerment of women (exposure to chances of rape and vio-
lence), does not derive from the perpetuation of patriarchy Ð however produc-
tive of many abuses that undoubtedly was in the past.60 Rather, it results from 
the abolition of gender difference. The latter was to a great extent (which Illich, 
nonetheless, exaggerates) constitutive of the sociality, economy and legality of 
all pre-modern human societies. Indeed, a sense of complementar-ity or of a 
kind of Ôsocial intercourseÕ and Ôgeneral marriageÕ between the thoroughly 
different assigned matching tasks of the two halves of the human race produced 
a reciprocal circle that to some degree automatically produced symbolic 
meaning, legal norms, political order, social peace, charitable but non-
institutionalised care and economic subsistence and stability. For Illich, this 
primordial model was, therefore, linked to a sustainable plenitude and not to 
economic scarcity Ð perhaps also because it construed culture and history as 
metaphorical procreation, which remains incessantly within a renewable 
human capacity.61 
It follows that the dissolution of gender difference helps to give rise to a 
new liberal economic subject Ð at first, the isolated matrimonial household, 
sundered from kinship after the twelfth century and later, the isolated needy 
individual Ð ultimately defined by an infinity and so a scarcity of needs. The 
breaking of reciprocity included the circle of gender, even though this 
implies no crude version of ÔessentialismÕ. Rather, the human universal was 
the gendered division of labour, and not the precise mode of division, which 
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varied greatly and sometimes oppositely from culture to culture. Thus, in 
some societies women might be the traders or the outspoken debaters, men 
the domestic types or the oblique and enigmatic speakers. 
Once gender in IllichÕs sense has been abolished, we are removed from the 
reality that gender difference is quasi-generic.62 There are no humans to 
whom gender difference is just tacked on by accident, as a bulge or its 
absence in the blue jeans (as Illich puts it), yet modernity wishes us to think 
that this is the case.63 And naturally Illich insists that the exceptions Ð trans-
sexuality, homosexuality, etc. Ð simply prove the rule by their manifestations 
in terms of parodic reproduction of gender difference, or else the substitution 
of difference in age and other quasi-essential varieties. 
This modern inculcation of an asexual ontological delusion is another 
aspect of the sundering of nature from culture and Ôthe whatÕ from Ôthe whoÕ, 
because gender is hitherto mysteriously universal (like archaic painting, one 
could suggest) as to form, and yet bewilderingly different as to content. Thus 
the persisting reality (despite everything) of gender difference tends to force 
us to acknowledge that there is something culturally beyond nature that is all 
the same somehow natural Ð supernatural in a certain sense. 
When this is denied, as in modern times, much reinforced by that very 
economics of scarcity which the abolition of gender tends to permit, then 
inevitably the revenge of ineradicable gender takes the form of construing a 
supposedly basic, asexual humanity implicitly upon the model of the male 
sex. Just for this reason, contemporary sexism follows from the abolition of 
gender difference, since women will henceforth always be regarded as sub-
ordinate, imperfect men. It is for this reason, according to Illich, that, despite 
all best efforts, under a modern, liberal, unisexual regime they are doomed to 
remain subordinate Ð socially, politically and economically. In particular, he 
notes how women throughout the globe carry a hugely disproportionate 
burden of Ôshadow workÕ Ð housework, childcare, maintaining of bureau-
cratic demands, care of consumer products. The developed capitalist system 
depends upon this, and it is totally unlike the traditional work of the domus, 
which was an integral or even the main part of older, largely or partially 
subsistence economies. 
This seems to remain the case today, even though the position of women 
as regards income has improved considerably beyond IllichÕs expectations in 
the 1980s. It is still, nevertheless, true that women remain grossly under-
represented at the summits, central and local, of every cultural and institu-
tional tree. But here one can suggest a twist to IllichÕs case. In many ways, 
the typical ÔunisexualÕ person is now more of a gender mix than he perhaps 
supposed: women appear to figure prominently in the middle ranks precisely 
because they are encouraged to combine an unnatural male professional 
sternness and detachment (which is always ethically dubious, however much 
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moralistically advocated) with a traditional, supposedly female characteristic 
of docility and compliance. It is just for this reason that quotas and positive 
discrimination are so unfavourable to any but a false, liberal feminism. For 
they are likely to favour precisely the over-promotion of just such a blandly 
careerist ÔneutralityÕ in every sense. This serves to prevent the emergence of 
genuinely strong and unambiguously gendered women who may also tend to 
revolutionise the public sphere through an infusion of more ÔdomesticÕ 
nurturing qualities and a more passionately formed and, therefore, balanced 
and subtle intelligence. 
This is not to say that any identification of gender difference is easy Ð but 
surely the fact that it is at once real and yet utterly elusive is suggested 
precisely by its formal preponderance and yet substantive variety in all 
ancient human cultures.64 Nevertheless, Illich fails to discuss the crucial point 
that any arbitrary division of gender labour, for all its traditional ubiquity, 
surely obfuscates as much as reveals the core of this elusiveness. Both Neo-
platonism (which, in the wake of PlatoÕs Republic accepted women as both 
philosophers and politicians) and Christianity gradually tended to question 
and remove this differentiation by task and role, just as the Christian removal 
of marriage from kinship (however ambivalent) did help to release women 
from the aristocratic threat of incest, concubinage and enforced capture by 
tribal formations (as Illich somewhat suppresses).65 
So neither the universal past nor the particular present provides us now 
with desirable paths for the social construal of gender. The more than dif-
ficult task before us is to imagine how men and women could share all roles 
in a way that admitted of an enigmatic complementarity, encouraging a 
fertile reciprocity beyond cultural and economic scarcity. This alone would 
allow any true possibility of gender equality in every area and at the cultural 
summit, For our culture would, thereby, have admitted that people only ever 
occupy a partial, gendered perspective, and therefore absolutely require Ôthe 
other point of viewÕ if they are to see themselves and to become, as a 
collectivity, truly self-governed. 
The Redefinition of Life 
In the absence of any such realisation, state tyranny remains compounded 
maleness as it is often construed Ð the lone virility of the massed will. Such 
tyranny contradictorily elevates the free and absolute control (by living spir-
its) of life over psychic life as such, whose combination of external bodily 
fragility with inviolable interiority should command our absolute respect.66 
For the latter involves a double and combined gift whose origins we cannot 
trace and with which in a sense we coincide through a conscious awareness 
of existence. In this gift lies the assumed basis of value for valuing 
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everything else. But by liberalising access to abortion and euthanasia to such 
a degree that the power over life and death is handed over to private jurisdic-
tion with its temptations to despair, liberalism surrenders the absoluteness of 
this vital foundation. In its place is positioned human freedom of choice and 
the pursuit of happiness now understood as including the right to terminate 
the lives of the immature, weaker, older or suffering, including oneÕs own life 
so understood. What is legitimated here is not genuinely desirable democratic 
right, but incipiently the will to power of some over others and essentially the 
strong over the weak. For if it is not the created and creative uniqueness of 
each freely developing human personality that is absolutely valued, then 
nothing logically prevents a legitimate extension of this will to power to 
ending the lives also of children and adults deemed to be too miserable, or 
insufficiently free, or too inhibitory of the free scope of others. This is espe-
cially true if one remembers that there can be slow means of condemnation to 
death. 
To reject the primacy of spiritual life is to abandon the entire basis of 
Western humanism, especially in its Christian form, over thousands of years, 
and to replace the noble ideal of humanity with the delusory yet dangerous 
norm of a spirit impossibly free of its own body manipulating all bodies and 
other spirits in its own interests. And a state that is itself run by such self-
imagined creatures has no qualms about manipulating both life and death in 
the interests of its own augmentation of power and ease of operation. In fact, 
only this state control demonically and fraudulently resolves the aporia of an 
embodied spirit pretending to disembodied hegemony. For the purported 
distance of spirit from body can be both compounded and re-incarnated as 
the artificial body of the state Leviathan, whose collectively imagined reality 
is in practice at one with the policed unity of all human bodies amassed into 
methodical coordination. 
In this way, liberalism about life, conception and death points inexorably 
towards a new form of biological totalitarianism. The logical conclusion of 
liberal post-humanism is Peter SingerÕs call to ÔunsanctifyÕ human life and to 
extend euthanasia to Ôseverely and irreparably retarded infantsÕ and those 
forms of human and non-human life whose medical condition causes 
Ôsuffering to all concerned and benefits nobodyÕ.67 Recently, Belgium has 
introduced a law making assisted suicide available to minors, even against the 
express wishes of the parents. The notion of a Ôculture of deathÕ developed by 
Pope John Paul II is therefore demonstrably precise and rigorous, manifesting 
as it does a new ÔecologisationÕ of the nihilistic embrace of nullity as the final 
expression of a refusal of all value.68 
LiberalismÕs appeal to individual rights not only fails to save the human 
person from the worst forms of manipulative post-humanism, but in fact is 
entirely complicit with them. For the bio-political logic at the very heart 
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of the atomistic liberal tradition redefines life as something that belongs to 
individuals as their own subjective possession. But since even self-ownership 
requires protection by the constitutional-legal system, which is ultimately 
upheld by the state, liberalism effectively grants the state power over life 
itself. That is why liberals have not hesitated to ÔmoderniseÕ marriage and 
liberalise both abortion and euthanasia. Thus, while, for liberalism, avoiding 
pain and maximising pleasure are seen as the best way of liberating the indi-
vidual, in reality liberal utilitarianism hands over life to the forces of the state 
and the market, treating it as a commodity that can be traded or dispensed 
with without regard to its intrinsic worth. 
Why Liberalism Denies the Reality of the Soul 
What underpins this redefinition of life is a refusal to acknowledge the reality 
of the soul and the ontologically irreducible relation between the realm of the 
psychic and the realm of the political. That is because the embodied soul 
evolves in the city and is, therefore, political, just as politics is about the 
governance of both the body and the soul and, therefore, the city is psychic. 
For the atomistic liberal tradition, however, the realm of the soul is corroded 
from two opposite directions, echoing the sophistic division between original 
nature and artificial law. Between the ape and the robot, the human being as 
living thought and creative tool-user Ð crafting his tools as styles and 
possibilities of new art as much as means to further speed and proximity Ð 
threatens to be lost. For the mystery of the human ÔthingÕ as lying precisely 
between the natural and the machinic is substituted an impossibly but delete-
riously attempted rational fusion of the two, which is something altogether 
different.69 
Thus liberalism, as already mentioned, tends to make the human vanish in 
two directions: archaically, in the face of the tide of pre-human nature; and 
futuristically in favour of a Ôpost-humanÕ project that can hopefully 
subordinate human egotism and the unpredictabilities of desire to a cyber-
netic era that will augment the liberal Ôpeace of a sortÕ into an absolute but 
absolutely eerie biotechnical tranquillity.70 These two opposite directions by 
no means mystically coincide Ð except, perhaps, at the never-to-be-reached 
utopian point when experts would have willed away their own will in favour 
of a sheerly ÔnaturalÕ cybernetic determinism. But before that point, liber-
alism always imposes upon us entirely contradictory imperatives, which 
negatively reveal the unreality of trying to deny, abolish or ignore the soul. 
Thus liberalism declares that all is natural and yet all is artificial, because it 
cannot admit that we are Ôsupposed to be culturalÕ, that nature most fully 
reveals herself in the human experience of love for nature, for other humans 
and for the divine. 
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This duality further plays itself out in the contradictory demand that all 
sacrifice their liberty to the needs of growth, and, yet, that the ÔrightsÕ of all to 
assert their negative liberty and material comfort against this need are equally 
absolute. The same logic is expressed in the view that we must submit to 
inexorable economic necessities, and, yet, that economic processes are the 
ultimate expression of human freedom. Or in the demand that we work all the 
time, and, yet, equally relax and consume all the time. Or, again, in the view 
that all our significant actions impinge on the freedom of others and, so, must 
often be criminalised and exposed to public ridicule in the name of Ôtranspar-
encyÕ, while equally we enjoy a right of absolute privacy to do what we like 
so long as it is (supposedly) done Ôonly to ourselvesÕ and to others with their 
consent. This despite the fact that any damage we did truly to ourselves and to 
our own soul would render us the most dangerous of citizens. Whoever loses 
her own soul, cannot, in fact, gain even the world, because thereby she has 
helped to destroy the human world also. 
These polarities tend further to coagulate in deeper ones of Ômale versus 
femaleÕ, Ôhuman industry versus natural environmentÕ and Ôrational ego 
versus the unconsciousÕ. In all three cases, we have to endure the social and 
psychological damage of a seemingly irreconcilable tension, which ruins our 
personal relationships, our integration of artifice with nature and our ability 
to relate dreams and imaginings to our everyday public lives. Yet in all three 
cases, we also fail to see that exaggeration in either direction (for example, 
the originally Viennese ÔmodernistÕ simultaneous adulation of both pure 
public functionalism and purely subjective artistic fantasy)71 is precluding the 
possibility of a harmonious balance of the sexes, powers and forces around 
an integration that must necessarily be psychic in character. 
Of course, we need sometimes to work and sometimes to play: to discern 
what is more physically or more spiritually caused; to expose some things 
and keep others hidden; sometimes to put the community first and sometimes 
the individual; to criminalise some things and leave other wrongs to the force 
of shame and social disapproval. But the point is that, without the vision of 
the transcendently good, we have no ÔprudentialÕ way to make these 
discernments, and to proportionately distribute different ÔrightsÕ. In 
consequence, liberalism is involved in an increasingly hysterical shuttle 
between the various sets of poles, which are always variants on the arch-
poles of nature and law. Above all, it tends to encourage the foolish view that 
anything not against the law is acceptable, while endlessly criminalising 
minor offences and utterances. Everything is to be negatively tolerated, but 
nothing is to be positively allowed. Substantive notions are no longer 
permitted to make any critical contribution, and the only ÔvalidityÕ lies in 
voluntarist self-assertion. 
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8. THE CULTURE OF THE WEST AND  
THE CULTURE OF ISLAM 
Will only the post-Christian West succumb to this debasement? Perhaps, in 
the end, as Houellebecq pessimistically anticipates, all human cultures, 
including that of Islam, will.72 But in the meantime, as he also suggests, the 
cruder and modernised modes of Islam offer a seductive alternative and a 
simplified conservatism of which Christianity is constitutionally incapable.73 
Gender precincts are unambiguously defined; male heroism is restored and 
possibly rewarded with multiple spouses; the dualities of sacred and secular 
ethics and legality are removed; education becomes an integral part of 
mechanical spiritual formation; death is not to be dreaded and even in 
military martyrdom sought. Against the culturally suicidal and birth-avoiding 
tendencies of the West, Islam provides every reason to live and to generate 
many offspring. And now Muslims, through no fault of their own, offer 
themselves to Europe as massed victimhood as well as beguiling alternative. 
It remains possible that liberalism will be insufficient to resist this but also 
that, as Houellebecq suggests, the more simplifying mode of Islamic critique 
could displace the more complex mode of the Christian, especially in a world 
of propagandistic travesty. 
This is because the difficulty we face in trying to salvage the European 
cultural legacy, which is centrally a Christian one, is that liberalism is its 
bastard offspring and not totally in the wrong. It is identifiably post-Christian, 
because Catholic Christianity first partially de-sacralised the political, 
encouraged freedom of association, the primacy of the individual conscience, 
the flourishing of the creative arts in representing everything, both high and 
low,74 and the freeing of gender difference from role constraints and of 
romantic love from patriarchal law. It is inherently difficult to re-instate the 
view that precisely true freedom is extra-legally constrained, precisely novel 
invention is the point of arrival and discovery of an objective telos Ð difficult, in 
other words, for Europe to overcome liberalism by being otherwise modern in a 
manner that will repeat, differently, its authentic antiquity.75 
But the difficulty must be faced, for the alternative is either the vanishing 
of Europe in the face of other civilisations, or the vanishing of humanity 
through the liberal subversion of the European legacy. 
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Culture as Formation 
1. POLITICS AS FORMATION 
Liberal education, as we saw in the previous chapter, characteristically oscil-
lates between esoteric concerns that bear no relation to politics on the one 
hand, and a form of utility maximisation that hands bio-political control over 
society to the forces of the market-state on the other. It is, therefore, a 
formation that ends up being profoundly de-humanising because it does not 
integrate the spiritual with the material, considering the former to be a purely 
private matter, while making the accumulation and alteration of the latter the 
default point of reference for public affairs. 
The same division can also be construed as an impossible division between 
the co-determination of Ôthe whoÕ and Ôthe whatÕ Ð a cult of ungrounded will 
on the one side and a cult of technical fatality on the other. From Descartes 
onwards, this implies that politics, like the supposedly best civic design, is no 
longer a mingling of souls but a Spartan mental manipulation, directed 
ideally or paradigmatically by one man, of material and corporeal forces that 
alone now constitute the acceptably and respectably ÔpublicÕ.1 Otherwise, the 
mental concerns a realm of privately reserved and seemingly Ôdead and 
buriedÕ interiority, which is precisely not the ÔpsychicÕ as debased linguistic 
usage might lead us to imagine.2 For traditionally, Ôthe psychicÕ was the very 
essence of public and political concern, as Plato argued against the sophists 
who viewed the soul purely in terms of private power engaged in manipulat-
ing the masses.3 
PlatoÕs argument is that sophistry removes the psychic from the political 
sphere in line with the dualism between nature and law, as we saw in the 
previous chapter. His refusal of this dualism is in harmony with the archaic 
wisdom of most human societies. In Platonic terms, this means that 
2 8 3  
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the realm of the psyche, though higher than the material, is still fully a part of 
nature Ð an integral element of the cosmos. And this includes StieglerÕs 
prostheses, since the arch paradigm for the eternal forms in The Republic is 
the crafted table, and though writing may be warded off, it is also invoked as 
the paradigm for the memory of the soul. 
A politics that integrates the psychic with the non-psychic suggests that the 
liberal emphasis on law, consent and individual conscience is insufficient to 
direct the often brutal processes of politics towards something higher than 
themselves. Liberal resistance, based on private right, is also not enough, 
because the main reality of all human association, including political associa-
tion, is itself psychic: it is to do with friendship (as both Plato and Aristotle 
taught), with benevolent generosity (as they also taught in common with 
Confucius and Buddha) and with a reciprocal sharing of the common good. 
Only secondarily is it about distributing material goods and designing 
specific law codes that are always somewhat arbitrary, yet should reflect as 
far as possible non-arbitrary justice. 
In other words, as we have already seen, politics requires a psychic com-
munity to which it is finally answerable, a community whose seeking of har-
monious relationship with society and the natural world is in excess of either 
material need or coercive law. Today, we need a revival of this function in its 
mode of Christian ecclesia, which most of all discovered and enacted the pre-
eminence of the person and of relationality within a fluid sense of the organic 
whole,4 beyond the twin atomisms of occidental egotistic individualism and 
Oriental static, rigid, hierarchical organism. 
Our politics requires this, rather than the fearful combination of modern 
Western libertarianism with an Eastern technologism of the spirit, collectivist 
autocracy and temptation to spiritual nihilism that could be arising in parts of 
Asia and of Europe. And it needs this, rather than the lamentably 
disenchanted and voluntarist transcendence increasingly advocated by some 
modes of Protestant Christianity and more extremely by Sunni Islam to the 
relegation of its more mystical, Sufi legacy. But, above all, it needs it rather 
than our modern liberal political legacy since the seventeenth century, as we 
have argued in the preceding chapters. 
Yet, far from being Western-centric, such a re-invocation of the WestÕs 
archaic legacy reconnects Western cultures with other civilisations that also 
emerged during the Axial Age. As Karl Jaspers first argued, the great phi-
losophies of East and West are of a single contemporary birth with the world 
religions.5 The Axial Age marked (in very different ways) the becoming 
reflexive Ð so both ÔtheologicalÕ and ÔphilosophicalÕ Ð of religious traditions in 
the period from around the sixth to the second century BC.6 This centred on a 
theoretical and practical critique of predominant norms of absolutist power 
underwritten by gods who were not believed to be on the side of ordinary 
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humans. The advent of critical thought and political resistance was from the 
outset inextricably intertwined with an appeal to religious transcendence Ð 
whether in Plato, Buddha or Confucius. 
Connecting all these traditions is the idea that the rightful exercise of rea-
son involves a pre-rational trust (pistis or faith) in the reasonableness of real-
ity Ð that the universe and all rational beings therein are not subject either to a 
deterministic fatalism or to the indeterminacy of random flux, but that they 
can be ordered harmoniously. Based on a new synthesis of personal liberty 
with universal telos, agency in the immanent order of being was, thereby, for 
the first time in human history seen as compatible with a transcendent out-
look. For the key difference of pre- and post-axial thought is the notion that 
personal flourishing requires some form of salvation by a benign deity that 
refuses sacrificial practices to appease divine wrath and, instead, represents 
the ultimate guarantee for the dignity of the person.7 In this manner, divinity 
is re-configured as the supernatural foundation and finality of the good that 
all human beings desire naturally Ð a good that exceeds complete comprehen-
sion, but is amenable to rational and imaginative reflection.8 
Moreover, ancient philosophy, East and West, and most Medieval thought, 
was neither detachedly rationalist (as with much of modern liberalism),9 nor 
resigned to the random flux of sensory experience and the short-term plea-
sures of hedonism. Rather, the philosopher had both to see aright and to live 
well, and he could not do one without the other. It was because philosophy 
involved ethos as well as vision that it was to some degree esoteric and incom-
municable: you had to join in and join with a whole culture if you were really 
to Ôget itÕ. This meant that politics was viewed ontologically and the cosmos 
politically. If one rejects that interchange, then, like the sophists in Antiquity 
or liberals nowadays, one espouses a duality of meaningless nature versus 
imposed culture Ð the artificial social contract and state-imposed education 
that tries to regulate the anarchic violence in the Ôstate of natureÕ. In this 
manner, the universalism of the axial vision, to which Enlightenment is but a 
recent, belated footnote, is prised apart from its accompanying integrating 
perspective, which one might say is just as ÔtechnologicalÕ and ÔecologicalÕ as 
it is respectful of the interior life. 
2. EUDAIMONIA AND PAIDEIA10 
To reiterate: education is today usually considered from one of two perspec-
tives: either it is thought of apolitically, in terms of the transmission of human 
knowledge and the benefit of the learner, or else it is thought of politically, in 
terms of the supposed benefits that education can bring to the strength of the 
state and the welfare of its citizens as citizens. But both these perspectives 
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are inadequate, as they tend to ignore the basically problematic ÔPlatonicÕ 
relationship that pertains between education and politics. Each refers to the 
other, yet each can claim to be included within the sphere of the other. Today, 
liberals naturally think of education as contained within politics to such an 
extent that it becomes a mere instrument of political forces, directed towards 
goals of national power, pride, social engineering and profit maximisation. 
By contrast, the more classical version of this containment thought of 
education as forming virtuous citizens, able to participate in the political and 
economic process. Yet for antiquity this containment was also reversible: if 
education (paideia) was a rehearsal for political debate and action, it was 
equally true that the life of the city was itself the most advanced school of 
humanity. The classical perspective, therefore, saw politics and education as 
equally important, and each as equally liable to subsume the other. 
This classical balance between the political and the educative, was, as we 
saw earlier, to some extent echoed within the eighteenth-century Enlighten-
ment. Both the tyranny of monarchical absolutism and the anti-humanism of 
materialist philosophy were, for several Scottish and Italian thinkers, espe-
cially, to be resisted by an education into experimental science and humane 
letters. Such an education would produce as many citizens as possible who 
were both free from superstition and able to sympathise with the nobler senti-
ments of others. The aim to expand the range of Ôcivil societyÕ outside either 
dispersed market interest or direct state control involved both the idea that the 
right educative influence would have political benefits and the idea that a 
restrained political practice would produce better citizens.11 In Scotland, 
thanks to the Calvinist legacy, this education has still much to do with schools 
and universities. In France, on the other hand, these institutions were often 
regarded by philosophes as too tainted by piety, and so they looked, rather, to 
a new conversational network of the enlightened Ð a Ôrepublic of lettersÕ that 
would be seamlessly fused with political reconstruction.12 Catholic Italy, 
which sometimes nurtured a Catholic Enlightenment in its universities, as in 
the case of Antonio Genovesi, fell somewhat in between. 
But at the same time, the complete integrity of the classical ideal, which 
had been both sustained and transformed by the Christian Middle Ages, was 
impaired by the Enlightenment. This integrity, which involved the equal bal-
ance between the political and the educational, depended upon a teleological 
understanding of virtue that understood the goal of politics to be human 
happiness in an ethical sense Ð individual fulfilment and mutual flourishing. 
The Enlightenment, however, was on the whole gloomier about constructing 
large-scale economic and political frameworks on the basis of virtue. In con-
sequence, it ultimately tended to derive not only economic but also political 
order from the benign blending of rival self-interest. Nonetheless, it retained 
at least some sense that state and market exist for the sake of the nobler 
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non-economic and politically free associative process of civil society. In this 
respect, we can recognise an explicitly Christian legacy that Enlightenment 
thinkers developed in a post-Christian direction: civil society now occupies 
that transpolitical space of free association and constitution making, which 
uniquely appeared in Europe as the space of the Church. That space was 
concerned, beyond politics, not just with the destiny of menÕs souls, but also 
with social processes of mutual charity and reconciliation in excess of legal 
coercion and punishment.13 
However, from a post-liberal perspective Ð which seeks to retrieve, revise 
and extend the classical legacy Ð the Enlightenment would appear somewhat 
parodic. First, its relative banishing of virtue from state and market formation 
is far more pessimistic than either Platonist-Aristotelian Antiquity, or the 
Christian Middle Ages, or, indeed, the Renaissance renewal of the fusion of 
Greco-Roman philosophy and law with biblical revelation (developed further 
by the early Romantics like Novalis, Friedrich Schlegel, Joseph Joubert and 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge). Second, even in the case of civil society, it is not 
clear that any genuine notion of ethical telos remains. The Enlightenment 
emphasis is less an Aristotelian one upon the goals of moral aspiration than it 
is a Stoic one upon the bonds of human sympathy. The latter horizon tends to 
lose its links to a reciprocal pursuit of teleological harmony (as still with 
Shaftesbury) and comes to denote a more complacent mutual regard for 
socially acceptable pleasures and disappointments.14 Here, sympathy is either 
spontaneous animal emotion or imaginative projection of oneÕs own feelings 
onto the human other. So in its modern, liberal guise, sympathy has come to 
mean little more than empathy, and empathy for the feelings of other is the 
basis for not just compassion, but also for cruelty. What is therefore primary 
to sympathy-become-empathy is, rather, individual human freedom and hap-
piness (in the sense of utility, not eudaimonia), which as something pre-given 
tends to reduce to mere material contentment. 
So what can now be seen is that both the modern enlightened and debasedly 
romantic approaches to education are predicated upon the loss of transcendence, 
which disturbs the balance between the political and the educational. However, 
we cannot seriously desire to return to the sheerly classical balance. For even if 
that balance directed all politics towards education, it equally made the polis the 
one road to paideia, and even to communion with the eternal gods. This over-
estimation of the political was forever interrupted by the ecclesia. The latter 
went beyond the classical balance in the direction of a kind of fusion of 
education with politics, since it admitted as citizens of the heavenly kingdom in 
its earthly sojourn children (besides women, slaves and metics). Inversely, it 
tended to stress that even adults remain children in the sight of God Ð children 
who must continuously learn. Both liturgical patterns and monastic 
communities tended, thereby, to combine governing structures 
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and pedagogic processes in one. In that sense, only a Christian legacy could 
possibly have given rise to the fictional reality of Hogwarts and its intimate 
continuity with the Ministry of Magic. 
3. EDUCATION INTO VIRTUE 
Enlightenment thinkers, including Rousseau himself, suggested that only a 
few should pursue learning and that its link to virtue would only be guar-
anteed by their responsibility to share in power.15 By contrast, a post-liberal 
politics seeks the education of the many, where that means, indeed, to 
encourage the virtue of the many. But in partial vindication of Rousseau, this 
is only possible if one makes space for that dispersed political participation at 
every level from local to international, which RousseauÕs own theory of city-
state sovereignty denied. In addition, mere advocacy of democracy does not 
solve the problem of how to inculcate virtue at large, nor of how to sustain 
virtue at the top of the political hierarchy, even if political representatives 
have been elected. 
In both respects, the link of education to time exposes the inherent limits of 
democracy if one is not prepared to espouse the ÔspatialÕ tyranny of the state 
over the group or the individual. For wisdom is necessarily communicated 
from initiator to initiated; even though the aim of this hierarchy is in time to 
reverse hierarchy and ensure that the initiated can in turn initiate others, 
initiation is still not something that can be elected, even chosen; since one 
never really knows what it is that one has agreed to learn, there is in a sense 
here no real ÔconsentÕ. 
In the second respect, as we indicated in chapters 1 and 5, one sees the 
naivety of the typical liberal attempt to substitute a democratic balance of 
power for the operation of virtue. Superficially, it would seem that liberals 
are right to mock those who wish to depend merely upon the goodwill of 
those in power or the goodwill of those who wish to organise welfare within 
civil society, etc. Yet this restricted view yields to the second-order naivety 
of imagining that, just because it distrusts mere trust, it can finally dispense 
with trust altogether. Too often now, history has had its revenge here: elected 
leaders have turned into dictators, state bureaucrats substituting rules for 
charity have ensured that welfare becomes the very reverse of charitable Ð an 
impersonal control over the individual and family who now find themselves 
trapped in penurious dependency. 
So alongside the democratic checks upon power, we still require an edu-
cation into virtue of potential leaders Ð however properly meritocratically 
recruited Ð and even the sense that they have been inducted into a ÔclassÕ or 
Coleridgean clerisy, whose entire ÔinterestÕ lies in an honourable connecting 
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of its own personal and family fortunes to that of the polity. We now know 
that the successors to the Ôold establishmentÕ are a Ônew classÕ that tends to 
milk positions of power for personal gain, knowing that their occupation of 
them is merely temporary and not a matter of lifetime or inter-generational 
vocation. An entire branch of neo-liberal economics deliberately deployed by 
the liberal left and right tells us that all public servants have only ever, or will 
ever, act like this.16 But a better reading of history can beg to differ with such 
ontologised cynicism. 
Both educators and governors need then to be primarily seekers after 
virtue, in a way that restores the classical circulation between the political 
and the educative. The way to prevent this circle from becoming tyrannical 
is, first of all, the constraint of democratic election. But for this to operate 
properly, the educative and temporal ÔaristocraticÕ factor must be so constitu-
tionally secured as to disallow any populist demoting of high culture, which 
would leave the populace itself prey to the democracy-subverting sway of 
either propaganda or technocracy. 
The second way for the public authorities to prevent tyranny is for the state 
itself to defer to the organisation of education freely within the realm of civil 
society, such that one sustains a certain open field of politico-pedagogic 
experimentation, which is at the same time searching for objective truth. One 
should, in this respect, not accept the liberal point that the purpose of the state 
is merely to Ôbroker different interestsÕ, rather than to make people either 
happier or wiser. It is, instead, the goal of the state to help human beings to 
flourish, as the ancients and the medievals taught, else politics is obviously in 
league with iniquity. However, beyond the antique, the pagan absolutisa-tion 
of the stateÕs vision of virtue is guarded against by the pedagogic role of civil 
society. 
But how can people be educated into virtue? We have already seen that 
modern liberal assumptions render this impossible. On the one hand, enlight-
ened utilitarianism reduces everything to egotistic pleasure, machinic or 
informational efficiency and the strength of the market-state. On the other 
hand, individualist romanticism reduces all to wilful self-seeking and, again, 
the strength of the state and market combined. The blend of Enlightenment 
and debased Romanticism results in a mixture of mere repetition of facts and 
their experimental manipulation, alongside an encouragement of ÔauthenticÕ 
self-expression. Students, in effect, are at once programmed as robots and 
unleashed as creatures of the wild. But in either case one is faced with the 
monstrous and not the human Ð though precisely a hybrid of the two is what 
much of the liberal left and right, utterly duped by capitalism and bureau-
cracy, now appears to want. 
This double-faced monstrosity manifests itself both as ÔconservativeÕ and 
as ÔprogressivistÕ pedagogy, a hybridity that Western education systems 
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under different governments have abundantly displayed. On the one hand, we 
have had the suppression of all personal character and creativity in favour of 
government-prescribed information, government proscription of any study of 
the dangerous past, check-lists, criteria comprehensible only to functionaries, 
sacrifice of the individual child to targets, and so forth. Alongside this we 
have also the perpetuation of rigid timetabling, endless exams and 
transferable skills testing. On the other hand, we have had an equal perpetu-
ation of the supposedly Ôchild-centredÕ neglect of grammar, spelling, other 
languages, mathematical and scientific difficulty, with no real gain in terms 
of a sophisticated teaching of natural science, which would above all deal 
with the process of its historical emergence and, so, the human reasons for 
the posing of its peculiar questions in the first place.17 Alongside this, there 
still persists from the 1960s a cult of free expression and mere ÔrespectÕ for 
any and every ÔotherÕ in the ethical and artistic realms, without any sense of 
the need to be inducted into the literary and artistic traditions of the West, 
which are no longer taught. 
Any adequate rage in the face of all this would have to be both radical and 
conservative, which is why it is so rare and why we lack any real critique of 
what is going on. For the hybrid monstrosity we are describing has deep roots 
in the enlightened/romantic pedagogic divide and its developed complicity. 
Authentic education, by contrast, would both pass on a tradition and 
encourage individual expressivity from the outset. It would not merely teach 
skills, but also initiate into the traditions of Europe and the particular nation 
or region in question, and equally foster all sorts of excitingly creative indi-
vidual responses to this legacy, beginning at the youngest possible age with 
pictures, fairy-tales and myths. We desperately need a genuine Ôthird wayÕ in 
education also. 
However, what impedes the emergence of a Ôthird wayÕ is a debatable, 
secular philosophy and politics. This philosophy is caught within the modern 
oscillation between the natural and the cultural, itself split between the 
intentionally voluntary and the mechanically artificial. As a result, individual 
creativity and spontaneous development are associated strictly with nature, 
while objective learning is associated with the accumulation of supposedly 
objective observation and the development of useful invented techniques. This 
divide leaves us with no educational option between a Rousseauist aban-
donment of real teaching on the one hand, and various modes of rote learning 
on the other. We lack, in consequence, any impartation of the sense that 
genuine knowledge is open to debate and can be creatively modified. Equally, 
and inversely, we lack any sense that aesthetic and ethical performances are 
properly subject to objective public judgement. This is precisely that Ôdifficult 
combinationÕ of the Western legacy, which we spoke of at the end of the last 
chapter as most awkward and yet most imperative to get across and to restore. 
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The philosophical root of the problem here is that what is spontaneous and 
arises from within the individual is seen as having nothing to do with what is 
imparted to her from without. In terms of the logic of secular immanence, 
this is inevitable: for all that is ÔgivenÕ is nature, while everything cultural is 
but arbitrarily ÔaddedÕ Ð either willed or fated by an inorganic evolution of 
the technical. 
How would one overcome this problem? This is only possible if in some 
way one re-admits participation in transcendence as embracing both nature 
and culture, both spiritual will and prosthesis in excess of anticipation, and 
thereby mediating between either duality. The crucial example here must be 
the thought of Plato, the first thinker about education in the Western 
tradition, who in the Republic made its theorisation fundamental for both 
philosophy and politics. RousseauÕs educational thought can be regarded as 
a modern parody of Plato, insofar as, like Plato, he opposes the knowledge 
that is innate within the child to knowledge that merely comes to her from 
without, via a teacher. However, Plato did not really see this knowledge as 
innate Ð rather, he saw it as being a dim recollection (anamnesis) of 
something once known Ð an awakening to the presence of universal forms in 
particular things.18 In this way, he did mythical justice to the conundrum 
that dictates that we cannot try to know about anything unknown without 
first knowing something about it. 
PlatoÕs dialogue Meno makes it clear that part of the answer to that conun-
drum is that we must first be taught by a teacher who can assuage our fear that 
there is a something that answers to what we seek.19 But this does not explain 
our seeking out of a teacher in the first place, even when she has not been 
imposed upon us by the modern state. Nor does it explain the same problematic 
if we transfer it to the collective and protological level where it becomes 
precisely (as we saw in our discussion of Stiegler in chapter 7) the issue of how 
humanity manages to invent itself as tool and language user before it has these 
things and, therefore, before it possesses human will and reason. How does 
humanity seek either to know or to deploy what it does not yet either use or 
know, yet must in some manner anticipate if it is to begin itself at all? 
So another part of the answer is that we do, indeed, both individually and 
collectively, obscurely anticipate the knowledge that we seek through the 
force of our searching desire, expressed in reaching, proto-ritual gesture. This 
anticipation is not a given a priori structure of the mind (as for Descartes, 
Kant and the modern tradition of rationalism that shaped liberal politics, as 
we indicated in chapter 1). Rather, it has to be triggered by something 
exterior, in particular the words of a teacher. On the other hand, the sense that 
Ôwe are going somewhereÕ is akin to a kind of memory of something yet to 
come. Plato spoke here of ÔrecollectionÕ in the sense of being awakened or 
alerted to the presence of something that is unfolding. 
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In either case, unlike the modern pedagogic theories, spontaneity and 
teaching work together rather than in opposition. This is because the truth they 
together seek transcends both nature and culture and concerns something 
ÔtrueÕ in a radical sense, combining nature and culture in one Ôtrans-ecologyÕ, 
as it were, since this truth is eternal and lies beyond space and time. Just for 
this reason, nature is relativised, while the apparently greater contingency of 
culture is inversely authenticated. Nature, like culture, may also be, in one 
sense, just the way things happen to be ordered for a time, within time. Yet, 
inversely, culture, like nature, may also be a varied, stuttering and stumbling, 
technically expressive and conjectural intimation of abiding truths of good-
ness, beauty and truth. 
If there is no such genuine objectivity confirmed by transcendence, then 
education into virtue is not really possible. That is because individual spon-
taneity and external knowledge will remain estranged from each other, and 
there will be no way to induct an individual, as authentically that individual, 
into a living tradition that trusts its own faltering quest for the truth. 
Ideas versus Ideals 
But surely, what we are saying here could not possibly seem more irrelevant, 
mystical and obscurantist. Is one really to suppose that the possibility of 
education into virtue requires assent to something like belief in the Platonic 
forms? Of what use as criteria are ÔideasÕ whose full reality escapes us and in 
which we but dimly participate? But once again, insanity turns out, rather, to 
reside with the refusal of all such notions and not with their embrace. And 
ÔPlatonismÕ, genuinely understood, is not a quirk, but the very basis of any 
possible philosophical refusal of sophistry. Without it, one has Ôpre-SocraticÕ 
physicalism and liberalism (today drifting to outright nihilism) and not phi-
losophy. In the issues raised by dialogues such as the Meno and the Phaedo, 
the highest stakes of Western civilisation are raised and they are, perforce, 
still being played out. 
For what has happened after we have abandoned any sense of archetypes, 
or ideas in the mind of God with which, in his purely unified ÔsimplicityÕ, he 
is co-terminous? Instead of these ideas, we have mere ÔidealsÕ. Unlike the 
unfathomable concretion of divine ideas, ideals are supposed to be fully com-
prehensible in their very abstraction. But, as such, they are often utopian and, 
therefore, irrelevant. For if one can locate no practical, mediating approxi-
mation to an idea, then, in reality, one has no understanding of that idea 
whatsoever, and one is doomed to a life of self-congratulating marginality. 
Sometimes, by contrast, as with French Jacobinism or the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution, attempts have been made directly to impose the abstractness of 
ideals in their very abstraction. Since, as Hegel realised, this is contradictory, 
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the result of the imposition of ideals is always terror: for the only way to 
incarnate an abstraction as an abstraction is by way of ceaseless subtraction 
of the determinate Ð a process also embarked upon at times for this false 
reason by modernist abstract and distortive art.20 But subtraction in practice 
is violence and death. 
It follows that an ideal is either pointless in its very knowability and, 
therefore, really unknown, or else it is so well known that it is really an 
ideal of destruction Ð as we earlier diagnosed to be the real driver of 
capitalism. The only Ôthird wayÕ here would be the notion of an unknown 
concrete ideal in which we dimly participate by putting it into effect to a 
certain degree. But this is just the rationale for embracing PlatoÕs forms (or 
Ôideas in the mind of GodÕ in later monotheist permutation) rather than 
modern ideals, as inculcated by our educational process. The entire 
argument is clinched once one recognises that without any ideas/ideals 
whatsoever, there could be no specifically human motivation, and, 
therefore, no existence of human culture. 
Once more it should be emphasised here that such an assertion is not a 
retreat to the stars away from techne, but that it, rather, accounts for the 
ineradicable surplus of spiritual anticipation to its realisation in an artefact, 
even though the beginnings of artefaction are required for, and run in tandem 
with, such anticipation. The latter necessitates some recognition of a luring 
transcendent norm, in order to avoid the lapse of anticipation to mere will, 
which would deny its evident phenomenology. And if this anticipation mani-
fests as our partial dissatisfaction with our own product, then this very dis-
satisfaction is suggested by the ÔincompletionÕ of the product itself. Thus the 
product or prosthesis with which alone we think, act, calculate, remember a 
past we have not lived and much of our own past that we have forgotten, 
itself also anticipates and so, in Platonic terms, itself also recollects. As 
Nicholas of Cusa finally sees, if the eternal ÔformÕ is a perfect idea or model, 
it must equally be the perfectly realised work of art. 
One can therefore conclude that our natural desire to know the transcendent 
Good ensures that we can in some degree realise it, while guarding against any 
totalitarian notion that we have the precise formula for its implementation. 
Modern education, however, nihilistically teaches children either that there is 
no Good, or that only liberalism can ensure that the social contract will guard 
against the Ôtyranny of the GoodÕ and instil, instead, the Ôlegitimacy of rightÕ. 
In that case, liberal thinking claims that each and every child is a self-
legislating god, or else liberal thinking terroristically suggests that it possesses 
the formula for its entirely perfect self-implementation here and now. Either 
way, it not only fails to educate into virtue, but also abundantly succeeds in the 
training of highly talented criminals, mostly skilled in the evasive exploitation 
of every human law and substitution for law by manipulable 
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economic contract. Increasingly, it is just these modern educational products 
that are now in charge. 
4. BEYOND LIBERAL BOREDOM 
By sundering education and politics from the quest for the transcendent 
Good, liberalism renders its serious side the inculcation of a spiritually 
leached technology (the processing of signs and experimental manipulation 
of matter). And it renders its more relaxed side of self-expression a prelude to 
the production of culture as mass entertainment, whose only serious valida-
tion lies in the making of money. Such reduction of culture to entertainment, 
in abandonment of any authentic ÔcultivationÕ that must be rooted in history, 
requires the claim that the past was not at all entertaining, but rather boring 
(except sporadically for the elites) and that only modern, liberal progress has 
brightened up the lives of the many. In fact, it is one of the most basic tenets 
of liberal belief that most people were bored out of their minds for most of 
human history. Before there were cinemas, art exhibitions, concerts, cocktail 
bars, public gyms, internet sites and a variety of ethnic restaurants, there was 
basically nothing to do Ð except, of course, suffer pain, which was more or 
less continuous. Yet, obviously, boredom is relative: what you miss, you do 
not know, and if you have never seen a film, then you look forward to feast 
days and perhaps even sermons. 
And much more decisively, variety and boredom stand in an ambiguous 
relationship. At first, variety reduces boredom, but in the long term, it can 
induce it, because it reduces the effort of response you have to make in the 
face of any experience. In fact, sustained attention to detail and creative use 
of what you are given is a far greater salve against boredom than the mere 
passive sampling of a large menu of consumer delights. Thus Charles 
Baudelaire already realised back in nineteenth-century Paris that rural mel-
ancholy was giving way to urban spleen,21 and today we know that lassitude 
and depression all too often strike precisely those who are offered a plenitude 
of possibilities. 
For where less is offered, the more the power to be fascinated by small 
differences and unfolding depths is cultivated. The Count of Monte Cristo 
evaded boredom in his bare cell by gradually exploring all its hidden pos-
sibilities for communication, subterfuge and, ultimately, escape. For just this 
reason we have to ask whether pre-Enlightenment, pre-liberal peoples might 
even have been less bored than us, because greater monotony and confinement 
to one place incited more active attention Ð for example, to the changing 
seasons and the annual variations upon their changes. A paucity of resources 
led to greater imaginative involvement with the use of words, music, human 
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movement and ability to shape natural materials. Do BrueghelÕs peasants 
look more anomically languid than people in a snapshot of a contemporary 
cityscape? 
Similar considerations apply to the supposed unending dirt and suffering 
of the ÔhorribleÕ past in which children are now so basely indoctrinated. For 
one thing, the low average life-spans of past times are misleading, since large 
numbers who survived a likely infant death often enjoyed a reasonable 
longevity. And not only were expected pains perhaps less acutely suffered 
than in our current culture, where all pain is regarded as an outrage, but they 
were also not, as yet, the things most feared, as Michel Foucault, Talal Asad 
and Ivan Illich have shown.22 Rather, a different social construction of value 
both ritualised physical suffering and feared far more the loss of honour, of 
human relationship, of landed connectedness and of oneÕs immortal soul. 
Nowadays, even the 1950s is regarded by liberals as basically the tail end of 
this gothic epoch of tedium relieved only by torture. And some of those who 
are old enough claim actually to remember the escape they made from the 
evil citadel of the primordial past. However, they are currently challenged in 
books and in the blogosphere by the memories of others who look back upon 
this epoch with fond nostalgia as one of childhood liberty and robust embrace 
of risk and adventure, and of an adult life sometimes suffused with a kind of 
mellow rapture.23 
Of course, both sides are right, and it seems amazing that we are not able 
to recognise that history is inevitably a process of simultaneous loss and gain. 
On the one side, we can say that the comfort and variety of life has gradually 
improved (in large part quite simply to the eradication, at least for now, of 
epidemics) along with greater opportunities for women and a greater social 
tolerance in certain respects. It is possible to celebrate all that and yet to 
mourn the loss of less tangible realities, especially since the 1950s Ð indeed, 
the childhood freedom to roam and fantasise,24 or the higher levels of civic 
engagement in religion and politics, as well as the much greater cultivation of 
hobbies and allotments. 
Yet the materialism of social liberals in relation to this debate is surely 
disturbing, as it is in league with the materialism of financiers, which they 
might elsewhere denounce. For the increase in cushioned comfort has not 
accidentally coincided with an increase in economic inequality and social 
isolation. One may seek to unmask the hardships and tedium of the past, with 
its lack of showers, inside toilets and coal fires.25 But how could these be 
absences if they were not felt as such at the time, and were in any case at least 
partially compensated for by family security, neighbourliness and a still 
surviving oral and folk creativity? Moreover, it is only a smugly metropolitan 
bourgeois perspective that can imagine that Ôunending domestic drudgeryÕ has 
vanished (for single-parent families, for instance?), along with bullying, 
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snobbery, poor education and bigotry Ð which generally mutate. And this is 
not to mention an increasing mass crisis of both physical and mental health, 
brought on in large part by dubious food, chemical pollutants and the loosen-
ing of social bonds of mutual nurture. 
These debates about the past matter, because they slant the current per-
spectives of the liberal left and right. A revived scientism tricks the left into 
imagining that increased hygiene and anaesthetics (though for how long?) is 
a sign of ÔprogressÕ in general. The same goes for the variety of 
entertainment, largely a by-product of technological advance. But while these 
things should not be derogated, there is a real sense in which they are trivial, 
and either neutral or actually detrimental to participatory freedom, if they 
subordinate human action and interaction to automatic processes. As to the 
advent of freedom of choice and social mobility as championed by the right, 
we should be able to celebrate such things in principle, while also counting 
their unacceptable cost in the mode in which they have arrived (and to the 
extent that they really have) in terms of the loss of interpersonal solidarity 
along with sufficient economic reward and compensation for the performance 
of menial and sometimes dangerous, but necessary, tasks. 
The debates about the past, thereby, tend to slant our sense of possibility in 
the present, because too often they present a supposedly necessary either/or, 
which precludes us from considering a possible both/and, often in the name 
of a freedom-denying superstition of ÔprogressÕ which announces that one 
cannot ever Ôstep back in timeÕ, as if history were not replete with examples 
of bending backwards and newly tuned repetitions of ancient themes. 
Examples include the gradual medieval recovery of a pre-pagan-imperial 
greater distribution of property and balanced ecology, or the Italian city-state 
reworking of the pagan polis, or todayÕs revival of global cities (as we will 
discuss in chapters 9 and 10). 
If the respective costs have been counted, then in principle people may now 
more freely choose and shape the advantages of rootedness, tradition, 
conservation, faithful commitment and fascinated attention to the common 
and repeated as more likely to hold their long-term interest. In the United 
Kingdom, one can see this happening, for example in the case of Ôextreme 
citiesÕ in the West Country where aspects of economy retained within a spe-
cific area ensure greater re-circulation, and, so, reciprocity (for example, the 
introduction of the Bristol Pound), and anticipation of possible global disaster 
encourages greater community independence and participation in the present. 
In the more specifically cultural dimension, one can note in Britain the 
strikingly increased attendance at cathedral and Oxbridge university college 
chapel worship, or in Italy and northern France a revival of educated youth 
involvement in Catholic thought and practice, besides globally, the number of 
young people who are members of charismatic movements and/or participate 
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in the annual World Youth Day. This by no means as yet clearly betokens a 
big religious revival, but there is much evidence that in Europe the mass 
decline of religion is somewhat balanced by its relative survival and even 
increase amongst the thoughtful and active middle classes.26 This does sug-
gest that many people are rediscovering that ritual is actually less monoto-
nous than constant surprise and novelty. The same new mood is shown in the 
revived interest in nature writing and landscape painting, as manifest by the 
radiated faces emerging from the 2012 London Royal Academy exhibition of 
the work of David Hockney. For his revived qualities of craft and attention to 
hidden beauty have succeeded in making the ordinary (the Yorkshire Wolds) 
sublime and the sublime (the Yosemite) familiar, the small and intimate com-
plete in itself, and yet only a part of a an evermore awesome non-identical 
variation and irregular symmetry. 
This makes up his Ôbigger pictureÕ, which conjoins locality to the whole 
planet. And it is in both ritual and contemplative art that security and surprise 
can be integrated Ð a fact that perhaps provides a clue as to how we might try 
to shape loyally committed, and yet not tightly constraining, human com-
munities in the future. Liberals ultimately sustain a dialectical movement 
between a diversity that is really more of the same on the one hand, and 
boredom with the ordinary, which is, in reality, full of depth and complexity, 
on the other. By contrast, post-liberals favour a culture that fosters creativity 
and the always novel search for perennial forms of beauty by combining 
traditioned high art with the equally traditioned popular. Since post-liberals 
reject the dualism between theory and practice, which ultimately arises from 
that between education and politics, they should seek to promote a culture that 
is at once subtly intellectual and practical, a fusing of art with craft and linked 
to every sort of daily, weekly, seasonal and religious ritual. 
5. ETHOS AND EQUITY 
As we have argued in chapter 6, the dimension of Ônurture, education and 
creative production through timeÕ, directed towards the discernment of the 
objectively good, is the precondition of democratic practice. However, as we 
have also seen, this cannot itself be democratically governed, given that we 
are all first born and are immature before we become adults through the 
directive (and sometimes necessarily coercive) nurturing of those who are 
already adults themselves. This ÔeducativeÕ dimension of human ÔnatalityÕ (as 
Hannah Arendt called it) remains inescapably hierarchic, though not statically, 
irreversibly or oppressively so.27 And the same applies to any necessary 
dimension of guidance or governance where we must defer to greater wisdom 
or expertise Ð as in the case of medical doctors. 
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Ignoring this dimension has led to a catastrophic confusion of social equal-
ity with a levelling of talent and non-recognition of intellectual and moral 
excellence. To make this observation is to be the reverse of elitist. For just as 
mixed government really does favour more democracy, so, by virtue of a par-
allel paradox, recognising tangled hierarchy and a greater scope and power of 
influence for those who combine talent with virtue really does favour greater 
fulfilment of talent by the many. 
It is the promotion of justifiable hierarchy that can ensure that an egalitarian 
politics, against the legacy of Babeuf, pursues an overall levelling up rather than 
a dumbing down. For justifiable hierarchy always requires the lead of examples 
to be followed Ð whether this be the learned physicist or the master-craftsman Ð if 
it is ever to become possible. Indeed, British socialism began as the aspiration to 
fulfil to the maximum the creative abilities of all, as with John Ruskin and 
William Morris.28 But it has sunk to a resentful attempt to ensure that all will 
equally endure the same awfulness to the end of time. Robert Tressall, who 
regarded workers content to surrender their skills in return for ease as the greatest 
enemies of socialism, must surely be turning in his hand-crafted coffin.29 
The emphasis on dynamic hierarchy and ethos is closely connected with the 
idea of personal representation that implies a strong fluidity between the 
political and the educative, since both are embedded in the social. Rather than 
imposing centralised control, a more ÔpersonalisedÕ government would grant 
under licence the performance of public functions to bodies of persons or to 
collective persons, which are corporations. Examples are the universities 
(now, alas, often but in theory!) or the BBC, both of whose independence and 
yet public-spiritedness should today be strenuously upheld and extended 
elsewhere (via more regional and local outlets). Conversely, it is possible from 
this perspective to understand how Ôself-appointedÕ educators and others are, 
nevertheless, carrying out ÔpoliticalÕ functions to the benefit of the entire 
polity and even the state itself.30 
6. REFORMING FORMATION 
In the wake of liberalismÕs ascendancy and triumph, instrumental and utilitar-
ian justifications have come to dominate all others in defining the purpose of 
education in the West. Now the worth of education is largely seen in terms of 
the economic value of qualifications Ð the lifetime income as the main 
measure of why schools and universities matter. Even as the presence of spe-
cifically craft-based vocational training has disappeared in so many parts of 
Europe and the United States, all schooling has subtly been assimilated to 
this paradigmatically capitalist model of producing able actors in the 
economy, not virtuous citizens Ð never mind virtuous leaders.31 
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In consequence, schools are now set up to create marketable skills dictated 
by the desires of employers, in contrast to those traits that are good to possess 
not simply as an employee, but as a human being and a member of a family, 
community and nation. And, of course, it is all too plausible that capitalism is 
evermore able to operate without even the minimum of virtue. But the more 
it does so, the more it tends to mutate into a mode of semi-criminal oligarchic 
politico-economic control of a de-spiritualised populace. The question is 
whether we are ready to accept such a dire transformation. 
The more education is defined in merely functional and skill-set terms, to 
the neglect of excellence, the more it produces students who are unmotivated, 
unambitious and cognitively disorientated. Such people are unlikely to make 
any dynamic economic impact and, therefore, the whole approach would 
seem, at least on the face of it, to be self-defeating even in its own terms. 
Indeed, a number of Western economies suffer from a chronic lack of 
productivity growth precisely because there is such a shortage of innovation 
and a total under-use of the creativity that certainly does exist (as evinced, for 
example, in BritainÕs arts, design and other innovatory sectors). To this 
degree, Bernard Stiegler is right: a capitalism without spirit is less produc-
tive,32 but as we have contended, it may be that capitalism is less a system of 
production than of destruction and control through the suspended threat of 
further dissolution. 
Thus, viewed more cynically, it could be that many of our current masters 
are quite happy for most people in the United Kingdom (as elsewhere) to be 
reduced to the status of an amenable and proletarianised middle and lower-to-
middle-grade professional class. For this serves the purposes of an increas-
ingly finance-dominated capitalised elite, who think of the role of the United 
Kingdom, in subservience to that of the United States, as largely the provi-
sion of financial services. That is combined with the random performance of 
some of the more subordinate business and manufacturing processes of 
international corporate conglomerates (increasingly based in the United 
States and in China) by the rest of the population. The question, once more, is 
this: do we really want to acquiesce in this evolution of Western (especially 
Anglo-Saxon) capitalism? 
This same approach has achieved, as earlier stated, an extraordinary com-
bination of the worst aspects of traditional education with the worst aspects of a 
progressive approach. Thus, whereas many continental European children still 
wear locally produced clothes and learn Latin and Greek, Anglo-Saxon 
children are dressed up in sometimes comic uniforms and yet learn little of 
their own cultural legacy. Increasingly, little knowledge or culture is imparted 
and, yet, creativity is not encouraged either, and tedious routines of periods, 
homework, examinations, note-taking and rote learning are still adhered to. 
Neither the right nor the left is able to make the proper diagnosis here, as they 
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are only concerned with instrumental value or various forms of equality (of 
opportunity or outcome). Meanwhile, in a desperate search for the improve-
ment of standards, we have also landed up with a combination of continued 
state control with a kind of multi-track anarchy. Thus, even private schools 
are constrained by a dubious national curriculum and, arguably, only a very 
few highly elite schools achieve genuine independence. On the other hand, 
the current British mix of local authority schools, independent academies and 
fee-paying institutions is highly confusing, dysfunctional and incoherent. 
Increasingly this incoherence is only resolved, as is likely intended, by the 
control of schools by business interests who will subordinate education to 
profit and ensure that all that is taught is the ability to make money, in terms 
of technical expertise and habits of conformism. 
To restore and extend, by contrast, the dimension of guidance in virtue, one 
can suggest the following transformative ideas in the realm of education, with 
the United Kingdom in mind, but an obvious relevance everywhere: 
A. Encouraging apprenticeships in every field and strengthening vocational 
training in primary, secondary and tertiary education; this includes sub-
stituting apprenticeships for part-time jobbing as an alternative to unem-
ployment (with a guaranteed tax break for business if apprentices are 
hired for a certain substantial period of time). 
B. Restoring the older technical colleges, but enhancing their prestige as 
vocational higher-education institutions (in Britain, this includes a number 
of polytechnics for engineers that reflect local traditions, for example 
marine conservation in Newcastle and Hanseatic trading in KingÕs Lynn). 
C. Reducing the number of universities to those that can viably offer an 
inclusive curriculum in the sciences or the humanities or both, accord-
ingly ending the respectively inhibiting confusion between training in 
skills in the case of polytechnics, and training in theoretical reflection in 
the case of universities. This is by no means intended to deny a crucial 
communication between these two, but only to deny a disallowing of 
their distinction that prevents either good practice or discerning theory to 
emerge at all. 
D. Bringing together re-distinguished universities and technical colleges in 
regional associations Ð with links to the extended work of guildhalls (see 
chapters 4 and 6); such an arrangement would also help to ensure that 
polytechnics can take over all training in medicine and law and that no 
Ôclass-divideÕ is intended here between them and universities. 
E. Restoring the self-government of universities and abolishing all centrally 
imposed external assessment exercises, including time- and resource-
wasting practices such as external examination in favour of peer-assess-
ment as part of an academic guild. They are once more to be treated like 
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independent public corporations, funded by a combination of charitable 
endowment and state grant. The restoration of student grants (perhaps by 
a combination of government, educational and charitable agencies) may 
have much to recommend it, as currently loans are contributing signifi-
cantly to the economy of debt. 
F. Re-instating block grants to the humanities as well as to the social sciences, 
in order to protect education into truth and curricular diversity, which are 
otherwise at the mercy of student take-up, upon which the central provision 
and funding of the humanities and social sciences now depends. 
G. Positioning collaborating universities and technical colleges in ultimate 
guiding charge of all schools for children of all ages according to region. 
This principle alone ensures that the ancient circle between education 
and politics is not broken by the ultimate dominating role of the political, 
as is inevitable if, as now, in most countries, a rupture is imposed on the 
flow from lower to higher education Ð a rupture mediated by govern-
ment, which then becomes the single source of the now divided lower 
and higher educational streams. If the integrity of the flow is restored, 
then education can again become an autonomous circle Ð located from 
one perspective within the wider circle of political autonomy, which 
from another is itself located within the wider circle of the educative. 
This arrangement can also help to facilitate the temporary use of 
university students as school teachers. 
H. Learning for once good rather than bad things from North America by 
postponing specialisation, retaining some study of both science and 
humanities for all undergraduates; making all undergraduate degrees four 
years in duration (or perhaps, more realistically, making the BA and MA 
degrees one longer programme at the point of entry); encouraging more 
all-round humanities programmes that mainly involve the reading of 
important historical texts in their wider historical context. Nevertheless, 
the British doctorate by dissertation only should be retained and North 
America should, inversely, be encouraged to adopt the British PhD sys-
tem, as their current one (involving years of mind-numbingly conformist 
Ôcourse-workÕ that is unnecessary after an excellently diverse and rigor-
ous system of high school Ð in the best instances Ð and undergraduate 
training) disastrously kills the creativity of young people and encourages 
the production of theses, books and even taught courses that are mere 
critical collages, often designed to appease several ideological factions at 
once. In short, we urgently need a new Anglo-Saxon pedagogic synthesis 
across the Atlantic. 
I. Placing all schools under the quadripartite control of teachers, parents, 
the local community and governors, mediated by cooperatively 
conceived local educational associations. 
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J. Turning all schools, if possible, into Ôvillage collegesÕ on the 
Cambridgeshire model inaugurated in the 1930s, offering all-age educa-
tion, training and through-life learning. Ways should be found to make 
access to this and endless Ôsecond chancesÕ always possible for everyone 
linked to a reciprocal duty of return. There could, indeed, be a Ônational 
educational serviceÕ, though the providers of this and the modes of provi-
sion might be highly diverse. 
K. Abolishing all national curricula except for the very broadest national 
guidelines, while enhancing the pay and professional status of teachers in 
order to attract people of much higher calibre than at present. 
L. Further encouraging faith-based and military-linked educational institu-
tions at every level, since they tend to promote the formation of character 
and resilience.33 
M. Promoting cross-fertilisation between the private and the public sector 
and, following the best examples of the former, re-infusing into the latter 
a sense of integration of learning (often around a religious vision that is 
offered to children for consideration), social responsibility and personal 
discipline. It should be demanded that private schools revert to the inten-
tions of their charitable foundations, or else such intentions should now 
be required. This means, perhaps, that they should take half their pupils 
on the basis of merit alone Ð given free places funded either by school 
bursarships or by local authority (building on the model of the old British 
Ôdirect grant schoolsÕ). 
N. Breaking with the current hotchpotch in Britain of state, free and academy 
schools (the latter twoÕs successes being much exaggerated) and, instead, 
trying mainly to ensure that there is one good school in every area, at every 
age-level and of every type, funded in various mixtures by the local 
authority and charitable sources. Neighbouring schools should be 
cooperatively linked together and the role of Local Education Authorities 
should be in some fashion restored, though in a more participatory and 
cooperative guise and under the ultimate guidance of Higher Education 
Institutions. These links are crucial in part to ensure the pooling of 
different specialisations in different institutions. The direct control of 
isolated schools by central government and the gradual selling of all edu-
cational bodies to the profit-based sector should be discontinued. 
O. Beginning educational divergence not at age 11 but at around age 15, and 
not as yet between arts and sciences but between the academic and the 
technical. Despite the considerable success of grammar schools in the past 
in the United Kingdom with respect to social mobility and ensuring 
experience of ordinary life in the higher echelons, selection at age 11 is too 
early, too socially discriminating, too damaging of individuals and too 
prone to dismissal of potential talent. Instead, not so much selection but, 
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rather, preferential option should begin around age 14Ð16 with 
alternative divergence into technical and academic streams. This could 
sometimes be reflected into transference into different types of school. 
P. Ending the current misuse of digital technology, especially in universities, 
to destroy the autonomy of teachers and the creativity of students. 
Currently, we are subject to a top-heavy model in which a preponderance 
of technical provision and of administrators tends ÔpoisonouslyÕ to reduce 
teachers and researchers to proletarianised sub-administrators and 
routinised functionaries of machinic processes. The reverse path, which 
should be taken, is to deploy other ÔcurativeÕ potentials of information and 
audio-visual technologies to encourage, instead, a ÔlightÕ model in which 
digitalised prostheses enable more academics (who need to be freed from 
the bureaucratic diktat by administrators and senior managers) to greatly 
extend their teaching reach across distances and through time, in a more 
interactive process with students, which would enable them to learn faster 
and imbibe from the outset a specific creative idiom. Book and library use 
would be much more encouraged than it is today (since the physical traces 
of pre-digital writing tell us rather more than a digital reduction, besides 
lending to significant writings a certain symbolic weight). But it has 
become easier today to use dispersed libraries while retaining interpersonal 
pedagogic connections. In this way, the subordination of many people to 
single machinic complexes would be reversed as the subordination of 
many machines (by simple virtue of the always astonishingly available 
internet) to a few people. Thereby, depersonalisation by computer would 
also be reversed as re-personalisation of the educational process through 
the computer. In a parallel fashion (as Stiegler recommends), television 
and video should cease to be a means by which instruction is contaminated 
by entertainment and, instead, become a means by which, from multiple 
servers and sources, entertainment becomes more infused by formation 
and interactive instruction. 
Q. Inverting the invasion of the university, college and school by the internet 
as the colonisation of the internet by educational processes. Currently, as 
we saw in the previous chapter, apparently free and spontaneous internet 
interaction is really spun into both formal and substantive conformity by 
subtle manipulators. As against this, one needs, indeed, genuinely free and 
democratic interaction. Yet things are really not so simple and are actually 
far more dialectical. For it is just this anarchy of interaction that invites 
both dominance and also private stalking and bullying, besides the 
pervasive presence of unsupported and arbitrary reports and views, which 
tend evermore to unsupported accusations of scandal at every level of 
society. Thus free interaction cannot really dispense with the factor of 
guarantee and authorisation as provided by universities and publishing 
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houses Ð whose possible corruption is balanced by multiplicity and 
competition. It is certainly striking that Wikipedia works without any 
such authorisation Ð yet Wikipedia is confined, as an encyclopaedia, to a 
certain thin and nude ÔobjectivityÕ, which is very useful, but precisely 
because it is limited. Any more detailed and controversial presentation of 
fact, cause, argument or opinion, rather requires one to know, first, from 
what source, and with what inevitable bias this derives, and, second, 
whether this source has a reputation for reliability, for initially (in a sort 
of social version of the Meno) we are all reliant upon repute. Thus both 
universities and publishers need to establish a greater ÔauthorisingÕ 
internet presence, as also do religious organisations. Inversely, authoris-
ing sites that have sprung up on the internet themselves need ideally to 
extend their activity into print publishing and the holding of non-virtual 
encounters. For already we are discovering that the speed and reach of 
the internet in connecting persons at a distance needs to be balanced and 
fulfilled by actual individual and group encounters. Hence the rising 
popularity of the festival, live debate, concert and theatre. 
R. Encouraging the appropriate use of older and simpler technologies. For the 
curative and creative use of the latest technologies can only be sustained 
if the older ones are not abandoned. This truth also applies to the domain 
of economic practice. This is, first, because the non-debilitating 
deployment of computers requires that, as far as possible, users imbibe 
some genetic sense of the automatic as having been gradually arrived at 
by a series of intentional and hands-on actions. They will be better used 
and understood if, for example, children have been introduced to the his-
tories and concrete models of the abacus, NapierÕs Bones, slide-rules and 
so on from primary school onwards, besides the beginnings of geometry 
in Egyptian land-surveying and so forth. In this way, as Edmund Husserl 
implied, authentic usage of any mathesis should repeat the process of its 
generation.34 Second, simpler technologies are not simply cruder than 
later ones, but, instead, usually have a greater scope and indeterminate 
capacity by virtue of their simplicity Ð like the cup, ring, pencil, stick, 
knife, wheel and bicycle. For this reason, and by virtue of their relative 
lack of automation and coded memory (although they were originally co-
generative, along with the operation of the human mind of the most basic 
and widespread recollections), they remain the crucial allies of human 
reason and creativity. This is true even in terms of the manufacture and 
improvement of complex machines (and especially the best ones) from 
cars to televisions to software programmes. It is also the case that more 
advanced technology is not always the most appropriate or the most 
sophisticated, economic and sustainable in certain circumstances Ð as, for 
example, often in the case of agriculture where excessively extreme 
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interventions tend to have uncontrollable and ecologically deleterious 
effects. The stick and wheel still guide us sometimes, rationally and not 
nostalgically, to select them as opposed to the machine or engine. 
Therefore, it is crucial that students of all ages still be taught variously 
to draw, to hand-write, to paint, to knit, to sew, to weave, to make pots, 
to dance, to ride horses, to row and sail boats and to climb mountains. 
7. ENHANCING THE ROLE OF FAITH SCHOOLS 
Within this multiple scenario, an important role would exist for faith schools. 
However, it is not simply a matter of defending this role, but, rather, of con-
sidering ways in which they might transform our entire approach to school-
ing. This could be done in the following ways: 
I. Faith schools should enter into cooperative partnerships with each other 
and with other schools, both private and state. This is in order to main-
tain school independence and, yet, to compensate, for reasons given in 
N above, for the defects of isolation. 
II. Like all schools, they should be free of any but the very broadest 
national curricular requirements and government micro-management. 
III. Instead, they should aim to appoint teachers of higher calibre. This 
might be achieved through (a) working with faith-based teacher 
training institutions; (b) paying higher salaries and (c) providing better 
working conditions, including reduced teaching hours and time for 
research, as in Germany, Scandinavia and France. 
IV. Faith schools should be cooperatives run by teachers, parents, the local 
community, and a governing board that remains largely under indepen-
dent control (not at the mercy of central government politicians, 
bureaucrats and regulators). 
V. Faith schools need to set an example by aiming to provide a combination 
of conservative and progressive child-centred learning. Hence, they 
should aim to increase the standards in science and mathematics and 
languages, as well as impart real historical (local, national, European, 
global), geographical and political knowledge. On the other hand, they 
should consider dispensing with the ÔperiodÕ model and teach in longer 
time blocks with more time for private study. The volume of homework 
should be reduced in order to provide more time for private reading and 
out-of-school or extra-curricular activity, as seen to lead to much higher 
levels of academic success in Scandinavia and, especially, Finland. Time 
must be used more productively, as it is often at the best private schools. 
Most assessment should be continuous and done by the single teacher, 
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as done very successfully in the United States and with little consequent 
corruption. Public examinations should have a more limited, checking 
role. The current procedures manifestly do not favour many intelligent 
young people, especially boys. In general, we need to appoint and then 
trust the right people at all levels of education, instead of appointing 
mediocrities and then subjecting them to all sorts of formalistic checks, 
which they deserve, but genuinely able and dedicated teachers do not. 
VI. A good ethos should be in part instilled through the central place of phi-
losophy and religious studies in the curriculum Ð aiming to bring all the 
different disciplines together and allowing children to start to develop a 
coherent worldview and avoid the psychic confusion and damage that 
may well result from the current system of unrelated courses. In every 
subject area, ethical questions should be raised. The school life should be 
related to the liturgical calendar of different faiths and there should be 
regular acts of worship. Sports and cadet corps should once again be 
deployed in order to build character and team spirit, while ensuring much 
more than in the past that the diverse and different levels of physical 
capacity of all children is developed without humiliation Ð which may 
well mean little or no involvement in team sports for some. At the same 
time, efforts should be made to develop to the most the physical abilities 
and well-being of all. Art, music and drama need to be seen as much more 
than marginal. Creative writing should continue to be part of the English 
curriculum at secondary school and beyond and not just at the primary 
level. Once more, note the combination here of ÔconservativeÕ and 
ÔradicalÕ notes Ð the example of the better public schools suggests that this 
combination is both what works and what is inherently valid. 
VII. Faith schools/adult education centres should seek strong links with local 
universities. As already stated in G, this could lead to a greater use of 
graduates as temporary teachers and also encourage a move towards 
normative attendance at local universities rather than going away from 
home. The assumption of the latter is highly detrimental to local loyalty 
and the local economy, as a continental comparison might suggest. It is 
also perhaps much more psychologically damaging for many young 
people than we realise: in the current economic climate, they are effec-
tively cast adrift at 19 from family, friends and community, just when 
they most need their support. 
8. AGAINST SECULAR BARBARISM 
Today, what the WestÕs politics and education need in cultural terms is a 
revival of the archaically Western vision in a new form. As T.S. Eliot wrote 
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in Little Gidding (1942), ÔIt is not to ring the bell backward. Nor is it an 
incantation. To summon the spectre of a Rose. We cannot revive old policies. 
Or follow an antique drumÕ. So to call for a revival does not mean restoring 
unjustifiable hierarchies and inequalities that the Enlightenment and liberal-
ism rightly swept away. After all, Christianity had already democratised 
Platonism with its God who reached down to be born in a manger and its 
more open yet more extreme, ever-to-be repeated mysteries of water, bread 
and wine as the now more accessible and yet more necessary modes of trig-
gering recollection of the eternally good. The higher wisdom had, thereby, 
become entirely united with just that ordinary and yet unfathomable love or 
reciprocity known to all human cultures. Equally, Christianity had democ-
ratised virtue by making it consist primarily in ÔsupernaturalÕ faith, hope and 
charity, which involve less Ômoral luckÕ than what Augustine called the 
Ôglittering vicesÕ of the pagans, able to be exercised fully only by the high-
born and economically fortunate. In the course of the nineteenth century, 
various socialisms, cooperative movements and, finally, Catholic and much 
Anglican social teaching started to realise these more egalitarian implications 
of Christianity, not in the name of the liberal left, but precisely in criticism of 
its egoistic pessimism. 
It is hard to see how we can sustain the genuine Western legacy unless we 
revive, more democratically, its archaic idiom. This is required to uphold the 
absolutely incomparable value of both the person and of relational 
reciprocity in free association. We need both the mysticism of the individual 
soul and the spiritual and liturgical community of souls, in whatever sense. 
For our true human equality resides in the upper register of the shared 
psychic and not in the lower register of matter, which is the realm only of 
the unconscious and occultly striving or desiring, and so not of the 
communal. Whenever equality has tried to speak in the name of our lowest 
shared attribute, a fantasised and grim purpose has been ideologically 
attributed to the innocent simplicity of matter Ð whether of racial preference, 
class preference or economic growth for the sake of it. The option of 
Ôdisenchanted immanenceÕ has failed us dismally. 
Instead, a more democratised version of Ôenchanted transcendenceÕ sees all 
worldly realities, including cultural ones, as symbolising something higher and 
hidden. For this perspective respects nature as mysteriously outside the human, 
as well as the higher place of many degrees of flora and fauna, with humanity at 
the top, within that nature itself. Allowing that our psychic culture belongs to 
nature allows us, therefore, to develop a humanistic ecology that still avoids a 
triumphalism about the human ability to control the natural world, as the early 
Anglican ecologist and political distributist H.J. Massingham and, more 
recently, Pope Francis have argued.35 This perspective is, therefore, preferable 
to certain Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment notions of man as the 
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measure of all things and of human beings encouraged (like their omnipotent 
maker) to dominate nature, even though they cannot be trusted to relate to each 
other but must, rather, submit to a mechanised version of divine providence 
(whose workings reflect Newtonian physics, like Adam SmithÕs Ôhidden 
handÕ). Such Ôdisenchanted transcendenceÕ is to be rejected. Yet an enchanted 
transcendence is also to be preferred to notions of Ôenchanted immanenceÕ or 
pantheistic conceptions of the universe. While they rightly preserve the mys-
teriousness of nature and favour poetic contemplation of its workings over 
attempts to deduce causal mechanisms, they deny the discernment of personal 
forces behind nature and, so, the sanctity of our own interpersonal life. 
Yet it is, rather, the Ôdisenchanted immanenceÕ of an eventually secular-
ised liberalism that has now captured our culture. In consequence, sheerly 
impersonal and devitalised social forces have started to undermine the 
interpersonal relationships and mutual flourishing on which vibrant cultures 
depend. Behind the functionalist formation that serves utilitarian purposes of 
utility maximisation lurks a nihilism that believes in nothing except the 
power of an impersonal natural flux that somehow (it is never really 
explained) combines randomness with efficient mechanism. We, accordingly, 
require a new and dynamic re-induction into virtue in order to save humanity 
from the post-humanist nightmare of bio-robotic rule and help to restore the 
cultural primacy of the living, yet always technically supplemented and, 
thereby, rational human person. 
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Chapter 9 
The Metacrisis of the Nations 
1. THE BATTLE AGAINST BARBARISM 
We live in more than troubling times. Barely twenty-five years ago, the 
triumph of capitalism betokened for some the convergence towards Western 
liberal democracy as the final form of human government, while others 
predicted a clash of civilisations pitting the West versus the rest. In reality, 
neither scenario has come to pass. Instead, we are witnessing a sustained 
attack on civilisation by a variety of barbarian forces within and across dif-
ferent countries and cultures: religious fundamentalism and the Ôglobal war 
against terrorÕ; the rise of old empires and new elites who combine bureau-
cratic capitalism with authoritarian plutocracy in a neo-liberal-communistic 
hybrid, as in China; the resurgence of virulent nationalism in parts of Russia, 
Eastern Europe and elsewhere; the power of a global financial oligarchy; the 
criminalisation of government worldwide and everywhere the bending of the 
rule of law to serve corporate interests. 
Barbarism is most strikingly apparent in the case of the Islamic State and 
similar forces of mainly Sunni (but also sometimes ShiÕite) Islamic extrem-
ism that torture, rape and slaughter men, women and children with impunity 
across Iraq and Syria, while perpetrating mass terrorist attacks against civil-
ians elsewhere. Stopping ISIS and their like is a battle against barbarism and 
for civilisation: for ancient ways of life, ancestral homeland, millennia-old 
traditions and different faith communities, including ShiÕite minorities, 
Oriental Christians and the Yazidi, as well as for the basic freedoms of 
societies across the West and beyond. 
This exigency does not gainsay the truth that Western foreign policy since 
the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement has contributed to the resurgence of Islamic 
fundamentalism, notably the legacy of artificially dividing ancient 
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civilisations, overthrowing established regimes and establishing client states, 
and valuing oil more than security and peace.1 What is even worse is the West 
and now apparently IsraelÕs continued support for Sunni countries such as 
Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and Turkey that fund and supply weapons not 
just to so-called ÔmoderateÕ rebels in Syria but also to the Al-Qaeda-affiliated 
Jabhat-al-Nusra and Salafist groups, which morphed into ISIS.2 
However, ISIS is not simply a creature of the WestÕs failed foreign policy 
or of the clash of civilisations that Huntington prophesised. Instead, it is 
largely the product of the long-standing sectarian conflict between Shia and 
Sunni powers that is now escalating and spreading all the way from North 
Africa via the Middle East and the Hindu Kush to Central and East Asia. This 
arc of instability is spilling over in the forms of massive population 
displacement and of terrorism that are driven by a poisonous creed of jihadist 
Islamism, which Ð as the Muslim scholar Ziauddin Sardar remarked following 
the 7/7 attacks in London Ð Ôcan be traced right back to the formative phase of 
IslamÕ.3 Like Al-Qaeda, ISIS is inspired by the example of the Kharijites (or 
ÔAssassinsÕ), a seventh-century sect that emerged shortly after the death of 
Mohammed to wage total war not just on infidels but also on all those they 
considered to be Muslim apostates.4 More generally, it has drawn on the study 
of mainline Muslim tactics, which in part permitted their astonishing original 
and rapid territorial expansion of engendering a scorched earth and popular 
fear and impoverishment that can serve to legitimate Islam as the one source 
of order.5 Abul Ala Maududi, Sayyid Qutb and Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, the 
fathers of modern Islamism, drew on the writings of Ibn-Taymyyah and 
Muhammad IbnÕAbd al-Wahhab (the founder of the Wahhabi movement) to 
reclaim both the narrower and the wider legacy to develop a new theology of 
jihad that has influenced the current generation of Islamic leaders Ð including 
Abu Bakr Naji and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.6 
Linking them all together is a puritanical and apocalyptic vision of a revo-
lutionary vanguard Islam that invokes the military prowess of Mohammed and 
his companions (somewhat fused with a Western-derived fascist understanding 
of will to power) in its quest to annihilate apostates and unbelievers.7 An 
extreme theological voluntarism,8 refusing sacramental and traditional 
mediation, prevents any allowance that human reason, custom and example Ð 
alongside more pluralised and repeated sacral events (the testimony of Muslim 
saints, besides that of Mohammed) Ð can help conduct believers to unity with 
the divine. Confined, instead, to literal QurÕanic injunctions, Islamists aim to 
weaken the will of infidels and insist on the collective responsibility (fard al-
kifayah) of true Muslims to conduct wars of conquest and subjugate all non-
Muslim monotheists to absolute dominance while annihilating all polytheists 
and idolaters. Secular non-believers are subsumed into the latter category and 
only in non-military circumstances are they even to be granted 
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the chance to convert. One sign of ISISÕs temporal syncretism here is the 
way in which it evidently assumes (beyond any QurÕanic injunction, if not 
necessarily all ancient precedent) the modern notion of total war in treating 
all non-Muslim citizens as combatants and, therefore, legitimate targets. 
Meanwhile, lovers of the pleasures that the extremists do not favour (such as 
rock music and dance) are necessarily apostates to their own monotheistic 
faiths, in the individual cases where these are still embraced. 
For this extremist outlook, all modern states are illegitimate and need to be 
absorbed into a global Ummah9 Ð ruled by a religiously sanctioned leader 
(amir) such as the self-declared caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. In his first 
public pronouncement in 2014, he promised to conquer Rome, raise the flag 
of the Islamic State over the Vatican and defeat ÔcrusadersÕ across the globe. 
Today, the fall-out from capitalist globalisation and the collapse of state 
structures in Syria, Iraq and Libya are creating the conditions for the expan-
sion of the new caliphate originally planned by Al-Qaeda and now executed 
by ISIS.10 
Even a few years ago, this project looked to most people in the West 
simply insane Ð albeit very dangerously so, for many and for some time to 
come. But now one can start to wonder whether it does chime all too well 
with globalisation and the current weakening of the power of the nation-state, 
besides the natural unease of the Islamic sense of Ummah with this concept, 
together with that of popular sovereignty and individual liberty.11 Moreover, 
the Caliphate project has been variously mulled over in the Near East ever 
since the fall of the Ottoman Empire and is construed (in keeping with 
Islamic history) as one for the very long term, in such a fashion as to 
strategically allow long pauses in the struggle when immediate gains seem 
unrealistic.12 Despite the symbolic boast about Rome, it may be focused in 
the first place upon reclaiming Saudi Arabia and Jordan, gradually re-taking 
Andalusia and the Balkans, destabilising France and Belgium (which has the 
most volatile Muslim enclaves), and, eventually, defeating Israel and captur-
ing Jerusalem.13 Even if ISIS is currently in retreat in the Near East (though 
not elsewhere), it is quite possible that it can regroup there and likely that 
successor extremist projects will arise in the future. 
2. LIBERAL HEGEMONY 
Thus the rise of ISIS can be seen as a new culmination of a profound trans-
formation in international affairs that belies the Ôdemocratic peaceÕ theory 
beloved of liberals Ð the claim that the spread of sovereign states and democ-
racy entails a civilising process and that Ôthe better angels of our natureÕ will 
prevail over the worst human instincts of selfishness, greed, mutual distrust 
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and violence.14 Instead, the post-Cold War era has seen the revival of old 
ideological forces of ethno-nationalism, far-right and far-left populism as 
well as the resurgence of holy war, which could ultimately prove to be as 
threatening to liberal hegemony as fascism and communism once were.15 
Nor is liberal hegemony simply threatened by external forces. It is unrav-
elling because the logic of liberalism tends to its own undoing, as we have 
argued in earlier chapters. In the case of international relations, the paradox 
is that the liberal order, which began as an anti-colonial project designed to 
replace the old imperial order after 1919, morphed into a new imperialism 
led by the United States. From Wilsonian idealism to the neo-conservative 
vision for a New American Century, the United States has always denied that 
it is in the business of building an empire Ð arguing, instead, that independent 
America came into existence precisely to throw off the shackles of British 
colonial rule and to fight imperialism everywhere. But since Wilson, the 
United States has sought to make the world Ôsafe for democracyÕ and to 
make national self-determination 
the prime test of state legitimacy, rather than dynastic inheritance or imperial rule. 
Here indeed was a Ôseismic shiftÕ in European history. Yet the principle of 
nationalism was an artificial construct, almost an anthropomorphic fantasy. 
Consider some of its cognate terms Ð national consciousness, national will, self-
determination: in each case the nation is treated as analogous to an individual 
human being. ... In short, [the aim of the US is] to recast the world in AmericaÕs 
self-image.16 
Thus US hegemony views national states as liberal egos writ large. This 
conception rests on liberal norms of individualism and voluntarism that are 
deeply rooted in American political life and have been exported by suc-
cessive administrations, which promote national ends by imperial means. 
Historian Niall Ferguson observes that Ôthe United States is the empire that 
dare not speak its name. It is an empire in denial, and US denial of this poses 
a real danger to the world. An empire that doesnÕt recognise its own power is 
a dangerous oneÕ.17 With around 750 military bases in three-quarters of the 
countries of the world and 30 per cent of total global wealth, US power now 
exceeds that of the British Empire at any point in time. If one adds to this 
AmericaÕs allies (especially the European Union and Japan), Western 
hegemony looks unassailable. 
Moreover, the liberal order appears to endure even at a time when US 
leadership is weakening and Western authority is in crisis. Although we are 
seeing the rise of both old and new Ôgreat powersÕ, and the return to a multi-
polar system as well as multiple pathways to modernity, no grand alternative 
to hegemonic liberalism seems to exist: the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, 
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China and South Africa) have all adopted capitalist models that depend on 
access to world markets for growth and development. Neither they nor any 
other countries have created blocs, exclusive spheres of influence or closed 
geopolitical systems that could rival Ð never mind replace Ð the open, rules-
based system organised around national state sovereignty and transnational 
institutional cooperation.18 While some power and authority might shift from 
the liberal West to the authoritarian East, liberal hegemony looks set to last for 
three reasons: first, the United States is one of the most powerful countries 
with a young population and a growing power to innovate, especially in 
robotics; second, the Transatlantic alliance remains the only global military 
structure; third, so far China is neither able nor willing to take over the world, 
and the Ôrising restÕ want to integrate rather than overthrow the Western liberal 
order.19 This order rests on the 1941 Atlantic Charter and the US-dominated 
institutions of the post-1945 system (NATO, Bretton Woods, GATT/WTO), 
which gave the United States special rights and privileges in exchange for 
providing a security umbrella for its allies in Europe and Asia. It created an 
Ôinternational societyÕ of sovereign states that is more than an unstable balance 
of power (contra realism) but less than a unified Ôworld orderÕ (contra 
cosmopolitanism), to use Hedley BullÕs terminology.20 
3. THE METACRISIS OF THE LIBERAL 
ORDER Subverting Western Civilisation 
Yet one can equally suggest that the WestÕs hegemonic power is weakening 
precisely because its underlying liberalism has progressively eroded the very 
foundations of Western civilisation. Part of the liberal appeal was the promise 
of progress, but liberalism unleashed the forces of science and technology 
while divorcing modernisation from the pursuit of substantive shared ends. In 
this manner, liberal ideology became increasingly associated with subjugating 
both nature and society to individual volition and with releasing the collective 
Ôwill to powerÕ. A few prophetic voices warned against such voluntarism and 
the subversion of virtues. Fyodor Dostoevsky in The Devils and Joseph Conrad 
in The Secret Agent anatomised the secular extremists who embraced 
nineteenth-century positivism and nihilism in pursuit of a revolutionary 
vanguard whose origins go back to the Jacobins, the first exemplary inflictors 
of modern ÔterrorÕ.21 And they also saw that this apparently shocking minority 
is, in reality, symptomatic of a wider terroristic tendency. DostoevskyÕs dictum 
that Ôwithout God, everything is permittedÕ rightly indicated that ethics would 
be increasingly subordinated to politics, and politics to the iron law of power Ð 
the sheer strength of individual self-assertion and 
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collective mobilisation, exemplified by mass conscription and total war since 
the French Revolution, Bonaparte and Bismarck.22 
As the Catholic meta-historian Christopher Dawson argued in 1942, it is 
surely no coincidence that in the run-up to the two world wars, Western 
civilisation Ôsuffered such a total subversion of its own standards and values 
while its material power and wealth remained almost intact, and in many 
respects greater than everÕ.23 Unlike ancient despotism that had deployed bru-
tal physical coercion, the positivist and nihilist ideas that many nineteenth-
century liberals celebrated used the resources of modern psychology and mass 
propaganda to enlist both body and soul. The new liberal creed of progress, 
equality and emancipation displaced Greco-Roman and Christian values of 
the dignity of the person and the freedom of association around shared 
substantive objectives, which Ð as Nietzsche himself remarked Ð Ôprevented 
man from despising himself as man, from turning against life, and from being 
driven to despair by knowledgeÕ.24 Thus the ambivalence of liberalism lies in 
the tendency to release human energy and foster individual freedoms while at 
the same time failing to guide the forces it unleashes on an international as 
well as national scale. 
Instead of the culturally amalgamated organic society of nations, which 
once composed ÔChristendomÕ, liberalism has supported an artificial state 
system wherein membership is defined exclusively in terms of central sover-
eign power without any reference to the national character of the societies in 
question. When in 1918 Woodrow Wilson elevated the Ôself-determination of 
peopleÕ into an absolute principle (which still governs the inter-state system 
to this day), he did not so much defend popular sovereignty or the consent of 
the governed for all the nations. Rather, he encouraged the process of 
empire-breaking and state-building that inaugurated liberal hegemony and 
led to new wars. Wilson also called for the creation of an international 
organisation Ð the League of Nations Ð based on the equal rights of each par-
ticipant member. This, as Dawson noticed, amounted to the recognition of 
every de facto state as a de iure nation (or identifiable ÔpeopleÕ) and treated a 
multiplicity of incommensurable political systems all alike Ð as though they 
were individuals writ large who are endowed with equal rights and a 
common nature. 
Over time, according to Dawson, the liberal destruction of the medieval 
society of nations in favour of an inter-state system left peoples and societies 
exposed to two competing, yet mutually empowering, forces: 
The modern world is being driven along at the same time in two opposite 
directions. On the one hand the nations are being brought into closer contact by 
the advance of scientific and technical achievement; the limits of space and 
time that held them asunder are being contracted or abolished, and the world 
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has become physically one as never before. On the other hand, the nations are 
being separated from one another by a process of intensive organization which 
weakens the spiritual links that bound men together irrespective of political 
frontiers and concentrates the whole energy of society on the attainment of a 
collective purpose, so as inevitably to cause a collision with the collective will of 
other societies. ... What makes the danger of war so great today is ... the death-
grapple of huge impersonal mass Powers [sic] which have ground out the whole 
life of the whole population in the wheels of their social mechanism.25 
The International Metacrisis 
The simultaneous interdependence of national societies and the sundering of 
social, cultural and religious ties that bind together people within and across 
state borders suggest that liberal hegemony faces a metacrisis. This is in 
contrast to a mere systemic crisis, which would be to do with external threats 
to the inter-state system (say from a rogue, revisionist state), or the internal 
failure to secure a proper balance of power between sovereign states with 
rival interests. For, instead, as we have seen, it is the founding liberal 
assumptions for international order that are eventually being shaken through 
their own operation. Alongside the revival of political Islam, this is the real 
reason for the growing anarchy in international affairs. 
This profound cultural malaise has affected the WestÕs ability to shape the 
contemporary world. US military might and European economic expansion 
can scarcely hide the absence of any substantive accord among Western 
powers. As America shifts its geostrategic focus away from the Euro-Atlantic 
region, the West seems increasingly split between European and Pacific 
powers Ð with Russia stuck in a Eurasian grey zone. Without an overarching 
narrative, the various parts of the wider West are drifting apart. There is a 
growing gap between an exceptionalist United States, a provincially cosmo-
politan European Union and a reactionary Russia. Whereas America offers its 
post-Puritan salvific promise as a Ôbeacon of democracyÕ to all the nations, the 
European Union seeks to pursue the Rousseauian and Kantian Enlightenment 
project of a post-national federation of states. Meanwhile, Russia and, 
increasingly, other European states seem to follow the counter-Enlightenment 
of Joseph de Maistre and Louis de Bonald: strengthening the national com-
munity against both foreign influence and minority demands. 
As the US and European response to the ÔArab SpringÕ, events in Ukraine 
and now ISIS shows, there is a strategic void. The twilight of the West in the 
sense of the unquestioned hegemony of the Atlantic community could now 
be upon us.26 Compared with the era since the discovery of the New World 
or even the recent Cold War past, the West today looks bereft of ideas, 
deeply divided and incapable of acting as a force for good. 
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Amid ever-greater global interdependence and volatility, Western countries 
now oscillate between market anarchy and coercive state control. They eschew 
global leadership and lasting involvement abroad in favour of managing risks 
from afar.27 Across the West, there is a growing populist backlash against the 
dominant forms of globalisation and calls to retreat to narrow national self-
interest led by insurgent parties such as UKIP and the SNP in the United 
Kingdom, kindred movements (usually ÔrightÕ but sometimes ÔleftÕ) on the 
European continent and the Tea Party and Donald Trump in America. 
The Anglophone liberal empire is still the globeÕs most potent coalition, but 
its hegemony is unravelling because it lacks a coherent intellectual vision and 
the necessary cultural-social cohesion. This is manifest in the protracted crisis 
of the liberal values-based foreign policy that was so dominant under Bill 
Clinton and Tony BlairÕs ÔhumanitarianÕ interventionism and the neo-
conservative crusade in Afghanistan and Iraq, but whose roots stretch back to 
the liberal imperialism of Woodrow Wilson and the nineteenth-century British 
liberals like Palmerston. For today we have, instead, a distinct shift back to a 
more nakedly interest-based foreign policy and, above all, to Ôgreat power 
gamesÕ and spheres of influence Ð a dynamic that accounts in large part for 
the beginning of a deep freeze in Europe in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis 
and continual conflict in the Near East.28 Thus we are witnessing the return of 
a post-Westphalian geo-politics, albeit in a mutated form, that revives and 
accentuates its inter-imperial dimension (as diagnosed by Benno Teschke)29 in 
terms of geo-economics and a global Ôculture warÕ between Western liber-
alism and its adversaries. 
For as long as the United States is in denial about its imperial project, the 
key role in contemplating an alternative falls to Europe. But if Europe cannot 
even make the European Union work when so much unites its member-states Ð 
history, culture and shared sacrifice Ð then these are dark times indeed. And if 
the European Union (which needs a profound internal transformation if it is to 
survive) does not get more fully and creatively engaged in the world, then the 
portents for the rest of the twenty-first century are even darker. 
4. MODERN SOVEREIGNTY IN QUESTION 
The Birth of International Relations 
The origins of the liberal order that is now suffering a metacrisis go back to 
the foundations of modern international relations. The standard liberal nar-
rative goes something like this: since the 1555 Peace of Augsburg and the 
1648 Treaty of Westphalia, the modern international order has been coter-
minous with sovereign national states that claim exclusive authority over 
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populations and territories. Over the last century, and especially following 
the 1918 ÔWilsonian momentÕ, this model of national state sovereignty has 
been extended both geographically and culturally by the forces of 
international law, multinational corporations, supranational organisations and 
the global economy. 
However, a more critical reading of international affairs and political econ-
omy suggests that the tension between the national and the transnational is 
internal to modernity itself. For the capitalist system, which like the national 
state is modern and not medieval, has from the outset favoured international 
open markets and the free movement of capital across borders. At the same 
time, the modern state could assert itself against rival forms of political 
organisation only by promoting financial expansion and new models of eco-
nomic accumulation (including the use of mercantilism by France, England 
and, more recently, Japan and Germany). From its inception in the city-states 
of Northern Italy in the fourteenth century, transnational finance was essential 
to the destruction of old medieval regimes and the institution of modern mod-
els of government.30 So, rather than being always diametrically opposed to the 
power of the state, the transnational can also reinforce the national subor-
dination of the local. Just as territorial states and de-territorial finance absorb 
relatively autonomous regional economies, so too national governments and 
multinational corporations promote a worldwide economy that increasingly 
abstracts from locality by uprooting markets from the cooperative fabric of 
human relationships and associations. 
In fact, the Hobbesian realpolitik, which modern nation-states are thought 
to pursue in order to sustain their own interests (and have done in part, in 
reality), is only a political version of the law of market coordination through 
the operation of self-interest. Either Ð according to American IR Thucydidean 
ÔrealismÕ Ð a hidden hand coordinates the blind and unlimited ambitions of 
states. Or Ð according to English School Grotian ÔrationalismÕ Ð state leaders 
anticipate providence by more prudently and even ethically constraining their 
own sovereign aims. In both cases, the anarchy of modern international order 
is mitigated by an ÔeconomyÕ of forces, which is entirely mixed up with the 
actual economy of money. But this can also plausibly be inverted: the 
monetary economy is driven by politics to the degree that mercantilism is 
never fully abandoned, and the need for permanent Ôprimary accumulationÕ to 
overcome market contradictions is equally driven by imperial ambitions for 
the extension of power.31 
Globalisation and Central State Sovereignty 
This is not to say that these equations have remained unchanged in the face 
of the current phase of globalisation. On the contrary, the fusion of 
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economics with politics, apparent throughout the modern age, now extends 
beyond geographical boundaries more than ever before, as national states are 
increasingly integrated into a transnational network.32 This dual aspect 
system rests on the convergence and even collusion of Ôbig governmentÕ and 
Ôbig businessÕ, notably national governments, multinational corporations and 
supranational institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO. 
Yet, precisely for this reason, the state remains central to the exercise of 
sovereignty. Through the executive branch of government, states retain the 
prerogative to enforce international agreements, laws and regulations within 
their respective jurisdictions.33 Even if international legal bodies now 
increasingly have the capacity to overturn the decisions of sovereign 
democratic governments (as with BrazilÕs recent attempt to freeze energy 
prices), they still require national political power as the real ÔpoliceÕ enforcer 
of these decisions. To this degree, globalisation does not so much undermine 
state sovereignty as further extend the subsumption of the local, which the 
single sovereignty of national states crucially mediates. 
The most basic contrast of models of sovereignty lies not between the 
Westphalian modern and the Ôpost-modernÕ blurring of borders, but between 
the modern and the premodern. In late Antiquity and the Middle Ages, the 
exercise of political power was regarded as an attempted representation of 
eternal order and sometimes as a divine gift of grace, which is properly 
received through manÕs transformative and architectonic perfecting of nature 
in which GodÕs goodness is intimated. The telos of politics was to re-
actualise as far as humanly possible the just and harmonious ordering of 
GodÕs original creation within the civic or imperial polity. Yet, as we have 
already seen, this very sense of trusteeship under God tended both to require 
a constitutional answerability to the people and to nurture some measure of 
distribution of the power to rule and the gift of ruling, and to encourage the 
growth of overlapping jurisdictions and a complex web of intermediary asso-
ciations.34 And in the end this ensured the ultimate transnational authority of 
the new supernatural polity that was the Church, of the first real system of 
universal international jurisdiction that was Canon law, and to some extent 
the international reach of a coercive power of last resort that was the Holy 
Roman Empire. 
5. THE MODERN ORIGINS OF ÔINTERNATIONAL ANARCHYÕ 
A Conflict of Civilisations? 
It is, nevertheless, true that in the era of globalisation, national states have 
somewhat ceased to be the primary frameworks of cultural reference and 
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that this has political consequences. ÔCivilisationsÕ assume more impor-
tance for peopleÕs identity as well as their security Ð symbolic and real.35 
And clearly, Ôthe religiousÕ stands at the heart of the civilisational. Here 
though, we would part company with Samuel Huntingdon: none of the 
diverse civilisations he lists Ð Eastern Orthodox, Chinese, Islamic, South 
American (this last a truly absurd example of North American condescen-
sion and misapprehension) and so forth Ð genuinely remain in existence. 
This is because most of the world has been so thoroughly permeated by 
liberalism and capitalism, which, as a general ideology and economy, is 
not just a political and an economic system, but an entire system of values, 
a quasi-religious way of life and system of representation. To read, for 
example, Haruki MarukamiÕs novel Dance Dance Dance is to realise how 
almost the entirety of JapanÕs past has been obliterated by global capital, 
with a break arguably more absolute than is the case in Europe, precisely 
because in adopting capitalism the Japanese have perforce come to adopt a 
wholly alien culture.36 Very significantly, the only thing that is Japanese 
in the novel is a religious sense of the porosity of the bounds between this 
world and a spirit world beyond death, and the continuum between the 
latter and the world of dreaming. The genius of the novel is to blend this 
traditional sense with a late modern sense of hyper-reality, so that what 
one gets is a kind of eclectic mix of ancient religion with capitalist Ôquasi-
religionÕ (Walter Benjamin). Viewed through the former, the latter is 
strangely shown to have secret elevating and redemptive potentialities. 
Nevertheless, one is left with the sense that the ancient can only narrowly 
break through and that it then requires one to handle consumer society 
stringently and sparingly, against its fundamental inclination. (Stick to 
your reliable Subaru, foreswear the gleaming Maserati, is the novelÕs 
oddly transcendental message.) 
This suggests that only the religious defines a civilisation that might today 
be considered as distinct against the Western one, and that even here old 
religions struggle against new and often debased religiosities. That appears 
especially true for those countries that do not have a tradition of organised 
monotheism, like Japan, China and most of India. They lack the presence of 
a counter-globalising force with a reach such as is provided by Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam, even if both Hinduism and Buddhism have now 
developed their own more local forms of often intolerant politicisation. This 
is why Huntingdon would appear to be correct only for the case of Islam. 
Here, indeed, one has a civilisation driven by a salvation religion that has a 
tendency to expand imperialistically and that still aims to inform all aspects 
of life. It is not surprising that with some decline in the effective sovereignty 
of the individual nation-state, Islam should enjoy an increase in power and 
influence. 
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Ius Gentium and Iustus Hostis 
Like the nation-state, of which it is an element, the modern system of inter-
national relations is very recent indeed, and is certainly not grounded in any 
ÔrealistÕ natural law, nor even in any autonomously geo-political Ôconstruc-
tivismÕ occurring between sovereign nations. For the standard IR theory of a 
geo-political ÔanarchyÕ pertaining on the high seas, in the air and in territorial 
ÔmarchesÕ only reflects a certain modern reality (in parts of Europe and North 
America), and is universally but a fiction. For most of ÔcivilisedÕ history, 
peoples have acknowledged an authority that extended over most of their 
known world Ð ancient China, for example, or the Roman Empire and 
Medieval Europe.37 And even between alien peoples, an unwritten Ôlaw of 
hospitalityÕ was exercised, diverse, of course, in different places, but, none-
theless, often found to coincide. The absolute stranger, precisely because she 
was beyond all ken, was not seen as primarily a potential enemy but, rather, 
as a temporary sojourner: she was first a stranger to be ÔhostedÕ before she 
became an enemy to be taken ÔhostageÕ. 
The ÔtemporarinessÕ of this welcome was not, as Derrida had it, a sign of 
aporia Ð only the enemy need be welcomed; were he a friend he would be at 
home. For the natural home of the other was intrinsically valued (something 
like, but also very unlike, your own home) and, therefore, his eventual return 
to that home was also valued and not viewed as a kind of expulsion and return 
of a captive.38 Respect for the strangerÕs character was bound up with respect 
for his mysterious origin: to receive him was to receive that origin and not to 
suspend it; eventually, to speed him on his way was (at least for the present) 
to refrain from conquering that domain. So, in hospitality, there was a 
balanced exchange, timed and spaced in due measure, not a played-out 
contradiction between an absolute one-way receptivity on the one hand and an 
abrupt termination of this gesture on the other. 
As to what went on within peopleÕs known worlds, this was nothing like a 
balance of power between states. The European ius gentium was a law of 
peoples, not states, and, thus, a full part of the natural law up until the time of 
Francisco Surez (1548Ð1617), when natural law came to be inversely based 
upon the law of nations, now itself more formalistically construed.39 Thus 
Surez now saw the privileges and prohibitions of the ius gentium as positive 
laws set up by contracting sovereign state partners: ÔThe law of nations does 
not forbid things because they are evil, but makes things evil by forbidding 
themÕ.40 In the European Middle Ages, there had existed no Ôsovereign statesÕ, 
only patrimonial rulers who in some eminent sense ÔownedÕ their kingdoms, 
while, inversely, the local lords acted as petty rulers within their feudal 
territories.41 Nothing usually guaranteed that the vassal of a vassal was also 
the vassal of his final overlord, and just for this reason, the lords 
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of the various ÔmarchesÕ were semi-independent of the political centre. Thus 
there were generally no wars in this period Ôbetween statesÕ. Many wars were 
between nobles and were bound up with what was seen as the restitution of 
justice or the remedying of crimes. Wars between kings had usually a dynas-
tic aspect and generally concerned the extension of terrain rather than the 
defence of boundaries. 
In the same period there existed some distinction between the lawless 
criminal and the enemy warrior. Thus, for example, Western report and 
fiction notably admired Saladin as the very exemplar of chivalry. (This has 
interesting inter-religious implications, given the sacral character of the 
chivalric cult.) While it was not supposed at this stage that there could be a 
Ôjust causeÕ of war on either side, nevertheless, Church and chivalric codes 
together sustained a sense of the iustis hostis as distinguished from the 
criminal or the infidel.42 Against the latter there could, indeed, be a wholly 
just struggle without quarter since he had no ius on his side whatsoever, on 
account of his failure to render any justice towards the true good. But within 
the bounds of Christendom, the fellow Christian could become a Ôjust 
enemyÕ, since both the warring parties ultimately owed allegiance to higher 
powers: the Pope and, sometimes, the Holy Roman Emperor. The latterÕs 
power was as much deliberately latent as, of necessity, weak: it was often re-
exercised in the case of emergency threats of extreme internal disorder or 
threats to Christendom from without. 
Thus, within this era, war generally fell within the sphere of both a kind of 
irregular policing and violent criminality, the issue being mediated through a 
sort of informal trial by combat. It was not as yet a purely ÔpoliticalÕ, nor, 
strictly speaking, an ÔinternationalÕ matter. The international dimension was 
only invoked when need arose to appeal to the imperial or else the papal 
guarantor of the order and unity of Christendom as such, either against inner 
disruption or against a rival civilisation. 
The Birth of International Anarchy 
Political and international warfare in the modern sense emerged only with 
the rise of sovereign and absolute Christian states, the contested struggle by 
sea and land for new-world territories, the lapse of the role of the emperor as 
ultimate guarantor and, finally, with the Peace of Westphalia, the lapse of the 
role of the Pope as international arbitrator.43 
In this way, Ôinternational anarchyÕ was born and the role of the iustus 
hostis was either augmented, as for Hobbesian ÔrealismÕ (whose tradition 
would pass down to E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr), or 
completely abolished, as for Kantian ÔliberalismÕ (whose legacy has been 
developed by John Rawls and Michael Doyle). Already, with Grotius, there 
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is some hesitation between the idea that war can have an iustus causis only 
on one side and the notion that both sides can wage war justly, if they 
possess real sovereign authority and have declared hostilities following the 
proper procedures. After Grotius, Ôjust causeÕ became more and more 
formally reduced in this fashion.44 But with Kant, on the other hand, one has, 
following the Scots political economists, the notion that trading nations will 
tend to balance out each otherÕs powers and arrive at a convenient peace, just 
like trading parties inside a state. As within the state, so internationally, Kant 
envisages a body of international laws that will pronounce upon property 
violations at the inter-state level. Yet, unlike Surez, he envisages no world 
government, because he believes that the many nations constitute a sort of 
international equivalent of the division of powers at the state level and a 
bulwark against tyranny. 
Since, nonetheless, war can for Kant be adjudicated by a moral law 
beyond that of sovereign states, there can no longer be any Ôjust enemyÕ at 
all: if your enemy is legitimately your enemy (in anticipation of the category 
of ÔterroristÕ), then he is an international criminal. This notion of a law not 
just prior to, but even independent of, any exercise of sovereignty ignores the 
fact that a law is an impotent fiction if it remains without authorisation and 
interpretation in the case of its application.45 
Either the realist over-dominance of the notion of the just enemy or its 
liberal abolition removes the medieval sense that war, while wholly regret-
table, is a kind of honourable recognition of the limits of human reason in 
arriving at a just consensus. Thus the enemy may be in the wrong, may even 
be a violator, but it is not quite so in the case of the person seen by all as a 
common criminal. By contrast, Baroque realism trivialises warfare and 
separates honour from virtue, because the combatants are now involved in a 
mere game of rivalry that is but an exceptional bloody extension of the mar-
ketplace, which has newly made agon normative. Inversely, Enlightenment 
liberalism ironically threatens to turn war into an unlimited action against a 
particularly heinous kind of criminal who is an enemy of civilisation as such: 
the global war against terror is, therefore, already here in sight and it turns 
out that both liberal interventionists and neo-conservative crusaders are 
Kantians not Hobbesians, after all... 
Yet, even in the case of the early modern and the Enlightenment periods, 
one can exaggerate the preponderance of strife between nations.46 In the first 
era, the really dominating factor is not the displacement of Christendom by 
competing nation-states, but, rather, the warfare without quarter (since it 
could not just be between enemies) between the two factions of Christianity, 
Catholic or Protestant Ð or if one prefers, the war against Catholic order, 
which was the continued but threatened unity of Europe itself.47 The 
religious civil wars were also wars about securing the unity of the emerging 
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nation-state (which could not as yet imagine religious plurality), these wars 
also had an international dimension (the operations of a threatened 
ÔProtestant InternationalÕ stretching from Bohemia to Scotland, for example, 
cannot be ignored in accounting for the unfolding of national events in the 
first half of the seventeenth century).48 And these wars surely were primar-
ily religious, if also suffused with dynastic and national power-politics. For 
the Catholics fought in part under the Pope and Emperor in order to pre-
serve a united Christendom, while the Protestants often envisaged (as with 
Comenius and, later, Leibniz) a new sort of Erasmian peaceful international 
Christian community, if the office of the Papacy could be overthrown or 
else modified. 
Dynastic Honour without Virtue 
In the later era, Teschke has effectively shown that, while the Peace of 
Westphalia (which he does not, however, explicitly point out) ÔsecularisedÕ 
the international sphere by establishing a treaty without the blessing of the 
Pope, it, nevertheless, did not really usher in (as nearly all IR textbooks say) 
an era of balance of powers between states. The treatise itself involved noth-
ing of the kind, but only an old-fashioned dynastic carve-up of the body of 
the ancient imperial heartlands between Sweden and France against 
Austria.49 Later, the wars of the eighteenth century continued to be in large 
measure inter-dynastic (and sometimes still inter-religious) feuds, rather than 
out-and-out quarrels between nations for the wealth of the earth. Even after 
the Vienna Congress, the balance of power was, in reality, an agreement 
among the various dynasties. And military campaigns throughout the 
nineteenth century were often the result of the shifting alliances of royal and 
noble families contesting, across national boundaries, for shares in 
MontesquieuÕs honour without virtue. 
Only after the First World War were dynastic empires (Germany, Russia, 
Habsburg and the Ottomans) decisively replaced by sovereign states, but 
instead of this inaugurating an era of egalitarian managed order, control 
over international relations lay with the old empires of Britain and France, 
as well as rising powers such as the United States and the nascent Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics. After the Second World War and de-colonisation 
(especially in the wake of the 1956 Suez crisis), the two superpowers 
steadily expanded their sphere of influence and extended their domination 
over newly independent states. In short, the international society of 
sovereign states was only ever a partial reality, heavily qualified by the 
enduring presence of imperial Ôgreat powersÕ and social-cultural ties across 
borders. Bruno LatourÕs claim that Ôwe have never been modernÕ also 
applies to international relations. 
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6. THE NEO-MEDIEVAL SHAPE OF CONTEMPORARY  
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 
Globalisation and Impersonal Rule 
The dominant model of globalisation has additionally established the primacy 
of the economic and the political over the social and the ethical. The subject 
of rights and contracts is no longer by definition a person, but a mere subject 
of a system or state, which means that subjectivity here dialectically inverts 
into objectification. The human subject as paradigmatically an owner, and 
owner of herself, now owns even her own body merely in part, while another 
aspect effectively belongs to the market or state. And this aspect is always 
homogenously compounded with other bodies to make one single manipu-
lable mass. This process of objectification has been taken much further in 
recent times and has been much assisted by the dominant model of globalisa-
tion, which permits a further degree of remote control of both isolated mental 
decisions and human flesh. 
However, there is another possibility. This is that transport and communi-
cations could truly provide the pre-conditions for the emergence of a Ôglobal 
villageÕ, in which social bonds and cultural ties really do embed economic 
transactions and political cooperation. The current mode of globalisation 
mostly destroys locality and interpersonal relationships by regarding local 
taste and custom as irrelevant. But globalisation also renders it more and 
more possible for one community, locality and even region to communicate 
directly with another in a totally distant part of the world without the direct 
control of bureaucracy and capital. In this way, it just could once more come 
to seem Ôcommon senseÕ that the entire economy should be subordinate to 
social reciprocity and that multiply interlocking polities should reflect the 
relational nature of humankind Ð including the complex ties of family, com-
munity, profession and faith. 
The Resurgence of Cities and Faiths 
This is not a mere possibility on the theoretical horizon, either. Globalisation 
has already transformed the secular settlement of national states and transna-
tional markets bequeathed to us by the Westphalian system. In a sense, we now 
live in a neo-medieval era insofar as we have outlived the dominant sway of 
national states and to some extent of undifferentiated markets. Viewed from a 
long historical perspective (say 5,000 years), the era of sovereign nation-states 
is very short (less than 500 years) and exceptional, compared with the relative 
norm of imperially organised systems with gradated polities, which rest on a 
different kind of suzerainty, that is, formal or semi-formal 
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relationships of supremacy and subordination that are situated somewhere 
between the absolute equality of independent sovereign states and the direct 
rule of repressive colonial powers. 
Even if the dominant modern institutional legacy will endure for some time 
to come, the exceptional era of the Westphalian settlement (which we have 
seen was itself not as exceptional as all that) appears to be drawing to an 
end.50 We seem to have entered an interregnum in which the shape of things 
to come is best described as neo-medieval. Far from indicating a return to, or 
repetition of, the Middle Ages, this notion suggests a reversion to long-
standing patterns that reflect the socio-cultural realities in which forms of 
political and economic organisation are grounded. Yet here most critics of the 
notion of neo-medievalism in IR have adopted a curiously literalist interpreta-
tion that posits some kind of identity or equivalence between the Middle Ages 
and our present situation, which would be guilty of the same ahistorical logic 
as that of liberal and Marxist theorists who treat the modern as necessary, 
normative and superceding the medieval.51 
To say that the contemporary world is not the same as the Middle Ages does 
not mean that the notion of Ôneo-medievalÕ is redundant. On the contrary, it can 
be used as a metaphor that helps IR thinking break out of conventional 
conceptual frames, and opens up new possibilities of recognising alternatives to 
the sovereign power of both national states and global markets. Such 
alternatives include hybrid institutions, overlapping jurisdictions, polycentric 
authority and forms of multi-level governance, which are all characterised by 
dispersed power structures and degrees of suzerainty that are not captured by 
modern paradigms of equal sovereignty and balance of power. 
In fact, signs that contemporary international affairs exhibit a neo-
medieval shape abound. The three Ôpolitical formsÕ that successively char-
acterise the West from Antiquity to the late Middle Ages Ð the City, the City-
Empire (Rome) and the Church52 Ð are all resurgent in new ways. Big cities 
are often trading more with other global cities across the globe than with 
towns or regions within their national borders. This is true not only for old 
and new city-states such as Singapore, Hong Kong or Dubai and, indeed, 
long-established metropolises such as London, New York or Tokyo, but also 
for new mega-cities Ð including Nairobi, Rio de Janeiro, Mexico-City, Kuala 
Lumpur or Jakarta Ð not to mention the booming metropolitan areas in China 
and India.53 
As Benjamin Barber suggests, ÔThe nation-state is failing us on the global 
scale. It is utterly unsuited to interdependence. The city, always the human 
habitat of first resort, has in todayÕs globalizing world once again become 
democracyÕs best hopeÕ.54 Barber writes off the state too hastily and fails to 
think properly about cities in relation to their regions and natural envi-
ronment, but his point about the rise of autonomous cities as powerhouses 
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of political transformation is surely right. The resurgence of global cities 
certainly witnesses to the rural exodus, which reinforces the divide between 
urban and rural areas, but it also offers new opportunities to build more hori-
zontal relationships between individuals, groups and communities that are 
not subject to central state control. 
Similarly, the global resurgence of religion is much remarked upon but lit-
tle understood. There is no return to faith, as if it had ever gone away. Rather, 
the intellectual and moral collapse of secularism provides new opportunities 
to re-think religion in international affairs in non-secularist ways.55 Amid the 
global flow of ideas and practices, it is often religious ties that bind together 
persons and communities both within and across national borders. Unlike the 
impersonalism of rights and contracts, the bonds of faith can nurture the kind 
of trust and cooperation on which vibrant societies and stable relations with 
other societies ultimately depend. Globalisation has re-inforced formal 
connections of bureaucratic control and capitalist commodification, but it has 
also opened up new spaces for new religious networks. Scott Thomas puts 
this well: 
The global and the local are becoming more closely linked together in a kind of 
Ôglobal particularityÕ. One key example is ... Ôglobalized IslamÕ, in which types 
of radical Islam around the world blur the connection between Islam, a specific 
society and a specific territory. Another example is the transnational links 
between churches and denominations that make up global evangelical and Pen-
tecostal Christianity. ... These global links or networks do not just happen; they 
are not free-floating, but are social networks, embedded in religious diaspora 
communities that are a key aspect of religious transnationalism ... such social 
and information networks have been part of much of human history, and a part 
of the main world religions for centuries, and existed long before the modern 
international system.56 
The Resurgence of Old Empires 
At least as fundamentally, the Westphalian idea of equality between 
sovereign states has turned out to be a bit of a myth. Amid the shift in power 
from the West and the North to the East and the South, global geo-politics is 
marked by the crisis of the nation-state and the resurgence of pre-modern 
empire, besides, and sometimes along with, a new permutation of the 
modern, colonising empire. 
One can approach this matter by first noting that the core UN principle of 
national self-determination and territorial integrity, alongside non-inter-
ference in internal affairs, is not really compatible with the recently adopted 
UN doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). So, on the one hand, under 
R2P, ever-smaller territorial entities can break away from their larger parent 
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country in the name of the right to self-rule (South Sudan, Kosovo, South 
Ossetia, to name but the most recent cases) and populations have been pro-
tected from the brutal force of tyrannical rulers (such as GaddafiÕs imminent 
onslaught on the people of Benghazi in 2011). But on the other hand, and 
more dubiously, R2P has also served as a justification for regime change 
encouraged (and sometimes brought about) by greater powers who enjoy an 
effectively quasi-imperial sway. The 2011 intervention in Libya encapsulates 
this ambivalence. Here the modern state is in tension both with imperial 
traditions that have long modern and pre-modern roots and with contempo-
rary realities such as tribal loyalties and Islamism that cannot be navigated 
with a merely Westphalian compass. 
The spread of globalised capitalism has led to a simultaneous national frag-
mentation and imperial consolidation that complicates any post-colonial and 
post-Soviet idea of an Ôend of historyÕ or a worldwide convergence towards 
liberal Ômarket democracyÕ. In the category Ôeconomically imperialÕ belong 
global capital movements and supranational institutions such as the IMF and 
the WTO, which represent a pooling of economic and political sovereignty that 
constrains the power of states. Meanwhile, a new Ôpolitical imperialismÕ is 
exemplified by powers as diverse as Turkey, Iran, Russia and China. Their 
leaders look back to pre-modern imperial traditions in order to define national 
roles in a multipolar world and to forge links independently of Western coun-
tries and institutions. This is why Moscow speaks of its post-Soviet Ôsphere of 
privileged interestsÕ, and Beijing considers Taiwan (as well as various islands 
in the South and East China Sea) as a renegade region that must be reintegrated 
into the Middle Kingdom.57 Equally, TehranÕs power projection across the 
Near East is raising fears of revived Persian imperial ambitions. There is a 
contest for supremacy in the wider region, and it pits the Shia crescent against 
the Sunni arc Ð the former is led by Persia and stretches from the Lebanon via 
Syria, Iraq and Iran all the way to Bahrain, while the latter is dominated by the 
Saudi Kingdom and encompasses Turkey, Saudi Arabia itself, Kuwait and the 
remaining Gulf States. 
In fact, AnkaraÕs assertive foreign policy has transformed TurkeyÕs role from 
that of being a bridge between Europe and Asia to exercising hegemonic 
influence in the lands that formerly constituted the Ottoman Empire.58 Indeed, 
the governing AKP partyÕs foreign policy strategy assumes a Ôdouble-gravity 
stateÕ that seeks to balance its shared values as a member of the Euro-Atlantic 
community with its interest in the Greater Middle Eastern neighbourhood.59 
Taken in combination, these attitudes compose a neo-imperial outlook Ð the 
revival of Ottoman traditions novelly borne by newly self-assertive ÔGreat 
PowerÕ Turkey that seeks to act as an imperial force rather than a modern 
nation-state. ErdoganÕs election as President underscores the gradual 
ÔsultanisationÕ and creeping Islamisation of the formally secular Turkish 
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Republic Ð especially considering his refusal to intervene decisively in the 
fight against ISIS on the Turkish-Syrian border, swayed by its overarching 
concern to subdue Kurdish separatism. 
The resurgence of old imperial powers is not limited to Europe, the Near 
East and China but can also be observed elsewhere. Across the globe we are 
seeing the resuscitation of ancient empires or transnational political configu-
rations that had never entirely died. In Latin America, Brazil is exercising a 
continental leadership role. In Africa, countries such as Nigeria and South 
Africa deploy cross-tribal and cross-cultural linkages that project their power 
well beyond their national borders. In Southeast Asia, Indonesia and the Phil-
ippines are engaged in struggles to secure their respective zones of influence. 
None of these developments can be captured either by the realist focus on 
sovereign states, nor by the liberal emphasis on inter-state relations, nor yet 
by the cosmopolitan accentuation of post-national identity. For all three 
approaches view the modern state as given, and underplay the social, cultural 
and religious ties that precede modern statehood and endure in international 
affairs with a revived force after the collapse of the conditions that ensured 
the unchallenged sway of the Westphalian system. 
7. IMPERIAL POWER AND GUARDIANSHIP 
Power as Imperial 
Ultimately, all political power tends to become imperial for at least three rea-
sons: either to stabilise volatile ÔbackyardsÕ (e.g. the United States in Central 
and Latin America; China in the South Chinese Sea; Turkey and Russia in 
the wider Caucasus and Eurasia), or to secure natural resources and market 
outlets (e.g. the United States worldwide; the European UnionÕs trade agree-
ments; ChinaÕs expansion in Africa) or else, again, to pursue a Ôcivilising 
missionÕ (e.g. the US export of democracy by ÔhardÕ and ÔsoftÕ power, or the 
European UnionÕs promotion of human rights, or ChinaÕs neo-Confucian 
project of global harmony). Indeed, even the geo-politically inept European 
Union is best described as a Ôneo-medievalÕ empire that has both pacified 
relations within its own borders and tries to project normative power by 
syndicating its values worldwide.60 
Thus contemporary Ôgreat powersÕ operate a tributarian system with 
smaller neighbours and other states across the world. They provide military 
security in exchange for market outlets and inexpensive imports. For 
example, the United States sells military equipment to its allies worldwide Ð 
notably smaller imperial powers such as India or Saudi Arabia, but also 
client states such as Egypt, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. It also buys cheap 
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consumer goods from abroad in order to fuel a consumption binge that papers 
over growing income and asset inequalities at home, while at the same time 
importing cheap (often unskilled and illegal) labour to maintain a young pop-
ulation and keep wages low. For its part, China needs primary commodities to 
sustain its buoyant economic growth, which it extracts in the resource-rich 
regions of Africa and Latin America. Beijing has also established a system of 
client states, which provide either underpaying sweat-shops (e.g. Vietnam and 
Cambodia) or market access for its cheap consumer goods. In the new Great 
Game, the geo-economics of energy and financial security matters just as much 
as the geo-politics of territorial control. Instead of national states and liberal 
market democracy, we are seeing the rise of old empires and new elites who 
combine oligarchy with authoritarianism in novel ways. 
This continual revolution in modern sovereignty also involves some 
modulations. If power is ultimately imperial, then the question is what this 
means for relationships between empires Ð old or new Ð and other countries. 
Arguably, there is a choice between various forms of direct colonialism and 
indirect exploitation and more virtuous forms of protection and cooperation. 
In the first case, we can see a parallel to the fate of the supposedly ÔfreeÕ 
labourer and ÔfreeÕ citizen, as Justin Rosenberg (who synthesised English 
school perspectives in IR with Marxist ones) pointed out. Just as agricultural 
wage labourers could be more enslaved in practice than the theoretically 
more ÔtiedÕ peasants of the past, so also colonies are ÔliberatedÕ, but, in 
reality, into a more absolute mode of contractual slavery at the hands of new 
internationally oligarchic masters (both states and corporations) who are 
more indifferent to their true well-being than even the more avowed masters 
of the colonial past.61 RosenbergÕs analysis (and his Marxism) is here more 
rigorous than that of most Ôpost-colonialÕ writing. 
In the face of the mutations of the Westphalian system, there is an urgent 
need for a much more equitable and more cooperative approach to 
international affairs, which can replace Ôliberal interventionismÕ and neo-
conservative crusades with an ÔassociationistÕ action upholding genuine 
transnational trusteeship and partnership in a fashion that respects local 
peculiarities and traditions. This is preferable to either an isolationism or a 
supposedly principled Ônon-interventionismÕ of a pure Grotian stamp, which 
is now either dangerous or outright impossible. 
The Associationist Alternative in IR 
In international relations, the notion of trusteeship or guardianship describes 
a relationship in which one state, country or nation assumes responsibility for 
the security and flourishing of another state, country or nation, which is 
thought to be unable to manage its own affairs without doing damage either 
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to itself or to others.62 In the contemporary world, there are many cases where 
this might apply Ð including transition economies, post-conflict countries or 
Ôfailed statesÕ. In the absence of trusteeship, there is always the strong risk that 
purely self-interested powers will fill the vacuum, thereby ensuring that a 
priggish absolutism with regard to national boundaries produces not the best but 
the worst Ð and not even compromise, which Ôassociationist interventionÕ 
(committed to a cooperative approach, but not to all and every tolerance of the 
behaviour of the other) is more likely to achieve. 
Associationist approaches would assume that the international system is 
not so much a society of sovereign states but, rather (as in the early work of 
English School, especially the writings of Martin Wight, Herbert Butterfield 
and Donald Mackinnon), a society of nations and peoples who are bound 
together by social ties and cultural bonds that are more primary than state-
guaranteed rights and market contracts. Up to a point, this is true of the 
countries that compose the British Commonwealth, members of the 
Francophonie, or the association of Ibero-American states, or certain parts of 
the post-Soviet space. 
Such advocacy is by no means unalert to the danger that the virtue of coop-
erative assistance can flip over into the vice of oppressive tutelage. This is true 
for all relationships that include forms of hierarchical dependency Ð from the 
family via communities and states to the international society of nations and 
peoples. However, the risk of exploitative domination is counterbalanced by 
the pursuit of mutual flourishing, which can only be sustained by an equally 
shared vision of a substantive common good. Without this common pursuit, 
one is left with the formalist vacuum of a purely legal and contractual equality, 
which inexorably engenders its own substantive opposite Ð namely the 
domination of the powerful and the wealthy. With ÔassociationistÕ intervention, 
the latter is an admitted risk, but with the apparently greater radicalism of a 
non-paternalist liberalism, the risk is, rather, an inevitability. For liberalism, 
different degrees of development are in the end but the outcome of chances in 
a game played according to fair rules, and therefore they are ultimately a 
matter of indifference. But for a Ôpost-liberal associationismÕ, shared virtue 
permits a common horizon of human concern between the richer and the 
economically poorer who may well be richer in depth of life, while the open 
advocacy of virtuous guardianship ensures that no relative failure consigns one 
to bio-political unconcern. 
But to realise this requisite, even in any degree, would require some prog-
ress towards the genuine practice of international government, international 
policing and the international rule of law. And this cannot be done merely in 
the name of acting for humanity or the cause of human rights. For the problem 
with a lot of Western interventions in the Near East or North Africa Ð as in the 
case of Libya in 2011 Ð is that if one is only intervening on that basis, 
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one will not possess a more concrete plan of medium-term trusteeship, 
which, though it might involve something more paternalist, could also prove 
to be of far more sympathetic use. 
For it is no good just saying we are acting in the name of humanitarian 
goals or human rights unless we have actually got a real plan for how we 
are going to help a desperate populace and how we are going to produce a 
more just constitutional government adapted to their valid cultural habits. 
In effect, recent interventions in the Near East can all be construed as 
either too much or too little. If we insist on always and despairingly saying 
Ôthis is too muchÕ in the name of a Grotian purism, then surely we must 
inevitably be putting an arbitrary block on our ethical sympathies and 
imperatives in the name of that debatable absolute which is the Ônation-
stateÕ, besides arguably putting at risk our own ultimate security. But any 
intervention is likely to remain an irresponsible Ôtoo littleÕ Ð or Ôtoo little 
and thereby also too muchÕ Ð if more powerful nations are not prepared to 
engage in long-term strategic assistance. An unashamedly more 
ÔparentalistÕ, substantive assistance could take more seriously than any 
locally autonomous modernising regime, local customs and habits and not 
override them in the name of ÔdemocracyÕ, ÔrightsÕ and ÔdevelopmentÕ, 
whose status can never have the absolute and eternal ring of ÔjusticeÕ or 
Ôthe human goodÕ. 
8. LIBERAL EMPIRE AND THE UN 
SYSTEM The UNÕs Double Deficit 
But this sort of ÔthickÕ international engagement cannot be delivered (as 
Dawson already realised in relation to the former League of Nations) by a 
formal alliance of nations sharing only abstract liberal principles in common. 
Such an organisation, like that of the UN, suffers a double deficit, doubly 
linked. The merely formal principles prevent it from communicating any 
substantive vision of a desirable political and cultural way of life, while the 
merely formal alliance of powers ensures that it lacks any power of real 
enforcement. This mutual linkage arises because principles of themselves 
engender no concrete unity or power, while contract divorced from a power 
of enforcement (which always proceeds from a more substantive, ineffable 
unity) is generative of no concrete agreement. 
For these reasons, the power of the UN has been in reality the power of the 
United States. That power is not bad in itself, and might in theory have been 
exercised in terms of its own often hidden and perhaps deeper associational 
genius. But unfortunately, the United States has largely sought to impose 
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on other countries merely formalistic and economistic principles that derive 
from its own dominantly liberal theory of itself, more perhaps than from the 
truth of the way it has reliably worked in practice. It has offered this thin 
gruel rather than the solid sustenance of a deep-rooted Western culture with 
which other cultures might enter into conversation. And since culture abhors 
a vacuum, the formalism is, in reality, the offer of a continuous commercial 
soundtrack and a permanent lust for the ephemeral. 
Liberal Imperialism Revisited 
Ever since the Wilsonian and Weimar era of the 1920s, it is this mode of 
liberal imperialism that has taken the global initiative. But in that era, such a 
commitment to the empty freedom of culture taken as Ôhuman choice as 
suchÕ helped generate its dialectical counterpart of totalitarian advocacy of 
merely material or ÔanimalÕ values of biological flourishing Ð whether Ômate-
rialistÕ or ÔracialÕ. This alternative was deliberately refused by the British 
under Baldwin, Ramsey MacDonald and George V, who avoided continental 
political violence by some shift of ownership and wealth away from the 
upper classes, an involvement of the representatives of labour in government 
and a populist re-invention of the role of the monarch Ð a re-invention of the 
British ÔmixtureÕ, which suggests that a parallel re-invention is possible 
today, if the political will for it were to exist.63 
By contrast, the Wilsonian Ôdemocratic republicanÕ option (partially taken 
up by several continental countries) sustained mainly the cultural commit-
ment to Ôhuman choice as suchÕ. Such a commitment tended (especially on 
the continent where it met less resistance from an American spirit of anarchic 
libertarianism) to compound aggregated individual ÔLockeanÕ wills as a 
ÔRousseauianÕ Ôgeneral willÕ, legitimating an ever-increased biological 
control of their own populations by the state taken as this willÕs legitimate 
legislative embodiment. 
Today it may be that just the same dialectic is at work, as liberalism once 
more automatically produces various totalitarian reactions (in new muta-
tions), while on the other hand, the contrast of liberal and totalitarian modes 
of the bio-political is somewhat less apparent today. For, in either case, neo-
liberal market and bureaucratic oligarchy impose an economistic mediation 
between a massive spectacular authority and a mere appearance of individual 
choice, while policing any aberrantly real choices with an ever-increased 
police surveillance. 
Not accidentally, this double idiom can be parodied by large criminal 
consortia, as in northern Mexico or large parts of China. So if the contrast 
between liberal and totalitarian is being qualified in a globalised era (partly 
for globalising reasons of increased abstraction and dialectical merging of far 
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and near), then so too is the contrast between licit and illicit, in the same con-
text and for the same reasons. It is possible to read the phenomenon of politi-
cal terror, which, again, is equally perpetrated by both states and outlaws, as, 
in one respect, an intensification of this situation. And in the case of both 
organised crime and organised terror, one has a terrible fusion of archaic, but 
now dispossessed, tribal and other archaic factions with all-too-modern aims, 
procedures and discourses. 
Putting Culture and Religion Back into IR 
The new triple threat of official anarchy, crime and terror may be one reason 
why certain modes of culture and religion are now once more to the fore. For 
we cannot quite allow either individual anarchy or collective power to be the 
ultimate principle, without admitting that we are now under the sway of a 
post-modern and post-theological ÔanimalisticÕ anarchy Ð even though this is 
increasingly the case. Therefore, to avoid this admission or surrender, 
unmediated and unmystical, voluntaristic modes of belief coming Ôright out 
of the blueÕ Ð whether Sunni Islamic or Christian fundamentalist evangelical 
Ð claim that legitimacy derives, rather, from some sort of hidden providential 
(rather than also transcendently ethical) mediation between the individual or 
locally communal self-interested actor on the one hand, and political col-
lectivities on the other. In this way essentialist racist, bio-political identities 
such as the Arab or the Anglo-Saxon worlds get re-construed as providential 
totalities bearing the secret of private salvation. 
At the same time, rigid revealed codes of mainly private personal conduct 
serve to ensure at least some boundary against incipient anarchy, and some 
residual sphere in which people will be restrained by that degree of discipline 
which remains necessary to market performance Ð however fused this may 
now be (beyond anything foreseen by Weber) with the operation of the 
pleasure principle. Indeed, if work is now also pleasure (both mainly involve 
texting...), then, significantly, charismatic Christianity endorses this equiva-
lence at a more elevated level with its blending of piety and ecstasy. Perhaps 
the Islamic equivalent is one-sidedly to do with insistence at once upon the 
duties and the pleasurable rewards of the Muslim male. 
The post-modern era (tentatively beginning as far back as the aftermath of 
the First World War in the IR field), beyond the sway of the nation-state and 
its extension into national empires, is, therefore, the era of liberal empire often 
collusive with totalitarianism and the renewal of ersatz, voluntaristic 
monotheism. Prior to that, one had the age of Christian empire and prior to 
that, again, the age of pagan empires. Every human age has been an age of 
empires, in a way that the term Ôpost-colonialÕ may all too easily ignore, just 
as one tends to overlook the fact that a nation-state is every bit as much 
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a product of original and often unjustifiable violence as is every imperial 
formation. For all these reasons, the widely accepted assumption that we live 
in a post-imperial era of sovereign national states whose equality is best 
ensured by promoting liberal democracy and individual human rights (or, 
alternatively, a pristine national genius) must be questioned Ð and along with 
it, British and Western foreign policy that have sought to implement this 
misguided conception of international relations. 
9. THE FAILURES OF WESTERN FOREIGN POLICY 
One may note that if British foreign policy since 1945 has been subject to 
indirection even more than indecision, then Western foreign policy in general 
may have been subject to a grand illusion. This illusion consists in blaming the 
occurrence of two world wars and Nazism on the phenomenon of empire rather 
than upon an excessive nationalism. For, after all, it is within the latter soil that 
both Nazi territorial ambitions and Nazi racism were nurtured, for all the talk of 
Reich, while an empire based upon race is, in a sense, but the nation-state writ 
large.64 Disaffected commentators like Lewis Namier and Elie Kedourie have 
noted that the British obsession in the Near East with both the naturalness of 
nation-states and the naturalness of ethnic and cultural over religious groupings 
had the effect of promoting Sunnism at the expense of religious minorities in 
the region. In local and traditional terms, pan-Sunnism was all that either 
Ôpopular national identityÕ or Ôpan-ArabismÕ could really mean Ð especially 
after the demise of the monarchies (which Britain should have supported far 
more and helped to become properly constitutional in character).65 
In consequence, Kedourie concluded that the British failure in this region, 
which we can now see is a direct factor in the growth of political Islamism, 
was not (as so many think) the consequence of imperialism as such. Nor was 
it the effect of an arbitrary tendency to divide colonial subjects into religious 
groups (not so arbitrary, and not so mistaken, in India where the policy only 
went wrong when combined with nationalism in the post-colonial era). 
Rather the opposite Ð in other words, the over-hasty, if often unavoidable, 
abandonment of imperial trusteeship combined with a liberal (and actually 
Christian liberal, under the influence of Arnold Toynbee) imposition onto 
another culture of categories of nation, ethnicity and economic class.66 By 
contrast, Oriental cultures, near and far, tend to function more according to a 
notion and practice of being in or outside the state apparatus on the part of 
individuals (which from a Western perspective can seem quite random), 
giving rise to characteristically factional, not social or economic, conflicts, in 
such a way that they cannot be resolved or even placated by mass representa-
tive democracy.67 
Milbank and Pabst_9781783486489.indb 339 5/31/2016 3:20:37 PM 
The Metacrisis of the Nations 339 
The failures of British foreign policy since 1945 are, of course, not confined 
to the Near East. After Churchill sealed the special relationship with the United 
States by co-writing the Atlantic Charter in 1941 together with Roosevelt, 
Britain has, in effect, relinquished not just, and inevitably, its hitherto 
preeminent status but also, and by no means inevitably, its still considerable 
scope for autonomous power and even wider capacity for cultural influence. 
The 1956 Suez crisis finally put paid to BritainÕs Great Power status. After that 
debacle, it was generally assumed that the United Kingdom must now act as a 
mere scion of its former North American colonies. But the reason for this 
assumption appears to have been more to do with habitually entrenched 
patterns of thought than with clear-sighted analysis. An older generation 
thought in Churchillian terms of Ôthe English speaking peoplesÕ, and so 
Atlanticism and Commonwealth-consciousness went together in their minds. 
On the other hand, a younger generation, imbued already with a strong 
rejection of the colonial epoch, tended to consider that the future lay entirely 
with Europe. The alternative combination Ð which would subordinate the 
American link within the Ôthree circlesÕ Ð of United States plus Europe plus the 
Commonwealth Ð seems rarely to have been entertained, and possibly in part 
because the ÔwhiteÕ Commonwealth countries themselves saw this as an either-
or and sometimes with reason Ð for example in terms of New ZealandÕs 
agricultural interests. Linked to this largely self-inflicted decline was the retreat 
from power of British intellectuals who no longer sought to influence the 
United KingdomÕs vision of world politics and thus left the fate of foreign 
policy in the hands of party politicians and career civil servants.68 
In recent times, the two main exceptions to the neglect of foreign policy 
were Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair. However, their shared preference 
for a rigid morality of ÔidealsÕ over ÔChristian realismÕ restricted at once the 
nobility and long-term viability of their achievements. Instead of trying to 
impose moral ideals regarded as fully moral in the abstract, Christian real-
ism, in accordance with traditional Western thinking, seeks participatively to 
incarnate transcendent ÔideasÕ in some possible degree, on the assumption 
that otherwise, without any exemplification, they are not really known and, 
therefore, proffer no true ethical guidance. 
But an at once moralistic and cynical ÔidealistÕ adherence to liberal capi-
talism blinded Thatcher and Blair to just how often since 1945 the United 
States had sought to undermine Britain as an independent global power, 
especially over the Suez crisis. The Ôspecial relationshipÕ was less a force 
multiplier for UK influence and more an instrument for US unilateral power, 
which the British have compounded by offering their island up as a gate of 
entry for dubious and, often, failed American policies in the economic and 
social area.69 The same applies to Blair and David Cameron recently Ð only 
qualified by Cameron and George OsborneÕs depressing and probably 
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miscalculated kowtowing to China, as if this country were inevitably destined 
to eventually displace the United States as the dominant global power. 
In different ways, they have all perpetuated ChurchillÕs failure to link 
Britain and its commonwealth partners to all the European powers and their 
former colonies, thereby providing a springboard for a potential global 
European-based commonwealth whose base could in time have included the 
sovereign countries of Central and Eastern Europe and a newly independent 
Russia. But is it possible still to revisit the neglected third alternative where 
Europe (led by the United Kingdom, France, Germany and, much further 
down the line, Russia) could act as the key shaper of such a world order? The 
final chapter will argue that this possibility, indeed, remains, even if the public 
and political morale to pursue it appears at present to be fatally absent. 
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Chapter 10 
Commonwealth, 
Culture and Covenant 
1. EUROPE: DEATH AND RESURRECTION 
We live also in more than peculiar times. The emerging neo-medieval shape 
of international affairs objectively favours a greater European role in global 
leadership, however remote a prospect that may currently seem. However, 
for the present, the foreign policy of the European Union, of its key member-
states Germany, France and Ð for the moment Ð the United Kingdom, as well 
as of greater Europe (adding Ukraine and Russia), has not caught up with this 
widely unexpected development. Western Europe, particularly the United 
Kingdom, has, in effect, abandoned any serious ambition to lead by example 
and failed to engage in a culture-based re-think of its own inherited imperial 
role. Britain, in consequence, has neglected both Europe (even after joining 
the EEC) and the countries of the Commonwealth. Meanwhile, France 
sought to remake Europe in its own Gaullist image, but never communicated 
any internal vision, or linked the external Francophone territories to a new 
European future. 
In this manner, EuropeÕs decline as a global power has become a self-
fulfilling prophecy. With the United Kingdom and France stuck in a post-
colonial impasse, EuropeÕs fate today seems to lie with a re-unified Germany 
that is reluctant to lead (except by diktat within the Eurozone) and a re-
assertive Russia whose aggressive defence of her sphere of influence 
undermines Europe just as much as the United States meddling in EU affairs. 
As the migration crisis and the barbarism of ISIS show, a divided Europe not 
only weakens Europeans at home but also exacerbates instability along its 
eastern and southern borders. Once a crucible of civilisations, the 
Mediterranean is now a symbol of drowning and destruction, for which 
EuropeÕs deep divisions are partly to blame, besides the long-term sundering 
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of the Roman, and then Christian, encirclement of the great inland sea 
through the extraordinary irruption of Islam. 
Europe is also absent from geo-politics at a time when old empires and 
new powers clash around the world. The Sino-Indian great power game is 
intensifying the standoff between India and Pakistan and could yet draw 
proxy forces in neighbouring Afghanistan into a potentially nuclear conflict. 
The reason why New Delhi has sought close military ties with the United 
States to contain Chinese leverage over Islamabad is that neither the United 
Kingdom nor the rest of Europe offered anything beyond a vague promise to 
extend trade. 
Beyond even the more imminent danger of a war on the Indian subcontinent 
(or between Western powers and Russia), there is an as yet small yet distinct 
future possibility that the United States and China are heading for a major 
conflict that may be fought in cyberspace and outer space as much (or more) 
as on land or sea. Both countries view themselves as exceptionalist 
civilisations and hegemons, with China perhaps becoming a revisionist power 
that seeks to challenge the Western-dominated order and ultimately replace it 
with a Sino-centric one. As Christopher Coker has argued, the ÔThucydidean 
TrapÕ Ð when a conservative status quo power confronts a rising new one Ð 
could precipitate hostilities in a context where both lack a proper cultural 
understanding of each other, and neither has a coherent strategy to avert war.1 
To do so and to bring about a genuine transformation of international affairs, 
Europe needs to recover her global leadership position alongside her main 
partners and aspire to a certain needed role of umpireship Ð helping to ensure 
that universal, constitutional provisions and rules are put in place and 
observed. 
But Europe is currently nowhere near to playing such a role. For the 
moment, it lacks the economic provision and military capacity to participate 
effectively in global leadership. The United Kingdom has largely recovered 
from the Great Recession of 2008Ð2009, but the long-term frailty of its 
economic model is closely connected with post-war Atlanticist obsessions Ð 
especially since 1979. An oligarchic cabal whose loyalties are more to an 
international moneyed elite has abandoned all semblance of an industrial 
strategy intimately linked to the United KingdomÕs security at home and its 
ability to project power abroad. It has done so under the cover of a neo-liberal 
dogmatism to which even the United States (whose government substantially 
intervened in 2009 to save its motor industry) does not fully adhere to in 
practice, thereby revealing how in the end mercantilist imperialism trumps its 
economic ideology. This truth ensures that while, in one sense, the loyalty of 
the international rich is only to themselves, even this loyalty continues to be 
co-opted by Anglo-Saxon corporate power. And allied to this reality is the 
point that abstract neo-liberalism as a genus does not simply include cultural 
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ÔAmericanismÕ as a species. To some degree, it is the other way round: a 
specific and debased ÔspectacleÕ that defines Americanism helps to ensure 
that what is, after all, a merely economic logic goes unchallenged. 
The 2013 announcement of the closure of the historic Portsmouth military 
shipbuilding yards and the 2015Ð2016 collapse of steelmaking Ð in consider-
able part caused by an undervalued pound (in deference to financial 
priorities) and UK opposition to EU tariffs on cheap Chinese steel Ð amply 
symbolise this obeisance not just to an economic but also to a transatlantic 
logic. They thereby exhibit a double alienation of British responsibilities, 
both to their own people and to the peoples of Europe and the world. 
Yet this alienation and continued twofold obeisance is not an inevitable 
destiny, especially because the United Kingdom has so far escaped the general 
European demographic crisis and is on course to be the most populous 
Western European country by mid-century. A more creative foreign policy 
would regard LondonÕs geo-political and geo-economic situation as a vortex of 
meeting and competing economic, political and cultural forces that provides a 
springboard for much greater positive world influence, in an era where cultural 
power is becoming evermore important. After all, up till the present, the 
United Kingdom remains the second net cultural exporter after the United 
States, while enjoying more prestige in this area in certain respects. Therefore, 
the prospect of some relative decrease in US power and a relative increase in 
UK power does not seem at all unlikely and has, arguably, already 
commenced, for all that BritainÕs political leaders across the political spectrum 
are now squandering this opportunity and rapidly losing diplomatic influence Ð 
in part through their failure to ward off the threats to the survival of the British 
Union and the United KingdomÕs EU membership. 
Moreover, with the EU and with the Commonwealth and the former 
French (and perhaps also Spanish) dominions together, the United Kingdom 
could try to craft an alternative international network of expanded fair trade 
and legal guarantee whose success in producing more sustainable economic 
growth, because it is linked to greater economic justice, could eventually in 
the very long term bring even the United States and other countries into its 
orbit of more successful and more virtuous international practice. The histori-
cal and cultural connections that the combined European and Commonwealth 
linkages offer are perhaps BritainÕs single greatest asset, rather than its 
confusing twin shackle, as the advocates of a greater UK involvement in the 
Anglo-sphere would have it. 
To say this is to re-invoke Oliver FrankÕs Reith lectures of the early 1950s, 
which unusually conceived of Britain as the centre of Ôthe three interlocking 
circlesÕ of the United States, Europe and the Commonwealth. It is worth 
asking why this vision was deemed so completely impossible in the wake of 
Suez. Since then, British foreign policy has oscillated between a largely 
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uncritical alliance with the United States on the one hand, and a half-hearted 
approach to Europe on the other Ð with the Commonwealth dropping off the 
political agenda altogether, save for the striking and visionary role played by 
Queen Elizabeth II and her advisors.2 These mental assumptions, rather than 
any iron force of circumstance, have most of all sustained the abandonment of 
FrankÕs vision. The radical alternative most of all in line with BritainÕs tradi-
tion of constitutionalism and mixed government remains that of re-thinking 
the United KingdomÕs global role at the heart of those three circles. 
This becomes truer if one considers the possibility of the United Kingdom 
as a very strong or even the strongest power in Europe. Here an even longer-
term diplomatic habit of mind has been, arguably, inimical to clear future-
thinking. This is the ÔrationalistÕ assumption, still central unfortunately for the 
ÔEnglish SchoolÕ of IR, that the threefold requirements of British security, 
British morality and British Protestantism all point towards a European policy 
mainly concerned with preventing the dominance of any one continental 
power. Quite apart from a frequent failure to realise that even this policy 
required to be pursued from within the European Union, which otherwise 
risked falling apart altogether, the traditional outlook failed to take account of 
the new international exigency for the pursuit of substantial pan-European 
unity rather than merely a balance of forces. Geo-politically, this exigency 
also bears upon the United Kingdom. But in addition, it failed to grasp the 
new possibility that inclusion within European structures, given the factors of 
demography and London-dominance already mentioned, could open the alto-
gether novel possibility of Britain herself being the most commanding conti-
nental power because she would then have pursued the ancient Constantinian 
vision of a pan-European polity ideally to be extended eastwards. This vision 
differs markedly from the restoration of the ancient Carolingian unity of 
France and Germany in the West, which at present faces its most serious 
intellectual and political challenge since 1939 Ð the migration crisis, the 
Eurozone crisis, the influx of ISIS fighters, a global economic slowdown, 
RussiaÕs provocations against Scandinavia and Eastern Europe and the 
corporate scandals of banks and car companies. Even after the Brexit vote, all 
this remains true. 
Thus in the new circumstances after the end of the post-Cold War era of US 
unipolar hegemony and the beginning of a decline in American power, the 
idea of the three interlocking circles can be revisited in a new guise that is less 
Atlanticist and less ambivalent about Europe. Moreover, it becomes both more 
realistic and more ethical, since it is less threatening to other European nations, 
if combined with the idea that they also might mediate between Europe and 
their own diasporas. But to realise this long-neglected and now far more viable 
potential requires that the British governing elites both abandon the liberal 
vision of international affairs with its neo-conservative radicalisation, and also 
reject the post-colonial narrative that has been equally 
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influential since the end of the Second World War. Despite its contaminating 
whiggery, the early work of the English School of IR indicates to a degree an 
alternative to both liberal imperialism and pseudo-Marxist post-colonialism by 
rescuing IR ÔrealismÕ in more culturist and religious terms.3 
Accordingly, the real alternative to either chauvinist nationalism or abstract 
cosmopolitanism is to re-envision international affairs in terms of covenant 
and commonwealth. Peoples, sometimes under religious inspiration, might 
covenant with each other in the interests of mutual benefit and genuine wealth 
construed as improved and shared material and spiritual well-being for all. 
Such covenants of reciprocal sharing could apply within the United Kingdom, 
and across the European Union and the British Commonwealth as well as in 
other parts of the world. They might take the form of voluntary agreements 
among participatory nations to meet minimum standards of the sharing of 
rewards, risks and resources in both the economic and the social realms, and 
also to meet certain shared standards of ÔsubsidiarityÕ, or of decentralised 
control and responsibility. Another aspect of such covenanting might be a 
pooled promise of financial solidarity under inspected control, if any nation 
found it hard to meet such standards. Equally, the validly recognised social 
problems arising from an otherwise desirable free flow of labour within the 
single EU market but across national borders might be dealt with by mutual 
agreements between nations and regions for some temporary limitations on 
immigration, coupled with much greater efforts to bring about genuine 
integration. 
Such a novel approach to globalisation would be a way to revive and re-
think the United Kingdom, Europe and the wider Anglo-Saxondom as 
something like multinational associations where social and cultural ties shape 
our identity more than individual entitlements and contracts. Thus the potential 
task for Britain and her allies is to build true commonwealths of nations and 
peoples who are no longer enslaved to the liberal empire of market-states in 
the West, or the reactionary revisionism of state-markets in the East. 
2. A VERY SHORT HISTORY OF EMPIRE 
Amid the resurgence of old imperial powers and the rise of new forces of 
global terrorism or financial oligarchy, Europe needs to abandon both the 
shared liberal/neo-conservative interventionist doctrine based upon suppos-
edly universal (but, in reality, narrowly formalistic) values and the post-
colonial narrative that too often denigrates the entire Western legacy, which 
it wrongly equates with colonial barbarity. This approach obfuscates our 
current global reality, wherein Ôthe worst of the WestÕ, which is completely 
dominant everywhere, can only be counteracted by the revival of Ôthe best 
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of the WestÕ. For example, the false cult of the ego by the true cult of the 
human person, and the rival cults of subjective freedom and ossified organic 
hierarchy by the equally true cult of primordial but fluid relationality. In the 
light of these considerations, we need to think afresh concerning the legacy 
of empire. 
The history of modern Western empires is commonly associated with one 
of two competing narratives: either the progressive unfolding of universal 
civilisation that invented and instituted freedom, democracy, market econ-
omy and the rule of law, or else a history of dreadful colonialism that led to 
violence, oppression and capitalist domination across the globe.4 Both these 
narratives seem to be diametrically opposed, but share more in common than 
might be at first apparent. First of all, they imply that European empires are 
an entirely modern invention, which exported modern ideas and institutions 
to the rest of the world Ð for good or ill. Second, and concomitantly, they 
assume that, in general, modern history superseded and ultimately replaced 
all preceding traditions. In this supercessionist light, the Glorious Revolution 
of 1688/1689 in England and the French Revolution of 1789 are seen as a 
series of absolute ruptures with the past, of which Britain and France (as 
much as the United States) have been the vehicle. 
Third, the same supercessionism ensures that European domination is seen 
as displacing the older project of Christendom, either in continuity with the 
Reformation, or solely with the Enlightenment. In this way, the post-
Westphalian system is seen as but the international arm of unquestionable 
ÔwhigÕ progress, famously rebutted by Herbert Butterfield.5 
Yet one can question this prevailing story. It uncritically accepts the con-
ventional periodisations of Antiquity, the Middle Ages and modernity, which 
ignore deep continuities over time Ð including the long-lasting impact of 
Greco-Roman law and participation in the polis/civitas, Christian constitu-
tionalism, the emergence of charitable institutions and the stuttering develop-
ment ever since Constantine of religious freedom, free association and the 
dignity of the person.6 If one takes these continuities into account, then one 
can tell a more balanced story that reveals how change and stasis are always 
complexly interwoven. 
From this perspective, the initial emergence of the British Empire belonged 
to an era spanning the early fourteenth to the late seventeenth century during 
which both ideas and practices already nascent during late medieval times 
achieved fuller maturity. If it was an early modern phenomenon, then it was 
also a late gothic one, which sustained a medieval crusading zeal. Indeed, as 
we saw in chapter 6, England herself already ruled an island empire, while 
every European kingdom understood itself as more like a mini-empire than as 
a modern European ÔstateÕ enjoying an absolute monopoly of legislation, 
policing and control of the money supply. Recent historiography confirms 
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that the extension of every medieval realm to its margins involved processes 
of attempted inculturation very like those later undertaken in extra-European 
colonies, while beginning with Rome itself, the margins also shaped the 
centre by a process of ÔblowbackÕ, which again anticipates modern global 
phenomena.7 
If late medieval beginnings can sometimes look unexpectedly like early 
modern ones, then, inversely, some medieval features of the international sys-
tem endured until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and even intensified 
in scope. Both Spain and Britain continued to be medieval monarchic empires 
extended overseas, with an accompanying sense of religious and cultural 
mission and a measure of continued commitment to the common good and 
substantive justice. It was in this context that the rights of the South American 
Indians could be defended by late scholastic theologians like Francisco de 
Vitoria, whereas the later and more modern treatment of the North American 
Indians by Anglo-Saxon Protestants was more simply genocidal (even though 
they began their colonisation with an excoriation of Spanish brutality and 
inter-ethnic humanitarian intent.)8 Notably, however, central British control 
tended to restrain in many (though not all) cases the very worse excesses of 
genocide and enslavement Ð these tending to be exacerbated by local control, 
as in the case of the appalling Australian treatment of Aborigines. 
Finally, the two dominant narratives of the British and the other European 
empires as vehicles of the modern share in a wider myopia that fails to see 
ÔEnlightenmentÕ as but one phase in a long-term Western rooting in its own 
version of the Axial Age. EuropeÕs specific axial legacy meant that the 
Christian synthesis most of all shaped its Ôlong post-antiquityÕ (approximately 
c500Ð1300). As a particular homiletic gloss on the Hebrew scriptures that 
was later interpreted by Greek philosophy and Roman ritual and law, 
Christianity not only lacked any absolute self-foundation, but also for that 
reason constantly evolved by integrating and transforming other Middle 
Eastern and European traditions in late Antiquity. This constitution of a par-
ticular universalism through an ÔeccentricÕ mediation of the prior and other 
ensures that Europe is uniquely and almost contradictorily characterised at 
once by a modesty of transmission and a pride in a duty to further convey.9 
After the fall of imperial Rome in the late fifth century, three different forces 
vied for the Roman legacy and shaped the WestÕs emerging civilisation: first, 
pagan tribes from Germanic, Turkic and Slavonic territories; second, Chris-
tendom and its ecclesial ÔbodyÕ of local parishes and transnational monasteries; 
third, IslamÕs creation of a caliphate from Arabia to the Iberian peninsula. Of 
these, as Rowan Williams writes, Ôthe Christian Church is quite simply the most 
extensive and enduring, whether in the form of the Western Papacy or of the 
ÔByzantine CommonwealthÕ, the network of cultural and spiritual connections 
in Eastern Europe linked to the new Roman Empire centred on 
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ConstantinopleÕ.10 Arguably, the British Empire more than any other power 
later developed this inheritance in the direction of a universal global polity Ð 
a project that was hijacked by the Whigs who simply promoted capitalism 
and colonialism, and then by the contingent and linked accidents of the 
American and French revolutions, which finally prevented the sporadically 
grasped possibility of a global monarchic-constitutional Anglican project.11 
Given this revisionist history of empire, we now need to re-think BritainÕs 
and continental EuropeÕs imperial past and the post-colonial situation. 
3. EUROPEÕS IMPERIAL LEGACY 
We saw in chapter 5 that, just because the British constitution bears strong 
traces of medieval mixed government, it really falls short of fully modern 
continental statehood (though so, in other ways, as we also saw, did ancien 
rgime France, because of its greater sustaining of medieval regionalism and 
corporatism). Although British constitutional exceptionalism is yet another 
ÔrelicÕ, which the liberal left has recently suggested that we try to dispose of, 
no suggestion could now appear more belated. For globalisation has 
effectively destroyed the autonomy of the ÔContinental stateÕ, alongside the 
apparent ÔanarchyÕ of the international realm lying between such states, which 
rendered warfare in theory but a formalist game between rivals, immune to 
ethical norms.12 Instead, Ôthe commercial seaÕ has now invaded everywhere, 
imposing its problematic anarchic rule, now untempered by formal regulation, 
quickly followed by militarised airspace, which can invade without invasion. 
We have witnessed the lethal impact of this with the often dubious deploy-
ment of drones, especially following the event of 9/11 and its final avenging 
through the troubling disposal of Osama bin Laden and other terrorists.13 It is 
to be hoped that the West can break with such lamentable barbarism (includ-
ing Guantanamo and the worldwide system of extraordinary rendition) and 
abide by its own best principles of liberality, including the need for fair trial 
in all possible circumstances, about which Western leaders love to lecture the 
rest of the world. 
From this perspective one can suggest that the antiquity of the British 
political settlement now gives it a benign late modern advantage. What has 
eventually triumphed on the sea and now by air is a narrow Anglo-Saxon 
economised empire that constantly seeks to export its own marketised politics 
and to culturally embrace all within the bounds of its own peculiar commer-
cial republic. To a considerable degree, of course, the British Empire paved 
the way for this. And yet, it would be false simply to say that this empire 
lined up with the modern piratical market rather than the British mode of 
ancient government. 
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For while, indeed, the British Empire upheld and increased much capital-
istic exploitation, it also at times tempered this politically and juridically in the 
name of Classical Ôgood orderÕ and Ômixed governmentÕ (imbibed from 
family, school and university). It inherited the Spanish and Portuguese claims 
to legitimate imperial in terms of securing the passage throughout the world of 
free (not initially capitalistic) trade, rights of passage and communication 
rights to preach the gospel. It is for this reason that Niall FergusonÕs pro-
enlightenment and neo-liberal defence of the imperial past is the wrong one. 
One could argue here, instead, that the American and to a degree the 
French empires were the political-economic outreaches of fully modern 
states, which therefore have sought to incorporate Ôthe otherÕ entirely within 
their own Republican logics (completely economised in the American case, 
and so rendered far more oppressive than the French instance). By contrast, 
Britain to some degree remained the extension abroad of a pre-modern 
political venture. This meant an empire that, like the Holy Roman Empire 
itself, sought to unite and pacify under shared evaluative norms and central 
protective guarantees of last resort, terrains that were, nevertheless, allowed 
to some degree (however appallingly inadequate) to retain a measure of 
cultural diversity and local autonomy.14 It was with a proper grasp of this 
nature of the United Kingdom that the Malta Labour Party led by Dom 
Mintoff sought full political incorporation into Britain in the 1950s and that 
this possibility was even considered for a time by a faction in France. 
In the current situation of horrendous globalised economic empire, it is 
important to remind ourselves of the fact that the United Kingdom is still 
formally speaking an island empire defined not by geographical bounds but 
by a claimed service (through constitutional monarchy and Church establish-
ment) of the common good. But its Germanic-Celtic version of medieval 
polity needs now to be supplemented with a more Roman-antique element of 
subsidiary federalism. 
Here Britain can obviously learn from her European partners. The recent 
moves towards a Scandinavian Union suggests a perceived need for inter-
mediate links between the level of the Ôregional stateÕ and Brussels Ð a 
circumstance that further suggests the possibility that, in the very long term, 
Southern Ireland might even choose to re-join a federated or confederated 
British Isles. And it is certainly to be hoped that it will very soon re-join the 
Commonwealth. From long ago, a Celtic-Scandinavian insular culture has 
been a reality (as the mixed styles of the Book of Kells attest). Therefore, an 
isolated English nation-state would be a wholly artificial reality, denying the 
reality of its own Celtic fringes (Cornwall, Cumbria, the Welsh Marches and 
the Scottish Borders). Similarly, an independent Scottish nation Ð through 
adherence to a contrived, post-Calvinist and sometimes pseudo-Gaelic 
ÔScottishnessÕ Ð would tend to deny its variously Anglo-Saxon, Norse, 
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Brithonic and religiously Catholic and Episcopalian components, while not 
doing justice to the real Gaelic legacy of the Highlands and Islands either. 
The implications for Commonwealth and other immigrants to the British 
Isles would also be negative: in fact, the British, ÔimperialÕ identity is for 
them the most civic, non-racial and non-nationalist one. 
This legacy is one of BritainÕs most significant assets. For the inherited 
internationalisation of this empire as ÔcommonwealthÕ can permit her to 
entertain the future project of infusing globalised structures with more con-
stitutionalism and respect for civil society. This can occur through an exercise 
of cultural influence and, where necessary, juridical linkages or guarantees (as 
are already in place for some business operations in Eastern Europe and 
elsewhere) and, as a final recourse, Western military intervention. 
From the above remarks one can start to see that in the international arena 
also, the social is really primary Ð the flow of religions, customs, fashions 
and influences across borders is what most of all binds the globe together. A 
successful future international politics needs to go with this flow and the 
United Kingdom is, by inheritance and inclination, in a good position to seize 
the initiative in this respect. The emphasis on cultural and social ties was the 
most interesting stress of the ÔEnglish SchoolÕ of IR gathered round Herbert 
Butterfield at Peterhouse, Cambridge. It exposes a glaring gap in the thinking 
of both Carl Schmitt and the American ÔrealistsÕ, as the following section 
shows. 
4. EMPIRE AS COMMONWEALTH: THE  
PRIMACY OF ASSOCIATION 
Liberalism inherited the notion of commonwealth from late Antiquity and the 
Middle Ages, notably the idea of respublica christiana, and redefined it in 
secular terms. In the Leviathan, Hobbes distinguishes commonwealth by free, 
contractual institution from commonwealth by forceful, violent acquisition. 
But in either case, creating a commonwealth for him marks the imposition of 
an artificial, political order on the violent Ôstate of natureÕ. Thus the polity is 
governed by will and artifice, not the intellect and any real inherent universal 
nature of things (which Hobbes denies).15 
In an albeit different mode, Kant naturalises violence within the order of being 
and considers inter-state warfare as a natural mechanism to regulate global 
anarchy. Thus internationally as well as nationally, liberal politics rests on the 
idea of asocial sociability: human beings are naturally self-interested and jealous 
vis--vis other human beings, but this eventually engenders some kind of 
competitive order. War is the process through which antagonism is transformed 
into stability, with human conflict somehow mirroring natural violence: 
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Nature has therefore once again used the incompatibility of human beings, even 
of great societies and state bodies ... as a means to seek out in their unavoidable 
antagonism a condition of tranquillity and safety, i.e. through wars, through the 
overstrained and never ceasing process of armament for them ... nature drives 
them to what reason could have told them even without so much sad experience: 
namely to go beyond a lawless condition of savages and enter into a federation of 
nations.16 
So Kant views warfare as an evil necessary to regulate the original violence 
that is supposedly our fundamental human condition. Only war will lead to 
the formation, destruction, and reconstitution of states until such time that 
national and international arrangements permit the creation of Ôcosmopolitan 
commonwealthsÕ.17 HobbesÕs and KantÕs ultimately converging, though 
apparently very different, conceptions of international order show the com-
plicit collusion of realism and cosmopolitanism in IR theory. 
Therefore, a truly alternative account would reject the claim that interna-
tional society is fundamentally anarchic Ð a global Ôwar of all against allÕ that 
mirrors the violent Ôstate of natureÕ at the national level. It is not so anarchic 
because the most primary ties, bonds, and connections between human 
beings are not confined to national borders. They are transnational inflections 
of universal human attributes: language, cultural customs, music, art, literary 
modes, fashions in manners and dress as well as religion. Therefore, as 
Catherine Pickstock says, ÔOne reason why different countries do not wage 
war all the time is the widely-diffused sense of shared culture and common 
sensibility which can stretch even across vast geographical distancesÕ.18 Long 
ago, but in the same spirit and against the New Whigs, Edmund Burke Ð 
perhaps the ultimate progenitor of the British ÔculturalÕ theory of IR Ð 
emphasised ÔtraditionedÕ association as the most universal mode of human 
interaction: 
In the intercourse between nations, we are apt to rely too much on the instru-
mental part. We lay too much weight upon the formality of treaties and com-
pacts. We do not act much more wisely when we trust to the interests of men as 
guarantees of their engagements. ... Men are not tied to one another by papers 
and seals. They are led to associate by resemblances, by conformities, by 
sympathies. It is with nations as with individuals. Nothing is so strong a tie of 
amity between nation and nation as correspondence in laws, customs, manners, 
and habits of life. They have more than the force of treaties in themselves. They 
are obligations written in the heart. They approximate men to men, without their 
knowledge, and sometimes against their intentions. The secret, unseen, but 
irrefragable bond of habitual intercourse holds them together even when their 
perverse and litigious nature sets them to equivocate, scuffle, and fight, about the 
terms of their written obligations. ... There have been periods 
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of time in which communities, apparently in peace with each other, have been 
more perfectly separated than, in later times, many nations in Europe have 
been in the course of long and bloody wars. The cause must be sought in the 
similitude throughout of religion, laws, and manners. At bottom, these are all 
the same. The writers on public law have often called this aggregate of nations 
a Commonwealth. They had reason.19 
By contrast with the liberal conception of nations as individual egos writ 
large that are driven by will not intellect (as for Wilsonian idealism), Burke 
accentuates the primacy of association over the sovereign power of the indi-
vidual and of the collective under the aegis of an artificial social contract. In 
other words, Burke inverts the modern priority of rights and contracts by 
arguing that the mutual moral obligations of interpersonal relations are more 
primary than abstract, formal and procedural standards imposed for either 
state-administrative or market-commercial purposes. Crucially, this extends 
to ties across nations and sovereign states, which suggests that a Ôfamily of 
nations and peoplesÕ really can embed the society of states and markets Ð 
even if this is not reflected in the currently dominant arrangements of interna-
tional affairs. One might in this light say that, ever since early humans 
walked right round the globe, both the global and the minutely local are more 
primary and more primarily linked than all the more restricted modes of 
political maximisation lying between them. 
In accord with this secondariness of the political middles, Burke therefore 
argues that Ôcommon-wealths are not physical but moral essences. They are 
artificial combinations, and, in their proximate efficient cause, the arbitrary 
productions of the human mindÕ.20 By Ôartificial combinationsÕ he means 
effects of human habit and creativity that blends nature with culture Ð the 
order of being with the order of knowing and ÔmakingÕ. In this manner, 
Ôcustoms, manners, and habits of lifeÕ provide the bonds and ties that infuse 
the immanent political order with a transcendent, cosmic outlook. Such a 
Burkean perspective shifts the focus from an artificial commonwealth that 
coercively regulates natural violence to a natural-cultural commonwealth that 
can uphold peace beyond conflict based on the principle of association. 
5. RE-INJECTING CHRISTIAN REALISM INTO IR 
It follows that a renewal and extension of this Burkean vision requires a break 
with the secularist assumptions of IR theory. Just as general IR theory took a 
secular turn in the 1950sÐ1960s, so too the specifically Christian terminology 
of early English School writings was gradually replaced by a discourse that 
focused on the institutions of international society, Ôleaving many Christians 
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trading in secular currency, where formerly agnostics had quite comfortably 
used religious coinageÕ.21 With the growing influence of Hedley BullÕs work, 
the dominant strand of the English School privileged the formal-procedural 
dimension of international society over substantive questions such as natural 
law, community, association and the common good. 
Bull and his English School contemporaries certainly offered an alternative 
to the scientistic dystopia of realism and the idealistic utopia of revolution-ism. 
But the price they paid for making GrotiusÕs rationalist tradition now 
completely normative was to eschew a metaphysical worldview connected 
with Christianity in favour of a secular discourse centred on increasingly 
abstract, vacuous categories such as Ôcommon interests, common values ... a 
common set of rules ... and common institutionsÕ.22 (By contrast, Martin Wight 
had somewhat tempered Grotian rationalism with a Burkean sense of 
substantive culture and distributive justice). As with IR thinking in general, the 
English SchoolÕs secular, post-metaphysical turn coincided with the decline of 
grand theory and the rise of secular positivism.23 
It is surely right to view the legacy of Herbert Butterfield, Martin Wight 
and Donald Mackinnon as a better starting point to develop a more realist 
position in IR that is both metaphysical and political, and can conceptualise 
international affairs beyond the secular categories of the Westphalian 
settlement. Their embrace of the international primacy of cultural forces and 
their critique of secularism provides a basis for re-integrating religion into 
politics. Both Butterfield and Wight viewed the Cold War as the final 
destruction of Christendom. In 1951, Butterfield warned of a Ôserious collapse 
of civilisationÕ across Europe and suggested that the violent clash of secular 
totalitarianisms marked a point in history at which Ôthe Dark Ages have actu-
ally returnedÕ.24 Three years earlier, Martin Wight had made the point that the 
modern secularist settlement culminates in post-1945 bipolarity, which 
licenses absolute power without ethical limits: 
It is in the international sphere that the demonic concentrations of power of the 
modern neo-pagan world have their clearest expression. Russia and America are 
the last two Great Powers within the Westernized system of sovereign states. 
And the characteristic of that system, after centuries in which the Church has had 
no influence upon its development, is the emancipation of power from moral 
restraints. Leviathan is a simple beast; his law is self-preservation, his appetite is 
for power. The process of international politics that has followed from this is 
equally simple: the effective Powers in the world have decreased in number and 
increased in size, and the method has been war.25 
Indeed, Butterfield and Wight believed that the modern separation of the 
sacred from the secular does not reflect the true nature of the world we all 
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inhabit. On the contrary, heavenly and earthly powers are inextricably inter-
twined and interact with one another according to certain patterns Ð in line 
with the ÔPlatonicÕ notion that immanent reality bears the trace of its 
transcendent source and in part reflects the divine warrant. 
So in qualification (albeit too muted) of the Hobbesian fear of a violent 
Ôstate of natureÕ and the Ôwar of all against allÕ, these thinkers shifted the focus 
back onto the social nature of mankind and the idea that human cooperation 
precedes the contractual arrangements both within and across nations. 
Precisely in the absence of a single sovereign who wields coercive power, the 
glue that therefore most of all holds together societies both nationally and 
internationally is Ôan antecedent common cultureÕ, which is more primary than 
the rights of individual citizens or sovereign states.26 Culture so configured 
rests on a shared Ôcosmic, moral constitutionÕ that is metaphysical in nature 
because it links immanent values to their transcendent origin and outlook.27 
Thus if the self-admitted residual ÔwhiggismÕ of the English School too often 
took the form of a state rationalist anticipation of the mediations of private 
interest by the Ôhidden handÕ Ð whether of the market or of international 
power-relations Ð this was qualified by the legacy of the more gothicising 
constitutional whiggery of Bolingbroke and Burke. Within this legacy, 
something of an older medieval sense of ius as just distribution rather than 
merely private possession had been to a degree sustained.28 
Moreover, beyond even natural law, Butterfield and Wight appeal to the 
principle and practice of love or charity, which complements both power 
politics and natural law, and which relates the dignity of all persons to their 
shared transcendent origin and finality Ð even if Butterfield aligns charitable 
understanding too much with an excessive retrospective denial that the right 
ever really lies on one side rather than the other. 
This metaphysical vision of perfectible unity differs profoundly from the 
dualism between the violent ethic of coercion and the peaceful ethic of love 
that characterises the thinking of the Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr 
who influenced mainstream realism in the United States and, to a lesser extent, 
the United Kingdom.29 The American theologian limited charity to personal 
piety and justified warfare as the fulfilment of a divine providential volition in 
excess of the ethical.30 As Ôtutors of mankind in its pilgrimage to perfectionÕ,31 
Christians (according to Niebuhr) have a duty to join AmericaÕs divinely 
sanctioned mission of spreading democracy and freedom across the globe. This 
license to kill in the name of liberal freedom coincided, for him, precisely with 
a pure pursuit of self-interest, understood in terms of Stoic ÔnaturalÕ limits to 
the reach of sympathy and justice that appeared to neglect any real theology of 
creation.32 In contrast, Butterfield and Wight posit in effect the ontological 
primacy of peace over violence and emphasise the ethical constraints on state 
action within and across national borders. 
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The adoption of such an ÔassociationistÕ model of IR would promote a 
plural search for the shared common good and substantive ends that can 
mediate between the individual and the collective will and thus help bind 
together members of diverse bodies and polities. Thereby, one can refuse the 
liberal view that the incommensurability of rival values either necessarily 
requires (an internationally unforthcoming) central sovereign power to 
arbitrate conflict or else leads to a fragile and uncomfortable international 
modus vivendi. 
Taken together, a commitment to the common good and constitutional 
corporatism by global powers such as Britain and her partners could in theory 
transform the dominant model of neo-liberal globalisation. The focus on 
shared substantive ends can correct the fixation either with instrumental and 
transactional relationships (merely national or international corporate inter-
ests) or with procedural ties (commitment to common rules and regulative 
bodies)33 towards the reality of shared cultural and social bonds that matter 
more in an increasingly globalised world. Similarly, the emphasis on Ômixed 
governmentÕ can, globally applied, redirect the debate away from either 
national-republican or global-cosmopolitan arrangements to more mutualist 
models of subsidiary federalism and multinational associations based on con-
stitutional rule,34 embedded institutions, uncorrupted law and the re-
balancing of power. 
6. EUROPEÕS POLITY OF CULTURE 
Faced with the absolutism of the French Revolution that sought to replace the 
Christian identity with a secular creed, Burke argued thus: 
It [Europe] is virtually one great state having the same basis of general law; 
with some diversity of provincial customs and local establishments. The nations 
of Europe have had the very same christian [sic] religion, agreeing in the funda-
mental parts, varying a little in the ceremonies and in the subordinate doctrines. 
The whole of the polity and Ïconomy [sic] of every country in Europe has been 
derived from the same sources. It was drawn from the old Germanic or Gothic 
customary; from the feudal institutions which must be considered as an 
emanation from that customary; and the whole has been improved and digested 
into system and discipline by the Roman law. ... From this resemblance in the 
modes of intercourse, and in the whole form and fashion of life, no citizen in 
Europe could be altogether an exile in any part of it. There was nothing more 
than a pleasing variety to recreate and instruct the mind; to enrich the imagina-
tion; and to meliorate the heart. When a man travelled or resided for health, 
pleasure, business or necessity, from his own country, he never felt himself 
quite abroad.35 
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BurkeÕs vision of EuropeÕs religiously based Ôpolity of cultureÕ (our term) 
provides an alternative to the liberal view that sovereign states or else sover-
eign individuals are more primary than the overlapping forms of associations 
that constitute countries and Ôinternational societiesÕ. 
In a remarkable report on ÔThe Spiritual and Cultural Dimension of EuropeÕ 
published in 2004, a reflection group composed of European statesmen and 
intellectuals debunked the myth that economic integration will lead to political 
union and that market forces can produce politically resilient solidarity: ÔThe 
original expectation, that the political unity of the EU would be a consequence 
of the European common market has proven to be illusory. ... To function as a 
viable and vital polity, the European Union needs a firmer foundationÕ.36 
Rejecting any arbitrary list of abstract values, the group argued that the role of 
EuropeÕs common culture, which is a variety of traditions that are both 
intertwined and in tension with one another, grows in significance as the old, 
secular logic of modernity is unravelling. 
The shared cultural bonds that link Europeans can draw on the Christian 
fusion of biblical revelation with Greco-Roman antiquity in order to promote 
solidarity, subsidiarity, the dignity of the person, the virtue of free association 
and the distinction of religious from political authority that avoids both 
aggressive secularism (masquerading as secular neutrality) and fanatical 
theocracy.37 In the absence of such principles, the professing of values 
associated with democracy and liberalism will sound increasingly hollow. 
Universal values of freedom, equality, solidarity and the will of the majority 
require transcendent finalities projecting notions of the genuinely good life, 
otherwise they are drained of their meaning by procedural process, or else 
they oscillate between the sovereign individual and the sovereign collective. 
Equally, they oscillate between obsession with imagined micro-differences of 
identity in the name of negative freedom, and the univocal rendering of all 
identities in the name of a formalistic equality as essentially the same. These 
oscillations then fall victim to state and market power, which will decide, 
arbitrarily or automatically, just where the verdict should fall and to what 
degree. 
To ward off this danger, Europe therefore needs to eschew merely abstract 
standards and formal values, allied to the priority of process over policy, in 
favour of a mutual recognition of particular practices, and a prudentially just 
distribution of their variously proper roles. Here Christian legacy is key: up 
to a point, Europe remains a vestigially Christian polity that is characterised 
by hybrid institutions, overlapping jurisdictions, polycentric authority and 
multi-level governance. 
The aforementioned report by the Reflection Group on the spiritual and 
cultural dimension of Europe puts this well: 
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Europe itself is far more than a political construct. It is a complex Ð a ÔcultureÕ Ð 
of institutions, ideas, expectations, habits and feelings, moods, memories and 
prospects that form a ÔglueÕ binding Europeans together Ð and all these are a 
foundation on which a political construct must rest. This complex Ð we can 
speak of it as European civil society Ð is at the heart of political identity. It 
defines the conditions of successful European politics and the limits of state and 
political intervention.38 
Contrary to common misconceptions, the European Union is neither a 
federal super-state nor an intergovernmental structure. Instead, European 
nations pool their sovereignty and are more like regions within a pan-national 
polity that combines a sui generis political system with elements of a neo-
medieval empire.39 The German constitutional court, in a landmark ruling on 
the Lisbon Treaty in June 2009, emphasised that the Union in its original 
outlook is not so much an international organisation or single state as a volun-
tary association of states. But now that the European Union has been captured 
by the logic of the market-state, its members need to strengthen the associa-
tional model that combines vertical, hierarchical elements with horizontal, 
egalitarian aspects. Based on overlapping jurisdictions and a complex web of 
intermediary institutions wherein sovereignty is dispersed and diffused, such a 
model can help re-embed both politics and economics within the civic and 
social bonds of civil society. Amid the current crisis of legitimacy, this 
suggests that the European Union should pursue a truly subsidiary polis that 
connects supranational institutions much more closely to regions, localities, 
communities and neighbourhoods. Most of all, the Union requires a much 
greater sense of a common demos with a mutual ethos and telos. 
Specifically, one of the clearest weaknesses of the European UnionÕs 
political system is the established modality of direct elections to the European 
Parliament (EP), which has broken the link between national political classes 
and the European project, giving national politicians and national parliaments 
a pretext to get involved less than they should do and might otherwise have 
done. Bound up with this is another structural weakness, namely the radical 
transition of the Commission from being a pan-European civil service in sup-
port of cooperation among national governments towards becoming a supra-
national institution that concentrates both legislative and executive powers in 
its own hand. Both EP elections and the design of the Commission drive a 
wedge between EU and national politics and deepen the growing gap between 
the Union and its citizens Ð a gap now manifest in the Brexit vote. 
For these reasons, the European Union should create a parliamentary 
system of bicameralism Ð with a lower house representing the people and an 
upper house representing cities, regions, nations, professions and faith 
communities. For its part, the Commission must revert to being a high-level 
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European civil service that supports the work of the European UnionÕs 
bicameral legislature and the European UnionÕs executive Ð the Council of 
Ministers and the European Council (and possibly nationally elected politi-
cians on secondment to the European Union to ensure the day-to-day running 
of the UnionÕs executive). In this manner, a bicameral system and an execu-
tive rooted in national polities can once again bind national political classes 
to the European project. The objection that the European Union already has a 
certain kind of second chamber in the form of the Council of Ministers 
ignores its current role, which is to relate the European project to national 
governments but not to national parliaments and national polities in the man-
ner that is needed. 
A bicameral parliament and the participation of nationally elected politi-
cians in the EU executive would go some way towards building a mixed 
government that is in line with the best traditions of European constitutional-
ism Ð the rule of law, limits on sovereign power, the interplay of the ÔoneÕ, the 
ÔfewÕ and the ÔmanyÕ, as well as the distinction of powers without, however, 
an absolute separation, which ends either in paralysis or in the primacy of the 
executive over the other branches of government. What a proper European 
polity requires is a much stronger measure of popular assent, coupled with 
civic participation (through local, regional and professional assemblies such as 
town-halls or guildhalls) and the guidance of Ôthe wiseÕ (based on the rep-
resentation of professions and faiths). Only a commonwealth of nations and 
peoples with shared social imaginaries will be able to foster social ties and 
civic bonds that are key to re-embedding markets and states in the interper-
sonal relationships of trust and cooperation. 
Externally, a commonwealth that reflects the mediating universalism of the 
Judeo-Christian and Greco-Roman traditions would contrast with the 
exceptionalism of old empires and new colonial powers such as the United 
States and China. However imperfectly, the European Union remains so far 
the only serious attempt to inaugurate a transnational polity whose members 
come together to form a voluntary association of nations that pool their 
sovereign power for the common good of their people and others across the 
globe. Europe has a dark colonial history, but it has also given rise to a set of 
institutions and practices that have transformed tribalism and nationalism at 
home and abroad. Moreover, Europe has shaped global history not through 
sheer size or military might alone, but, rather, through its inventiveness and 
the creation of Ôforce multipliersÕ.40 European creativity today is mirrored in 
the international order that reflects EuropeÕs Christian heritage. For example, 
European Protestant theologians and Catholic figures played a decisive role in 
creating the League of Nations after 1919 and the United Nations in 1946, 
while Christian Democrats from Italy, Germany, the Benelux countries and 
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France led the way in setting up the project for European integration and 
enlargement in the late 1940s and 1950s.41 
In contemporary parlance, the Christian origin and outlook of the post-1919 
world order is based on the idea of ÔnetworkingÕ and ÔmainstreamingÕ 
Christian ideas and thus multiplying the power of EuropeanÕs vestigially 
Christian polity. The invention of international organisations and 
supranational bodies reflects the Christian commitment to create a Philonian 
megalopolis Ð a cosmic city that upholds universal, global principles 
embodied in particular, national or regional practices. Arguably, Christianity Ð 
whose global spread outstrips that of Islam and other world religions42 Ð is 
EuropeÕs single most significant force multiplier. 
7. WESTERN FOREIGN POLICY IN A  
WORLD OF RESURGENT EMPIRES 
Renewing BritainÕs Global Outlook 
Nowadays, city-states, empires and transnational religious institutions are, as 
we have seen, once again resurgent and capable of displacing the Westphalian 
system of national states and global markets. European influence will further 
diminish unless it changes tack, in comprehension of this new context, and 
adopts a truly bold and imaginative foreign policy in which genuine ambition 
and genuine generosity would coincide. This is particularly true for Britain, 
which remains EuropeÕs most globally orientated power.43 
Had the Scots voted for independence in September 2014, it would have 
been hard to overstate the implications for Scotland and the rest of Britain. The 
former would have faced protracted economic uncertainty, an uncertain 
relationship to the EU and a shortage of national defence capabilities. For 
Britain, the loss of Scotland (a threat that has returned after Brexit) would have 
been devastating both symbolically and in real terms Ð the end of a 300-year-
long union during which time Britain became the globeÕs largest empire of all 
times. After years of sacrificing its armed forces on the altar of austerity, the 
rest of the United Kingdom would have lost access to the strategically 
significant naval bases at Faslane and Coulport in the Firth of Clyde on the 
Scottish west coast. Leaving aside the exposure to financial meltdown, Lon-
donÕs role in Europe would have been much diminished. Without ScotlandÕs 
positive influence, the United KingdomÕs retreat to Ôsplendid isolationÕ in the 
wake of the Brexit vote would loom even larger in the eyes of Europe and the 
rest of the world. Yet Britain (or a residually lone England) still faces the 
prospect Ð despite its being very far from inevitable 
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Ð of becoming a glorified Singapore: a city-state with some rural hinterland 
in a world of old and new imperial powers. 
The potential consequences of Scottish secession for Europe are similarly 
hard to overstate. ScotlandÕs independence could have triggered a wave of 
further secessions Ð from Catalonia and the Basque country in Spain, via 
Wallonia and Flanders in Belgium, to the Balkans and beyond. This, coupled 
with the current wave of populism and nationalism, might have led to the 
unravelling of the European integration process, starting with the much-
maligned Eurozone. Of course, all this remains a distinct possibility, 
especially in the wake of the influx of millions of refugees and BritainÕs 
wavering commitment to the continent. Without a more positive, never mind 
non-existing, involvement on the part of Britain, the European Union will 
continue to lack a clear geo-political vision and the prospect of regional 
secessions, of course, remains. Anti-establishment movements everywhere 
are blaming the nearest easy target rather than the globalisation process itself, 
and so they can only be met by a shared European alternative approach to the 
global. 
Yet, alongside Russia (and as her game-changing intervention in Syria 
serves to show), Britain is the only power in the wider Europe with a truly 
global outlook, and as long as both remain on the margins of the European 
Union, EuropeÕs role in the world will be increasingly marginal compared 
with that of the United States and China.44 Right now Britain and the Euro-
pean Union increasingly look like an economically constrained annex to the 
United States, which oscillates between isolationism and interventionism. 
Meanwhile, Russia risks becoming a vassal state that supplies cheap 
resources to China. After more than 500 years of continental prestige, the 
whole of Europe is deeply divided and diminished in international affairs.45 
But with Scotland remaining in the Union, Britain has a unique and 
perhaps final chance of crafting a more imaginative foreign policy and 
playing a transformative part in international affairs, especially across the 
wider Europe. Such a vision refuses either a British version of the 
American dream or the post-imperial destiny of ÔLittle EnglandÕ, on the 
model of either a Ôlarger SwedenÕ (inside the European Union) or a Ôlittle 
NorwayÕ (if Brexit were really to happen). To view Britain either as an 
appendix to the United States or as a small post-imperial sovereign state 
would be to misunderstand who she is and how she came to be Ð which is 
not out of a big revolutionary explosion. Rather Ð to agree with both 
gothicising whigs and High tories, besides the more romantic aspect of the 
English Labour legacy Ð its slow-burning genius, as both English and 
Celtic, since before the Norman conquest (and always of a part-Christian 
inspiration) is political Ð is to know how to govern, based on a flexible 
rule of law and on constitutional free association at many different levels. 
It is this long legacy of interweaving consent with leadership and freedom 
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with community that has most of all given to the world European represen-
tative government. By comparison, the revolutionary legacies are rather 
inadequate parodies, on which what is best in France and the United States 
does not really depend. 
Therefore it is important for the understanding of the Western destiny and 
its future to tell a better story about the British one Ð not simply a whiggish 
and capitalist recent story that is superficial and misleading.46 Part of this 
story is the truth, already invoked, that Britain has always been an internal 
empire where a group of diverse local territories, ethnicities and cultures 
was already held together by a common set of symbolic loyalties, values and 
acceptance of a certain jurisprudential horizon that was already committed 
to a counter-centralisation and balancing protection of the substantive rights 
of different social groups, as argued in the Middle Ages by Sir John 
Fortescue.47 There is, therefore, a historic sense in which empire can be 
more benign, plural and inclusive of a reality than that of the nation state. Of 
course, the British Empire was overwhelmingly to do with capitalist 
expropriation, and it eventually tried to impose precisely modern ÔstatistÕ 
features on a global scale. However, it also from the outset mitigated 
through politics, diplomacy and cultural negotiation a more naked exploita-
tion on the part of freebooting entrepreneurs, besides tempering through 
missionary interests the demand for white settlement and a merely economic 
engagement with native territory. Equally, given the limits of its military 
and personnel resources, it perforce had to encourage the emergence of more 
plural and indigenous modes of political control, while also fostering a 
certain cross-cultural and international modulation of an originally merely 
British ethos Ð such that, for example, Indians and not British people often 
managed the empire and quasi-empire in India itself, Africa and China, 
while indigenous Africans often proved more successful missionaries than 
the British originals.48 
For this reason, it is shallow to think that the legacy of empire bequeathed no 
positive and equitable potential, or that it could not be turned towards mutual 
and cooperative notions of international commonwealth Ð even though such a 
mutation was sadly held back by (if anything, latterly growing) racist prejudices. 
In fact, there are historical links between the emergence of the British 
Commonwealth,49 of Francophonia and of the European Community (originally 
envisaged in some ways as a substitute for the recently lost Habsburg control in 
the East and an attempt to restore the ancient Carolingian unity of France and 
Germany in the West).50 And although it is still largely assumed that British and 
French influence must necessarily wane, we forget that those who assumed this 
in the 1960s would be staggered by the fact that they are still in the early 
twenty-first century militarily involved in major conflicts in the Near East and 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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European Commonwealth 
Empire is always about, finally, to end yet never quite does so, and in certain 
modes Ð such as the underwriting of foreign business by British law or the 
creation of charter cities (a measure of guardianship to uphold the rule of law) 
Ð re-invents itself in some positive new ways in contrast to the post-imperial 
corporate and oligarchic ravages that we have disgracefully supported. Indeed, 
it can be argued that part of the British loss of influence (itself exaggerated) 
was due to loss of nerve and absence of vision on the part of a decadent 
establishment and not wholly to historical inevitability.51 Equally, it is 
questionable to suppose that the cultural and political break-up of the United 
Kingdom follows automatically upon the end of empire, as opposed to a more 
plausible Celtic discontent with metropolitan neo-liberalism, a mood almost 
equally shared by the North of England, East Anglia and the West Country. 
For a British, and even a British Isles, dimension in both culture and politics 
stretches right back to the early Middle Ages Ð as historians rather than 
Hollywood-made movies so clearly attest. 
If British identity has tended to lapse in favour of Celtic and now English 
ones with the success of the SNP and the rise of UKIP (and whatever suc-
cessor party might emerge), then this is not inevitable, but rather the result of 
a southern English failure to offer a vision of British identity. Such a vision 
has to include a new version of looking outwards in order to seek to help 
others and the British themselves towards political and economic equity in 
suitably diverse terms Ð because without this maritime destiny (which one 
might regard as a European identity intensified) the British identity must itself 
be lost. That this destiny has often been pursued with brutality and was 
abandoned so recklessly and irresponsibly Ð with dire consequences in the 
Near East Ð only precludes Britain, like France, from trying to pursue it in 
future more charitably and cooperatively if these nations act out of guilt, 
which is always to act in bad faith. Outside Western Europe (which is itself 
not immune) the world now exhibits a general descent into demagoguery, 
oligarchy, anarchy and tyranny Ð whether the liberal tyranny of democratic 
despotism (as in the West) or the reactionary tyranny of authoritarian state 
capitalism (as in China or Russia). To retreat to an insular powerlessness in 
the face of these threats would be for Britain and Europe to betray their own 
legacy and identity and to jeopardise their long-term security. 
Based on their historical and cultural connections the European Union with 
the Commonwealth and both Francophone and Ibero-american territories 
could potentially offer a genuine alternative to (federal or unitary) super-
states on the one hand, and globalised free-trade zones on the other. 
Indeed, the current crisis of Brexit, the Schengen area and the Eurozone, 
with their potential threat to the very existence of the European Union, 
ironically gives 
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Britain, despite all her past and present anti-continental irresponsibility, the 
chance to take the lead in crafting a ÔEuropean CommonwealthÕ with an 
internationalist extension.52 Such a commonwealth would be a loose federal 
association defined by a shared religious and intellectual legacy, besides a 
shared ethical, social and political culture. Taking this lead has become 
urgent in the face of GermanyÕs current desire to impose ÔAsiaticÕ disciplines 
of an undemocratic capitalism upon the southern European countries, while 
progressively weakening its own internal social market within which it still, 
nevertheless, exceptionally basks. As an alternative to this process, Britain 
and France need to adopt once again a more global outlook and Germany to 
export its own in many ways exemplary economic model (though it needs 
radicalisation and a removal from an all too statist mode of corporatism) in 
adaptively different ways to other European countries. This might involve 
some blending with the rather more mutualist structures of welfare provision 
in the Latin polities. Any such moves would require a greater internal 
balancing, whereby Germany learned to consume more and other European 
countries to produce and export more.53 
Thus, while one must deplore the (albeit often circumstantially enforced) 
selectivity and mixed motivation of recent Western intervention in the Arabic 
uprisings, it is still to be hoped that a new, more European-led approach to 
international affairs can replace Ôliberal interventionismÕ for rights and mar-
kets with an Ôassociationist interventionismÕ upholding genuine transnational 
trusteeship and partnership in a fashion that respects local peculiarities and 
traditions. 
Given the international associationist programme set forth above, the rea-
sons for sustaining the United Kingdom are the same reasons for still seeking 
to remain in the European Union, and yet again for not abandoning British 
links to international Anglophonia, for in every case an imaginative foreign 
policy would call for the abandonment of false and dysfunctional either-orÕs 
in favour of strangely possible paradoxes. This would mean not to focus on 
state or market, religion or the secular, Anglophonia or Europe, or nation 
versus the global but, instead, to shift the emphasis to intimate reciprocities 
in ever-widening circles from the local street to the planet, fusing economic, 
political and ecological purpose in the name of the flourishing of each and 
every person and their combination as workers to build a shared and beautiful 
megalopolis. 
8. COVENANT AND COMMONWEALTH 
If this seems utterly fanciful at present, since, although objectively possible, 
it lacks every precondition of subjective willingness, then it could become 
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less so in the face of increasing emergency Ð which, as in the case of Nazi 
Germany, can change public thinking very rapidly. Currently, Europe is chal-
lenged by militant Islam both at its frontiers and within its borders, and by an 
influx of refugees, which is turning into something more like a nomadic 
incursion, inciting an understandable mass fear about a further loss of identity 
and traditional ways of life. The overwhelming majority of refugees are 
themselves fleeing from terror, tyranny and chaos, and are frequently Muslims 
escaping from an Islamic extremism, which they utterly reject, yet a few will 
have malign intents and more of the children of refugees may well in time 
grow drastically discontented with their new home. 
In the face of these threats, it is all too possible that European nations, 
already now moving apart, will simply close their individual borders, withdraw 
from external European engagements and try to reduce and constrain their 
Muslim populations. But, besides destroying the European ethos in a quasi-
fascistic mode, this would still leave Europe vulnerable to a radical Islam that 
is, by definition and its perverse sense of duty, hostile to an ÔidolatrousÕ 
neighbour and bound to attack it in future in various ways. Perhaps, indeed, a 
caliphate or rival caliphates could take hold, Israel would be existentially 
threatened in a way that the West could scarcely ignore and elements of the 
growing Muslim minorities within Europe would be yet more inclined than 
they are already today to provide a potential fifth column of support. 
The only way, therefore, for Europe to secure its future is twofold. First, 
whatever the fate of the EU in its current configuration it must truly draw into 
an Ôever closer unionÕ within a subsidiary, federal polity, else its individual 
parts will themselves be continuously threatened. The failure of European 
security integration, which allowed the Paris attacks of November 2015 and 
the Brussels attacks of March 2016 to take place, gave the lie to any notion 
that the Islamist emergency will lead to a return to the supremacy of the 
Hobbesian state, designed only for protection, as though that were an ahistori-
cal default position.54 In reality, a new globalised enemy who is everywhere, 
inside as well as out, can only be contested by equally transnational forces. 
Equally, an ideological, civilisational enemy cannot be fought only in terms of 
supposed Hobbesian realism, but only through a recrudescence of self-belief 
and rediscovery of just what it is that we believe in and what holds us 
together. So as we have argued, political and military solidarity, besides a 
reversing of demographic decline, requires a renewal of EuropeÕs cultural 
legacy, including its Christian aspect. 
Second, security within can only be achieved by securing for others, 
including overwhelmingly Muslim ÔothersÕ, security without. Radical Islam, 
other religious sectarianisms, climate change, capitalist exploitation, corrupt 
government and the collapse of the rule of law are rendering the Near East and 
Sub-Saharan Africa scarcely habitable for many. The same processes are 
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more mutedly at work in India and Burma and further East. Thus, at the very 
least, Europe, North America and Australasia need to intervene in the Near 
East and Sub-Saharan Africa in order to assist local populations in rendering 
these places viable as human habitations and to mitigate the need for mass 
migration. 
Currently, as said, the popular will to do this is lacking and, yet, as also 
already indicated, a growing threat of drastic cultural and political transfor-
mation could shift peoplesÕ minds. But drastic intervention is in any case 
required, because it seems likely that a merely half-hearted engagement with 
ISIS could in the short term backfire and in the long term eventually engen-
der a yet more fearful and widespread Islamism. Even if ISIS is decisively 
defeated on the ground in Syria and Iraq, they could still regroup in reaction 
later in that area, or elsewhere within the Middle East and within wider 
Islamic territories, especially in Africa and Europe Ð as is already happening 
in Libya.55 Therefore, serious military action (realistically also involving the 
United States) would also have to include a long-term commitment to stay 
(even for as long as half a century). The task is to craft Ð together with the 
peoples of the Near East, including an Israel pressurised to give the 
Palestinians justice in exchange for security Ð a new stable order based on 
associationist political structures respectful of local religious, ethnic and 
tribal legacies but compatible with the rule of law and the plural tolerance of 
different faiths and cultural allegiances. 
In the short term, this implies the adoption of a distinct military and political 
strategy that has so far been lacking. In order to defeat ISIS and fully to 
overcome radical Islam, the basic options are to ally either with the Sunni arc 
or with the ShiÕite crescent. The latter course should be adopted, in cooperation 
with Russia, because neither Turkey nor the Gulf States are unambiguous 
opponents of ISIS, which unfortunately has become the spearhead for the 
expression of wider Sunni discontents.56 The long-term and modern tendencies 
of some strands of Sunnism towards intolerance and extreme jihad must be 
openly recognised, and equivalently, the more sacramentally mediated 
tradition-respecting and ÔCatholicÕ variants of Islam must be supported against 
the militant ÔCalvinismÕ of the Wahhabist legacy.57 More broadly, the West 
should lend aid to those Muslims who openly recognise that they must learn 
from Christianity in shaping an unprecedented mode of Islam that would break 
with both the advocacy of jihad and the non-separation of a secular political 
and legal sphere. Neither of these things is, in a long historical perspective, 
simplistically contemptible, but neither of them is compatible with the 
Christian and modern norms upon which Western civilisation is built. And 
unfortunately both these things are clearly supported by the QurÕan itself Ð a 
sacred text whose authority is more literally regarded than most Christians 
have regarded the Bible,58 despite the subtle, beautiful and 
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life-enhancing exegetical complexities that have often been erected on top of 
this non-negotiable foundation. We have either collectively continue to 
believe that we have made an ÔadvanceÕ that the QurÕan misapprehends and 
distrusts, or deny this and deny ourselves and our own future. 
Such an approach would nonetheless be respectful of the degree of truth in 
the Islamist critique of the West. For the many merely social explanations for 
the rise of Islamism are insufficient, if by no means totally wrong. Certainly, 
Muslim minorities in the West suffer poverty and discrimination and, if not 
that, then sometimes a disdain that can breed disaffection. Certainly, there is a 
long-standing grievance against the West that includes anger at the treatment 
of marginalised Muslim tribes and failures to intervene to protect Muslims 
(for example in Bosnia) as well as anger at grossly misjudged interventions 
(as with Iraq and, arguably, Afghanistan), besides geo-politically and eco-
nomically convenient support for secular tyrants. The list should also include 
the disgraceful pandering to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States Ð but this has 
involved an effective encouragement of Islamic extremism that is more of 
concern to Islamic moderates. 
One can validly ask here just how really concerned the West was with 
Islamism before the displacement of Al-Qaeda by ISIS. Its irruption, after all, 
allowed Western states to gleefully assume exceptional powers and new mea-
sures of control over all its own citizens, rather than imposing on Muslims 
specifically a justifiable exceptional demand that they put their own house in 
order, while the 9/11 wars were oddly off-centre in terms of their supposed 
extremist targets. The West has, thereby, failed to better protect not only its 
own citizens, but also Muslims who have themselves been more often than 
anyone else the victims of terrorism. And one can note in this respect the 
highly curious way in which a certain modern Protestant (and sometimes fun-
damentalist) theological voluntarism and an equally modern Islamic volun-
tarism have, in effect, reinforced each otherÕs standing as militant advocates, 
in the course of their ostensible mutual standoff. Indeed, both for a long 
while in the wake of 9/11 regarded the main enemy as being the secular 
BaÕathist states of the Near East. No wonder ShiÕite Iranians, however 
absurdly, have tended to detect a conspiracy. 
In effect, both sides would seem implicitly to have realised that, with the 
decline of the nation-state, Grotian-Hobbesian liberal or Schmittian 
justification of the political through the need for security and requirement of 
a threatening external foe (a vision ultimately grounded in theological 
voluntarism and pessimism, as we have seen) can only be revamped through 
the discovery of a new ÔpervasiveÕ enemy within as well as without, such as 
to create a permanent condition of emergency.59 In the face of this dire 
development, the only pacifying course can now be rediscovery of the polit-
ical as the positive mutual quest for virtue, which can open up a realistic 
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prospect of a global order sustained by striving vision and not constitutive 
antagonism. 
But having said all that, and having also noted how Western deficits in 
relation to Islam also apply, in parallel ways, more globally, then one can 
still ask just why resistance should have taken the form of recrudescence of 
a pure but brutally simplified Islam. Part of the answer here is certainly a 
collapse of secular ideologies of resistance, partly as a result of Muslim and 
other religious disillusion with secular regimes. However, one needs here to 
move beyond simple liberal regret and sense that history has gone 
perversely and for the moment away from its ÔnormalÕ progressive direction. 
To the contrary, the discernment of many in the global East and South, 
including Muslims, that the secular critique of capitalism and liberalism is 
inadequate should be seen as valid, and as coinciding in some respects with 
the critique made in this book Ð though as too often taking cruder forms and 
as not informed by the necessarily more complex and muted relationship 
that Christianity has to the liberal legacy, as its own bastard offspring. The 
theorists of the Muslim Brotherhood and of the Iranian Revolution were not 
wrong to see that the denial of the sacred tends of necessity to commodify 
everything and to encourage an anarchic selfishness. They were equally 
right to refuse a sub-Soviet-style statism that negates group and individual 
liberties. Unfortunately, their response has been to adopt a version of 
authentic QurÕanic religion that is, nevertheless, disastrously unqualified by 
the complex subtleties of Islamic tradition, fused with elements of Western 
fascistic ideology. 
Moreover, the liberal alternative of a global embrace of liberal capitalism is 
all too likely to leave most of the Global East and South in permanent 
subordination and penury, given that economic and regional inequity is built 
into the logical workings of capitalism. Therefore, we cannot, as the West, 
simply and arrogantly return to an exacerbated version of liberal progressivist 
illusion Ð though the ÔHegelianÕ possibility must remain that the entire globe, 
including Islam, could succumb to this illusion in the end and, so, to the per-
manent economic depression of some and to the materialist illusion of most. 
This would be a dismal and, in reality, a regressive prospect. History has truly 
moved on and disclosed something unexpected, but true, to our gaze. If we are 
prepared to recognise this, then we can begin to try to craft a post-liberal 
global approach that would seek to ensure that integral and substantive social 
loyalties can live alongside each other in peace, which means also in terms of 
those substantive Ð and often pan-religious Ð loyalties that they can discover 
they share in common. 
Otherwise, and for the moment, the new historical truth confronts us as 
terror. And it includes a moment of truth for lost Christendom Ð as to the 
consequences of this internal loss as well as the continued implications of its 
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earlier external loss of the southern and eastern Mediterranean to Islam.60 The 
long term has returned to haunt Europe and the world. And now this ghost 
demands of Europe the seemingly impossible Ð to recover its own interior 
identity and to engage externally in a commonwealth-creating global project. But 
only the impossible may be remotely realistic. 
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Summary and Prospect 
In this book we have argued that liberalism is the dominant modern ideology 
but it now faces a metacrisis, which tends to the undoing of the Greco-
Roman and Judeo-Christian traditions on which it rests but which it distorts 
and hollows out. Characteristic of this metacrisis is an exacerbation of the 
arbitrary and tautologous implications of liberalism, whose unwarranted 
anthropological pessimism and superficial techno-scientific optimism are all 
disconnected from reality. In consequence, what we see today is an extremity 
of liberalism that necessarily tends to slide into an outright authoritarianism 
always lurking in the liberal logic. 
By the same token, liberalism threatens to collapse back into the materi-
alism that is one-half of its dualist worldview, evacuating the ungrounded 
idealism that is its other half. Starting in the late nineteenth century, liberal 
procedural formalism and emptiness were challenged by the materialist 
philosophies of Fascism, Nazism and Communism, all arguably modes of 
Comtian positivism that sought to re-construe positive liberty on a non-
religious, supposedly scientific basis. And following their eventual collapse in 
the twentieth century, liberalism has increasingly insisted on its own latent 
materialism, which today takes the form of naturalism and scientism (of which 
militant atheism is one expression).1 For this perspective, the human mind is 
but a series of chemical processes governed by instrumental rationality and 
the body but a collection of atomic cells that belong to a Lockean proprietor, 
now reconceived as a material brain.2 Not only has the soul disappeared, but 
also the subject, such that private biological ownership must inevitably prove 
more and more a cipher for the operation of a centralised technological 
control. The persisting and, indeed, augmented subjectivity or demonic 
psychic character of the oligarchic controllers then becomes the esoteric secret 
of our times that cannot be resolved or at least publicly admitted. 
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At last, indeed, a positivist priesthood rules, and it must inconsistently also 
compose an invisible masonic psychic brotherhood. 
Yet this new totalitarian liberalism, or psychic elitism, is also threatened 
by a new recrudescence of fascism and the politics of positivistically 
grounded mass identity. In default of the emergence of a non-positivist post-
liberal movement based on a democracy of the psyche, it is all too possible 
that quasi-fascist tendencies will increase their appeal and eventually seize 
power across Europe, and even, in the United States, as we can already see. 
For one might describe such insurgents as the crude, parodied versions of 
post-liberalism that, nonetheless, answer to some of the same exigencies Ð 
notably a popular revulsion against liberal excesses: the success culture that 
operates at the expense of most people, the amoral and narrow criteria that 
define this success, and a cosmopolitan contempt for embedded identity and 
the need for belonging. 
Currently, this demand is so strong that governments across the West are 
trying to bring about a measure of regional and local autonomy Ð as with 
Northern Powerhouses in the United Kingdom or decentralisation to the 
regions of France.3 However, the danger remains that local leaders (rather 
like post-colonial rulers) will be corralled by national party and bureaucratic 
cadres, unless a more powerful local self-government is linked to genuine 
citizen participation and to non-political economic and social associations, 
alongside a keen sustaining of local inherited identity. Where the new fascists 
pander to a politics of fear and exclusion of the alien (the immigrant, the 
refugee), mainstream politics needs to develop a politics of hope, which 
addresses popular concerns about loss and cultural insecurity, and offers a 
positive vision of patriotism and international solidarity.4 
If neo-fascism is travestied post-liberalism, it does not at all follow that the 
latter is soft fascism, for, to the contrary, neo-fascism tends merely to 
exaggerate in populist terms the very tendencies that it inchoately discerns 
and purportedly resists. Thus it characteristically combines the de-regulated 
neo-liberal approach to business and taxation with central state dirigisme and 
welfarism. Far from resisting the modern cult of the sovereign state, the 
amoralism of modern public life and corporate rootlessness, it, rather, seeks Ð 
in frightening repetition of the 1930s Ð to dishonestly enlist popular support 
behind these things, in the name of an ethnocentric atavism. Such gross 
populism becomes the unwitting vehicle for the further growth of the 
nihilistic power of a dishonourable few. 
Nothing could be more opposite to the post-liberal proposition of a Ôpolitics 
of virtueÕ. The latter seeks to promote individual fulfilment and mutual 
flourishing in an objectively valid sense, observant of natural equity, though 
always mediated, as it must be, by local inheritances and specificities. Nor 
could nationalism and ethnocentrism stand in a greater contrast to the 
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post-liberal drive to deconstruct monistic sovereignty and to share ÔrulingÕ in 
every sense both within and across national frontiers. By comparison, not only 
is neo-fascism chauvinistic and amoral, but it is also nostalgic in a bad sense, 
since it seeks only a retrieved and exaggerated version of recent modernity. But 
the post-liberalism we advocate seeks to renew long-standing and variously 
embodied traditions of Ôconservative socialismÕ that have been side-lined and 
eroded and yet have never completely disappeared.5 This tradition is one of a 
paradox whose ideas are in tune with the temporal and spatial complexities of 
reality: thus it sees that an increase in popular participation and an increase in 
ÔaristocraticÕ educative guidance and the guardianship over equity finally 
exercised by the ÔsingleÕ symbolically sovereign power belong together. They 
are only opposed for a simplistic liberal political ontology. 
However, critics of post-liberalism contend that a post-liberal politics rests 
on an Ôan incoherent body of ideas, which invokes a historically parochial 
view of liberalism and denies or rejects some fundamental facts of contempo-
rary ... lifeÕ, namely that a majority is reasonably content with contemporary 
life precisely because most people hold liberal values, which alone can hold 
highly diverse societies together.6 Of course, a growing number of people in 
Western countries and elsewhere are socially liberal and rightly so in certain 
respects. They prefer a fair and open-minded mentality to an insular and 
bigoted attitude (in terms, for example, of minority rights, ethnic diversity and 
reasonable levels of immigration). However, a sizeable majority is also much 
more small ÔcÕ conservative and associationist than mainstream parties 
recognise: most people (including many ethnic minorities) choose a fairly 
traditional family life, want to live in safe, stable places and are generally 
sceptical about change.7 Even university graduates and professionals who are 
liberal-cosmopolitan tend to become culturally more conservative and 
communitarian as they settle down and get married. They worry far less about 
high mobility and more about buying their own house, finding their children a 
place in a good school, having access to decent healthcare and living in 
relatively stable communities with low levels of crime and a moderate degree 
of trust and neighbourliness. 
Beyond this more complacent aspect, they tend also to long for a more 
intense and romantic sense of belonging to community and nature, and a life 
and landscape that would more symbolically mediate a sense of ultimate 
mystery and purpose. Witness here the rise in popularity of pilgrimage and 
cathedral worship and other more acute modes of liturgy, despite the decline 
in churchgoing, whose usual liturgical modes may now seem just too bland. 
There is also an upsurge of popular interest in concert, theatre, live debate and 
secular festivals, including musical, literary and philosophical events Ð 
besides the new cultural concern with the specificity and numinosity of land-
scape8 and the revival of local craft traditions often in relation to ecological 
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concerns.9 Perhaps the majority of people can be considered to be properly 
liberal on some issues, over-influenced by a cosmopolitan elite on others, but 
all within a more overwhelmingly conservative-associationist outlook. 
The question for post-liberalism, therefore, is how best to mobilise this 
unexpressed consensus, which rejects both mainstream liberalism and neo-
fascism, and which runs against the concerns of dominant party factions Ð 
revealing the limitations of our current mode of representative government, as 
we have outlined. Today, by contrast, the most cogent resistance to both these 
tends to come from locally based citizens movements that are able to link up all 
the different sites of struggle Ð ecological, domestic, pecuniary and political Ð in 
a movement counter to capitalist commodification exactly in the sense that they 
implicitly question its founding sunderings of the symbolic and the reciprocal as 
the prime site of the ethical. Not accidentally, these movements Ð as in the case 
of Ôcommunity-organisingÕ Ð tend to have a pan-religious dimension and in this 
respect to transcend the modern instru-mentalisation of the religious as the 
typical bourgeois American vehicle.10 For it is religions that tend to propose 
some overall account of the human essence as teleologically directed by nature 
in an ethical direction, without which the ethical must sink to the level of 
sentimental and epiphenomenal illusion. 
Given the recent relative failure of post-liberal groups in Britain to gain 
traction with the mainstream political parties,11 there is a continued need to 
try to link this local level with a wider national and international attempt to 
re-define the tacitly agreed ideological ground of politics in general and to 
make post-liberalism the new consensus against the fusion of economic with 
cultural and political liberalism. Above all, there remains a clear need for a 
broad popular movement in shaping a politics of the common good Ð a 
movement that can overcome the binaries that divide Western countries and, 
increasingly, the whole world: young versus old, owners versus workers, 
natives versus immigrants, city versus countryside, faithful versus secular. 
New vehicles are needed that can bring together individuals and groups 
with seemingly opposite values and interests, including trade unions, 
business associations and faith communities. If they can together build 
movements with new members and activists beyond single-issue protest and 
section interest, then they can help renew or transfigure political parties. Thus 
post-liberalism needs to become a broader cross-class and cross-cultural 
movement promoted by the churches, other faith traditions and civic groups 
such as CitizensUK or Occupy. 
We can therefore conclude this book by saying that not only is a politics of 
virtue the alternative to liberalism, which is either moralistic or amoral, but that 
it is also only an ethical alliance of forces, which is likely to be able to put this 
alternative into place. Given the general drift of most of the population towards 
further voluntary servitude, greater inequality and cultural insecurity, 
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it is important to stress that a potential for resistance, not by any one par-
ticular group or class, but by ÔeveryoneÕ already exists. But just because it 
concerns everyone, it can only be authentically articulated and organised in 
more ideal terms, which is to say, in the name of human flourishing as such, 
and in a way that links together all the dimensions of political, economic and 
social life. This will require a new irruption of a communicable ethical and 
probably religious vision, genuinely able to move people. 
Such an irruption would include a renewed pursuit of Christian ecumenism 
under a new sense of practical exigency and public responsibility and not just 
inward-looking idealism. Allied to this should be a new sense, already present 
in the Catholic Church and lay movements in Italy, that Christian churches 
need now to organise and act directly in the economic, cultural, education and 
political fields, not mainly through the surrogate of political parties. One can 
see the relevance of such an ecumenism to intra-ethnic conflicts and to clashes 
between nations, above all between Western Europe and Russia, where a 
shared Christian faith should now allow a primacy of culture to translate into 
more political terms in an era tending beyond the supremacy of the nation-
state. The joint declaration by Pope Francis and Patriarch Kirill at their meeting 
on 12 February 2016 that sets out a broad agenda of cooperation could be the 
long-overdue beginning of a much-needed rapprochement.12 
And allied to the ecumenical exigency, in turn, should be a new recognition 
that, for all the inevitably enormous area of acceptable disagreement, 
uncertainty and debatability, there is a much greater political consensus 
implied by orthodox Christian belief than has recently been taken to be the 
case. This is somewhat witnessed by the new tendency of Christians in the 
British Parliament to cohere in roughly post-liberal views across the party 
divides. It is just this consensus that this book has sought to articulate more 
thickly, though in the belief that it is a consensus that can be shared for the 
most part by people of other faiths and by non-religious people of metaphysical 
sensitivity. It is clear that there are many non-religious people who, never-
theless, fully recognise the existence, mystery and irreducibility of the human 
spirit and respect the wider mystery and value of nature and Being itself. 
A powerful implication here is that naturalism versus anti-naturalism, or 
psychic politics versus anti-psychic anti-politics, is a secretly more crucial 
modern political struggle than the more apparent and often illusory intra-
liberal one of left versus right. The sudden re-emergence of a crude scientism 
and anti-religiosity in the 1990s was the first rising to the surface of this 
truth. With the defeat of the anti-liberal positivist ideologies, liberalism itself 
as the dominant modern ideology revealed its own shadow-side or secret 
heart of positivism. Likewise, after the defeat of the positive secular creeds 
(Marxism, scientific racism, sociology, Freudianism), a negative, anti-
religious creed of secularity itself took their place, impossibly posing 
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its supposedly default refusal of faith as itself a religion of the ÔhumanismÕ 
that its post-psychism most clearly no longer believes in. But this insight 
cannot quite explain its degree of anti-religious virulence (emerging before 
the recrudescence of militant Islam), or its inconsistent double claim that 
Christianity is both in terminal decline and yet remains a dangerous threat to 
liberal values. Rather, one may suggest, another reason for the rise of the 
Ônew atheismÕ is a secret fear that actually, in the face of the collapse of the 
positive secular ideologies, a religious revival Ð this time refusing cultural 
and political marginality Ð might be just around the corner. And that fear may 
not be wholly unfounded, especially if we have regard for the growth of 
religion outside the West,13 and do not dismiss the potential impact of a 
highly educated religious minority in the West itself, given the impact of 
small secular vanguards in the past. 
But even if the emergence of a religious and metaphysically inspired post-
liberal movement seems unlikely, it is far less unlikely than any other scenario 
of non-fascistic resistance to liberalism. For the mainstream is today hampered 
not just by the success of oligarchy in ÔdisorganisingÕ all elements of potential 
resistance, but also by the inadequacy of its own inherited analysis that accepts 
too much of its enemiesÕ terms of reference. Above all, these are the primacy 
of the isolated individual and of Ônegative libertyÕ. In the face of this, as we 
have shown, it is not possible to recover a Ômore humanly credible type of 
liberal thinkingÕ (as John Gray claims) since none such is, or could possibly 
be, theoretically available. Instead, resistance must be based on the primacy of 
positive liberty and a substantive vision of true human flourishing. At the heart 
of this primacy lies the sense that human beings Ð as integral, if bizarre, 
rational and political animals, uneasily poised between bios and techne Ð are all 
heroic cultural labourers, who work because they are guided by a vision of the 
further realisation of the Good. After all, ÔmanÕ is, as Thomas Carlyle put it, 
Ôthe missionary of OrderÕ.14 
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